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This work considers the legal fundamentals of EC telecommunications law.
The liberalization process in die telecommunications sector was mainly developed by three
important Court ofJustice cases. Firstly, the British Telecommunications case1 was an early example of
the application of competition rules in the telecommunications sector. Secondly, the Tetra Pak case"
answered the question whether competition rules can be used to restrain anticompetitive practises in a
particular market or market segment. The Court found that Tetra Pak was "in a situation comparable
to that of holding a dominant position on the markets in question as a whole". In the literature, this is
referred to as Associated Market Dominance. Thirdly, the Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint3 case
examined the essential facility doctrine, and that ruling, though restrictive, suggests that the doctrine
may still be of relevance in the telecommunications field. In particular, the case showed that it is likely
that an operator with strength on a related market (a mobile market compared to a fixed market) can be
found to have control of an essential facility to which access is needed. In particular, incumbent fixed
operators, which have benefited from a monopoly regime and its network, funded by the state through
taxes, can be considered to control an essential facility.
The study examines EC telecommunications law on its way to full liberalization, from the 1987
Green Paper to the fully liberalized market, which was in place in 1998. The considerable achievement
over this ten-year period must be acknowledged. It is also shown how Article 86 EC was used by the
Commission to force the liberalization process.
The conclusion is drawn that "enforcement is the key to success", with some consideration being
given to the energy and postal services. Part I ends with a more practical discussion of interconnection,
which is considered to be the key element of Community telecommunications policy.
In addition, the study examines consumer expectations in the converged fixed/mobile market. It
shows that the majority of customers in the telecommunications market will actually subscribe to some
form of converged service and that the regulator}' regime for that kind of service needs, therefore, to be
carefully tailored to this new environment. As a result, the distinction between fixed and mobile will be
less clear, and this requires that the regulatory framework adopts a consistent approach towards the two
markets.
The study further notes that given the complexity of the sector, consumer protection authorities
seem to be willing to let specialist regulators handle the problems. It also discusses the possibility of
applying competition rules in the area by, firstly, discussing the level of competition in the market for
services and, secondly, the desirability of a market where operators and providers are encouraged to
meet the needs of the customers in order to win their business. It continues by discussing the
changeover from sector-specific regulation to the application of competition rules, with a special
emphasis on significant market power. It also shows that the Commission needs to balance against the
application of subsidiarity, tire need for greater certainty, as tire scope of the relevant product and
service markets vary among tire different member states.
Finally, tire study argues that conversion to reliance on competition rules is dependant on tire
degree to which competition law can acquire tire analytical tools to deal with tire technical and
commercial aspects of convergence in the field of mobile markets.
1 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984| ECR 873 (British Telecommunications case).
2 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak. v. The Commission [1994] ECR-I-755; on appeal Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak internationalSA v.
The Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951.
3 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner vs. Mediaprint Zeitungs-nnd Zeitschriftenver/ag [1998] ECR-I-7791.
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Introduction to the Study 3
Hie Commission published, in 1987, its Green Paper on telecommunications1 seeking to
liberalize the market for telecommunications services and equipment, which were then
exclusive rights of national telecommunications administrations. The Green Paper marked
die point of departure for liberalization of the telecommunications markets and for EC
legislation in die telecommunications field to improve and maintain competition in one of
die most dynamic markets of the Community.
Witiiin die regulatory- framework adopted by the EC, the fixed and mobile sectors are
treated as separate markets, witii different regulatory requirements applying to each sector,
admittedly-, sometimes overlapping. A central objective of this framework is to imitate
competition by die introduction of asymmetric ex ante regulation, which is meant to force
operators witii significant market power to undertake a number of obligations widi regard to
new entrants and consumers. Ex post, competition rules apply in parallel to this sector
specific regulation as a corrective to any- abusive practices.
This study- will focus particularly- on die challenges raised by die increasingly- competitive
market situation in telecommunications. Two significant aspects will be looked at:
♦ The level of sector specific European Community* regulation that exists compared to
die general consumer protection legislation in force in the Member States.
♦ Whether it is appropriate to continue to regulate the fixed and mobile services
separately-.
Convergence in diis sector (die merging of fixed/mobile communications services into an
integrated service package, where die consumer is offered both fixed and mobile services,
using one terminal, one number, and receiving one bill) has been taking place over die last
ten years with mergers, joint ventures, and alliances among some of the giants in the different
sectors. Only recendv have the converging services been offered commercially.
This study- will address, therefore, whedier diere is a need for telecommunications
specific consumer protection regulation, whedier die regulatory framework should
differentiate between voice and other services, and whedier die regulatory- obligations should
be technologically neutral (regarding die provision of networks and services using
fixed/mobile technologies and Internet telephony).
1 European Commission. (COM 87/290 final).
4 Introduction to die Study
The study consists of three parts (apart from the Appendices):
Part I provides an introduction to the telecommunications sector, followed by a
discussion of the origins of liberalization of the telecommunications market. This
introduction describes developments in the telecommunications sector to date. Chapter 1
sets the scene for the study, beginning with the origin of liberalization. Chapter 2 considers
the Open Network Provision Framework, which leads up to a discussion of the
interconnection environment in Chapter 3.
Part II is intended to give an overview of the relevant market and of consumer drivers
of fixed/mobile convergence. In chapter 4 a description of the increasing demand for
mobile services is provided, as well as a discussion of die increasing utility of mobile services,
the falling price of mobile services, emerging data mobile technologies, and a short review of
the current market developments.
Part III introduces the regulatory and competition law challenges of fixed/mobile
convergence. Chapter 5 focuses particularly on regulatory requirements of converged
services and the differences between fixed and mobile sectors. Chapter 6 deals with the
specific issues related to fixed and mobile convergence and considers the extent to which
consumer expectations affect regulatory options and market entry issues (access to
networks).
The conclusion sets out a proposed regulator}' model, which seeks to identify relevant
markets and how market power should be measured in a fixed/mobile converged
environment. It concludes with a discussion of key elements of this preferred regulatory
environment.
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1*1ris chapter gives an overview of the development of the telecommunications sector to date,
describes briefly the liberalization and the harmonization of the European market, and
considers whether there actually is a distinctive difference between the liberalization and the
harmonization directives in the telecommunications sector2. This introduction is intended to
provide a useful background to the study'.
Since 1 January 1998, the telecommunications markets have been fully liberalized in
most of the European Union. The telecommunications regulator}- process in the European
Union (EU) should be seen as part of the wider process of the economic integration of
Europe initiated by die Treaty of Rome4. This process was accelerated dirough die
European Community''s internal market programme5, which since die mid-1980s has
provided a firm basis inter alia for the development of a common regulator}7 framework for
die telecommunications sector. The broader political framework of die Maastricht Treaty,
the Treaty7 on European Union, which entered into force in November 1993, has added an
important new element to the legal basis for European integration in the area of
telecommunications by means of its Tide XII on Trans-European networks. The
Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, does not have specific implications for
telecommunications policy, but renumbered that section as Tide XV.
Hie European telecommunications sector has historically been characterized by a
strong public service monopoly tradition togedier with an industrial policy of creating
2 For an introduction to European Telecommunications Law see, for example: J. Bauer and C.
Steinfeld, Telecommunications initiatives of the European Communities , Telecommunications in
transition: Policies. Services and Perspectives in the European Community. C. Steinfeld and J. Bauer-
Caby, eds. (1994).; R. Ellger, Telecommunications in Europe: Law and Policy of the European
Community7 in a key Industrial Sector , Singular Europe — Economy and Policy of the European
Community in a key industrial sector. Adams, ed. (1992) 203 ff.;J.A.K. Huntley, Recent Developments
in European Telecommunications Law , Computer Law and Practices. (1990) 49 ff.; S. Kamall,
Telecommunications Policy (1996): 27 ff.; S. D. Lando, The European Community's road to
Telecommunications Deregulation , l'ordham Law Review (1994) 59 ff.; W. Sauter, The
Telecommunications Law in European Community , ELR (1995) 92 ff.; and R. Schulte-Braucks,
Telecommunications I ,aw and Policy in the European Community , Fordham International Law Forum
(1990) 234 ff.
3 For political considerations leading up to the liberalization of the telecommunications sector see R.
Kramer, A faith that divides , Competition Policy in European Telecommunications (1991)., and W.
Shepard, Concepts of Competition and efficient policy in the Telecommunications Sector ,
Telecommunications regulation today and tomorrow . Noam, ed. (1983), especially 79 ff.
4 Founding Treaty on the European Economic Community, signed in 1957.
5 Set up by the Single Iiuropean Act, the first important reform of the Treaty of Rome, which entered
into force on 01.07.1987.
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"national champions". This environment has created a strong national orientation for the
sector, and consequently the loss of the potential opportunities of a Europe-wide market.
Within this context, a first phase of Community policy was initiated in 1984 with the
aim to move the sector forward by establishing common lines of development. The most
important aspects of this early phase were:
♦ standards development, to cope with the problem of national fragmentation created
by different national specifications
♦ common research, under the form of shared programmes between operators and
industry at the European level. The preparatory' phase of the RACE6 programme
was started. Between 1987 and 1995, the main RACE programme was operational,
under the second and third R&D framework programme. The ACTS7 programme
took over from RACE in 1994 under the fourth framework programme.
♦ special development programmes for the least developed regions of the European
Union, in die context of structural funds. The STAR programme was adopted in
1986. The Telematics programme ran between 1992 and 1993.
♦ initial tentative steps towards common European positions in the international
telecommunications arena
A second phase of Community policy was initiated in 1987 with the publication by die
Commission of the Green Paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment8. By issuing diis Green Paper, the Commission
started a Europe-wide debate on die telecommunications regulatory environment, with the
basic aim to adapt it to the requirements of a single European Community market. The main
direction of die common telecommunications policy has been set by die consultative process
initiated by the Commission on the basis of the 1987 Green Paper and its successors, by key
resolutions adopted by the Council and European Parliament, and by the European Court of
Justice. The main steps since the 1987 Green Paper have been:
6 Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe.
7 Advanced Communications Technology and Service.
8 European Commission. Green Paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment: Towards a dynamic European Economy . (COM 87/290
final). 30.07.1987.
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♦ the Green Paper on Satellite Communications, published by the Commission in
1990°
♦ the Telecommunications Review of 199210
♦ the Green Paper on Mobile and Personal Communications, published by the
Commission in April 19941'
♦ the Green Paper on Infrastructure Liberalization published by the Commission in
two parts, in October 1994 and January 199512
♦ the Council Resolutions ofJune 1988, December 1991, July 1993, December 1994,
June 1995, and September 19951 \ which adopted tire results of the consultative
process carried out at each of the major steps
♦ die European Parliament Resolutions of April 1993, January 1993, April 1995, May
1995, and December 199614, which gave Parliamentary support to the directions
taken
9 European Commission. Green Paper on a common approach in the field of satellite
communications in the European Community: Towards Europe-wide systems and services . (COM
90/490). 20.11.1990.
10 European Commission. Review of the situation in the telecommunications services sector:
Communication by the Commission . (SEC 92/1048). 21.10.1992.; European Commission.
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the consultation on the review of the
situation in the telecommunications services sector . (COM 93/159). 28.04.1993.
11 European Commission. Green Paper on a common approach to mobile and personal
communications in the European Union: Towards a personal communications environment . (COM
94/145). 27.04.1994.
12 European Commission. Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and
cable TV networks — Part I: Principle and Timetable . (COM 94/440). 25.10.1994.; European
Commission. Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV
networks - Part II: A common approach to the provision of infrastructure in the European Union .
(COM 94/682). 25.01.1995.
13 European Council. Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment up to 1992 . (88/C 257/01; OJC 257/1). 04.10.1988.;
European Council. Resolution of 19 December 1991 on the development of the common market for
satellite communications services and equipment . (92/C 8/01; OJC 8/1). 14.01.1992.; European Council.
Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector and the need
for further development in that market. (93/C 213/01; OJC 213/1). 06.08.1993.; European Council.
Resolution of 22 December 1994 on the principles and timetable for the liberalization of
telecommunications infrastructures . (94/C 379/03; OJC 379/4). 31.12.1994.; European Council.
Resolution of 29 June 1995 on the further development of the mobile and personal communications
sector in the European Union . (95/C 188/02; OJC 188/3). 22.07.1995.; European Council. Resolution
of 18 September 1995 on the implementation of the future regulator}' framework for telecommunications
. (95/C 258/01, OJC 258/1). 03.10.1995.
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♦ the landmark rulings of the European Court of Justice in the British Telecom Case
and on die Commission's use of Article 86 (ex-Article 90) of die EC Treaty in die
sector1'
♦ die Communication on Universal Service for Telecommunications in die perspective
of a fully liberalized environment, published by die Commission in March 199616
♦ die Commission's White Paper "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment"17,
with die full political support of Council, and has placed the Union's
telecommunications policy at the heart of the Union's general policy
As a follow-up to the White Paper, die Bangemann Group Report on "Europe and the
global information society"18 has confirmed the Union's telecommunications regulatory
14 European Parliament. Resolution of 20 April 1993 on the Commission's 1992 review of the
situation in the telecommunications services sector . (A3-0113/93; OJC 150/39). 31.05.1993.; European
Parliament. Resolution of 19 January 1993 on a common approach in the field of satellite
communications in the European Community . (A3-0424/92; OJC 42/30). 15.02.1993.; European
Parliament. Resolution of 7 April 1995 on the Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications
infrastructure and cable television networks - First part - principle and timetable . (A4-0063/95; OJC
109/310). 01.05.1995.; European Parliament. Resolution of 19 May 1995 on the Green Paper on the
liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks - Part II: A common
approach to the provision of infrastructure for telecommunications in the European Union . (A4-
0111/95; OJC 151/479). 19.06.1995.; European Parliament. Resolution of 19 May 1995 on the Green
Paper on a common approach in the field of mobile and personal communications in the European
Union: Towards the personal communications environment. (COM 94/0145) . (C4-0061/94).; European
Commission. Communications to the European Parliament and the Council on the consultation on the
Green Paper on mobile and personal communications. (COM 94/0492) . (C4-0046/95). (A4-0097/95;
OJC 151/473). 19.06.1995)).; European Parliament. Resolution of 12 December 1996 on the
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on universal service for telecommunications in the
perspective of a fully liberalized environment. (C4-0205/96).
15 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984] ECR 873 (British Telecommunications Case). - where the Italian
Government challenged a Commission decision under the competition rules taken against British
Telecom. This case confirmed the full application of Treaty competition rules to the telecommunications
sector.; Case 202/88, Trance v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223. - This upheld European Commission
Article 90 Directive on competition in the markets for telecommunications terminal equipment in all
essential points .; Case 271/90, [1992] ECR 1-5833 and Case 281/90, Spain, Belgium, and Italy v. Commission
[1992] ECR 1-5833. — This upheld the European Commission's Article 90 Directive on competition in the
markets for telecommunications services in all essential points.
16 European Commission. Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic
and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Universal service for telecommunications in
the perspective of a fully liberalized environment - an essential element of the information society . (COM
96/73 final). 13.03.1996. This Communication has now been complemented by two further
Communications: one on costing and financing of universal service (European Commission.
Communication of 27 November 1996 on assessment criteria for national schemes for the costing and
financing of universal service in telecommunications and guidelines for the Member States on the
operation of such schemes . (COM 96/608). 27.11.1996.); and the other in February 1998 assessing the
current state of universal service in the EU (European Commission. First Monitoring Report on
Universal Service in Telecommunications in the European Union . (COM 98/101). 25.02.1998).
17 European Commission. White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - The challenges
and ways forward into the 21st century . (COM 93/700). 05.12.1993.
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agenda. The report pleads for a break with the past, ending monopolies, and making rapid
progress towards a fully liberalized environment. It advises the European Council on a
strategic approach towards the information society in order "... to improve the quality of life
of Europe's citizens, the efficiency of our social and economic organization and to reinforce
cohesion". This strategic approach was delineated in the Commission's Action Plan on
Europe's way to tire Information Society adopted in 1994 and is still an underlying theme of
die updated Action Plan adopted by the Commission in November 19961' and regularly
updated.
Finally, reflections on die next phase of telecom policy, looking beyond 1998 when the
Council agreed bodi to liberalize public voice telephony and accepted the Commission's
proposal to liberalize telecommunications infrastructure ", started widi die Commission's
December 1997 Green Paper on die convergence of die telecommunications, media and
information technology sectors, and the implications for regulation"1. In November 1999 die
Commission adopted a communication on the 1999 review of die telecommunications
regulatory framework22, launching a public debate fromwhich policy conclusions were drawn
in spring 2000. At die same time, concrete proposals were made to adapt the existing rules
to die needs of competitive, converging markets.
In a recendy presented study by Pierre Larouche"J, die development of die
telecommunications sector is presented as four Models:
♦ die Starting Model (until 1990)
♦ die Regulatoty Model of the 1987 Green Paper (1990-1996)
♦ the Transitional Model of die 1992 Review and die 1994 Green Paper (1996-1997)
♦ the Fully Liberalized Model (1998 - )
18 The Bangemann Group Report. Europe and the global information society - Recommendations to
the European Council . 26.05.1994.
19 European Commission. Communication on Europe's way to the Information Society . (COM
94/347 final). 17.07.1994.
20 For a view of the liberalization model see the Infosoc presentation at www.ispo.cec.lx'. This
presentation is regularly updated. Further, for a presentation of the fully liberalized model a
recommendation is made to: P. Nihouls, Droit europeen des telecommunications. (Bruxelles: Larcier in,
1999).
21 European Commission. (COM 97/623). 03.12.1997.
22 European Commission. (COM 99/539). 10.11.1999.
23 P. Farouche, Competition Law and Regulation. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing,
2000).
12 Introduction to the Telecommunications Sector
The development is perhaps better viewed as an "evolution over time""4, rather than as
"models"-1. As mentioned earlier, die Council agreed pursuant to the 1992 Review, to
liberalize public voice telephony by 1 January 1998, and after the consultation process on the
1994 Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable
television networks-6, the Council adopted the September 1995 Resolution-7 where die
implementation timetable for the future regulator)- framework was set out. Further, die 1995
Resolution listed, with timetables, the legislative measures that had to be adopted by 1
January 1998. According to the timetable, die Commission adopted Directive 96/19 on the
basis ofArticle 86 (3). Admittedly, the revision of the ONP framework28 was adopted much
later than planned. Concerning universal service, which will be dealt with later in this study, it
was not until 1996 that the Commission set out its vision on this matter29. Apart from these
two exceptions, die timetable for the liberalization of the telecommunications sector has
been followed with intervention developing over time as was intended in the 1992 Review.
Chapter 1 deals mainly with the regulator)? aspects of telecommunications, covering
only in a non-exhaustive way other areas related to telecommunications, such as
developments regarding die Internet, convergence of telecommunications media and
information technologies, and promotion activities.
24 Baker McKenzie, Telecommunications Law in Europe. J. Scherer, ed. (London: 1993).
25 P. Ravaioli (Head of Unit, Telecommunications Market, Information Society) and P. Sandler (Legal
Adviser on Telecommunications Regulator)' issues in the Information Society), Recent Developments in
the field of Competition: The European Union and Telecommunications. (Brussels: 1996).
26 European Commission (COM 95/158 final). 03.05.1995.
27 Resolution of 18 September 1995 on the implementation of the future regulator)' framework for
Telecommunications . (OJ C 258/1). 18.09.1995.
28 Directive 97/51 of 6 October 1997 . (O) L 295/23). 06.10.1997.; Directive 98/10 of 26 February
1998 . (OJ L 101/24). 26.02.1998. Adopted by the Council and the European Parliament on the basis of
Article 95.
29 European Commission. Universal Service for Telecommunications in the Perspective of a Fully
Liberalized Environment. (COM 96/final). 13.03.1996.
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The liberalization of the telecommunications sector is based upon, firstly, the competition
directivejU, secondly, the ONP directive concerning the telecommunications services'1, and,
thirdly, the terminal equipment directive'" concerning the liberalization of the terminal
equipment market". This chapter offers a background to the liberalization of the
telecommunications market, starting with the British Telecommunications case and considers
how this case relates to the EC Treaty rules. The discussion of the terminal equipment
directive and the service directive at the end of the chapter should give a good understanding
and basis for Chapter 3, the Open Network Provision Framework, which provides a legal
framework for the medium to long term liberalization of the conditions for
telecommunications services.
In die EC Treaty there is no mandate dealing with telecommunications, in contrast to
areas such as transportation or the environment (Article 74-84 EC and Article 130R-T). The
Treaty Competition rules:
♦ Article 81 (anti-competitive agreements)
♦ Article 82 (controlling monopoly abuse)
♦ Article 85 (regulation introducing competition)
♦ Article 86 (applying the Treaty rules to the public sector)
were at the beginning of the 1980s, only of limited application to regulated sectors such as
telecommunications in Europe. The rules of competition of the EC Treaty'4 are contained in
Articles 81 - 94. Tire rules of competition are designed to ensure that the objectives of the
Treaty are effective and are not distorted". The rules of competition are to be considered in
the light of the Treaty provisions designed to establish a single market, in particular those
30 90/338/EEC. (OJL 192/10). 24 07. 1990.
31 90/387/EEC. (OJL 192/01). 24 07. 1990.
32 88/301/EEC. (OJL 131/73). 27.05. 1988.
33 For a descriptive article on this subject see: ). M. Naftel, The natural death of a natural Monopoly;
Competition in EC Telecommunications after the Telecommunications Terminals Judgement, European
Competition Law Review 3. (1993) 105.; and: S.M. Taylor, Article 90 and Telecommunications
Monopolies , European Competition Law Review 6. (1994) 322. For a shorter analysis see: J. Scherer, ed.,
Introduction, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, by Baker and Mckenzie. (London: 1993).
34 For the fundamental principles of the EC Treaty, see Articles 2 and 3.
35 Case 85/76, Hoffmann - Ha Roche & CoAB v. EC Commission [1979] ECR 461.
18 The Development of the Telecommunications Sector
establishing the freedom to provide services '6. Without the rules of competition, numerous
other provisions of the Treaty would be poindess.
Article 81:1 of the EC Treaty and Articles 36 and 53 in tire Agreement on die
European Economic Area address die problem of interference widi die play of competition
in the Common Market resulting from collusion between market participants over their
business decisions ' . The Articles (81:1 EC Treaty, 53 EEA Agreement) provide:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with die Common Market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices, which may effect trade between Member States (Contracting
Parties) and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within die Common Market (territory covered by this
Agreement), and in particular those which:
♦ directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions
♦ limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment
♦ share markets or sources of supply
The Court ofJustice has said "Article 81:1 seeks to achieve the same aim'' on different
levels; the maintenance of effective competition within the Common Market'" '. Tire
Commission has held that "Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the
power to behave independently..."^0. The provisions of the Treaty, of course, determine the
limit and the object of die Community's competition activity in die telecommunications field.
Secondary EC legislation is conceived, amended, and implemented taking account of tire
interpretation of EC Law by die European Court of Justice (ECJ). This case law has been
useful in providing a framework for the Community legislation in such a very sensitive field
as telecommunications. It should be remembered that it was through die ECJ case law that
36 Case 22/79, Greenwich Film Production v. SACEM [1979] ECR 3275.
37 D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EC. Oxford Press [1999] - regularly
updated.
38 As vertical supply arrangements foreclosing access to source of supply, horizontal cooperation
agreements setting up certain facilities foreclosing or excluding access for third part}* (non-participating)
competing undertakings, strategic alliances, separation agreements between undertakings with strong
positions in up or downstream markets, agreements to create and operate trans-European networks.
39 Case 6/72, Furoemballage and Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 (Continental Can Casej.
40 Case 6/72, Furoemballage and ContinentalCan v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 (Continental Can Case).
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the principle of full application of EC law to telecommunications was firmly established,
concerning EC competition rules through the British Telecom case41 and concerning the free
movement of goods and services through the INNO case42. The ECJ has narrowed these
limits but it was not until the 1985 decision in the British Telecommunications case4', that
Articles 81 and 82 were enforced. Article 86 was first applied in 1991 in the terminal
equipment case and the service directive case44.
There was immense commercial pressure for Community policy, due to the
technological upheaval on a worldwide scale in telecommunications43. The Cecchini Report
estimated that in 1982 the telecommunications equipment market was worth US $17.5 billion
of which terminal equipment accounted for 24%. The rest is made up of transmission
equipment (13%) and central office equipment (47%). The Cecchini Report estimated
further that standardization alone would lead to cost savings of over US $1 billion in the
telecom equipment market and US $100 million in the terminal equipment market. The
changes in the commercial world were principally:
♦ the convergence of infomnation and Telecommunications technologies
♦ tire emergence of optical fibre
♦ digitalization
These developments led to the creation of a multitude of enhanced telecommunications
services. Both in Europe and in the United States new economic forces grew willing to
provide these services in competition with the public operators, which in their Member
States enjoyed monopolies over basic and other telephone services.
The European Commission responded to this by preparing a Green Paper on
telecommunications46. This led to the adoption of tire Community legislation47 designed to
41 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1985] ECR 873 (British Telecommunications Case).
42 Case 18/88, Regie des Telegraphes et des Telephones v. GB-INNO-BM S~A [1991] ECR 5941.
43 ECJ Judgement of 20 March 1985, Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984] ECR 873 (British
Telecommunications Case).
44 Case 202/88,France v. Commission [ 1991] ECR 1-1223. (The TerminalEquipment Case)', and Case 189,
Spain v. Commission [1990] and Case 271/281, Spain v. Commission [1992] ECR 1-5833 (The Service Equipment
Cases).
45 See European Commission. Cecchini Report on the Cost of Non-Europe. (Bruxelles: 1988).
46 European Commission. Green Paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment: Towards a dynamic European economy. (COM 87/290
final). 30 06.1987.
47 For such details see footnote 52.
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open the national Telecommunications markets both for tenninal equipment and for the
provision of enhanced services by providing a framework for competition through the
abolition of statutory monopolies enjoyed by tire telecommunications utilities in each
Member State. More exactly to abolish the special and exclusive rights enjoyed by diese
utilities to ensure full application of tire Treats" rules to public and private utilities. Before tire
Green Paper, it was generally thought that the telecommunications sector was an instance of
natural monopoly48 and it was in dre British Telecommunications case49, which will be
discussed in more detail in dre next chapter, drat the application of dre competition rules1" to
the telecommunications sector has its roots. The action against British Telecom came at a
time when a more detailed reflection of the aspects of the European Community's
telecommunications sector was on track.
The speed of evolution of technology created pressure within dre Community for dre
issue to be solved at a political level, as part of global review of tire telecommunications
policy in dre European Union'1. Not only dre behaviour of statutory monopolies, but also
their very existence, was an obstacle to the development of telecommunications in dre
European Community.
The debate focused around the Commission's 1987 Green Paper, which identified dre
bases of a common approach towards the telecommunications sector1-. The Green Paper
identified the need to allow full development of the supply of services and equipment,
consequendy making it possible for the industry to take full advantage of dre technological
and economic evolution of the world market. In addition, the Green Paper emphasised dre
48 For a detailed discussion on this subject see: A. Ogus, Regulation — Ix'gal Form and Economic
Theory. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).
49 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984] OJL 298/49 (British Telecommunications Case).
50 For a brief overview see R. Whish, Competition Law. (London: Butterworths, 1993). 339 ff.
51 The European Union was created by the Treaty on Political Union, which entered into force on
1 November 1993 (the Maastricht Treaty). That Treaty extended the areas of competence and
cooperation of the European Member States, beyond a simple economic Community. From a legal
standpoint, the European Community continues to exist within the Union, and the legal institutions and
provisions in the field of telecommunications and competition remain those of the Community and the
EC Treaty, rather than those of the European Union, which does not enjoy legal personality. References
to the European Union refer to the political rather than the legal entity. The European Union groups the
Member States of the European Community into a single economic area, sharing a variety of fields from
foreign trade to aviation, environmental policy, research and development, and sex discrimination.
52 For another view on this period see: Section II The Regulatory Model of the 1987 Green Paper
(1990-1996) in P. Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Plart
Publishing) (2000), 3ff.
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"role of telecommunications administrators in tire provision of network infrastructure must
be essentially safeguarded in order to allow them to fulfil their public service obligations" 5 >.
On the issue of monopoly, the Green Paper accepted, within narrow limits14, that a
combination of economic and legal considerations and the public interest led tire Member
States to reserve to one or more telecommunications administrations the right to provide tire
basic infrastructure and telecommunications services. Certain types of service could be
opened to competition providing that competition did not undemrine the ability of the
operator to provide universal service. Greater emphasis was placed on the concept of
universal service as a service and not as the provision of a physical network11.
The Green Paper was much welcomed in the telecommunications sector and tire
Commission set out a programme for its implementation on 9 February 1988, which was
approved by tire Council on 30 June 1988. Building on tire Council Resolution and the
Green Paper, two important directives16 liberalizing, firstly-, the supply of terminal equipment
(tire 1988 terminal equipment directive17) and, secondly tire provision of telecommunications
services (the 1990 service directive18) were passed.
53 European Commission. (COM 87/290 final). 30 06.1987. 177.
54 European Commission. (COM 87 (290 final). 30.06.1987. 70-72, 74.
55 European Commission 1992 Review of the situation in the telecommunications services sector .
(SEC 92/1048 final). 21.10.1992.
56 A Directive is a binding legal measure, which sets out specific goals and provisions which the
Member States must implement into their own law by a specified time limit, usually 18 to 24 months after
adoption. The Member States are generally free to decide how they implement the measure, through
primary or secondary legislation or by administrative regulations. In most cases the power to adopt a
Directive rests with the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission. However, in the field of
competition policy, Article 86 (3) of the Treaty gives the Commission the power to remedy structural
competition problems by adopting Directives. Both the Terminal Equipment and the Services Directive
were adopted under the Article 86 (3) procedure.
57 European Commission. Directive 88/301 of 16 May 1988 on competition in the market for
terminal equipment. (OJ L 131). 25.05.1988. 73.
58 European Commission. Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services . (OJ L 192). 26.07.1990. 10.
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This chapter focuses on the British telecommunications case59, which is considered a
landmark in tire liberalization of the telecommunications sector. After tire British
telecommunications case, competition law was applicable to the sector, but very rarely used,
mostly in cross-border telecommunications in tire EC60. Before this, the Member States were
in charge of their own telecommunications sector. The monopoly operator normally solved
problems as they appeared. Any harmonization and coordination that might be necessary
between Member States could proceed under Article 95 EC. As tire Member States held a
monopoly over tire whole telecommunications sector, it was not necessary to use legislation.
Recommendations were normally used61.
The British telecommunication case was tire first example of the application of
competition rules to the telecommunications sector. Tire initial decision of tire Commission,
applying EC competition rules, was that British Telecom was abusing its monopoly position
in breach of Article 82. British telecommunications attempted in tire early 1980s to curtail
the activities of telex agencies in the United Kingdom. Some agencies that were using the
most advanced technology were able to undercut, quite significantly, tire tariffs charged by
British Telecom for international telex transmissions.
British Telecom then introduced regulations which, complying with British Telecom
international obligations within the International Telecommunication Union, strongly
advised such agencies not to charge below the rates applied by British Telecom for such
services. Because of complaints, the Commission issued the decision finding that British
Telecom was abusing its dominant position over its United Kingdom network. A number of
Member States challenged the Commission's decision because they were concerned about
tire application of the competition rules to a public sector service. Italy led the action and tire
59 For an analysis of the Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1984] ECR 873 (British Telecommunications Case),
see: J. Miiller, Competition in the British telecommunications market: the impact of recent
privatazation/deregualtion decisions, Law and Economic Transborder. Mestmacker, ed. (1987). 279 ff.;
and: Schultze-Braucks, European telecommunications law in the light of the British telecom judgement.
(1986). 39 ff.
60 See for instance: Global Mobile Satellite Systems , Press release (IP/95/549). 07.06.1995.; or:
Inmarsat-P. Article 19(3), Notice of 15 November . (OJ C 304/6). 1995.; and the obvious British
Telecommunications Case, Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1985] ECR 873. Decision of 10 December
1982. (OJL 360/36). 1982.
61 As an example: Recommendation 84/549 of 12 November 1984 concerning the implementation of
harmonization in the field of telecommunications.
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case established the benchmark for the future use of the competition rules in the
telecommunications sector.
The ECJ found, firstly, that public entities were "undertakings" within the meaning of
Articles 81 and 82 if they were carping out an economic activity, irrespective of whether or
not the undertaking itself was of a commercial nature. Italy claimed, however, that the
British Telecom regulations, considered abusive by the Commission, constituted the exercise
by British Telecom of regulatory power given to it under statute, which then could not be
subject to competition rules. Hie Court did not say that the regulations were not of a
regulatory nature, but that their content was the result of commercial activity. The terminal
equipment and services directives, discussed in chapters 1.2 and 1.3, later solved this
problem, which required the separation of regulatory and operational activities. Italy argued,
thirdly, that statuton* monopolies were compatible with the Treaty on the basis ofArticle 295
EC ("This Treaty* shall in no way7 prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system
of property* ownership"), which stated that the effects of the Treaty7 are neutral as regards the
Member States' choice of property ownership, whether in the private or public sector.
Member States were, according to Italy, free to create such monopolies; therefore, British
Telecom had the right to protect its monopoly7 by7 preventing activities being carried on
which were within its preserve. This argument was rejected by7 the Court, which stated that
British Telecom monopoly rights concerned the provision of a network and not the services
over that network, and, further, that British Telecom regulations aimed to restrict the
activities of the agencies, not eliminate them, thus falling outside the scope of Italy*'s
argument. The question of the compatibility of British Telecom's monopoly with the Treaty
was dropped.
Finally, Italy argued that the challenged British Telecom regulations which, in the
beginning had been introduced to restrict the activities of the international telex agencies, did
not constitute an abuse under Article 82, considering they7 were made to prevent an improper
use of the British Telecom network, over which it had been granted monopoly7 rights. It was
claimed that the telex agencies wanted to bypass normal tariffs by using special equipment
and advanced information technology to transmit a high volume of messages over a short
period. The Court focused on the public interest in the use of new technology allowing fast
message transmission, which could not be regarded as an improper use of the network, and
thus rejected this argument as not being abusive under Article 82. The abusive nature of
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British Telecom's behaviour lay in its attempt to prevent the use of new advanced
technology, thereby limiting technical progress and the introduction of competition into a
highly regulated market.
The objectives underlying Articles 81 and 82 serve as a comer stone for all Community
legislation in the telecommunications sector and have been referred to in many of the
Commissions decisions62. In tire British telecommunications case, the ECJ left open the
question of whether tire statutory monopolies granted over telecommunications equipment
services and infrastructure could be compatible with the Treaty. This issue created a
tremendous pressure within the Community. It had to be solved at a political level as part of
a global review of telecommunications policy in the EC. The very existence of statutory
monopolies seemed to be a hurdle to die development of telecommunications in die
European Community.
The debate focused in 1987 on die Commission's Green Paper on die Development of
the Common Market for Telecommunications Services (the Green Paper)6'. The Green
Paper identified die basis of a common approach towards die telecommunications sector. It
identified the necessity of allowing full development of supply of services and equipment and
of making it possible for the industry to take full advantage of die new technological and
economic evolution. Further, it emphasized "the role of Telecommunications
Administrations in the provision of network infrastructure must be essentially safeguarded in
order to allow them to fulfil dieir public service obligations"64.
On die monopoly issue, the Green Paper accepted a combination of legal and
economic considerations, together widi public interests, and allowed the Member States to
preserve telecommunications administrations61, widi the right to provide die basic network
infrastructure and telecommunications services. It was decided diat monopoly should be
very narrowly defined66. The Green Paper accepted that a telecommunications
62 Case 85/86, Rockwell/Iveco [17.08.1983] OJ 1 224; Case 86/405, Fibre Optics [22.08.1986] OJ L
236/30; and KSB/Goulds/Lomva [25.01.1991] OJ 1 19.
63 European Commission. Green Paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment; Towards a dynamic European economy . (COM 87/290
final). 30.06 1987.
64 European Commission. (COM 87/ 290 final). 30.06.1987. 177.
65A government department with overall responsibility for telecommunications as well as the public
telecommunications operator providing the network and services under that department's control.
66 European Commission. (COM 87/290 final). 30.06.1987. 70-72/74.
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administration must be able to draw on sufficient financial resources in order to operate a
network that is public and has national coverage. This objective did not, however, justify
monopoly rights over telecommunications services in the Member States; therefore, certain
types of service could be open to competition, providing that competition did not undermine
tire ability of the operators to provide this universal service. Universal service is considered a
service and not the provision of a physical network as a result of the 1992 review6'. The
Green Paper also indicated that the public operators should be allowed to compete in the
liberalized services and terminal equipment markets. In order to prevent potential conflicts
of interest and competition problems, the operational and regulatory functions of
telecommunications administrations should be separated. The Green Paper was welcomed
within the telecommunications sector, leaving the Commission to set out a work programme
for its implementation on 9 February 198868, which was approved by the Council on 30 June
198869.
On die Council Resolution and the Green Paper were built two key directives. The
first liberalized the supply of terminal equipment (the terminal equipment directive'0), and die
second concerned the provision of telecommunications services (the service directive71). To
open die supply of terminal equipment to competition, the Commission adopted the
terminal equipment directive under Article 86.3 EC in order to remove all the national
monopoly rights enjoyed by die public operators in the Member States. Other legislative
actions were also taken under Article 95 12, designed to promote such terminal equipment and
to develop harmonized European standards.
67 European Commission. 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Services Sector .
(SEC 92/1048 final). Brussels. 21.10.1992.
68 European Commission. (COM 88/48 final).
69 European Council. Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications Services and Equipment up to 1992 . (OJ C 277).
70Terminal Equipment Directive: European Commission. Directive of 16 May 1988 on competition
in the market for Terminal Equipment. (OJ LI92). 27.05.88.
71 Service Directive. Directive on competition on the Markets in Telecommunications Services .
90/388/EEC (OJ L192/10). 24.07.1990.
72 European Parliament. Resolution of 23 November 1989 on competition in the telecommunications
sector . (OJ C 323/118). 1989. - The European Parliament agreed with the Council that Article 95 EC
would be the proper legal basis for all measures to achieve the goals of the 1987 Green Paper.
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Liberalization
By such landmark initiatives described above tire Commission's Directorates-General (DG)
for competition (formerly DG IV) and the Information Society Directorate General
(formerly DG XIII) for telecommunications have been exercising a day-to-day oversight,
establishing a slowly growing body of important decisions in the telecommunications sector.
The need to provide a set of terms of reference for the growing number of
telecommunications related cases led to the Commission's adoption of guidelines ".
The Commission's decisions define the conditions under which dominant
telecommunications organizations may regroup themselves in new alliances with each other
and with third parties without infringing tire competition rules. Such new alliances were
expected to play an important role in exploiting the coming liberalized market place which
was in force at 1 January 1998. INFONET Services Corporation notified the first alliance
for the provision of value-added network services to the Commission. INFONET is a
company owned by five incumbent EC telecommunications organizations and six non-EC
telecommunications organizations. The Commission's decision confirmed that even joint
ventures among dominant telecommunications organizations will be cleared, provided
certain conditions are fulfilled. Such conditions could be obligations by the Member States
of die joint venture to avoid cross-subsidization and discrimination, as well as various
recording and reporting obligations74.
The Commission took a similar approach to EIRPAGE, a joint venture between
Board Telecom Eireann and MOTOROLA relating to a paging system in Ireland. This
paging system was to be interconnected widi the public telecommunications network7". The
geographical scope was limited to Ireland, but even so the Commission concluded that it
would have a considerable effect on trade. It was exemptible under 81 (3). The Commission
accepted tiiat the technological benefits for consumers created from the joint venture could
not have been achieved as rapidly and to die same extent in die absence of die joint venture.
In this case, EIRPAGE had undertaken to provide a service beyond die more profitable
73 Guidelines on the Application of EC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector . (OJ C
233/02). 1991. 15.
74 European Commission. (OJ C7). 11.101.1992.
75 European Commission. Decision of 18 October 1991 . (OJ L 306). 07.11.1991.
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urban areas and consumers would be guaranteed a choice because there would be
competition at the agent's level. Further, the Board Telecom Eireann had given an
undertaking ensuring fair market entry for third parties interested in interconnected paging,
and both the parties undertook certain specified recording and reporting obligations.
In 1991, the Commission published guidelines76 on the full application of EC
competition rules (Articles 81 and 82 and the merger regulation). The guidelines are meant
to clarify the application of the competition rules to the market participants in the
telecommunications sector 7. In a communication'8 between the European Electronics and
Information Technology Industry and the European Commission, it was pointed out that
the competition rules must be viewed "in the context of the special conditions of the
Telecommunications sector and the overall Community Telecommunications policy will be
taken into account in their application".
In several rulings ' the ECJ ruled that Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty concern the
conduct of undertakings and not tire laws of the Member States (by the intent of Article 5
(2), the Member States must not maintain in force any measures which could deprive those
provisions of their effectiveness). The ECJ stated that such would be the case if a Member
State were to require cartels or reinforce the effects diereof, or to encourage abuses by
dominant undertakings. When this behaviour is imposed by a Member State measure,
leaving no choice to tire undertakings concerned, Article 86 may apply to the Member State
involved. In such circumstances Articles 81 and 82 may also apply to the undertaking's
behaviour, taking into account the constraints to which the undertakings are submitted by
the mandator}7 Member State measures". In addition, when the action or behaviour comes
from the free choice of the undertakings involved, and die Member State has taken measures
to encourage or has encouraged or strengthened die effects, Article 81 and/or Article 82
76 Guidelines on the Application of EC competition rules in the telecommunications sector . (OJ C
233/02). 1991.
77 Telecommunications embraces any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing,
images, and sounds, or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical, and other electromagnetic
systems. (Article 2 ofWATTC Regulation of 9 December 1988).
78 European Commission. The European Electronics and Information Technology Industry: State of
Play, issues at stake and proposals for action . (SEC 91, 565). 03.04.1991.
79 Case 229/83, Gederc / Gasoline [1985] ECR 17; Case 299/83, l^ec/erc / Books [1985]; Cases 209 to
213/84, Alinistetepublic v. Asjes [1986] ECR 1425; Case 311/ 85, Vereniging van \/!aamse Reisbnreans v. Sociale
Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheid diensten [1987] ECR 3801.
80 Guidelines on the Application of EC Competition rules in the telecommunications sector . (OJ C
233/ 02). 1991. 15.
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apply to the undertaking's behaviour and Article 86 may apply to tire Member State measure.
This could be tire case if tire Member State has approved or legally endorsed tire result of tire
undertaking's behaviour.
The guidelines and the Article 86 directives are intended to complement one another,
to the extent that they cover dre principles governing the application of the competition
rules: Articles 81and 82 on the one hand and Article 86 on the other. Tire text of Article 86
(2) reads:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest
of having tire character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject top the
rules on competition, in so far as tire application of such rules does not obstruct tire
performance, in law or fact, of tire particular tasks assigned to them. The
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to
the interests of tire Community81.
On the application of tire competition rules to interconnection agreements in tire
telecommunications environment, one must note that there are four conditions required for
the application ofArticle 86 (2). The undertaking concerned must have been entrusted with
tire operation of a service of general economic interest. Further, should the application of
competition rules obstruct tire performance of the service concerned, and then a balance
must be made between tire Community interest and tire necessity of the beneficial results
derived from exclusion of tire application of the competition rules.
Tire obvious question concerning interconnection, concerns tire possible application of
Article 86 (2) to universal service obligations imposed on telecommunications organizations.
There seems to be no problem with the application of tire first two conditions. Universal
service obligations are generally imposed on telecommunications organizations by a formal
legislative or administrative act under national law, and universal services correspond to what
tire Court considers to be services of general economic interest. The conditions were set out
in the Corbeau case82 regarding postal services. The ECJ argued that it could not be disputed
that tire Belgian Regie des Postes was entrusted with a service of general economic interest
consisting in the obligation to collect, cany, and distribute mail on behalf of all users
81 See Paragraph 84 of: Guidelines on the Application of EC Competition rules in the
Telecommunications Sector . (OJ C 233/02). 06.09.1991.
82 Case 320/91, Continental Can v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-2533 (The Continental Can Case).
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throughout the territory of the Member States concerned, at uniform tariffs and on similar
quality conditions "irrespective of the specific situations of the degree of economic
profitability of each individual operation"8
In another case, the Almelo84, the ECJ further argued that tire undertaking which had
been given the task, through the grant of a non-exclusive concession governed by public law,
of ensuring the supply of electricity in part of the national territory was entrusted with a
service of general economic interest. The Court stated that the undertaking concerned had
to ensure that throughout the territory in respect of which the concession was granted, all
users, whether local distributors or end users, should receive uninterrupted supplies of
electricity in sufficient quantities to meet demand at any given time, at uniform tariff rates
and on terms which may not vary free in accordance with objective criteria applicable to all
customers.
For the telecommunications sector, reference could be made to the INNO83 case. In
this judgement, the ECJ considered that the monopoly held by RTT (Belgian
telecommunications organizations) for the establishment and operation of the Public
Telecommunications Network constituted, at that stage of the development of the
Community, a service of general economic interest within the meaning of Article 86 (2) of
the Treaty. The Court referred to the fact that "such monopoly is intended to make a public
telephone network available to users"86.
The third condition for the application of Article 86 (2) (that the application of the
competition rules must obstruct the performance of the services concerned), as explained in
the case law of the ECJ87, "essentially results in an economic test to be performed". Hie
Court said that restrictions on competition from other economic operators had to be allowed
in so far as "they were necessary in order to enable the undertaking entrusted with the task of
general interest to perform it". In order to apply this test which was left to the national court,
the Court stated that it was necessary to take into consideration the economic conditions in
which the undertaking operates, in particular the costs which it has to bear and the legislation,
83 Case 320/91, Continental Can v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-2533 (The Continental Can Case).
84 Case 393/92, Gemeente Almelo v. Commission [1994] ECR 1477 (The Almelo Case).
85 Case 18/88, Regie des Te/egraphes et des Telephones v. GB-INNO-BM SA..[1991] ECR 5941.
86 Case 18/88, Regie des Te/egraphes et des Telephones v. GB-INNO-BA1SA.. [1991] ECR 5941.
87 Case 393/92, GemeenteAlmelo v. Commission [1994] ECR 1477 (TheAlmelo Case).
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particularly the environment, to which it was subject. The Court was more explicit in the
Corbeau88 Case, with regard to the economic test to be performed for determining whedier
or not derogation from the application of the Treaty rules is warranted. The Court indicated
in that case that it had to be determined whether the full application of die Treaty rules
would compromise the economic equilibrium of die service of general economic interest
performed by die undertaking entrusted widi diis service.
In a regulatory environment where the universal service obligations of die
telecommunications organizations selected for such service provision is entirely financed by
payments made out of a specific fund, it is hard to understand how there would still be place
for invoking a derogation to die Treaty rules under Article 86 (2). The economic viability of
die service of general economic interest could not be jeopardized by the application of the
Treaty rules since it would be entirely financed through direct funding. If the universal
service burden is not dealt widi fully through a universal service fund, die arguments for
invoking Article 86 (2) by die telecommunications organizations entrusted widi die universal
service appear to be much stronger.
The last condition for the application of Article 86 (2) involves a balancing of the
requirements of die particular tasks entrusted to die undertakings concerned and the
protection of die interests in the Community. This was analyzed in die Luxembourg v.
Muller case8 ' in 1971. This condition has not given rise, after the judgement in diis case, to
any important developments in the case law. It appears to be relatively clear that where
certain restrictive practises by die telecommunications organizations, which are under die
obligation of universal service, fulfil die odier conditions of Article 86 (2) as outlined above,
such practises would equallv fulfil the last condition of this provision.
88 Case 320/91, Continental Can v. Commission 11991] ECR 1-2533 (The Continental Can Case).
89 Case 10/71, Minister Public Luxembourg v. Aluller [19711 ECR 723 (Port de Alertert).
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The terminal equipment directive removed die special and exclusive rights over terminal
equipment (telephones, faxes.). The history behind diis directive is interesting and is often
referred to as "the compromise of December 1989""'. When the Commission ratified the
directive, which removed the special and exclusive rights on the basis of Article 86 (3), this
was challenged by a number of die Member States (France supported by Italy, Belgium,
Germany, and Greece). This opposition would have been enough to block a proposal under
Article 95 EC. In order to liberalise the telecommunications market in full, the Commission
had to precede in the same way as with the liberalization of telecommunications services.
This is why a draft directive " was adopted based on Article 86 (3) EC and at the same time a
draft directive on ONP (Open Network Provision) was based on Article 95 EC. (A
discussion of the relationship between directives adopted under Article 86 (3) (liberalization)
and under Article 95 (harmonization) and the relevance of these terms is included at the end
of Chapter 3.1).
Before enacting die terminal equipment directive, it was thought that die grant of
special and exclusive rights to telecommunications operators was not as such incompatible
with die EC Treaty. This view was based on die Sacchi9"case of 1974.
As the background of the 1989 compromise has been discussed very thoroughly in the
literature '1, only die main focus of the disagreement between the Commission and die
Council will be discussed: namely, basic data services. At that time, the late 1980s, die
different Member States had different models for regulating the data communications sector.
In the United Kingdom, die official policy was to leave it to the users to arrange for diese
services by buying it from private service providers (often referred to as the US Model)94. In
other Member States, such as in France, a public service approach was taken and the services
were entrusted to die PTO (telecommunications operators), granting them exclusive rights.
90 See for instance: C. Hacker, Le compromis du 7 decembre 1989, Droit de l'informatique et des
telecom 73. (Council press release 196/89). 1990.
91 See Bulletin EC 12-1988, paragraph 2.1.72 (the draft Service Directive).
92 Case 155/73, Sacchi v. Commission [1974] ECR 409 (The Sacchi Case).
93 See as examples: P. Ravaioli and H. Ungerer (Information Society Directorate), Liberalization of
European Telecommunications. 1991.; and: S.M. Tatlor, Article 90 and Telecommunications Monopolies
. (ECLR 322 at 325-8). 1994.; and P. Larouche, European Telecommunications Law. (Oxford and
Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000).
94 For a description of the different models in the Member States P.A. Daviud and Steinmullers,
liconomics of combatility standards and competition in the Telecommunications sector. (1994) can be
recommended.
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In Larouche's work "European Telecommunications Law", the UK model is described
as "not very developed"93, which is difficult to understand, since the United Kingdom was
the first of the Member States to fully liberalise the telecommunications market. With the
Internet96, which the United Kingdom saw coming, the US model (with interconnection to
private networks ) seemed to be the right way to go, and the US model was retained and
proved to be successful9'.
The directive required equipment to be approved by an independent body and
publication of all network technical specifications necessary to manufacture interconnecting
equipment (Articles 5 and 6). It also required die termination of long term lease and
maintenance contracts in force at the date of adoption of the directive (Article 6). This
provision was however annulled bv the ECJ98, in die Telecommunications Equipment Case,
as the scope of Article 86 (3) is limited to Commission action against State measures that
breach the competition rules, whereas the length of die contract was the result of a
commercial agreement between the user and the telecommunications operator.
The directive is based on die presumption that a state monopoly over the manufacture
for sale of terminal equipment would constitute a state measure in the sense of Article 86 of
the Treaty, which is incompatible widi EC Treaty provision which guarantees undisturbed
competition, free trade in goods (Article 28), and free trade in service (Article 49). The
directive presupposes anticompetitive effects from the creation of monopolies99. EC
telecommunications monopolies required users to hire telephones and PABXs (for line
connection), and thereby prevented diem from buying their own terminal equipment. This is
an example of abuse of a dominant position, identified in Article 82 (d).
The Member States responsibility was invoked through the combination of Articles 3
(f), 10, 82, and 86. The directive also stated a separation of regulatory from operational
activities, in order to avoid the conflict of interests which would arise if the
95 40 ff.
96 For a good view of the history of Internet, see: All about the Internet: A brief history of the
Internet, Federal Networking Council. Resolution 10/24/1995. This work can be downloaded from
ww.isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.htmL
97 In some Member States the discussion concerning basic data services and voice telephony
concerned cream-skimming by new service providers.
98 Case 202/88, France v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223. 1226 ff. (The TerminalEquipment Case).
99 For a discussion on the TerminalEquipment Case, Case 202/88, France v. Commission [1991] ECR I-
1223 and a background study, see: K. Platteau, Article 90 EC Treaty after the Court Judgement in the
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Case . De Brandt van Hecke & Lacgae. (3 ECLR).
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telecommunication operator should act as both a provider of a network and as an equipment
supplier. The telecommunication operator would otherwise be in a position to approve
competing equipment for connection to its network. In order to provide public access to the
technical information necessary to open the tenninal equipment market, the directive also
provided for the Member States to publish their technical specifications and type-approval
procedures for equipment.
Article 86 (3) was thus used to solve problems such as conflict of interest, and this was
at the time very controversial. The article gives the Commission the power to ensure that the
Member States comply with their obligations under Article 86 by means of either a decision
or a directive. That the Commission chose a directive is of vital significance in the
development of Article 86. It allowed the Commission to evade the necessity of Council
approval (the political consensus was absent for such liberalization) and the Commission was
using the competition rules to eliminate a statutory monopoly instead of regulate the manner
in which it operated. The Member States contested the directive on the grounds of lack of
competence. The case was brought before the ECJ and the Member States argued that the
Commission was not empowered to limit or abolish exclusive rights. The Court delivered its
judgement1"" in the Tenninal Equipment Case and upheld the directive strengthened the
Commission's endorsing powers.
The directive focused strongly on the technical progress in terminal technology as the
reason for liberalization and the need for users to be allowed a free choice for the full benefit
of such new technologies. As a consequence tire directive was based on the hypothesis that a
state monopoly over tire manufacture of sale of terminal equipment constitutes a state
measure, in tire sense of Article 86, which is incompatible with the EC Treaty provisions
which guarantee undistorted competition between Member States, free trade1"1 in goods
("quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall without
prejudice to tire following provisions, be prohibited between Member States"), and free trade
100 Case 202/88, France v. Commission [1991] ECJ 1-1223 (The Terminal Equipment Case). See also: Cases
71, 281, 289/90, Spain v. Commission [1992] ECR 1-5833 (Service Equipment Case). Directive 88/301 (the
Terminal Equipment Directive) dealt with the liberalization of the telecommunications equipment market.
The two cases are known for having confirmed the power of the Commission to order the removal of
special and exclusive rights on the basis of Article 86(3) EC.
101 Article 28 EC.
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("within the framework of die provisions set out below, restrictions on thein service
freedom to provide services within die Community shall be progressively abolished during
die transitional period in respect of nationals of the Member States who are established in a
state of the Community other than that of the person for whom die service is intended").
Another effect of increased competition in die telecommunications terminal equipment
market is die vertical interlinkage widi other sectors. To look at those effects it is necessary
to differentiate between the various vertical levels of die production chain in die
telecommunications industry. The terminal equipment market amounts to approximately
25% of the expenses made annually by telecommunications services. From the amounts
spent on equipment, two-thirds concern terminal equipment and one-tiiird network
equipment. The two categories of terminal equipment accounting for the largest share in the
market are telephone sets (12%) and PABXs (Private Branch Exchange, private switching
equipment) (34%). All other equipment relates to smaller shares: telefax (8%), modems
(7%), and telex machines (4%). The trend in the terminal equipment market is that the
relative share of telephone sets and PABXs will decrease and that all other terminal
equipment will increase considerably.













102 Article 59 EC. (The Transitional Period mentioned ended in 1968).
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This is illustrated"1, in figure 1, on page 40, to show the effects of a liberalized tenninal
equipment market. The diagram starts with component production at the bottom and ends
up with value added services (VAS), where the accumulated value added from previous
production steps has widened the cone considerably.
A study on liberalization in the telecommunications market1"4 has shown that the long
gestation period and the large investment needed to establish a new generation of digital
exchange makes tire financing of sufficient research and development in tire
telecommunications industry a major problem. Most European carriers have provided
support by buying prototypes built to their national specification, but some1"1 have preferred
to acquire in the world market the technology that has been paid for by others.
Related to these industrial policy objectives, maintaining a technological base is also an
employment issue. Given the political opposition to the necessary restructuring in the
industry, it can be seen that increasing die competitive pressure at the next market level, the
network services, only eliminates such slowdown in adjustment and restructuring policies.
The procedure by which diis comes about can be illustrated by a number of confrontations
that are being enacted between unions, equipment manufacturers, and telecommunications
administrations both nationally and amongst each otiier internationally.
Hie result is obvious: die nationally oriented procurement policies are inefficient
because of unexploited economies of scale in production and integration. A result of Italian
telecommunications protective pokey was seen in die buyout of OHvetti by the German
industrial and telecommunications group, Mannesmann. The Mannesmann group agreed to
buy 49% shares in Okvetti Mobile Telephony Service Holdings (OMTS), a
telecommunications holding company created by the former Italian computer giant Okvetti.
Mannesmann acquired an initial 25% of OMTS worth 560 milkon ECU at the end of 1997
and a further 24.9% worth 660 milkon ECU before March 2000. Okvetti transferred, in
November 1997, all of its telecommunications assets to OMTS, including its 25.5% share
i°3 jgjvf International Chair in Computer Science at its ten-year anniversary, celebrated in Brussels
1986. This issue is from a speech by Professor J Muller, INSEAD, Fontaineblcau, France 1990, presented
in: Natural Monopoly, Deregulation and Competition, Schaaf. Elsevier Science Publication. 1990.
104 L. Foremaan, F. Peck, and T. Muller, Liberalizing the European Telecommunications Market.
1988.
105 Norway and Denmark. See further: L. Foremaan, F. Peck, and T. Muller, liberalizing the
European Telecommunications Market. 1988.
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holding in the cellular operator Omnitel Pronto Italia (OPI), in which Mannesinann also own
a stake, and its 67% share holding in the fixed network operator Infostrada. The two
companies also agreed that all their future investments and initiatives in the Italian
telecommunications market would be realized through OMTS. Omnitel's major
shareholders are the US telecommunications groups Bell Atlantic and AirTouch.
The way out of this dilemma is to explore more fully tire potential of a larger market
within the European market and from there to an open world market for
telecommunications equipment. The keys to successful policy in the equipment sector are
financial incentives to encourage productivity advances and technical change on the
equipment side, combined with a situation of competitive supplies, independent of where in
the Community die producers are located. Reducing barriers to entry through an extension
ofmore international competitive procurement rules, as the Commission is attempting, must
be quick to be effective.
Chapter 1.3
The Services Directive
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The opening to competition of the telecommunications services market was initiated by the
so-called services directive adopted by die Commission on 28 June 1990 (also under Article
86)106 This provided for the removal of special and exclusive rights granted by Member
States to telecommunications organizations (TOs) for the supply of value-added services by
the end of 1990 and data services by 1 January 1993" '. The directive permitted on a
temporary basis the maintenance of exclusive rights over die supply of public voice
telephony service, considering that immediate liberalization of this service could damage die
financial stability of the incumbent TOs and thus preventing them from ensuring the
provision of a universal network. As mandated by die directive, it was diis continuing
monopoly, which was the principal subject of the policy review during 1992.
In view of die introduction of competition, this directive also required die separation of
operational and regulatory functions, which were at the time accumulated by the TOs. This
has now been implemented in almost all Member States, through, for example, die creation
of government departments and/or independent agencies to handle regulatory matters, with
day to day operation of the business firmly in die hands of the TO. This separation is often
supported by the conclusion of management contracts between die State and the TO.
Further provisions on the separation of operational and regulatory functions have been
included in the ONP framework.
Satellite
Building on the large consensus achieved on the basis of the Satellite Green Paper on 13
October 1994, the Commission adopted a directive abolishing special and exclusive rights for
the provision of satellite services and equipment by die end of 19941"8. According to this
directive, licensing and declaration procedures may only be justified by the compliance with
essential requirements, including avoidance of harmful interference and effective use of
i°6 European Commission. Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets
for telecommunications services. (OJ L192/10). 24.07.1990.
107 This Directive, by defining very narrowly the scope of the monopoly over voice telephony, has also
liberalized voice telephony services other than those provided for the general public (e.g. voice service for
corporate communications or so-called closed user groups).
108 European Commission. Directive 94/46/EEC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive
88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications. (OJ L
268/15). 19.10.1994
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frequency spectrum. Licenses must be granted pursuant to objective, proportional, and non¬
discriminatory criteria.
Cable TV
On 18 October 1995, tire Council adopted a directive lifting restrictions on the use of cable
TV networks throughout the Union of already liberalized telecommunications services (all
telecommunications services except public voice telephony)109. In particular, diis directive
allowed new multi-media telecommunications services to be offered over cable TV networks
throughout the European Union from 1 January 1996. The measure removes national
regulations preventing die use of cable TV networks for anything other than simple, one-way
television broadcasting services. These regulator}' restrictions thus effectively prevented cable
TV operators from offering carriage or provision of any of die new interactive multimedia
services. Examples of such new services include: tele-shopping and tele-transaction
packages, interactive games and education services, and on-line databases including
detailed/moving images.
The cable directive (and the 1996 full liberalization directive) also required a
Commission review, by the end of 1997, of the impact on competition of the joint provision
of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator, and the restrictions on
die use of telecommunications networks for die provision of cable TV capacity. The results
of this review are contained in a Commission Communication adopted on 17 December
1997110 In that review, the Commission found that the joint ownership of
telecommunications and cable TV networks by die same company stifled the development
of telecommunications markets, discouraged innovation, and prevented die full exploitation
of the benefits of convergence between telecommunications, media, and information
technology markets.
109 European Commission. Directive 95/51/EC of 18 October 1995 amending Directive
90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for
the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services. (Oj L 256/49). 26.10.1995.
110 European Commission. Communication (98/C 71/04) concerning the review under competition
mles of the joint provision of telecommunications and cable television networks by a single operator and
the abolition of restrictions on the provision of cable television capacity over telecommunications
networks . (OJ C 71/04) 07.03.1998.
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As a follow-up, the Commission adopted on 23 June 1999 a directive111 under Article
86 (the former Article 90) of die Treaty, which addresses die problem of "cross-ownership"
between the telephone network and cable networks, i.e., die ownership by incumbent
telephone operators of bodi networks in die same market.
The directive dierefore requires, as its main provision, that die telephone network and
die cable networks widiin die same market must not be operated by a single legal entity.
Such legal separation is die minimum condition to reduce die conflict of interest and to open
die way to the development of bodi networks towards multi-media applications, and
introduce necessary competition safeguards. This will encourage die development of both
networks to carry broadband services such as high-speed Internet access.
Mobile Communications
Building on die large consensus achieved on die basis of die Mobile Green Paper and, in
particular, die support of the Council and die European Parliament, on 16 January 1996 die
Council adopted a directive amending die services directive to include mobile
communications112, previously specifically excluded from its scope. Besides requiring die
removal of any remaining special and exclusive rights by February 1996, die Commission's
directive provided for:
♦ an early liberalization of infrastructures, so that mobile operators could build dieir
own fixed or microwave transmission networks (subject to availability of frequencies)
or use networks owned by diird companies
♦ die right for mobile operators to direcdy interconnect (widi the public network and
with mobile operators in other Member States) by the same date
♦ required Member States to consider license requests to operate digital mobile services
using DCS 1800 technologies from 1 January 1998
111 European Commission. Directive 99/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC
in order to ensure that telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single operator
are separate legal entities. (OJ L 175/39), 10.7.1999.
112 European Commission. Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive
90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal communications. (OJ L 20/59). 26.01.1996.
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Tlie Commission considered that the lack of progress on these issues would effectively slow
down the development of mobile and personal communications and, particularly, the further
development of roaming between different networks in different Member States. More
recently then, in some cases again after Commission intervention, DCS 1800 (nowadays
called GSM-1800) was introduced in most Member States by several new license holders.
Full Competition
Following the political agreement among Member States to liberalise all telecommunications
services (including voice telephony) and telecommunications infrastructure by 1 January
1998, with transition periods for certain Member States, on 13 March 1996 the Commission
adopted a directive1 lj amending the directive of 28 June 1990 on full competition
(90/388/EEC). This directive called on Member States to take tire necessary steps in order
to ensure that markets were fully open by 1 January 1998114. In addition, it specified that
restrictions on use of alternative infrastructure for services already liberalized (all
telecommunications services except public voice telephony) should be lifted by 1 July 1996.
Harmonization aspects of licensing are covered by tire licensing directive (see section
2.5).
Another important factor to safeguard the introduction of competition in these areas is
effective interconnection. Therefore, the directive requires interconnection to the voice
telephony service and pubkc switched telecommunications networks to be granted on non¬
discriminatory, proportional, and transparent terms, and based on objective criteria. In
particular, the directive required Member States to publish, by 1 July 1997, the terms, and
113 European Commission. Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Commission Directive
90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets. (OJ
L 74/13). 22.03.1996.
114 Transition periods have been granted for Member States with less developed and very small
networks. In accordance with Commission decisions: No 114/97/EC (on Ireland) of 27.11.1996. (O) L
41/8). 12.02.1997.; No 310/97/EC (on Portugal) of 12.02.1997. (OJ L 133/19). 24.05.1997.; No
568/97/EC (on Luxembourg) of 14.05.1997. (OJ L 234/7). 26.08.1997.; No 603/97/EC (on Spain) of
10.11.1997. (OJL 243/48). 05.09.1997.; and No 607/97/EC (on Greece) of 18.06.1997. (OJ L 245/6).
09.09.1997., temporary derogations have been granted with deadlines for full liberalization of 1.7.1198 for
Luxembourg, 1.12.1998 for Spain, 1.1.2000 for Portugal and Ireland (the Irish government has announced
that full liberalization will be achieved by 1.1.1999), and 1.1.2002 for Greece. The decisions include
detailed timetables for the gradual abolition of various remaining restrictions and for the fulfilment of
regulator}- requirements under Community law, before the final deadlines (see texts for more detail).
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conditions for interconnection to the basic functional components. More detailed provisions
on interconnection are included in the European Parliament and Council directive of 30 June
1997 harmonizing interconnection conditions (see chapter 2.4), whilst guidance on the
application of the competition rules in Articles 81 and 82 (ex-85 and ex-86) of the Treaty to
access and interconnection agreements, is provided by the Commission's Notice published
on 22 August 1998.
Tire 1996 directive also provides for the required measures for safeguarding universal
service in the Member States (see chapter 4.1.2.). Specifically, Member States are required to
allow tariff re-balancing taking account of specific market conditions and the need to ensure
the affordability of universal service. In particular, current rates which are not in line with
costs and which increase the burden of universal service provision should be adapted, in
order to achieve tariffs based on real costs. When such tariff re-balancing is not completed
before 1 January 1998 (in time for liberalization), Member States shall report to the
Commission on the future phasing out of the remaining tariff imbalances, including a
detailed timetable for implementation. The purpose of this directive is to create early
certainty with regard to national legislation and the rights and obligations ofmarket players in
the liberalized telecommunications environment. Its provisions aim to give full effect to the




The EC legislative achievements in the telecommunications field since the 1987 Green Paper
and after the British Telecom case must be acknowledged. The evolution of EC
telecommunications law during a period of just ten years is impressive. PART I of the study
showed that the political compromises leading to a fully liberalized telecommunications
market had and still have their weaknesses. Many of the terms used, such as
"interconnection", "telecommunications services", and "market power", to mention just a
few, still have to be defined.
In chapter 2 the Open Network Provision framework will be discussed . It starts with
a description of the various directives under the ONP framework, adopted under tire Open
Network Provision directive.
Chapter 2
Open Network Provision Framework
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Regulations implementing Articles 81 and 82 in application of Article 83 of the EC Treaty
constitute law in force and are enforceable throughout the Community. It is obvious that
Community acts adopted in die telecommunications sector are to be interpreted in a way
consistent widi competition rules, to ensure die best possible implementation of all aspects
of the Community telecommunications policy.
This applies to die relationship between competition rules applicable to undertakings
and die ONP rules. ONP comprises die "definition by die Council directives, of technical
conditions, usage conditions, and tariffs principles for Open Network Provision, starting
with harmonized conditions for the use of leased lines"1'1. The ONP principles have been
fixed116 on die establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through
die implementation of ONP, adopted by die Council on 28 June 1990 under Article 95 of
die EC Treaty. ONP has a fundamental role in providing Europe-wide access to
Community-wide interconnected public networks, and when Open Network Provision is
implemented, any network user will be offered harmonized access diroughout die
Community, whichever country they address. The hamionized access will be ensured in
compliance widi die competition rules as mentioned above, as die Open Network rules
provide.
After 1 January 1998, die time for the deregulated market, ONP can only be defined by
reference to general competition law principles, for instance, dominance based on market
shares rather than statutory privileges, and on the other hand full liberalization of services and
infrastructure will require the full adoption of ONP principles.
The adopted ONP focuses on interoperability and interconnection as the main issues
requiring regulation and supervision. It also recognizes that interoperability and, more so,
interconnection are likely to be die most controversial day-to-day issues in die new liberalized
environment. Another challenge for ONP will be to re-define die possible scope of specific
national requirements relating to essential requirements, which are security of network
operations, maintenance of network integrity, and interoperability of service and data
protection. Data protection may soon be harmonized to an extent that would anticipate any
need to deal widi it separately, as an issue in die framework ofONP.
115 European Council. Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications services and equipment up to 1992. (OJ No C 257/01). 04.10. 1988
116 European Commission. Directive 86/ 387/ EC. (OJ L 192/1). 24.07.1990.
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The adopted ONP policy should draw a clear distinction between service and
infrastructure.
The challenge of implementing fair competition may be even more daunting when the
Community liberalization measures reach the core of the telecommunications organization
activity, namely public voice telephony and die control of the basic infrastructure. These are
not new markets, but traditional and mature ones. The total dominance of incumbent
telecommunications organizations is consolidated. Experience of full liberalization in die US,
die UK, and Japan shows that established local market dominance stands a good chance of
persisting in the foreseeable future, even when the legislative and administrative mechanisms
protecting it are removed by appropriate Community legislation.
To be able to handle such a situation Stanbrook and Hooper in a study117 suggest two
lines of action: the first is encouraging infrastructure competition to weaken die incumbents'
control over botrleneck facilitates and die second involves imposing specific conditions on
incumbent dominant players. The study further examines whether Community law and
policy offer the basis for asymmetrical measures diat would favour new entrants by imposing
appropriate restrictions on dominant players. Such asymmetric measures must, diough,
respect the principle of equality as developed by the ECJ118. Such objective justification must
be related to one of the objectives of the EC Treaty.
117 Stanbrook and Hooper for the European Commission, Legal and Institutional Issues Raised in
Preparing for the Full Liberalization of the Telecommunications Sector. 09.1994.
118 See: Case 152/81, Ferrario [1983] ECR 2357/2367; Case 162/82, Cousin [1983] ECR 1101; and Case




The original directive on the application of ONP to leased lines'", adopted by the Council
on 5 June 1992, aimed to ensure the availability throughout the European Union of a
minimum set of analogue and digital leased lines up to 2Mbit/s with harmonized technical
characteristics. It also aimed at eliminating technical restrictions for the interconnection
between leased lines and public telecommunications networks.
Additional relevant provisions concern:
♦ availability of information on technical characteristics, tariffs, supply and usage
conditions, licensing and declaration requirements, and conditions for the attachment
of terminal equipment
♦ establishment of common ordering and billing procedures throughout the Union
♦ implementation of cost accounting systems by TOs in order to assess compliance
with tire basic principle of cost orientation of tariffs
♦ setting up of a conciliation procedure involving tire Commission, to deal with
disputes related to tire implementation of tire directive to be used when requested by
users
In 1997 the leased lines directive was revised12" to ensure that, in a competitive market,
all users continue to have access to leased litres from at least one operator, under harmonized
conditions of access and use, including access to a mandatory minimum set of leased lines.
This revised directive of 6 October 1997 had to be transposed into national law by 1 January
1998. This harmonized offering is expected to act as a benchmark in terms of quality, price,
and service levels, which other operators and service providers will seek to better. Tire
decision as to which organization(s), separately or jointly, will carry- this obligation-to-provide
will be taken at tire Member States' level. Obligations are normally to be placed only on
organizations with significant market power. However, if no organization has significant
market power in a given Member State, obligations must still be placed on at least one
organization to ensure full territorial coverage. In a market where competition is fully
effective, tire xreed to apply tire principle of cost orientation diminishes. Tire revised leased
119 European Council. Directive of 5 |une 1992 on the application of open network provision to
leased lines 92/44/EEC. (OJL 165/27). 19.6.1992.
120 Directive 97/51 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending
Council Directives 90/387/EEC. Directive 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive
environment in telecommunications. (OJL 295/23). 29.10.1997.
62 The Development of the Telecommunications Sector
lines directive, therefore, provides for tariff regulation to be set aside by the NRA once no
organization has significant market power in a specific market.
Price ceilings based on the lowest costs in the EU are recommended for the monthly
leasing of a transmission circuit by an incumbent to another telecommunications operator,
enabling the latter to link a user to its backbone network under competitive conditions. An
incumbent operator charging more than the recommended price would have to justify why
he is required to do so. In response, the national regulator}7 authority can oblige the operator
to reduce its prices to a competitive cost-oriented level.
As leased lines are only one means of access to the customer, the recommendation also
invites Member States to take other measures to stimulate competition and technical
innovation in local access networks, which constitute a bottleneck. The recommended
measures may aim to mandate unbundled access to the local loop of the incumbent operator
,and encourage the rapid deployment of emerging access technologies such as digital




The original directive on tire application ofONP to voice telephony services was adopted by
the European Parliament and Council on 13 December 19951"1. A new directive122 on Voice
Telephony was adopted on 26 February 1998 and has replaced the 1995 directive. The aims
of this ONP voice telephony directive are to ensure the availability throughout the
Community of good quality telephone services, and to define the services available to all
users, in tire context of Universal Service.
In view of tire close link between the scope of tire voice telephony service and universal
service, tire directive addresses detailed service issues, such as:
♦ definition at national level of targets for supply time and quality of service
♦ provision of advanced facilities
♦ discounts, low-usage schemes and other specific tariff provisions
♦ availability of itemized billing
♦ access to and use of directory services
♦ provision of public pay-telephones
♦ specific conditions for disabled users and people with special needs
♦ numbering issues
The revised directive also takes account of the competitive market and was due to be
implemented in Member States by mid-1998. It identifies the telephone services and
associated facilities to be publicly available to all users in the context of universal service,
reflecting the Commission Communication on Universal Service of March 1996. It ensures
that all users can on request gain access at an affordable price to the fixed public telephone
network, at a fixed location, for communication by voice, data or facsimile, and have access
to a basic range of facilities including itemized billing and tone dialling. The decision as to
which organization(s), separately or jointly, will carry these obligations-to-provide will be
taken at the Member States' level.
121 European Parliament and Council. Directive 95/62/EC of 13 December 1995 on the application
of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony. (OJ L 321/6). 30.12.1995.
122 Directive 98/ 10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1996 on the
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment (replacing European Parliament and Council Directive
95/62/EC, 98/10/EC) . (OJ L 101). 01.04.1998.
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There is also a legal requirement for affordability, to be defined at a national level,
allowing account to be taken of particular national situations and priorities. Affordability
exists alongside the requirement for cost orientation, which is driving of the current process
of tariff re-balancing. The principle of affordability ensures that tariff re-balancing proceeds
at a pace which is consistent with the introduction of competition, but which at tire same
time does not result in unacceptably steep price rises for users.
The revised directive calls upon Member States to set up consultative mechanisms with
users, consumers, suppliers, and manufacturers at the national level on issues related to the
level, quality, and affordability of universal service. The Commission will provide regular
reports on the evolution of tariffs throughout the Community.
In three specific areas:
♦ concerning directories
♦ consumer contracts
♦ access to emergence numbers
tire directive also applies to mobile telephony.
Chapter 2.3
Packet Switched Data Services
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The Council recommendation of 5 June 1992 on the application of ONP to public packet-
switched data services (PSDS)12j called upon Member States to ensure that on their territory,
a minimum set of packet-switched data services with harmonized technical characteristics is
provided, taking into account market demand. This recommendation also dealt with
transparency of information, harmonized tariffprinciples, and quality of service issues.
Although packet-switched data services and ISDN are liberalized, they are still subject
to ONP recommendations. They are placed under the Open Network Provision framework,
mainly because of the ongoing debate between die Commission and a number ofMember
States over the scope of liberalization in basic data services. Until the result of that debate
has been determined, it will be placed under ONP harmonization. A discussion on tiiis
subject is carried out in Chapter 2.6.
Annual statistical reports were prepared up to 1995, when it became clear that the
availability of PSDS offerings, including level of penetration, had reached an appropriate
degree diroughout the Union widi regard to the objectives of the ONP framework directive.
ISDN124
The Council recommendation of 5 June 1992 on die application of ONP to ISDN1"3 calls
upon Member States to ensure that on their territory an ISDN with harmonized access
arrangements and a minimum set of ISDN offerings according to ETSI standards are
provided, together widi adequate and efficient interoperability between ISDN networks in
order to allow for Community-wide operation. As for PSDS, this recommendation deals
widi transparency of information, harmonized tariff principles, quality of service issues and,
in addition, numbering.
Annual statistical reports have been prepared in order to examine die results of the
application of die recommendation. Since diey seem to indicate diat the availability of ISDN
123 European Council. Recommendation 92/382/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the harmonized provision
of a minimum set of packet-switched data services (PSDS) in accordance with open network provision
(ONP) principles. (OJL 200/1). 18.7.1992.
124 The 1997 ISDN report can be viewed at the Internet address:
http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-en.htm
125 European Council. Recommendation 92/383/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the provision of
harmonized integrated services digital network (ISDN) access arrangements and a minimum set of ISDN
offerings in accordance with open network provision (ONP) principles. (OJ L 200/10). 18.7.1992.
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offerings, including level of penetration, has reached an appropriate degree throughout the
European Union with regard to the objectives of the ONP framework directive, 1997 was




Interconnection is seen as a key element of a competitive market, allowing new market
entrants access to existing end users, on a basis which will encourage increased investment
and market growth in the telecommunications services sector. The interconnection directive
was adopted bv the EP and Council on 30 June 19971"6. Its objectives are to ensure "any-to-
any communication" and to guarantee the rights of market players to obtain interconnection
with the networks of others where tins is reasonably justified.
the harmonized framework for interconnection is characterized by:
♦ application of the open network provision principles of transparency, objectivity7, and
non-discrimination, in accordance with the principle of proportionality7
♦ priority given to commercial negotiations between interconnecting parties within a
framework estabkshed a priori by national telecommunications regulator}' authorities
in accordance with the principles of the directive
♦ clear responsibilities for national regulatory authorities, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, including effective mechanisms for dispute resolution.
The directive aims to strike an appropriate balance between die rights and obligations of
players in accordance with their relative positions in the market. For this reason, it provides
for designated organizations providing publicly available telecommunications networks and
services (as defined in its appendix) to have rights and obligations to negotiate
interconnection with each other, on a non-discriminatory basis, in order to ensure national
and Europe-wide services.
Obligations for organizations with significant market power include requirements for
non-discrimination, for publication of a reference interconnection offer, including
interconnect price lists, for cost-oriented interconnection tariffs supported by7 transparent
cost accounting systems, and for accounting separation in certain cases.
As well as providing a framework for interconnection, die directive is central in
establishing the rules for die costing and financing of universal service in a competitive
environment. It allows Member States to decide which organizations have an obligation to
provide universal service, and describes the conditions governing the mechanisms that
126 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP). (0| L 199/32). 26.07.1997.
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Member States may implement for the sharing of any unfair burden that arises from such an
obligation.
An amendment to die interconnection directive was adopted on 24 September 1998127,
in order to bring forward the date for introduction of operator number portability to 1
January 2000'" and to extend its coverage to the entire fixed network. Moreover, this
amending directive requires the introduction of carrier preselection by at least all fixed
network operators with significant market power, also as of 1 January 2000. In addition to
die directive, die Commission has adopted a recommendation on Interconnection in a
liberalized telecommunications market129. Part 1 of the recommendation, dealing with
interconnection pricing, was adopted on 8 January 1998.
The recommendation has been updated on 29 July 19981to provide die latest figures
on interconnection charges throughout die EU.
Part 2 of die recommendation adopted on 8 April 19981'1 deals widi accounting
separation and cost accounting systems for implementation of interconnection obligations
with particular regard to the principles of transparency and cost orientation. It recommends
that NRAs require operators with significant market power to provide cost-oriented
interconnection and die disaggregation of operating costs, capital employed and revenues of
their integrated operations into at least the following broad business lines: core network (e.g.,
interconnection services), local access network (e.g., local loops), retail, and other activities
(e.g., mobile, cable TV).
127 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/61/EC of 24 September 1998
amending Directive 97/33/EC with regard to number portability and carrier pre-selection. (OJ L 268).
03.10.1998.
128 Member States with derogation for the full liberalization of telecommunication services are grantedo o
additional periods of two years after their respective full liberalization dates.
129 European Commission. Recommendation 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998 amending Commission
Recommendation 98/195/EC of 8 January 1998 on Interconnection in a liberiized telecommunications
market. (OJ L 28/30). 15.08.1998."
130 European Commission. Recommendation 98/5l'l/EC of 29 July 1998 amending Commission
Recommendation 98/195/EC of 8 January 1998 on Interconnection in a liberalized telecommunications
market. Part 1 - Interconnection Pricing. (OJ L 228/30). 15.08.1998.




Directive 97/13/EC on a common framework for general authorizations and individual
licenses in the field of telecommunications services was adopted by the European Parliament
and by the Council on 10 April 19971'2. It had to be implemented by 1 January 1998. In an
open environment telecommunications operators have to comply with a number of
requirements relating both to predominantly technical issues (essential requirements) as well
as to public interest objectives. Authorization (or licensing) regimes provide an appropriate
means to supervise access to the market and to monitor compliance with the requirements
which are imposed on operators. At the same time, the development of competition will be
served best by authorization regimes which do not impose undue burdens on operators,
whedier through conditions or through procedures.
The key elements of the directive are:
♦ the prohibition of any limitation in the number of new entrants, except to the extent
required to ensure an efficient use of radio frequencies and, under limited
circumstances and for a temporary period, of numbers
♦ tire priority given to general authorizations (characterized by the absence of prior
approval by the national regulatory authority), as opposed to individual licenses.
Although the scope of individual licenses has been extended by the Council, the
signal sent and the principles set out by tire directive are very clear : national licensing
regimes must adopt tire least onerous system possible, and one of the means to
achieve that aim is to resort as much as possible to general authorizations.
♦ tire definition of harmonized principles: The directive offers important guarantees to
organizations applying for a telecommunications license in the EU, especially for
new entrants, by setting up time limits and other procedural requirements, and by
establishing principles with which national licensing regimes will have to comply, in
particular with regards to conditions which may be attached with licenses.
♦ a procedure allowing harmonization of licensing conditions. This procedure
associates CEPT/ECTRA/ETO and CEPT/ERC/ERO in the technical
132 (OJ L 117/15). 07.5.1997.
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preparation of harmonized conditions and should result in Community decisions
creating rights for undertakings1".
♦ the establishment of a one-stop shopping procedure to facilitate simultaneous
applications for and granting of licenses in several Member States. The Commission
has granted a mandate to CEPT to put this procedure into place.
The directive has also established a licensing committee, composed of representatives of the
Member States and chaired by die Commission, to assist the Commission in executing the
various tasks which the directive has created. The licensing committee also deals with
matters following from the S-PCS Decision.
133 The Commission has concluded a Memorandum ofUnderstanding with the European Committee
for Telecommunications Regulator)' Affairs (ECTRA), an inter-govemmental organization comprising
EU Member States as well as other European states, including those from Central and Eastern Europe.
Under that MoU, the Commission entrusts certain work orders, in particular in relation to the
harmonization of licensing conditions, to ECTRA's European Telecommunications Office (ETO).
Chapter 2.6
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The Commission adopted the approach'14 that EC law should at least allow a compromise
solution for the introduction of asymmetrical Community' measures. An example of this
could be tire market dominance enjoyed by an incumbent operator. Dominance would than
be measured by an SMP (Significant Market Power) test. The market share 50%, would than
be interpreted in the light of how dominance is assessed under Article 82 EC. This approach
requires telecommunications organizations and Member States to prove, in a certain amount
of time, that certain specified practices or arrangements listed in tire asymmetrical measures
comply with EC law. A shift in the burden of proof is a heavy requirement affecting only
certain categories of undertakings detenrrined for instance by their market share.
Undertakings are deprived of the benefits of automatic exemption of certain of their
contractual clauses if their market share exceeds certain limits.
In this area, it must be remembered that ensuring universal service is of vital
importance in fulfilling the challenge to reach full liberalization. Ensuring compliance with
the 1990 service directive and Article 86 (2) of the Treaty is entrusted to the dominant
incumbent telecommunications organizations.
As explained in the transparency directive'15, where a public service obligation is
imposed, some form of compensation is normally provided for the serving of unprofitable
areas or the provision of otherwise economically nonviable services, the assurance of which
is deemed to be in the general interest. There was a debate in the Community'
telecommunications sector'16 as to what form compensation should take after the
liberalization in 1998 and even what in fact the scope of the universal service should be'1 .
With political emphasis on solidarity, integration, and the social dimension of the internal
market it must be seen as clear that the solution to the universal service question must be
found at the same time as liberalization.
134 European Commission. Regulation on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of technology transfer agreements. (OJ C 178). 30.06.1994.
135 European Commission. Directive of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations
between Member States and public undertakings 80/723/EC. (OJ L195). 29.07.1980.
136 lite fora for this discussion are mainlv Information Society Directorate and Competition
Directorate.
137 For a description of this debate see: P. Larouche. Competition Law and Regulation in European
Telecommunications. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000). 31 ff.
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As stated in tlie Council resolution',8, elements of universal service are contained in tire
ONP directives, the Council recommendations on packet-switched data, and139 the ISDN
offerings. Tire point for tire Member States is to define what should constitute universal
service. Tire resolution called on tire Member States to "establish and maintain an
appropriate regulatory framework and set appropriate targets In order to ensure, in the
light of specific national circumstance.. .universal service throughout their territory". This
approach would appear to be confirmed in tire Corbeau14" case.
Following the resolutions, the Commission undertook comprehensive studies and
consultations on these points. The Commission is currently reviewing the detail of national
schemes for universal service, which had to be notified to the Commission in early 1997 for
review as to their compatibility with Community law. Looking beyond the voice telephony
directive under the ONP principles and the legal framework for tire costing and pricing of
universal service, the Commission published in March 1996141 a communication examining
tire scope on universal service, how it might be adapted to the needs of tire fully liberalized
telecommunications market in 1998 and, of course, the issue of affordability. Tire broader
political issue of promoting public access to new information services was also considered
and tire Commission announced "a further proposal to amend the ONP Voice Telephony
Directive of December 1995 to create an obligation of affordability, require the provision of
certain additional voice telephony features, such as touch-dialling, call - barring and itemized
billing and to strengthen consumer rights and provide better service for disabled users".
Further tire Commission announced a communication on tire criteria14" which tire
Commission is using when examining national schemes for tire costing and financing of
universal service as well as guidelines for their practical operation and a first monitoring
138 European Council. Resolution of 7 February 1994 on universal service principles in the
Telecommunications sector. (OJ C 48). 16.02.1994.
139 European Council. Directive 90/387/EC. (OJ L192). 24.07.1990.
140 Case 320/91, Continental Can v. Commission [1991] ECR L2533 (The Continental Can Case).
141 European Commission. Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic
and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Universal Service for Telecommunications in
the perspective of a fully liberalized environment - an essential element of the Information Society .
(COM 96/73 final). 13.03.1996.
142 European Commission. Communication of 27 November 1996 on the assessment criteria for
national schemes for the costing and financing of universal service in Telecommunications and guidelines
for the Member States on the operation of such schemes. (COM 96/608).
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report at the end of 1997 to access the scope, level, quality, and affordability of universal
service.
On 11 September 1996 die Commission adopted its14, proposal to adapt die existing
ONP voice telephony, whilst on 27 November 1996, die Commission adopted also die
communication on the assessment criteria for universal service schemes. The
communication represents an important step for die Commission in diat it is designed not
only to provide concrete guidance on how the existing legislation should be applied by die
Member States, but also to prove guidelines for many of the detailed aspects of universal
service. Guidelines on calculating the costs of universal service, based on a long run average
incremental cost methodology and die practical operation of universal service funds or other
financing mechanisms determining who contributes and in what proportion to any burden
associated widi universal service.
After die introduction of the different directives, die integration of Articles 86 (3) and
95 of die EC Treaty will be discussed. The common view is diat directives adopted under
Article 86 (3) are called liberalization directives and those adopted under Article 95 are called
harmonization directives144. A summary of the directives is presented in figure 2 on page 84.
143 European Commission. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
application ofOpen Network Provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment. (Replacing European Parliament and Council
Directive 95/62/EC); (COM 96/419 final). 11.09.1996.
144 See as example the www.ISPO.be - A. Bartousch, Europaisches Telekommunikationsrecht in |ahr
1988. (1999). The Status Report of EU Telecommunications Policy, updated occasionally at the
INFOSOC Web site. This WEB site changes its looks far too frequently, so it might take some effort to
find the quoted material.









(Amending Directive 88/301, (on
competition in the markets in
telecommunications terminal equipment),
and Directive 90/388 in particular with
regard to satellite communications).
Directive 95/51
(Amending Directive 90/388 with regard
to the abolition of the restrictions on the
use of cable television networks for the
provision of already liberalized
telecommunications services).
Directive 96/2
(Amending Directive 90/388 with regard
to mobile and personal communications).
Directive 96/19
(Amending Directive 90/388 with regard








(Establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the




(Amending Directives 90/387 and
92/44 (on the application of open




telecommunications with regard to
ensuring universal services and
interoperability through application of
the principles ofONP).
Directive 98/10
(On the application of ONP to voice
telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive
environment).
These four Directives are referred to
as the Open Network Provision
Framework.
Directive 97/13
(On a common framework for general
authorizations and individual licenses in
the field of telecommunications
"\ 145services).
The packet-switched data services and the ISDN are not placed in either of the two
categories although they are liberalized, but still under ONP recommendations146.
145 This Directive is not regarded as falling under the ONP framework as it is also based on articles
47(2) and 55 EC Treaty.
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As actions were taken to liberalize the telecommunications market towards 1998, the
overlaps between the two directive categories seem to have increased147, as die original
purpose of die ONP framework was lost widi the removal of die rest of die special rights
over telecommunications infrastructure and the ONP directives were seen more as a
regulatory framework for telecommunications148. The players in the market could be
identified as falling into three categories:
♦ operators with significant market power
♦ operators of public telecommunications networks
♦ telecommunications service providers
Gradually the liberalization directives149 and die harmonization directives began to cover
similar ground. In fact die Commission introduced all its proposals under Article 86(3). The
Commission made its proposal for die newONP framework under Article 86 (3) with regard
to die implementation of full competition in telecommunications market (Directive 96/19).
It is interesting to notice diat the full competition directive was in force during the process
that led to die adoption of die ONP framework and die licensing directives. The
Commission dien, with the terminal equipment directive discussed earlier, extended die
scope of Article 86 (3) to include die power to abolish special and exclusive rights. The
Court ofJustice upheld this15". As discussed in chapter 1.1 the full competition directive was
used to:
♦ abolish exclusive rights on telecommunications services (apart from voice telephony)
♦ regulate the access and use of telecommunications infrastructure and voice telephony
146 It is thought that the reason for this is that a number ofMember States are not in agreement with
the Commission about the scope of liberalization concerning the basic data service.
147 When the removal of special and exclusive rights over telecommunications infrastructure and voice
telephony took place, the purpose of the ONP framework disappeared.
148 For a similar view see P. Barouche, Competition Law and Regulation European
Telecommunications. (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000). chapter I: 4.
149 A detailed examination of the two types of directives was done by P. Inhaul, EC
Telecommunications: Towards a new Regulatory Paradigm, 1998, and was presented in an article
Convergence in European Telecommunications: A case study on the relationship between regulation and
competition law. This article can be downloaded from www.diihtal4aw.net. Furtif, sexe: Dr P. Nihilismes
thermal, Les telecommunications en Europe: concurrence ou organization de marche? (L°uvain-la-
Neuve, 1997.
150 See Chapter 1.1.2, supra.
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♦ separate the operational and regulatory functions of the telecommunications
operators (TO)131
With the full competition Directive 96/19, the Commission took a further step to strengthen
its powers under Article 86 (3), by moving into die competition environment, as a result of
die abolition of special and exclusive rights. This meant in practise that die harmonization
directives under Article 95 were overlapped by die liberalization directives under Article 86
(3).
As mentioned earlier, a detailed discussion of die distinction between die two
categories of directives has been done by Nihoul in his doctoral thesis11", which is why only
his conclusions will be mentioned here. He concludes that, at least in die EU context, it is not
possible to make a hard distinction between competition and regulation. He bases his
argument on different elements where competition law and regulation would supposedly be
different. He mentions:
4 die time when the intervention takes place (ex post for competition law and ex ante
for regulation)
♦ the form of obligations (negative for competition law, positive for regulation)
♦ the effect on die firm (protective of freedom for competition law and restrictive of
freedom for regulation)
♦ die scope and precision of intervention (broad general and simple for competition
law and narrow, detailed and complex for regulation)
♦ die aims (efficiency for competition law and redistribution for regulation)
♦ the circumstance of intervention (specific events for competition law and no
restrictions for regulation
♦ the object of intervention (market power for competition law and market parameters
for regulation)
♦ die directness of intervention in the functioning of firms (indirect for competition
law and direct for regulation)
151 This was an important issue since, as the telecommunications markets would be liberalized and the
TOs should come into those markets, it was obvious that the TOs could no longer have any regulatory
powers.
152 See P. Nihoul, Les telecommunications en Europe: concurrence ou organization de marche?
(Louvain-la-Neuve, 1997.
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Therefore153, the distinction between competition, as is mentioned in the liberalization
directives, and regulation, as is mentioned in the harmonization directives does not stand.
This would, however, be the case in the USA134. (As the US rules are of limited
relevance in tire European debate, one must be careful in using use them when discussing
EU position.) Competition in the USA means the natural state of the market, free from
regulator mechanisms that get in the way of tire free play of the market, and regulation
would then be a state of affairs where government intervention replaces some or all
mechanisms of competition.
To summarize the two views one can argue that:
♦ In the USA, regulation is seen as unfavourable to competition law, so either
competition law or regulation would apply155.
♦ In tire EU, competition law and regulation are not seen as incompatible136. As
liberalization overtakes state interventions with sector-specific regulation,
competition law will continue to be applicable to the liberalized sectors even when
sector-specific regulation is in place.
Directives adopted under Article 86(3) played an important, if not vital, role in the
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The major reason for this was that tire
Commission used them to push through the liberalization process. As shown on page 55 the
full competition Directive (90/388) and tire four directives amending it, were used as a
reference to support the new regulatory framework as it is described in the directives ratified
by the European Parliament and the Council under Article 95.
153 As P. Nilioul concludes, supported by P. Larouche in his work European Telecommunications law
Chapter II: E in fine.
154 For a discussion on US regulation, see Supreme Court Judge S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform.
(Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1982).
155 A view that is supported by Supreme Court judge Breyer, in Regulation and its Reform.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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In the Green Paper on liberalisation of telecommunications, infrastructure numbering was
recognised as a "key factor -a pivot in market liberalisation and the introduction of
competition"157. It was further seen as necessary to ensure that die "development of
telecommunications networks and services are not hampered on numbering grounds" and
that "this challenge needs to be addressed by careful management of die overall numbering
schemes, at a global, European and national level". According to Article 129b of die Treaty,
"die Community shall aim at promoting die interconnection and interoperability of national
networks as well as access to such networks".
Since die early 1990s die European Commission, the Council, and die European
Parliament have been active in developing and opening a unified numbering environment
within Europe:
♦ a Europe-wide access code for emergency services (112) to operate horn 1992 and
only in justified cases from 1996 alongside existing national emergency codes158
# a Europe-wide access code for die international dialling (00) to be introduced
between 1992 and 1998159.
The administration of national numbering will remain a national function to be carried
out by an authority independent from the operators.
The goals set out by the Council call for die development of a cooperation framework
based on CEPT160 coordination mechanisms, similar to that for radio frequencies. In
September 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a framework contract were
signed with die CEPT European Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs
(ECTRA) and die European Telecommunications Office (ETO), which has been set up in
Copenhagen, under ECTRA. ECTRA adopted in November 1996 a decision on the
establishment of a European Telephony Numbering Space that was approved by die
Member States in June 1997 and adopted by the Commission161 in its Green Paper.
157 Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure and cable television
network - Part II, A . (COM 94/682 final). 28.01.95.
158 European Council. Decision of 29 July 1991 on the introduction of a single Eluropean emergency
call number 91/396/EC . (OJ L 217/31). 06.08.91.
159 European Council. Decision of 11 May 1992 on the introduction a standard International
telephone access code in the Community 92/264/EC. (OJ L 137/21). 20.05.92.
160 The European Confederation of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations.
161 The European Commission Green Paper on a Numbering Policy for Telecommunications Services
in Europe: Towards a European Numbering Environment. (COM 96/590 final). Brussels. 20.06.1997.
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In order to shape Europe's future numbering environment and establish the political
priorities in political objectives, the Commission has made the regulatory basis for the
framework from the requirements in a competitive environment for control of national
numbering schemes to be the responsibility of National Regulator)7 Authorities (NRAs).
Regulator)7 numbering responsibilities are set out in the ONP open voice telephony
directive162, the interconnection directive,161 and the Commission directive on frill
liberalization164. The Green Paper was welcomed16' and the issues addressed were
recognized as crucial for the development of effective competition in a single European
telecommunications market. It was pointed out that for all numbering changes and number
mechanisms, the need of the user should be the point in focus. Changes to numbering plans
always impose considerable burden on both business and public subscribers, and should
therefore only be envisaged if tire benefits clearly overweigh die costs166.
Consumer organizations and various service providers stressed tire importance of an
objective information campaign, to inform die subscribers in due time of die new
possibilities which would be available, in particular number portability, carrier selection16',
and Europe-wide service numbers. The subscriber should obtain clear information on how
to benefit from any of these new options. The Green Paper proposed the introduction of
carrier selection in two steps: call-by-call carrier selection to be introduced by 1 January 1998,
and carrier pre-selection by 1 January 2000.
The increase of competition as potential effects of carrier selection was widely
recognized, both by those who therefore advocated a rapid and general introduction and by
those who for die same reasons insist that a more cautious and limited approach should be
chosen.
162 European Council. Directive 95/62/EC. (COM 896/419 final).
163 European Council. Directive 97/33 EC of 30 June 1997 on Interconnection in
Telecommunications... of the Principles ofONP. (OJ L 199/32). 1997.
164 European Commission. Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 with regard to the full
implementation of full competition in the Telecommunications Markets. (OJ L 74/13). 1996.
165 Around 80 written comments were received from residential and business users associations,
telecommunications service and network providers, equipment and software manufacturers, and NRAs
and their associations. A public hearing, with more than 100 participants, took place on 5 February 1997.
166 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council regarding the Consultation on the Green Paper on a Numbering Policy for
Telecommunications Services in Europe . (COM 97/203).
167 The possibility for customers to choose their long-distance or international operator, e.g. by dialling
a code or by determining the default carrier.
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Concerning the issue of mobile versus fixed, the mobile operators argued that no form
of carrier selection should be imposed to the mobile sector as sufficient competition already
exists. Some of the operators also invoked technical complications for tire implementation
of carrier selection in mobile networks for which standardized solutions need to be
developed first. On the other hand, long distance service providers insisted that all local loop
access providers, both wired and mobile, should be obliged to offer carrier selection. The
reason for this discussion was a presentation made by ECTRA168 estimating that the direct
costs for numbering changes would be within the following ranges: "the cost of a subscriber
number change 10-50 ECU, the change in national destination code 1-10 ECU, and the
cost of a country code change at least 0.5 ECU". A reasonable estimate of the total direct
costs would amount to approximately 2 billion ECU16'. The most important issue on
numbering is the issue of ensuring effective competition. In addition to general application
of competition rules under the EC Treaty, the legal framework for telecommunications
establishes obligations for Member States with regard to numbering1
The Commission directive required that adequate numbers are made available for all
telecommunications services before 1 July 1997. The interconnection directive171 reiterates
tins requirement and stipulates further that "National Regulatory Authorities shall ensure that
numbering plans and procedures are applied in a manner that gives fair and equal treatment
to all providers of publicly available telecommunications services", and that there shall be no
"undue discrimination in the number sequences used to give access to the services of other
telecommunications operators".
As indicated earlier ECTRA estimated the costs for numbering changes in the
European Community. These estimates were based on four options for a European Strategy
towards a long term numbering strategy:
168 ECTRA (European Committee for Telecommunications Regulator)' Affairs) Project Team on
Numbering, Report on Costs of Number changes . 10 July 1995.
169 This is estimated with about 200 million subscriber lines at a cost of 10 ECU per line. The Council
Decision on the introduction of the common emergency number 112 and the consequential review of a
number of national numbering schemes has significantly facilitated the introduction of other short codes
starting with 1.
170 European Commission. Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EC
with regard to the implementation of full competition in Telecommunications Markets. (O] L 74/13).
22.02.1996.
171 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in
Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and Interoperability through application of
the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP). (OJ L 199/32). 1997.
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♦ Option 1 was a continuation of the present situation and should only be reactive to
market forces or ITU172 developments.
♦ Option 2 would implement a European Telephony Numbering Space (ETNS) for
special pan -European services such as free-phone, premium-rate, or shared-cost
service without making changes to country codes1
♦ Option 3 issued the creation, in addition to providing numbers for special services,
of a clear European numbering identity1 4 by using the number 3 to proceed current
national country codes, for example 333 for France, 344 for the United Kingdom or
346 for Sweden. The reason for this Option was that it would liberate up to 50 new
country codes within Europe and allow the current country codes starting with
number 4 to be recycled within the world-wide numbering plan.
♦ Option 4 was the creation of a single digit country code for Europe173, within a
unified European numbering scheme, which would over time merge with national
schemes.
In the consultation period following the ECTRA suggestion176 it showed that Option 1
was widely rejected, but there was support for rapid progress on Option 2. There was a clear
division of opinion between incumbent operators and new market players with regard to the
need for rapid progress on Option 3 and on Option 4.
This division of opinions was confirmed by the contributions received on the
consultation on the Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure
and cable TV networks17'. The reason for these differences is mainly that alternative fixed
local loop178 access providers believe that tire debate on carrier selection is based on tire, in
their view, wrong presumption that the local loop is a utility rather than a competitive
product.
172 International Telecommunications Union. (ITU).
173 Tire implementation was initially foreseen via the allocation of a virtual country code by ITU.
Country code 388 was set aside and marked unavailable until mid 1997 pending further study in Europe
on the set up of an ETNS.
174 A three digit numbering code.
175 Similar to the use of 1 to call North America from other parts of the world, or 1 + the local area
code to call long-distance within North-America.
176 Report on the consultation on strategic options for numbering of Telecommunications services in
Europe, by ECTRA PT N, 10 July 1995.
177 (COM 94/682). 25.01.1995.
178A line connecting a customer's telephone equipment with the local telephone company exchange.
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The consultation process arguments were countered by long distance and international
service providers who believe that the regulatory framework "should not favour one
particular structural outcome of tire competitive process, like infrastructure or service based
competition The long distance providers added that "carrier selection will also provide an
incentive to invest in the local loop given die importance of customer ownership".
As to the mechanism of carrier selection, a view was held tiiat easy access1'' is a
sufficient instrument to facilitate competition in order to lower long distance and
international tariffs. This group insisted that where easy access already exists, die cost for
mandatory migration to equal access would not outweigh die benefits. A majority of the
comments, however, from die new entrants in die long distance and international service
market, die business and residential users associations, die majority of incumbents, and the
national regulator}' authorities supported die need for full equal access. Various international
service providers expressed strong misgivings concerning die risk that easy access is wholly
inadequate in bringing about effective competition, given its strong bias in favour of die
incumbent operator.
The international service providers advocated that "experience shows that customers
find it difficult to make the additional dialling effort required for selecting a different carrier
than die one determined by default by die local access provider". The latter will, in most
cases, be die incumbent even in a fully liberalised market. In the context of competition,
incumbent operators argued the need for harmonized and synchronized introduction of pro-
competitive number mechanisms throughout the European Community in order to avoid
competitive distortions. Some of the operators, however, felt that a gradual introduction
would be more appropriate in order to allow operators to integrate die introduction of
number portability capacity in their regular network update programme.
The timetable proposed in die Green Paper suggested the implementation of
European Telephony Numbering Space by 1 January 1998 at die latest. Pan-European
carriers and operators with pan-European strategic vision, expressed very strong support for
179 Easy access in relation to carrier selection refers to the situation where the default long distance
carrier is determined by the local access operator with the possibility of override through dialling of a
short code by the user on a call-by-call basis. Compare with equal access, which in relation to carrier
selection refers to the situation where the long distance carrier is pre-selected by the customer with the
possibility of over ride through dialling on a call-by-call basis.
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the development of a European Telephony Numbering Space and felt drat it would create
opportunities for die development of pan-European services. Furthemiore, there was broad
support for implementation of a European Telephony Numbering Space on the basis of die
388 country code.
On die basis of the consultations on priorities for action, die timetable for the
availability of carrier selection and pre-selection, number portability and pan-European
numbers eventually was agreed as follows180.
By 1 January 1998: Call-by-call carrier selection to be offered by all fixed local access
providers with significant market power, in all Member States, where full liberalization is
required by that date, and in Member States where additional transition periods have been
agreed, by die end of those periods.
By 1 January 1999: Establishment of a European Telephony Numbering Space on the
basis of country code 388.
By 1 January 2000: Carrier pre-selection, with default to be determined by the
subscriber and with call-by-call override for the user, to be offered by all fixed local access
providers with significant market power in all Member States. Operator number portability
to be offered by all operators for non-geographic special service numbers (freephone, shared
costs, premium rate services). The Green Paper also suggested in order achieving diese
objectives actions, which will be needed.
By end of 1997: Proposal for appropriate legislative measures to ensure the availability
of facilities for carrier pre-selection and number portability throughout die Community by 1
January 2000. The Commission trusted that ETSI would endeavour to adopt common
standards, both on alphanumeric dialling and the * and # codes by die end of 1997181. ETO
Report with detailed description of national numbering plans. Launch studies on possible
minimum criteria and standardization requirements in view of a long term number portability
solution, and alternative, on-screen/on-line means, for tariff information, for the user.
180 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council regarding the consultation on the Green paper on a Numbering Policy for
Telecommunications Services in Europe . (COM 97/203).
181 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council regarding the Consultation on the Green Paper on a Numbering Policy for
Telecommunication Services in Europe . (COM 97/203). 23.
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By end of 1998: Examine possible extension of carrier selection and number
portability requirements to mobile operators.
By early 1999: Appropriate legislative measures to be adopted to ensure the availability
of facilities for carrier pre-selection and number portability throughout the Commumtv by
1 January 2000. Member state to implement 388 for the European Telephony Numbering
Space. The Commission is to issue common guidelines on fair and pro-competitive
arrangements for sharing costs of number portability. Commission recommendations on
further restructuring of national numbering plans in view of competition requirements and
gradual convergence.
By end of 1999: Examine desirability of extension of carrier selection requirements to
fixed local access providers without significant market power.
By early 2000: Further study, in the light of experience with a liberalized single market
in telecommunications and with tire ETNS, of die need for and costs/benefits of unified
European numbering environment. A long term view on a European numbering
environment to be developed, on the basis of experience gained with a liberalized market and
with tire European Telephony Numbering Space. A communication182 was presented on tire
1st October 1997 for a proposal for a European Parliament and of tire Council amending
Directive 97/33/EC (dre interconnection directive) widr regard to operator number
portability and carrier pre-selection.
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A proposal for a common framework18, for general authorization and individual licenses in
the field of telecommunications was adopted in November 1995. The proposal replaced
two previous proposals, one on the mutual recognition184 of licenses and other national
authorizations for telecommunications services, and one on a policy for the mutual
recognition183 of licenses and other national authorizations for die provision of satellite
network services and satellite communications services
In an open environment telecommunications operators have to comply with a numbcl¬
ot" requirements relating both to predominantly technical issues (essential requirements) as
well as to public interest(s) objectives. Authorization or licensing regimes provide an
appropriate means to supervise access to the market and to monitor compliance with the
requirements which are imposed on operators. At the same time, it has become clear that
the development of competition will be served best by authorization bodies that do not
impose undue burdens on operators, whether through conditions or through processes.
After the European Parliament suggested certain amendments, a directive on a
common framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the field of
telecommunications services was agreed by the Council186 and shows key elements in the
licensing field. The directive was intended to be implemented by die Member States in time
for full liberalization on 1 January 1998.
The directive prohibits any limitation in the number of new entrants, except to the
extent required to ensure an effective use of radio frequencies, and under limited
circumstances and for a temporary period, of numbers. Further die priority given to general
authorizations characterized by the national regulatory authority as opposed to individual
licenses. Although the Council has extended the scope of individual licenses, the signals sent
and the principles set out by die directive are very clear. National licensing bodies must adopt
die least onerous system possible, and one of the means to achieve that aim is to resort as
much as possible to general authorizations.
183 European Commission. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a common
framework for General authorizations and individual licenses in the field ofTelecommunications Services.
(COM 95/545; OJ C 90/5). 27.03.1996.
184 (COM 92/254 final).
185 (COM 94/41 final).
186 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/13/EC on a common framework for
general authorizations and individual licenses in the filed of Telecommunications services. (OJ L 117/15).
07.05.1997.
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Concerning the definition of harmonized principles, the directive offers important
guarantees to organizations applying for a telecommunications license in the European
Union, especially for new entrants, by setting up time limits and odier procedural
requirements, and by establishing principles with which national licensing regimes will have
to comply, in particular with regard to conditions which may be attached to licenses. As an
example, tire directive forbids certain kinds of illegitimate licensing conditions, or requires
that license fees only cover the administrative costs and be proportionate to the work
involved in issuing and monitoring the license.
In a study by N/E/R/A187, reflecting the discussions behind the two proposals188 in
order to put die licensing directive in context, they argued that the need to obtain separate
licenses or authorizations in the Member States was harmful to a true single market, time
consuming, and a barrier to entry. When the service proposal was introduced, the concept of
a single European telecommunications license was replaced by a watered-down procedure
for mutual recognition of national authorizations, under a simplified and, as claimed, more
efficient procedure, based on prior harmonization of national conditions for authorization of
telecommunications services.
Both proposals envisaged die creation of a Community telecommunications
committee. The Proposals stated that die Committee was to have an advisory role, leaving
final decision making power to the Commission. The Economic and Social Committee
recommended that die Committee should have greater powers, which was, however, resisted
by the Commission. In general the NRAs would have retained die right to issue, monitor
and enforce licenses to provide telecommunications services, bodi proposals contained
powers for the Commission and in certain cases to overturn national licensing decisions.
187 National Economics Research Associates, A Marsh & D. McLennan Company, London, The
Proposed Community Position on Licensing and Interconnection. Report made for DG XIII, April
1997.
188 The Services Proposal: European Commission. The amended Proposal for a European Parliament
and Council Directive on the mutual Recognition of Licenses and other National Authorization for
Telecommunications Services. (COM 92/254, as amended bv COM 94/41). The Services Proposal:
European Commission. The Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Policy for
the mutual recognition of Licenses and other National Authorization for the Provision of Satellite
Network Services and/ or satellite Communications Services . (COM 93/652).
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This caused great concern in die Member States and diese powers are not repeated in die
Common Position18'1 on die licensing directive.
The main difference between the licensing directive and die two wididrawn proposals
is that the Community moved away from die idea of mutual recognition of licenses and
thereby further away from pan-European licensing in favour of national harmonized
procedures for the granting of audiorizations and the conditions attached to authorizations.
In a way to promote deregulation, die Commission also promotes the grant of general
authorizations by Member States, tiiereby removing die need for individual national licenses
in many cases.
The new proposed licensing directive does retain certain elements from die previous
wididrawn proposals. For instance, it requires diat ECTRA and ERC/ERO develop
harmonized license conditions and diat a one-stop-shopping procedure for individual
licenses be set up to assist undertakings to provide trans-European services. If this
procedure is fully implemented, it may facilitate simultaneous delivery of individual national
licenses following a single application. In a parallel study by ETO190, diey have 1995 set up a
type of one-stop-shopping regime envisaged by die licensing directive, however, only for data
transmission and value-added services.
Another feature of the original proposal was that operators, intending to operate in
more dian one Member State, may request the relevant NRAs coordinate their authorization
procedure in order to ensure tiiat diey issue the necessary audiorizations on substantially die
same conditions, but diis provision was removed in die Common Position.
Finally, a common position was reached on 9 December 1996 under which die use of
licenses is limited in Article 7 to:
allowing access to radio frequencies or numbers, granting licensees particular rights
with regard to access to public private land, further to imposing obligation and
requirements relating to die mandator)- provision of publicly available Member States
services and/or public Member State networks, including obligations under ONP
legislation and/or relating to universal service provision and imposing specific
obligations related to competition rules on players witii significant market power in
189 Common Position adopted by the Council on 9 December 1996, Brussels 2 December 1996.
190 European Telecommunications Office, One-Stop-Shopping on, Bearer Data Services and Other
Liberalized Services. Copenhagen. 1995.
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relation to publicly available Member State services and/or public Member State
networks.
In addition to tins, individual licenses may be used in relation to the provision of voice
telephony services, the establishment and provision of public Member State networks, and of
other networks involving radio frequencies. According to Article 10 (1) of the Common
Position, the number of licenses may be limited for any category of services for the
establishment and operation of networks "only to the extent required to ensure the efficient
use of radio frequencies for the time necessary to make available sufficient numbers in
accordance with Community Law".
In the cases where licenses are required, the NRAs are put under stringent obligations
and a new Licensing Committee is to be set up, comprising representatives ofMember States
in order to assist tire Commission to monitor the application of the licensing directive and to
promote exchanges of information. A recent development in tire field of licensing was a
discussion in the Council of a proposal by tire Commission1" to introduce S-PCS in the
Community in a coordinated fashion. An important issue, was the need for action at
Community level, on tire grounds that coordination on frequency allocation and licensing
already takes place via organizations such as ITU and the CEPT.
In a consultation round, tire Member States, or at least most of them, rejected
provisions in the proposal, allowing the Commission together with a Committee of Member
State representatives to develop criteria for licensing operators for the EU Market and for
selecting tire operators, which suggests political concern over expansion in tire role of the
Commission in tire area of licensing and that tire subsidiarity argument could be deployed
against further pre-emption in this area. Concerning the involvement of a European
regulator)' authority, there was support among tire Member States for such a body. The
strongest support came, obviously, from companies wishing to operate across Europe.
These companies considered tire case for a single license to operate across Europe and issued
by a single European body, to be very strong. One company, which was interviewed192,
191 European Commission. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on an action
as a Union Level in the field of Satellite Personal Communications Services in the European Union .
(COM 95/529).
192 Issues Associated with the Creation of a European Regulator)* Authority for Telecommunications
Survey Results in the consultation on the Creation ofa European Regulatory Authorityfor Telecommunications NERA
and Denton Hall for the European Commission.
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stated, "How can you envisage a single market for Telecommunications, when there is no
one to give you a European License?".
The difficulties faced concerning licenses in the Community originate mainly from the
fact that the licensing procedure differs widely from country to country within the European
Community. The two extremes are die United Kingdom and Gennany. Under die United
Kingdom system19', which uses die license conditions as the principal instrument of
regulation, very detailed licenses are issued. Even guidelines to die license are introduced"4:
As soon as reasonably practical on or after 1 August 1997 and in any event no later
than 31 December 1997 die Licensee shall introduce and make generally available a
scheme complying widi the guidelines to be agreed between the Director and die
Licensee in accordance with which the Licensee will provide to every person who is,
or wishes to become, its residential customer and who requests such provision, voice
telephony services under which no outgoing calls can be made except as a
consequence of die requirements on the Licensee under Condition—
In Germany, the approach is the opposite. The licenses are much shorter than in die
United Kingdom. For example, in Germany an operator just agrees to have the status of a
public telecommunications operator in very broad terms"3. Rights, restrictions, and
obligations are established for that category or organization in die legislative and regulatory
measure accompanying telecommunications liberalization in Germany.
There are also differences between Member States in the levels of compliance and
enforcement. This is an important issue, as even if the formal rules are harmonized, different
levels of enforcement will mean diat harmonization is not achieved in practise.
In addition to diis, differences in license conditions between die Member States can
impose extra costs on those who are trying to establish a seamless network across Europe,
rather than a patchwork on national networks. Operators arguing against die involvement of
a European regulatory audiority in the issuing of a European Community license, die setting
193 Statement issued by the Director General of Telecommunications in Interconnection and
Interoperability, and in the OFTEL's Management Plan for 1997/ 98 and beyond, June 1997.
194 See, for instance, Draft British Telecom License condition and Guidelines for the Lifeline Scheme.
These can be downloaded from the OPTEL web site. (Due to frequent changes of the WEB site it might
be difficult to find).
195 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Postwesens und der Telekommunikation — Postneuordnungsgesetz,
'l"he Postal Reform Package II on September 14, 1994. Published by the German NRA.
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of license conditions, and the monitoring of compliance, believe that the costs of multiple
license applications and of compliance with different sets of license conditions, have been
greatly exaggerated, and that European measures are currently on the table that will deal with
a number of the problems raised.
One such solution could be the one-stop-shopping available through the ETO as a way
of minimizing tire costs of multiple license applications. It was pointed out, however that
ETO only deals with the licensing of services and has no authority to impose binding license
conditions or to oblige licenses to be granted by the NRAs concerned.
Under mutual recognition or single European licensing, service providers will need to
apply for one license instead of fifteen. Under the class licenses administration, service
providers will not need to make any license applications.
The supporters of a single European license argue that the licensing directive is
insufficient to meet tire needs of those wishing to establish pan-European operations. It is a
common view that the impact of the licensing directive would be relatively limited1The
Council Resolution on the review of the situation in the telecommunications Sector and the
need for further development in that market197, together with the resolution of 22 December
1994 on the principles and timetable for the liberalization of telecommunications
infrastructure198, as well as the European Parliament resolutions of 20 April 1993, 17 April,
and 19 May199, all supporting the process of full liberalization of telecommunications services
and infrastructure by 1 January 1998, ended up in the directive on a common framework for
general authorizations and individual licenses in the field of telecommunications services.""0
The directive shows no significant changes, apart from a contribution to the entry of new
operators into the Market, which can be considered as a part of the information society.
196OFTEL's Management Plan for 1997/ 19978 and beyond, June 1997. See further Universal
Telecommunications Services, Detailed Explanatory Notes to the Consultative Document, February 1997.
197 (OJC 213). 06.08.1993.
198 (OJ C 379). 31.12.1994.
199 (OJ C 150). 31.05.1993.; (OJ C 109). 01.05.1995.
200 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/ 13/C of 10 April 1997 on a common
Framework for General Authorizations and Individual Licenses in the field of Telecommunications
Services. (OJ L 117/15). 07.05.1997.
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The effect ofmarket liberalization on economic welfare-01 is significant. Hie welfare gain to
the British economy of the changes in British Telecom's prices over the period 1983 - 1992
shows that the increase was [2 billion per annum (0.5% of GDP)202. The study shows that
it was mainly from the substantial reductions in the price of national and international calls
over the period (from 8.3% to 6.7% per annum). When studying the United States
economic welfare gain on liberalization, the welfare benefit to customers from changes20' in
prices, shows a gain of $0.7 - 1.6 billion per annum. These findings show that when looking
to the future "complete liberalization of telecommunications and information services in the
United States would add 0.5% per annum to US growth over the next ten years (1993 -
2003)".
Not only prices can be a ground for economic growth. A fast introduction of new
technologies and services brings other benefits. It has been estimated that if there had been a
two year delay in the introduction ofPCN services, GDP would have been £300 million less
than would otherwise have been the case, and around 7.300 jobs would have been lost204. As
a result of tire 10 - 15 years delay in licensing cellular telecommunications in tire United
States, due to political reasons, a study estimates the loss of economic welfare in the United
States reached $86 billion-03. These studies show that competition and liberalization have had
beneficial effects on prices, productivity, costs, and an overall economic welfare. Perhaps not
on direct employment in tire telecommunications service sector, but the wider effects on
employment seem to be positive.
This effect has not only been beneficial for centralised regions or large countries.
Smaller countries and less developed countries in the telecommunications services area have
been equally favoured206. One can argue that the benefits of new telecommunications
technology, and investments following liberalization in these countries, will be substantial. It
201 Welfare equals in this context the difference between consumer's willingness to pay, and the
marginal cost of supply equals profit.
202 N. Attenbourgh, R Foster, and J. Sandbach, Economic effects of Telephone Prices in the UK.
Toic No 8. 1992.
203 R. Crandall, After the break - up: US Telecommunications in a more competitive area.
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1191).
204 Smith systems Engineering and NERA, The Economic impact of the use of Radio in the UK.
1995.
205 1 Rolhs, C.Jackson, and T. Kellev, Estimate of Loss to the United States Caused by the Delajr in
Licensing Cellular Telecommunications. 1991.
206 The European framework for competition in telecommunications. Telecommunications Policy
Vol. 19 No 4. 1995.
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is partly for these reasons that the implementation of the Open Networks Provision and EU
liberalization and harmonization issues are being rapidly implemented in the Member
States.207.





The Open Network Provision framework contains, as shown in this chapter, substantive
procedural and organizational rules for the Community wide harmonization of the
conditions for an "open and efficient access to and use of public telecommunications
networks and, where applicable, public telecommunications services"-08.
In its fundamental nature, the Open Network Provision is meant to facilitate the access
of private companies to public telecommunications network and to assure public
telecommunications services.
The other goal of the Open Network Provision is to achieve harmonization of
technical interfaces, and to seek to remove discrepancies in conditions of use and tanffs,
thereby facilitating the provision of pan-European telecommunications services.
These issues were discussed in chapter 2, ending with a discussion of the economic
welfare ofmarket liberalization.
In chapter 3, tire interconnection area will be discussed from a more practical
perspective, as interconnection is seen as the cornerstone of the liberalization of the
telecommunications market.
208 Article 1.1 of the ONP Directive: Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the
internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of Open Network Provision









Integration with the Fixed Network
The development of the directives on interconnection leading up to the fully liberated
telecommunications market has been discussed in chapter 2.4. In this chapter
interconnection from a technical and economic perspective will be discussed. An
understanding of these technical and economic aspects will be of value when the consumer
market of fixed/mobile convergence is discussed in chapter 4.
As interconnection is seen as a cornerstone of the liberalized market (without
interconnection the other rules would have been poindess), it is of value to define, or to try
to define, some of the terms used in the ONP framework. As said earlier in chapter 2.4, the
ONP framework relates to public telecommunications network and public
telecommunications services. In Directive 90/387210 and Directive 90/388211 the definition
of public telecommunications network was modified. In fact, no definition at all was given.
In addition, in Directive 97/13"'" the term "publicly available telecommunications services" is
used. This has created some uncertainty regarding the meaning of publicly available.
209The picture, figure 3, is taken fromWIK, Network Interconnection in the Domain of ONP. Nov.
1994, and is only used as an illustration of the practical side of interconnection.
210 Establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation
of ONP. (OJ L 192/1). 1990.
211 On competition in the market for Telecommunications services. (OJ L 192/10). 1990.
212 On a common framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the field of
telecommunications services. (OJ L 117/15). 1997.
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By Directive 96/19 13 the Member States must enforce many obligations on the former
monopoly holders; the most important are214:
♦ to provide interconnection to the public voice telephony service and to the public
switched telecommunications network to other providers
♦ The telecommunications operators must implement accounting systems for public
voice telephony and for public telecommunications networks in order to calculate
the cost for interconnection.
This is also applicable concerning licenses. An individual license can only be imposed for
public voice telephony and for public telecommunications networks (and other networks
using radio frequencies)215. On the other hand contributions to universal service funds can
only be required from providers of public telecommunications networks216. These providers
are also entitled to the rights of way21 .
Public voice telephony seems therefore to play a very central role under Directive
96/19, as it is under a heavier regulatory framework than the other concepts. Directive
96/19 further defined public telecommunications network as "a telecommunications
network used inter alia for the provision of public telecommunications services" that is
"telecommunications services available to the public". Unfortunately the directive does not
define what it means by "available to the public". Perhaps it means "for the public" as in the
definition of public voice telephony? It could be debateable if there is any agreement
amongst decision makers and other interested parties as to what the terms mean. These
phrases, however, are not repeated in the definition of telecommunications sendees.
Finally, concerning packet-switched data sendees, which, as said earlier, are liberated
but under a number of ONP provisions, these could then be considered as public
telecommunications network as it is obviously available to the public. As a consequence of
213 Amending directive 90/388 with regard to the implementation of full competition in
Telecommunications markets. (OJ L 74/13). 1996.
214 Directive 96/19, Article. 1(6). (OJ L 74/13). 1996.
213 Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388 with regard to the implementation
of full competition in telecommunications markets, Article 1 (2 and 3). (OJ L 74/13). 1996.
216 Directive 96/19, Article 1(6). (OJ L 74/13). 1996.
217 See Article 7(1) of Directive 97/13 On a common framework for general authorizations and
individual licenses in the field of telecommunications services, b) the grant ofways over public and/or
private land.
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tlais packet-switched data services could then be under heavier regulation than they were
before the liberalization.
It is vital that the fully liberalized market is defined perhaps through the route of
decision making by case law.
Interconnection is the major element for the fully liberalized market. Interconnection
between public networks and services should be ensured218, and operators with significant
market power have to give access to their networks219 while respecting the principles of non¬
discrimination, proportionality', transparency, and objectivity220. The rest of this chapter will
describe the more practical side of interconnection.
218 Directive 97/33 On Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal
services and interoperability through application of the principles ofONP, Articles 3 and 4 . (OJ L
199/32). 1997.
219 Directive 97/33, Article 4(2) . (OJ L 199/32).
220 Directive 97/33, Articles 6 and 7. (OJ L 199/32).
Chapter 3.1
Interconnection from a Technical Perspective
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Interconnection between networks divides into two separate categories:
♦ symmetric relationships (exist between TOs that interconnect for international
service at national frontiers and between two mobile operators who are directly
connected)
♦ asymmetric relationships (exist where the two parties are substantially unequal in size
or technical conditions)
Most interconnection relationships between TOs and other operators and service
suppliers are asymmetric. Technically different facilities must be assimilated, and the traffic
and services of the two networks are often proportionate. Further, the incumbent network
operator is often the dominant supplier, whereas an entrant demands interconnection for
technologically advanced services.
Therefore interfaces that provide access to "bottlenecks" (defined by the European-
American Centre for Policy Analysis as "involving a situation where a competitor, in order to
produce its own service, absolutely requires as an input a resource that is produced by the
dominant operator and the competitor is unable to produce this input itself'), may enable the
incumbent, by controlling the technical arrangements of interconnection, to affect the
competitor's viability, products, or costs.
Another vital area in interconnection concerns the technical requirements that are2"1
necessary to achieve equal access and thus contribute to conditions for fair competition, both
between two or more competitors, and between new network operators and an incumbent
operator, are known to all parties.
A telecommunications network contains a large number of interfaces at which
components are attached or interconnected. The network operator manages these
connections by coordinating its staff and by establishing specifications from the external
suppliers of components. The operator and the suppliers must rely on international technical
standards to define portions or even all aspects of an interface. The national TO has
modified these standards or has developed interface requirements, which have to be met by
all of the TOs suppliers. Consequently, network relationships have to be represented by a
series of layers.
221 Wissenschaffliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste (WIK), Network Interconnection in the
domain ofQNP. November, 1994.









































As described in figure 4, the bottom layer, "Infrastructure", gives Bandwidth
(capacity"). It is built from levels of transport facilities such as cables, radio links, and more
interestingly, satellite facilities. This layer incorporates the transport facilities of different
entities such as TOs, television, distribution companies, and television broadcasters.
In the layer "Network Services", the technology" provides for the routing of signals and
messages through the infrastructure. It consists of network switches and control facilities.
At this level the network services include voice telephony service, X25 data service, and
television distribution.
At the "Value-Added Services" layer, the networks provide access to information and
communication services, which can be reached and selected by the individual user e.g.,
cashless calling, freephone, videotext, and E-mail messages.
At the top level layer "Information Services" provide the information, such as data
files, travel information, and television programmes.
The two lower layers are "Basic Services" and the two top layers are "Enhanced" or
"Value-Added" services. These two layers require high-level features. It is interesting to
notice that this technological distinction is found in the regulatory" administrations of some
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Member States, often to separate monopolistic provision from competitive provision of
222
services .
The European-American Centre for Policy Analysis put forward the view that this
model could be expanded into three dimensions, where it shows more explicitly the
possibility of competitive provision of resources.
To be able to distinguish
between the different competing
providers at each level, the four
layers can be expanded into four
service planes. In each service
plane, the competitors are spaced
apart in a horizontal direction, and
the vertical direction indicates die
hierarchical distance to the end
user in the delivery chain of
network components.
The figure 5 shows the three
dimensional "Interconnection
Space" with the four service
planes. 'Ihis interconnection space
contains an overflow of internal
interfaces where network components belonging to a single telecommunications firm might
be interconnected. The difficulty in selecting the best way of internal interconnection is a
classical economic problem for every telecommunication company. In the classical
monopolistic supply of telecommunications resources, the telecommunications organizations
encompassed much of the interconnection space shown in the figure. The TO supplied all
of the infrastructure components between the international gateways from the bottom level
up, even including the end user's terminal equipment. IBM used for this purpose an "end
user certification". In the early days of interconnection there only existed a few
222 Wissenschafftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste (WIK), Network Interconnection in the
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"international gateways". Transit switches at the highest level, and, later, interfaces for user-
access, entered the market as the terminal market gradually become liberali2ed. Obviously,
these interfaces have become the most standardized and the TOs were also vertically
integrated and supplied not only routing capability, but also value-added services.
Strong technological and economic forces make new external interfaces accessible. As
an example, in the infrastructure plane of the figure an independent mobile operator, shaded
in the figure, is interconnected to the TOs infrastructure at an intermediate or higher level of
the architecture. The operator may also supply some of the routing services needed for
mobile calls, interconnecting the signalling facilities with the TOs signalling network in
another plane. The figure 5 also shows independent service providers in the value-added
services and information level, which are interconnected to the TO for routing and
infrastructure services.
The policy issues facing the European Union are to what extent the operation of a free
market will lead to the benefits of a particular path through the interconnection area, and to
what extent regulations are required to enforce these interconnection paths. As suggested
earlier, regulatory intervention might be necessary to remove bottlenecks.
Chapter 3.2
Interconnection from an Economic Perspective
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Interconnection always involves a service rendered by one operator to another. This
presupposes that the second operator wants to place a product on the market. Thereby,
interconnection functions as almost any market transaction in everyday life. A firm wants to
buy a product because it needs it.
Interconnection issues arise in relation to the category that has not specialized. A
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buys the input from a specialized
producer. There are differences
from the normal way the goods or
services are exchanged in other
areas. Interconnection is often
seen as rising the problem of
bottlenecks where the demander
can not produce its own service
and for legal and technological
reasons can not produce the input
itself. Further, the demander and
the producer often compete with
each other in the
telecommunications sector. This
leads to ongoing cooperation
between die two parties that is far
wider than that of a simple
demander and producer.
Interconnection is highly
desirable, but requires a significant
degree of cooperation. The
environment of this cooperation
takes place in a compentive situation between the parties, l oo much cooperation will lead to
an easy way of solving the technical problems, but results in an unwanted lack of
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reached. In a mature situation one can expect that the former monopolies will subside, and
that the market for interconnection will offer a wide choice of interconnectors.
The problem of botdenecks in the field of interconnection has received a lot of
attention in many studies"1. Bottlenecks have received careful examinations in USA antitrust
policy. This evolved from a railroad case in 1912. Railroads had controlled the only bridge
into St. Louis and denied competitors access. The Supreme Court decreed the bridge a
bottleneck and declared that denial of access would be a restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act (essential facility). A bottleneck was described as the control of a facility by a
single firm, which facility is essential for production, and where others are unable to duplicate
the facility. Further, that denial of access would substantially harm competition, with an
absence of valid business reasons for not providing access.
To solve the problem of bottlenecks, governmental intervention is necessary, but as it
does not cater for all types of interconnection, this intervention has to be on a case-by-case
basis. Cost accounting and cost information will play an important role in this regulatory
environment. Costs will always be an important feature in interconnection regulation,
especially in the development of tariffs. The more liberated the telecommunications market
continues to be, the more vital is the information reflecting the costs. In the customer
protection area, it will prevent customer exploitation and prevent anti-competitive pricing in
business areas, thereby promoting customer choice through competition. Concerning social
obligation, the special service prescriptions for TOs will fulfil public policy obligations.
The Commission carried out a study224 on cost accounting methods and changes
planned by TOs and NRAs. This study looks, in detail, at the telecommunications industries
in the USA, Japan, Australia the UK, France, and Germany. Arthur Andersen2-3 argued
against such a study, since interconnection charges have developed differently in the various
countries, depending mainly on the structure of the industry at the time competition was
introduced and the different government objectives for the future structural development of
223 One of the most important: EAC (European-American Centre for Policy Analysis), Multilevel
Regulation in Telecommunications. November, 1994.
224 Wissenschaftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH, Regulatory Requirements on Cost
Accounting Systems within the Framework ofONP . DG XIII Final Report. (February, 1992)
22:1Arthur Andersen. Study on Cost Allocation and the General Accounting Principles to be used in
the Establishment of Interconnect Charges in the Context of Telephone Liberalization in the European
Communities. Study for the European Commission. October, 1994.
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the national telecommunications sector. Since the Commission used the study in developing
the interconnect charges226, this work is, nevertheless, based on their study.
Interconnection develops as the market develops. This was clearly shown in the UK.
"Issues concerning interconnection have been brought sharply into focus by the
Government's decision in 1991 to end the duopoly in wirelines and to open die UK
Telecommunications Markets to greater competition"227.
To achieve a costing system one needs die cost data. The figure 6, on page 129, shows
the flow of costs, from a company's view, through the cost accounting system presented to
die Commission by Arthur Andersen. This is traditionally done via the general ledger. The
costs will then be identified as either revenues costs, costs which relate solely to die period
covered by the statement, and capital cost, those costs which pertain to network plants, other
fixed asset categories, and other costs for which the cost is spread over several years.
When die revenue and capital costs are identified they will be grouped into four cost
pools:
♦ The Services pool can be direcdy identified widi a service, such as wages of staff, cost
of cell stations in mobile services, and depreciation of international gateway switches.
♦ The Network Elements pool contains die costs relating to the various components
of transmission, switching and other network plant and systems. Consideration will
be given to the network components which cannot be allocated direcdy to a
particular service.
♦ The Related Functions pool contains the costs of functions necessary for die
provision of service to the customer, such as billing, maintenance, and customer
service.
♦ The Odier Functions pool contains die costs of functions which are not related to
die provision of service, but which are an important part of the operations of the
company. For example planning, personnel and general finance.
226 The ONP Directive, Section VII 4.4: Principles for Interconnect charges to Public Networks.
227 OFTEL Consultative Document issued by the Director General of Telecommunications:
Interconnection and Accounting Separation. June, 1993.
132 The Development of the Telecomimimcations Sector
The general rules for the process of cost attribution follows those set out in the leased
line22s directive, especially Article 10. (2). At step 2 of the figure 6, other function costs are
allocated to either services, network elements, or related functions, and, finally, in step 3, the
accumulated network elements costs are allocated to services to arrive at individual service
costs. The recommendation given by Arthur Andersen and followed by the Commission
said that:
Activity-Based Costing principles should be encouraged for use by TOs as a method
for understanding tire underlying costs and cost drivers, where Fully Distributed
Costs or Embedded Direct Cost standards are used. The industry should agree the
cost drivers and cost allocation and attribution methodologies to be applied. TOs
should be encouraged to develop long run incremental cost information for pricing
decisions. Until such time as long run incremental costs are practicable, interconnect
charges should be based on Embedded Direct Cost plus a margin to contribute to
the joint and common costs of the interconnected Operator. Tie si2e of the margin,
above the embedded Direct Cost, should be determined by negotiation between the
parties to interconnect. Only when there is a dispute should the Member States
NRA become involved. A process for eliminating inefficiencies should be agreed
between the NRAs and incumbent Operators. Tie Costs of inefficiencies in
incumbent Operators should be calculated where a Fully Distributed Cost approach
is used for interconnect charges. Such calculations should either be scrutinised by
the NRAs or carried out by them. The cost of such inefficiencies should not be
passed on to interconnecting Operators in the Interconnect charge and should only
be shared where this is felt by the NRA.
Charges efficiency concerning interconnection is defined using a tripartite definition of
economic efficiency""9. Firsdy, technical efficiency, which means that the operators in the
telecommunications industry should use the telecommunications network resources as
efficiently as possible to provide any given volume of traffic. Interconnection agreements
228 Council of the European Communities, Directive 92/44/EC of 5 ]une 1992 on the application of
Open Network Provision to Leased Lines. (OJ L165/27).
229 The European Commission DG XIII (Information society Directorate), Study on cost Allocation
and the General Accounting Principles to be used in the establishment of Interconnect Charges ion the
Context of Telephone Liberalization in the European Communitv.
Interconnection from an Economic PerspectiveI 133
should encourage efficient investment in network resources. The operators should
discourage ineffective entry into the market and unnecessary duplication of resources.
There are many different definitions of efficiency. In the context of interconnection
charges efficiency, tire definitions used by tire Commission in tire interconnection directive""30,
which originated from tire study-'1 by Arthur Andersen will be applied. Three types of
efficiency are used:
♦ Tire Dynamic Efficiency means that the telecommunications industry increases its
level of productivity, through the use of new technologies and/or new management
procedures, and responds rapidly to market needs. Concerning interconnection, it
involves setting interconnect conditions, which do not constrain technical and
market innovation, and setting interconnection charges which give incentives to tire
incumbent to improve its efficiency.
♦ The Static Allocative Efficiency requires the telecommunications industry to act in
such a way that the economy as a whole uses resources efficiently, not just in creating
services but also in consuming tire services. This means that the customer or the end
user prices should reflect costs of provision, so that the customer or end user will act
in an economically efficient manner. The interconnect charges should reflect the
relative cost of providing the interconnect services. Tire new entrant's cost structure,
ofwhich interconnect charges are a major part, will then reflect the incumbent's cost
of provision, and tire new entrant will have a strong incentive to reflect its cost in its
end user prices.
♦ The Static Technical Efficiency requires that tire operators which make up tire
telecommunications industry, use network resources as efficiently as possible to
provide any given volume of traffic. In particular, interconnect agreements should
encourage efficient investment in network resources. They should discourage both
inefficient entry into the market and unnecessary duplication of resources.
Interconnect charges which are set to low will encourage inefficient entry by
operators who will be able to make money, not because they are more efficient than
230 The Interconnection Directive: Directive 97/33/EC. (OJ L 199/32). 1997.
231 Arthur Andersen Stud)' on cost Allocation and the General Accounting Principles to be used in
the establishment of Interconnect Charges ion the Context of Telephone Liberalization in the European
Community . Study Prepared for the Commission of the European Communities DG XIII.
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the incumbent, but because they are subsidized through low interconnect charges.
On tire other hand, interconnect charges which are set too high will discourage entry,
or lead to unnecessary duplication of resources. The new entrant will build its own
facilities and the country will lose die economies of scale which could be achieved
through the incumbent providing die same facilities and providing them to the new
entrant.
Furthermore, price rebalancing could help to remove historical discrepancies between
tariffs and costs. This will dien improve die allocative efficiency, and privatization can
ensure, that the telecommunications organization needs to account to its shareholders for die
profitability which it achieves. Particularly if coupled with price control regulation, the effect
of privatization is to create further pressure within die telecommunications organizations, to
drive costs down, and increase dynamic efficiency!
When studying these measures diere seems to be very litde scope to use interconnect
charges direcdy to improve telecommunications organization efficiency. Interconnection
widi odier operators will only have a marginal impact on the incumbent's business even after
several years post liberalization, 1998. The level and structure of interconnect charges will
not therefore affect die telecommunications organizations efficiency, at least not in the short
term, however in the long term it will be a matter of survival. If the interconnection charges
are set so as to enable competition, then diey will have an indirect major influence on the
efficiency of the incumbent
telecommunications
organization. Subsequendy,
if the charges are set in a
manner that discourages
competition, they will
indirecdy have contributed to
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In a competitive market the difference between the fully distributed costs and die long
run incremental cost must be minimised2'2. This compromise is suggested in a study2" by
Ovum. This compromise encourages market entry and competition and puts incentives on
the incumbent telecommunications organization to reduce costs dirough increased efficiency.
The interconnection cost could be set on costs set below fully distributed cost.
The figure 7, on page 134, shows that the use of historical information from die
incumbent operator's audited fully distributed costs, will allow interconnect charges to be
determined in advance and provide transparency in die relationship between costs and
charges. Initial interconnection at below fully distributed cost will put pressure on
incumbents to become more efficient and redress any structural imbalances in the
Interconnect administration, such as unequal access. The margin above embedded direct
costs (die cost basis for interconnect charges) to be applied in die early stage of liberalization,
should be established dirough negotiation between die interconnecting parties. Where tiiis
does not give rise to any agreement, the national regulatory audiority should determine die
appropriate margin.
232 The capital costs associated with changes in fixed assets capacity, often using a capacity cost
approach.
233 Ovum, Interconnect: The key to Effective Competition. October, 1994.
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The NRAs apply, on a day-to-day basis, the EU's telecommunications policy, and legislation
of die terminals- 4 and services2'1 directives. The NRAs' responsibility' covers front-line
supervision of licensing, interconnection, type-approval, allocation, and assignment of
frequencies, surveillance of usage conditions, and dispute resolution. The aim of the
Community's deregulatory policy was that supply of telecommunications goods and services
should be separated from the regulation of die telecommunications sector and such a
separation of die NRAs, at least as a formal matter, from all public and private undertakings
in the Telecommunications Sector has now been achieved in all Member States2 '6.
Concerning die involvement of the NRAs in Interconnection agreements, at least four
possible levels of involvement can be identified:
♦ on the request of either party, the imposition of contract terms for matters not
agreed between the parties
♦ on die request of eidier party, die imposition of contract terms omitted from
arrangements negotiated by die parties
♦ assistance from die NRA during the course of negotiations
♦ on the initiative of the NRA itself, after-the-event-intervention by the NRA to
challenge or impose particular terms of interconnection
Coudert Brothers, in a study2'7, discuss a situation where the NRA has imposed
particular terms. This is the question of the impact of Articles 81 and 82 of die EC Treaty.
It seems to diem tiiat the articles should apply in a normal way to die agreement embodying
such terms. It could also be argued, that if, s a result of the NRAs actions, the agreement
contains terms which are anti-competitive, the Member State where the NRA is active may
be in breach ofArticles 3 and 5 of the EC Treaty.
Under such circumstances, the Commission could, of course, challenge such a practise
of the Member State, dirough launching an action for failure to fulfil die European
Community obligations pursuant to Article 226 against that Member State. In a decree, it
234 European Commission. Directive 88/301/EC . (OJ L 131/73). 27.05.1988.
235 European Commission. Directive 90/388/EC . (OJ L 192/10). 24.07.1990.
236A list of the names and addresses of the NRAs can be found in the Commission publication
regarding the conciliation procedure provided for under the Open Network Provision Leased Lines
Directive, OJ C 214, 04.08.1994.
237 Coudert Brothers. Competition Aspects of Interconnection Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector . Study for the European Commission. June, 1995.
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was confirmed that the Commission could envisage the adoption of a decision under Article
86 (3) addressed to tire Member State in question, although only in certain limited
circumstances2'8. Such circumstances could be where the measures imposed by the NRA
require an undertaking, winch has exclusive rights to abuse its dominant position.
The Communication sees the NRAs as the front line in regulatory intervention
concerning interconnection agreements. In some2,9 of the Member States this intervention
Iras already taken place. The majority of tire telecommunications laws in the different
Member States provide that whilst tire parties should, in the first instance, endeavour to
negotiate and agree terms and condition between them, where they fail to do so tire matters
in dispute may be referred to tire NRA for resolution in some way. In at least four Member
States interconnection agreements are subject to the approval of the NRA, whether or not
they have been involved in the settlement of tire applicable terms and conditions. Only two
of the Member States go further than this, tire United Kingdom and Greece, where the terms
and conditions to be negotiated and ultimately determined by the NRA are set out in great
detail.
At present, there is no requirement for uniformity of approach between the NRAs, and
tire focus is likely to be more on national, rather than EU Regulations2411. The proposed
directive"41 suggests more independent NRAs in the Member States. There could, therefore,
be a possibility that an agreement will successfully pass the process of a NRA test and yet
contain provisions that infringe Articles 81 and 82. In tire case of Article 81, such
agreements should be notified and if not they will be illegal and void of effect. Where
properly notified it would be for tire Commission to decide whether or not an agreement
merited an exemption or a negative clearance. This is called by tire Coudert Brothers, the
"Double Jeopardy", where interconnection agreements need to pass through different
screening processes which are applied by different authorities. There is a need for
harmonization of tire institutional approach to interconnection.
238 Joined Cases 48/990 and 66/990, The Netherlands and Others v. Commission [1992] ECR 1-565.
239 The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden.
240 For a detailed discussion on this subject see: Institutional Aspects of EU Regulator}' reforms in the
Telecommunications Sector: An Analysis of the Role of National Regulator}' Authorities , Journal of
Network Industries 1:5-32. 2000. Kluwer Law International.
241 European Commission. Proposal for European Parliament and Council Directive amending
Council Directives 90/387/EC and 92/44/EC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive
environment in Telecommunications. (COM 97/236).
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'IIils double jeopardy also exists in die two-stage in die NRA-Comniission, concerning
agreements of national competition law and Treaty competition rules. For instance,
agreements in the telecommunications industry which are subject to validation requirements
under national competition law, may also come to be reviewed by die Commission under
Article 81. Further, the interplay between NRAs for telecommunications and NCAs242
generally is something that is dealt with at a national level. Where telecommunications
regulation is inadequate in certain areas, the national competition law may fill in what is
missing. This is the case in the United Kingdom, obviously to avoid tire double jeopardy
situation. In the United Kingdom, the Director General of telecommunications may
consider the legality of provisions which are restrictive of competition, and which otherwise
have rendered tire agreement liable to registration with the NCA, which, in the United
Kingdom case, is the OFT (Office of Fair Trading).
The solution to this problem could perhaps be that NRAs should (continue) to have
responsibility for setting rules for interconnection at tire local level, and for assisting in
resolution of the disputes where tire parties so require, but that tire NRAs should be required
to confonrr these rules to principles based on the competition rules and the Open Network
Provision, to be set by the Commission.
An interesting discussion on institutional aspects of EU Regulatory reforms in the
telecommunications sector, more specifically, an analysis of the role of tire NRAs was
presented by Damien Geradin"41. He argues that tire regulatory duties entrusted to the NRAs
can be divided into four main categories:
♦ controlling access to the market
♦ controlling the behaviour of operators on the market
♦ ensuring the performance of universal service obligations
♦ settling disputes
This shows that tire NRAs will play a crucial role in tire implementation of the EU
telecommunications regulatory package. Therefore, the creation and functioning of
competitive telecommunications markets will in great part depend on tire effectiveness with
242National Competition Authorities.
243 D. Geradin, Institutional aspects of EU Regulatory Reforms in the Telecommunications sector:
An Analysis of the Role of National Regulatory Authorities . Journal ofNetwork Industries 1: 5-32.
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which NRAs exercise their regulatory duties. This was recognised by the Commission,
which stated in its Fifth Report on Implementation "the new entrants have expressed fears
that the concentration in the same hands ofministerial, regulatory and shareholder functions
may lead to conflicts of interest, and they question the extent to which these tasks are being
exercised independently"244.
Geradin concludes in his article, very rightly, that while the substance of the rules
generally receives a great deal of attention, implementation aspects are often ignored despite
their importance. The risk of such lack of attention is that, although in theory fully
liberalized, the EU telecommunications markets will remain divided across national lines
because of the remaining existence of inconsistent regulatory frameworks. Greater effort
should thus be made at both national and EU level to ensure consistent implementation of
the telecommunications regulatory framework by the NRAs.
It has been said by the operators, when discussing interconnection deals with BT, that
BT requires the new entrants to present a united approach when negotiating with BT. If this
is the case, it could well be that BT are forcing the new entrants, who obviously are
competitors in the market, to give away their business strategy or, at least, to be forced to
discuss it with their competitors. This could lead to higher prices for the customers as the
interconnection charges will be negotiated through a united approach. If this is the case, it
seems that OFTEL in the UK market is a weak player.
When considering the degree of centralization that is required for tire implementation
of EU telecommunications law, the approach adopted by the Commission is once again a
compromise, this time between the current system which relies on the application of sector-
specific regulation and a system whereby sector-specific regulation is phased out and replaced
by competition law. This is also the conclusion reached by Damien Geradin in his study241.
244 European Commission. Annex III to the Fifth Report on Implementation, Effective Application
— Analysis by Member State . 2000. 3.; Further for a good analysis on this issue see: W. Smith, Utility
Regulators — The Independence Debate p. 127: Independence needs to be reconciled with measures to
ensure that the regulator is accountable for its actions. Checks and balances are required to ensure that
the regulator does not stray form its mandate, engage in corrupt practises, or become grossly inefficient.;
For a discussion contrasting the differences between the continental and UK approaches in terms of
administrative review see: The gavel and the robe . Economist: 7 August 1999, p. 27.
245 D. Geradin, Institutional Aspects ofEU Regulator}- reforms in the Telecommunications sector:




This first part of tire study examined tire EC telecommunications law on its way to full
liberalization, mainly from tire 1987 Green Paper to the fully liberalized market, which was in
place in 1998. Tire considerable achievement over this ten-year period must be
acknowledged. The 1989 compromise between the Commission and the Council played an
important role, but, as it was a compromise, it is inevitable that it had its weaknesses. Such
terms as "services" (public/publicly available telecommunications services), "networks"
"public telecommunications networks", and, more importantly, "interconnection", "access",
and "significant market power" are not, as yet, precisely defined. There can be no doubt that
this will be clarified in the course of decision-making, by case law.
Further, part I examined how Article 86 was used by the Commission to force the
liberalization process. It also showed how, regarding the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission
on the one hand and the Council (and European Parliament) on the other, did not agree on
die legal basis to carp,' out die Community's objectives. Liberalization was die main objective
for die Commission, by removing special or exclusive rights (from service odier than voice
telephony). The Commission removed die special and exclusive rights under Article 86 (3),
as it considered the rights to be incompatible widi die Treaty. Harmonization was the main
objective for die Council and die European Parliament, which saw liberalization as a
consequence of harmonization. They considered that all measures should dierefore be based
on Article 95. The Council disliked the fact that the Commission acted alone under article 86
and, eventually, a political solution took place, known as die Compromise of 1989. In die
compromise, the Commission agreed to obtain the Member States support before enacting
any directives under Article 86. The terminal equipment judgement later strengtiiened diis
link. Directives under Article 86 were then the instruments, in some literature called the
"sword ofDamocles", for the set up of die ONP framework.
A conclusion tiiat can be drawn dierefore, is tiiat "enforcement is die key to success".
If one looks at other sectors, such as energy and postal services, where the European
Community is proceeding under Article 95, one realizes tiiat in diose sectors die progress is
far slower and far less ambitious. The protest from die Member States, which was
anticipated by the Commission, did not take place, at least not on the scale expected.
Further, and perhaps more interesting, is that after liberalization diere is litde room to
apply Article 86 to die telecommunications sector, short of to the financing of die universal
service. This can lead to die European Community relying, again, on Article 95 or, which is
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preferable, replacing Article 86 (3), with Articles 81 and 82 and the merger control regulation,
for the coming evolution of the Telecommunications policy. This will be discussed more
closely under part III of the study.
Part I ended with a practical discussion of interconnection, the key element of
Community telecommunications policy. The next part of the study will examine the position
of the consumer in the telecommunications sector: what they expect, their demands, how the
substitution of the fixed to mobile market is progressing, and how the consumer market has
developed over time. This is by way of general background to the discussion that follows on
mobile communications.
PART II
THE CONSUMERMARKET OF FIXED/MOBILE
CONVERGENCE
Chapter 4
The Consumer Market ofFixed/Mobile Convergence
Ihe Consumer Market of Fixed/Mobile Convergence 151
The growth in mobile communication subscriptions during the 1990s has been remarkable
and looks to remain rapid, although a slight downfall has been noted from the end of year
2000. Indeed, penetration rates which have been reali2ed in Scandinavia, show that there is
capacity for considerable further growth in the rest of Europe"44.
As the penetration of mobile telephony in the consumer market rises, the issue of fixed
mobile convergence will become increasingly important. Consumers are realising that they
are paying different bills for fixed, mobile and Internet communications, even when the same
company is delivering these services. Consumers would benefit in terms of convenience and
cost if a single communications source were to deal with all dieir communications
requirements.
The growth of fixed telephony in Europe during the 1990s has been steady but
unexceptional, as shown in figure 8, on page 152. The demand for fixed telephone lines has
been driven by business requirements and the needs of householders (the consumer sector).
Growth in demand for new residential lines has been restricted by the limited growth in the
number of households and the fact that penetration rates are above 90% in most European
Union Member States. In recent years, some homes have been installing second lines for
Internet and fax usage, but these are still in a small minority. The diagram below shows the
development of fixed telephony of the 1990s.
By contrast, the growth in the number of mobile subscribers has grown dramatically
throughout the decade, as shown in figure 9, on page 152. In 1990, the mobile telephone was
the tool of senior executives and the rich. Currendy, the mobile telephone is becoming a
mass-market product, with penetration among the general public growing very rapidly
indeed. The diagram below shows the growth of mobile subscribers over the decade.
The market for mobile telephones is growing quickly and will soon be larger than the
market for fixed telephone lines, which has already happened in Finland, where die
penetration of mobile telephones, at 70%, is the highest in the world.
246 For a regular update of the consumer market penetration see www.ispo.be. especially the
Interconnection Atlas (web based only). The WEB site is undergoing a reconstruction, why it might be
difficult to find the Interconnection Adas.
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Until the mid-1990s, the prices for mobile services were high, and the operators did not
market services to consumers, but as the business market began to slow down, mobile
operators turned to the consumer market, marketing packages designed to appeal to the
private individual.
Consumers responded, slowly at first, to the attention of the mobile operators.
Innovation in tariff packages encouraged subscription, and as the advantages of mobile
ownership became obvious, increasing numbers subscribed. By 1997, packages were being
designed that made it practical to give a mobile telephone and one year's subscription as a
gift. One problem held back mobile telephony as a mass-market phenomenon. In common
with fixed services, mobile services exposed their owners to debt if not used carefully. While
for many consumers this was not an issue, for a large number of people the prospect of
falling into debt was a real restriction to subscribing. The introduction of pre-paid services in
late 1995 offered a means to subscribe to mobile services without that risk, and launched
mobile telephony as a real mass-market service248.
Third Generation Mobile Telecommunications System
248 An interesting discussion on this subject is done byWIK in a Study called Re-examination of the
scope of the universal service in the EU . Bad Honnef. April, 2000. In the studyWIK discusses whether
universal service obligations should be expanded to cover Internet services. Their analysis is based on
consideration of E-commerce, surfing, IP telephony and fax, E-mail, Broadcast E-mail and video¬
conferencing; they conclude that apart from E-mail and Broadcast the rest should be covered by universal
service provisions.
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Most of the growth in mobile telephone subscriptions comes from consumers. Most
of the consumer subscriptions ofmobile services have occurred since the launch of second-
generation (2G) mobile services. Over the next five years, third generation (3G) mobile
services will be installed, figure 10 on page 154 is illustrating the 3G system, offering higher
quality voice communications and data communications at speeds that will enable users to
access the Internet and corporate intranets fast enough to allow realistic use of the services
available.
It is likely that in the beginning of the development of 3G services, the focus will be on
the requirements of the business customer. The price of 3G handsets is likely to remain
sufficiently high to deter consumers from 3G services for some time. However, it is
probable that operators will migrate consumers to 3G networks, in order to utilize fully their
high spectral efficiency.
The increasing popularity of mobile communications, in combination with the high
penetration of fixed telephony, will cause the market for converged services to become
significant in the coming decade. It is very likely that packages offering fixed and mobile
communications, such as those which are emerging in the market from organizations such as
VIAG Interkom in Germany and WIND in Italy, will see a large adoption among business
and consumer customers over the coming years. It is most likely that the majority of
telecommunications customers will subscribe to some form of converged service within ten
years. The motivation to do so will be strong, as the service providers are offering tolls to
keep customers up to date with the latest developments in even- area of telecommunications
at the best prices.
As it is likely that the majority of customers will subscribe to some form of converged
service, the nature of the regulatory regime for those services needs to be considered. The
current fixed and mobile regulatory regimes are very different. Regulation of the fixed
market tends to focus on monitoring the activities of the incumbent operator and ensuring
that other operators can compete on a fair basis. Mobile markets have historically been more
competitive, and the asymmetric nature of regulation of these markets has not been as
prevalent as for fixed communications. Other obligations on incumbent operators in fixed




The main cause for the increase in demand for mobile telephony among consumers has been
the falling price of mobile handsets and services. The overall cost of using fixed services has
also been falling steadily, but not as rapidly as the cost of owning and using mobile services.
The 1990s have seen the cost of communications fall in real terms. This reflects decreases in
the cost to telecommunications operators (TOs) of offering telecommunications services
and, to some extent, the effect of competition. The diagrams below show the falling cost of
fixed, figure 10, and mobile services, figure 11, respectively, to a residential user.
The total cost per line to a residential user of fixed telephony, 1990 to 2002249.
Figure 11.
—♦— Belgium —■— Denmark Finland —X— France —X— Germany —•— Ireland
—1—Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK
249 The diagrams are from the Analysis Study Fixed and Mobile Convergence and the 1999 Review .
Luxembourg. January, 2000. The figures for 1999 and 2000 are from: European Commission. The
Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package (COM 2000/814).
Brussels. 07.12.2000. The figure for 2001 and 2002 are from the NUA web site.
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The two diagrams, figure 11 on page 159 and figure 12, show that there has been a
dramatic decrease in the cost of a mobile telephone subscription to a residential user over the
1990s — a much faster fall in cost than observed for fixed communications (except in the
Scandinavian countries), and that the total annual cost of using a mobile telephone is now
close to that of using a fixed telephone line~nl.
However, it is not correct to say that a user could move all calls to a mobile from a
fixed line at little cost. The diagrams show the average cost of having a fixed line and a
mobile based on average usage of these services by a residential customer. The calls used to
calculate the fixed and mobile costs are very different, because of the different ways in which
fixed and mobile telephones are used.
250 As is pointed out in the Analysis Study, Fixed and Mobile Convergence and the 1999 Review
this takes into account that users make fewer calls on a mobile than on a fixed line.
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In fact, the cost of using a mobile instead of a fixed telephone for a given set of calls
would result in a cost increase of between two and three times, depending on which Member
State the customer lives in and which mobile service provider is chosen. However, this cost
for mobile is much smaller than it used to be, and is falling. The falling price (in real terms)
of owning a mobile, and increasing individual wealth enjoyed through economic growth,
have combined to make mobile communications affordable to consumers. The figure 13,
below demonstrates how the affordability of mobile telephony has increased during the
1990s.











— 1 t 1 \ gas. a
France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden UK
□ 1990 □ 1998
The fall in the price of mobile services during the 1990s has been dramatic, compared
to the very modest reduction in the price of fixed services. One can easily think that mobile
prices will eventually reach those of fixed services, or even fall below them, in certain
Member States. As pointed out in the analysis study252, this is unlikely to happen, mainly
because the supply ofmobile capacity is limited by spectrum availability. This has not proved
251 For a regularly updated version of the costs see www.ispo.be. The Status Report on EU
Telecommunications Services .
252 Fixed and Mobile Convergence and the 1999 Review, page 16 ff.
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to be a significant problem so far, but difficulties are anticipated in the future as demand is
likely to outstrip the available spectrum. Price is one factor that will be used to manage
demand for mobile services. Fixed services, on the other hand, face no such capacity
constraint. The second reason could be that the fall in prices for fixed communications
services seen thus far is likely to be only the beginning of a long series of real reductions in
the price of fixed communications, as the spread of Internet Protocol (IP) communications
increases data communications and dramatically reduces the price per bit carried of voice
communications.
For these reasons, it will be advantageous to use mobile communications instead of
fixed communications. This advantage will ensure diat users will require converged fixed and
mobile services in the future and will not transfer completely to mobile communications.
One significant difference between the fixed and mobile communications sectors is the
differing level of innovation in the pricing of services. Fixed TOs have tended to offer very
straightforward packages to residential users, invok ing the payment of connection, rental,
and usage fees. Discounting has been introduced in the last few years, but is generally
restricted to "Friends & Family"-type discounts.
The mobile industry, on the other hand, has shown great innovation in pricing its
sendees. It has tended to be much more flexible about bundling connection and handset
costs with usage charges, in order to lower the barriers to entry for residential customers.
Some examples of the innovative approaches to pricing which operators have adopted are"31:
♦ personal security tariffs
These services were priced to have a low rental charge, but the cost per minute using
the telephone was high.
♦ low-user tariffs
These tariffs were designed to be affordable to the occasional user of mobile
telephony.
♦ bundled minutes
These were designed to reassure the user about the amount of money that they
would be liable to pay for the service each month.
2d3 These examples are from the Analysis Study, but could also easily be found in any commercial TV
advertising or newspaper advertisement.
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♦ home-zone packages
These packages began as an attempt to encourage customers to use their mobile
telephone from home. This offer was perhaps not one of the best, as the consumers
rightly used the fixed telephone when at home, as it was, and is, much cheaper to do
so.
♦ free off-peak calls
This offer was launched by Mercury 0ne20ne254 in the United Kingdom to attract
customers, which they certainly did. However, the offer was not given to new
customers, as the existing customers reserved the right to free off-peak calls. The
result was, of course, that 0ne20ne carries much more traffic than any other
operator in the United Kingdom and has the smallest number of customers.
♦ pre-paid services
This is probably the best offer in the mobile communications market255. Analysis is
of the opinion that it revolutionised the mobile market and made it possible to have a
mobile without the danger of running up debts. The result has been the launch of a
real mass market for mobile telephones.
Such innovation offers a great deal of flexibility for consumers to find a package which suits
their requirements.
Pricing innovation offers a great deal of flexibility' for consumers to find a package to
suit their requirements, but it can also create confusion for the user, as there is a confusing
selection of options available to choose from. The opportunities and confusion that face tire
consumer is likely to increase as more converged fixed and mobile services are offered.
From the subscriber's point of view, the integration of fixed and mobile services can occur in
different ways. At the simplest level, tire consumer receives a single bill and uses a single
telephone number or liaises with a single sales and service provision organization"16. In most
cases, this still requires two terminals (one for fixed and one for mobile services). These
types of converged services have obvious benefits for consumers in terms of convenience. It
254 For a description of the Company and the Company's offer, see http:/ /mercurv.uk.
255 One of the main parts in Wissenschafliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste (WIK) concerns
prepaid services as an affordability issue under the scope of universal service. The Study can be
downloaded from http://wik.org.
256 Initiatives like the European VPN Users Organization (EVUA) ensure that operators offer a One-
Stop-Shop for telecommunications services.
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is clear that tire advances in technology have supported tire introduction of such services.
Many7 companies now use billing platforms that can produce consolidated bills using
information from quite different fixed and mobile networks237.
Intelligent network functionality7 has enabled personal numbering to be introduced,
where the called party7 is "found" on whichever telephone is in service. Further
developments include the actual sharing of infrastructure between mobile and fixed
networks, which is the subject of ongoing work under the ACTS programme23*.
Many companies have recognized that there is a potential market for converged
services. There have been alliances between fixed and mobile service providers across
Europe, being able to offer a single point of contact for sales and customer support. Many7
of these alliances are also offering Internet access, recognizing the fundamental role that
Internet access is playing in the communications requirements of consumers.
At this part of tire study, a selection of the combined fixed and mobile products and
services which operators have launched, will be identified. This will be of importance when
discussing the different areas in Chapter 4.1, Consumer Expectations. Therefore, part from
the services that integrate fixed and mobile services, those services that aim to substitute fixed
with mobile services will be discussed, as these will present important regulatory implications
for consumers.
At the beginning of fixed/mobile convergence, integration has largely been concerned
with packaging together existing services offered by fixed and mobile operators. Examples
which are well established are:
♦ personal numbering. Customers have only one telephone number. This is made
possible using intelligent networking functions, which check in the first instance
whether the mobile telephone is switched on. If it is not, the call is routed to the
fixed network number. If this is also unavailable, the call is routed to a voice
mail service, which can be accessed from either telephone. A number of
packages offer a combined subscription that is cheaper than buying individual
fixed and mobile subscriptions. Examples of this type of service include the Duet
257 For a deeper discussion on this subject see Part I: 2.7 The Numbering Environment and 4.1.2.
Number Portability.
258 ACTS: BAM-G2: Sharing the access network infrastructure in next generation communications
systems .
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package offered by Bergamo in Belgium and Tele Danmark in Denmark, BT's
Flexinumber in the United Kingdom, and TELE2 in Sweden. Similar services are
widely available from both fixed and mobile operators. One problem with that
service concerns the fact that it may not always be possible to offer the same
degree of information on the combined bill as was offered on the previously
separate fixed and mobile bills"1'.
♦ combined billing. Operators produce combined bills for mobile and fixed
services, which are provided by separate networks. Customers receive a single
bill for both their mobile and fixed terminal usage.
♦ single handsets. Services which offer the convenience of a single handset have been
launched in Europe. BT Cellnet recently began commercial provision of its
Onephone product in the United Kingdom. This incorporates a DECT and a GSM
telephone in a single handset. The customers still have separate numbers for mobile
and for fixed services, but can subscribe to a personal number so that callers can find
them more easily. The benefit of this service is that the telephone uses the fixed
network when in range of tire DECT base station (typically up to 100 metres from
the home), giving the subscriber tire benefit of calls over the fixed network which are
cheaper. When outside this range, tire telephone switches to the cellular network. A
selection of integrated services is described below;
♦ Atlantic Telecom (UK) 26°. The UK fixed wireless access operator Atlantic Telecom
has recently announced a service called All in One, which uses tire BT Cellnet
network. It offers two fixed lines and one mobile, combining both fixed and mobile
charges in a single bill.
♦ RSL COM (UK)261. The fixed telecommunications operator RSL COM announced
plans in late 1998 to offer single billing for fixed and mobile services, following its
acquisition of the mobile service provider Motorola Telco.
♦ Viag Interkom (Germany)262. In July 1999, Viag Interkom launched the Geirion
service. Using a single handset, subscribers can make and receive calls whether at
259 Criticism on this issue has been raised by both OFTEL in the United Kingdom and by
Konsumentverket (Consumer's Organization) in Sweden.
260 For a full view of the concept of the offer, see www.atlan.tic.telecom/uk/ flash-index.htm.
261 For a full view of the concept, see www.rslcom.co.uk.
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home or on tire move on a single fixed network number. At home, tariffs are linked
to Viag Interkom's fixed network, while on the move tire call is charged at a mobile
call rate. Genion offers one number, a single voice-nrail, a single bill, and a single
contract.
♦ WIND (Italy)26'. WIND, the new third Italian operator jointly owned by ENEL,
Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom, launched services aimed at tire consumer
sector on 1 March 1999. It has national fibre infrastructure and a license to provide
dual-band GSM 1800 mobile services. WIND currently offers a single bill for fixed
and mobile traffic, and free calls to and from WIND mobile and fixed telephones
held by the same subscriber. Other measures to make the package more attractive to
consumers include the "Best Option Plan", where tire customer's bill is checked and
automatically credited if the service could have been cheaper using an alternative
tariff package.
Newer operators, such as VIAG Interkom in Germany, are building new, fully
integrated mobile and fixed networks. The benefit to the consumer of integrating new fixed
and mobile networks is that a single number can be given to the customer, rather than a
personal number that diverts to an existing either mobile or fixed number. In this case, calls
from the mobile network are planned to be priced at approximately the same level as those
from the fixed network (or some average level between typical local and national fixed call
rates).
As the price of making mobile calls falls nearer to that of using fixed services, and as
tire quality and coverage of mobile services improves, many mobile operators will be offering
services designed to make tire mobile telephone tire primary telephone service. These
services do not represent integration, but indicate an important development of tire mobile
market. This suggests that the cellular mobile telephone will increasingly be used in
situations where a fixed telephone was used previously. For the consumer sector, this will
probably result in that the mobile telephone is used in tire home.
One example of mobile services that substitute for fixed is home-zoning, in which
special tariffs, closed to the fixed rates, are applied to calls made in a limited area in or
around the subscriber's home or office location.
262 For a full view of the concept, see www.viagintercom.de/index/indexf.htm.
263 por a fyji vjew Qf tpe concept, see wuw.uind.it.
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Outside this area, normal GSM tariffs apply. Tele Danmark offers a service of this
type called the Zone. In addition, in Germany, VIAG Interkom began a pilot phase of a
home-zone service in May 1999 involving 500 test subscribers in Berlin and Munich.
The commercial launch of its home-zone service occurred in July 1999. VIAG
Interkom's intention is that, within the home-zone, which covers a radius of up to two
kilometres from the subscriber's home, calling charges will basically be the same as fixed
network fees. Outside the home-zone, customers will pay the customary mobile
network calling rates.
Ericsson264, which was developing GSM home base stations, abandoned the initiative
in late 1998; there is a possibility drat dris concept will become a commercial reality in the
future. Anodrer option diat was tried in tire past, provided mobility using die fixed network.
It was intended to give die subscriber die benefits of mobility over a limited area while
offering typically lower fixed tariffs. The DECT standard has provided die basis for diis
mobility solution, enabling traffic to be kept on die fixed network. DECT uses die spectrum
between 1880 MHz and 1900 MHz and has a very limited range (the household cordless
DECT-based telephones today have an estimated range of only 100 metres). However, by
using a larger number of more powerful base stations, it is possible to cover a region with
DECT. Telecom Italia and Finnish fixed operator Helsinki Telephone Company have bodi
offered subscribers mobility using DECT technology, aldiough diey are not currendy doing
so. Telecom Italia launched its Fido service in 28 cities in January 1998. A surcharge was
applied to calls made when calling from outside tire home. Helsinki Telephone Company's
DECT City telephone service was introduced in 1994. This provided coverage in die
Helsinki area only and was targeted primarily at business users. It was priced at the same rate
as fixed services and actually cheaper than cellular mobile rates.
Manufacturers such as Ericsson have developed a new specialized terminal, which can
be used as a normal cellular telephone and a Professional Mobile Radio (PMR). The terminal
is equipped with a Push-To-Talk (PTT) button, a built-in loudspeaker, and a special
emergency button allowing dialling public emergency numbers. Even when the terminal is
used in PMR mode, it operates in the 900/1800 MHz frequency bands. This new system
could be introduced on existing GSM networks by establishing a new server which will
264 Sweden's major mobile telephone manufacturer.
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connect to the GSM Mobile Switching Centre and use the GSM network to provide PMR
functionalities such as group calls and PTT operations.
As more advanced mobile data services are launched around Europe, it is likely that
they will become more fully integrated with fixed data services. A number of operators are
trialling systems that allow subscribers to update the telephone director}7 held on their mobile
telephone subscriber interface module card, from an application that resides on their fixed
PC at home. Unified messaging services, such as those offered by Telia"61 since early in 1998,
provide customers with access to integrated voice, fax, e-mail, and Internet services via their
cellular telephones or other Web-enabled devices, such as smart telephones and Personal
Digital Assistants. In the same way that voice-mail retrieval is currently available from either
fixed or mobile telephone terminals using today's personal numbering services, one can
expect all electronic messages to be also available from a fixed or mobile terminal in the near
future.
Overall, there are significant opportunities to increase consumer convenience in the use
of data services delivered to fixed and mobile terminals. Internet telephony is the term used
to refer to the transmission of telephone calls over the Internet. Until recently, Internet
telephony consisted of sending voice calls from one PC to another via the Internet. A
number of commercial operators are now introducing other services that make Internet
telephony more attractive to consumers, including PC-to-mobile phone, telephone-to-PC,
telephone-to-mobile phone, and Internet fax services. As the Internet will be used almost
everywhere, it is quite possible that it will become a universal transmission medium for all
services, including voice, data, and video.
The widespread availability7 of Internet connections, which are capable of carrying all
types of services, together with a rapid take-up of other Internet-based services and
technologies, could lead to a very sharp transformation of the telecommunications industry'.
It could, for instance, bring about a collapse in voice service pricing as Internet based voice
services become available for the same "price per bit" as other Internet based data services.
263 Sweden's major telecommunications operator.
Consumer Expectations 167
This could have an effect on the pricing of interconnection266, which wouldmove from using
a duration-based charging mechanism to one based on the volume of data transmitted.
Internet telephony is not currently encompassed by legislation affecting voice
telephony, although as the reliability and quality of voice calls carried over the Internet
improves, this may need to change. In its Green Paper267, however, the Commission
suggested three possible options for regulation:
♦ remaining with the current approach and separate regulatory frameworks for
telecommunications and media, extended to new converged activities when required
♦ developing a new framework for converged activities alongside the existing ones
♦ fusing all existing framework into a single new converged framework268
As pointed out by P. Larouche269, competition law itself has not converged and it will need to
evolve before it can be used to give the impulse EU regulation in a converged
telecommunications and media sector.
A wide range of services that bring fixed and mobile service offerings together are
currently being offered to the consumer. In the future, many more advanced services of the
type currently offered to businesses maywell also be extended to the consumer sector.
Undeniably, fixed/mobile convergence is a result a commercial reality.
266 For a view of the present pricing of interconnection, see chapter 3.2, Interconnection from an
Economic Perspective.
267 Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology
Sectors, and the Implication for Regulation . (COM 97/final). 03.12.97.
268 For a description of the EU regulatory framework see: T. Kiessling and Y. Blondel, The EU
regulator}' framework in telecommunications . Telecommunications Policy 571. 1998. See also, worth
special emphasize on Convergence, the good study by: T.F. Baldwin, D.S. McVoy, and C. Steinfeld,
Convergence: Integrating Media, Information and Communication Sage: London. 1996. For an
interesting view of the public consultation see: European Commission. Results of the Public
Consultation on the Green Paper . (COM 99/108 final). 10.03.99.
269 The detailed developments are described in: P. Larouche EC competition law and the convergence
of the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors . Telecommunications Policy 219. 1998.
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Consumer protection policy plays two important roles in the context of telecommunications
regulation. Tire first role is to set fundamental policy goals that shape the formation of other
telecommunications policies, e.g., number portability and carrier selection. Hie second role is
to provide a set of measures intended to protect consumers, which are independent of other
policies, e.g., consumer information policies.
The Amsterdam Treaty amended the EC Treaty to address the special role of the
consumer in EU law and policy. Article 153 (1) states, "In order to promote the interests of
consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall
contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers as well as to
promoting their right to information, education and to organize themselves to safeguard their
interests". Article 153 (2) requires that "consumer protection requirements ... be taken into
account in defining and implementing other Community policies and actions".
In the Consumer Policy Action Plan 1999-2001, the Commission comments that "the
importance of the inter-linkages between consumer policy and other policies is set to grow"
due to economic as well as political presents, and that it will bring "a new influence for
consumer policy that will have to be matched by a new maturity on the part of consumers
and their representatives". Consumer interests and their relationship with other policies have
become essential components of policymaking, and consumers' awareness of their rights is
leading to a greater recognition of their responsibilities.
There is a political will at Community level to involve consumers and their
representatives in tire definition and implementation of their rights. These rights fall into five
categories:
♦ the right to protection of health and safety
♦ the right to the protection of economic interests
♦ the right to redress
♦ the right to information and education
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♦ die right of representation (the right to be heard)270
In the telecommunications sector, the universal service rights supplement these basic
rights. Universal service refers to "a defined minimum set of services of specified quality
which is available to all users independent of their geographical location and, in the light of
specific national conditions, at an affordable price"271.
Unlike basic consumer rights, which are designed to correct die imbalance between
consumers' vis-a-vis producers, universal service rights effect a redistribution of resources,
ensuring that all consumers have access to a minimum set of services that are necessary to
participate in the information society.
Apart from the concept of universal service, a range of legislative instruments exists at
Community level, implemented and complemented by national legislation, which addresses
issues relating to die protection of consumers arising in the context of dieir relationships widi
service providers. Five different phases of such relationships can be noted"7", which are
which are presented in figure 14, on page 175, togedier widi die specific telecommunications
matters raised at each stage2 J: During each of the phases, consumers are protected by a
variety of general Community legislative instruments, which impose harmonized protection
requirements across all industrial sectors. These instruments include:
♦ the data protection directive" 4
♦ the misleading advertisement directive" '
270 See, e.g.,: European Council. Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the
European Economic Communities for a consumer protection and information policy (First Consumer
Programme') . (OJ 1975 C92/1).; European Council. Resolution on a second programme for a
consumer protection and information policy ('Second Consumer Programme') . (OJ 1981 C133/1);
European Council. Resolution of 23 June 1986 concerning the future orientation of the policy of the
European Economic Community for the protection and promotion of consumer interests ('Third
Consumer Programme') . (OJ 1986 C167/1).
271 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/10/EC of 26 February 1998 on the
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment, Article 2.2(f) . (OJ L101/24). 1998. Art. 2.2(f).
272 European Telecommunications Office (ETO). Final Report on Consumer Protection for the
European Commission . January, 1998. 4.
273 For an overview of the telecommunications sector in this area see: William H. Melody, ed.,
Telecom Reform: Principles. Policies and Regulatory Practices. (Technical University ofDenmark, 1997).
274 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such
data. (OJ 1995 L281/31).
Consume! Protection in the Telecommunications Sectoi 173
♦ the unfair contract terms directive"76
♦ die distance selling directive"7'
♦ die right of redress directive278
Figure 14.
Phase Consumer Protection Issues
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275 European Council. Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading
advertising . (OJ 1984 L250/17), as amended by: Directive 97/55/EC of 6 October 1997 . (OJ 1997
L290/18).
276 European Council. Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts .
(OJ 1993L95/29).
277 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts . (OJ 1997 LI44/19).
278 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions
for the protection of consumers' interests . (OJ 1998 L166/51).
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In the telecommunications sector, the following sector-specific Community legislative
instruments impose a more limited range of harmonized consumer protection requirements:
♦ the telecommunications data protection and privacy directive279
♦ die ONP voice telephony directive"8"
♦ the interconnection directive281
♦ the licensing directive"8"
In accordance widi dieir different national legislative traditions and the principle of
subsidiarity, Member States have addressed consumer protection in very different manners,
aldiough all Member States consider consumer protection matters to be issues of major
importance. In Spain and Portugal, for example, consumer protection goals have been
protected in the constitutions. Consumer protection issues in the telecommunications sector
are regulated based on general horizontal legislative instruments adopted by the Member
States. In a number of Member States, however, these general measures may be
complemented by telecommunications-specific instruments, e.g., Denmark, Finland, and
Germany. Odier Member States rely exclusively on horizontal legislation, implementing die
specific requirements of die European telecommunications harmonization directives by
including specific conditions in telecommunications network and service provider licenses,
e.g., France, Ireland, and die United Kingdom.
The nature of mobile telephony and integrated fixed and mobile services is changing
very rapidly. It is, therefore, important to understand die concerns that the consumer will
have, in order to develop die regulator}- framework best able to support them.
This part of die study will discuss some of those concerns and how diese concerns are
addressed under current legislation, including die ONP voice telephony directive:
279 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications
sector. (OJ 1998L24/1).
280 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/10/EC of 26 February 1998 on the
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment . (OJ 1998 L101/24).
281 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) . (OJ 1997 L199/32).
282 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/13/EC 10 April 1997 on a common
framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the field of telecommunications . (OJ
1997 LI 17/15).
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♦ the content and scope of universal service obligations
♦ the contractual relationships between consumers and telecommunications
professionals
♦ the ability of consumers to make informed choices
♦ tire protection of consumer integrity and privacy
♦ tire settlement of disputes and tire representation of consumers
The scope and content of consumer protection rules governed by various provision of
tire ONP voice telephony directive often vary according to both tire type of operator
providing tire service, e.g., fixed or mobile, and tire market position of such operators, e.g.,
operators with significant market power. The continued application of drese criteria will be
discussed under fixed/mobile convergence.
In a fixed/mobile converged environment, dre parameters of universal service
obligations, and dre responsibilities of those operators that are designated to provide
universal services, may need to be redefined, especially in light of tire multiple categories of
market operators that are subject to consumer-oriented obligations.
The ONP voice telephony directive, which defines the bundle of universal
services to be provided to consumers, requires Member States to ensure that all
reasonable requests for connection to the fixed public telephone network at a fixed
location, and for access to fixed public telephone services, are met by at least one
operator. Member States may, if necessary, designate one or more universal service
providers, so that service is available throughout the whole of the national territory28'.
Designated providers must provide a connection to the fixed network that is capable of
allowing users to make and receive national and international calls, and that is capable of
supporting speech, facsimile, and data communications"84. Member States must also ensure
that public pay telephones are provided, so as to meet the reasonable needs of users in terms
of both numbers of public telephones and their geographic coverage283, and may, where
appropriate, take specific measures for disabled users and users with special social needs"86.
283 Article 5.1. EC.
284 Article 5.2. EC.
285 Article 7. EC.
286 Article 8. EC.
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Tlie definition of die universal service bundle, however, is only one aspect of the
directive. The directive is also concerned with achieving an appropriate balance between die
development of new services, and the sustaining of competition on the one hand, and the
protection of consumers in their relationship with service providers on die other.
Consequendy, die directive defines different categories of operators, to which the range of
obligations defined in the directive applies to varying degrees:
Firstiy, the directive distinguishes between mobile operators and fixed operators, by
excluding die mobile operators from many of die obligations under die directive. Mobile
operators are subject only to five key obligations set forth in die directive, namely:
♦ Article 6 on directory and enquiry services
♦ Article 9 (b) on the access to operator assistance services and enquiry services
♦ Article 9 (c) on free access to emergency7 services
♦ Article 10 (1) on an operator's obligation to provide consumers with a contract
♦ Article 11 (1) on the publication of information on standard terms and conditions.
Secondly, fixed operators are subject to the following categories of obligations:
♦ The provision of universal service is ensured through die designation by die Member
States of universal service providers.
♦ Significant market power is used as the criterion to distinguish further between
remaining fixed operators. Organisations with significant market power are subject
to additional obligations relating to:
♦ quality of service
♦ the provision of additional facilities (calling line identification, direct dialling-in, and
call forwarding)
♦ tariff principles (cost-orientation, transparency, and unbundling of services)
♦ cost-accounting principles
Moreover, distinctions are also drawn among fixed operators in terms of die types of
consumer obligations relevant to individual types of service, such as"s :
♦ universal service288
287 For a detailed view and discussion over these items see: Directive 98/10 of 26 February 1998 on
the application ofONP to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a
competitive environment. (OJ L 101/24). 1998.
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♦ access to fixed networks
♦ public telephone services
♦ voice telephony services
For instance, only providers of voice telephony services, together with designated
universal service providers with significant market power, are under the obligation to provide
the additional facilities listed in Article 15 of the directive. Member States28 ' should take into
account the ability of an operator to provide universal services in designating such an
operator, which not only enjoys significant market power, but also invariably has a dominant
position.
Universal service obligations only apply to fixed carriers, although a degree of universal
service provision can be identified in tire license provisions of mobile operators that require
them to guarantee extensive geographic coverage, or to contribute to universal service funds.
Given the existence of tire principle of technology neutrality, tire technical means by which
universal services are delivered may need to be reconsidered in light of fixed/mobile
convergence. Tire use of market power as an indicator of the ability to provide universal
services, however, remains relevant.
Further, another problem could be consumer protection issues. These measures
address how best to prevent harm to consumers and to prevent the occurrence of
competitive market distortions characteri2ed by significant gap between both
telecommunications suppliers and consumers, and among suppliers themselves.
Regulatory measures addressing information-related obligations result from the
asymmetric power enjoyed by telecommunications operators as compared to consumers.
These types of measures apply to all operators, regardless of their relative importance in tire
market and despite the level of competition, and also apply irrespective of the technology
used. Such measures mainly deal with obligations designed to counterbalance consumers'
relative lack of information and bargaining power, by requiring operators to provide
consumers with sufficient information on their services and tariffs. This may also include
288 In some cases, designated universal service providers come under additional obligations, provided
that they also enjoy significant market power. This is true in the case ofArticle 15 on the provision of
additional facilities, and Article 17 on tariff principles and cost-orientation.
289 Recital 6 of the Directive.
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positive obligations such as die provision of an itemized bill or selective call barring services,
which allow the consumer to control his or her level of consumption.
Denmark has adopted a set of telecoms-specific, technology neutral obligations in the
field of consumer protection"Some smaller market players have complained to the Danish
NRA, die NTA that die requirements are unbalanced, both in economic and administrative
terms, and have argued that an exemption should be available to smaller market actors. The
NTA, however, is of die opinion diat a system of exemption would be difficult to manage in
practice. Exempting some providers, based on dieir size, would not be appropriate given die
regulation's objective of protecting consumers, thereby' meaning diat regulatory' restrictions
should apply whatever the size of the operator. NTA has considered the option of
differentiating between operators according to the types of customers they serve and die
services to which dieir customers subscribe. For example, the NTA suggests diat operators
could be subject to stricter obligations, in terms of the range of services offered to
subscribers, where the amount paid by consumers varies with die level of consumption"'".
Otiier measures prescribed by the directive relate to die desire to protect consumers
from abuses of market power. These measures deal, for example, widi principles such as
cost-orientation and die unbundling of services. In such cases, as well as cases where the
provision of certain services such as calling line identification or call forwarding is imposed
on operators with significant market power, it could be difficult to understand whedier this is
consumer protection or universal service. Therefore, there is a need to reconsider whedier
certain obligations regarding cost-orientation should be mandated, and to assess whedier
competition law will be sufficient of itself to tackle die abuse of market power with regard to
retail pricing issues. If this would have been done, the universal service providers would
remain subject to die obligation to provide affordable services, and concerning die provision
of additional facilities (calling line identification, call forwarding, direct dialling in), where such
measures are not necessary for the protection of die consumer (where their provision does
290 Executive Order No. 581 of 6 July 1999 on the Provision of Telecommunications Networks and
Services. Telestyrelsen (the Danish NRA).
291 Telestvrelsen, Udredning vedrorende regulering af udbudet af telenet of teletienester. Copenhagen,
September 1999. By the same token, the NTA has recently the view that business end users do not need
the same level of protection as private end users. Accordingly, it has proposed that the current regulation
be amended so that either: (i) regulatory requirements apply to the relationship between an operator and a
non-professional (private) end user; or (ii) operators and business end users are provided the opportunity
to derogate from mandated standards in their contracts.
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not assist consumers in controlling their consumption patterns), the issue then becomes one
of whether these measures are essential, and, therefore, need to fall within the scope of the
universal service, or non-essential, and can be best left to tire marketplace to provide via
competitive service offerings. Therefore, it could be an advantage if a distinction could be
established between universal service obligations and consumer protection measures.
Universal service would be provided, as is now tire case, by one or a few operators, subject to
specific obligations in terms of tire services to be provided and their tariff levels.
Secondly, consumer protection measures should apply to all fixed and mobile
operators, which is an extension beyond those of the directive. As regards the content of the
universal service obligation, and consistent with the principle of technology neutrality, tire
limitation of tire universal service bundle to fixed networks may also need to be reconsidered.
The European regulator}" framework does not impose any obligation on universal
service providers regarding tire provision of particular bandwidth. Where Member States
have included in their definition of universal service a reference to minimum access speeds,
these have never exceeded 2,400 bits/second2'2. As information society services require
more bandwidth, some consumer groups argue that there is justification for including in tire
universal service bundle a minimum bandwidth requirement greater than 2,400 bits/s,
especially since standard networks will increasingly feature greater access speeds.
Admittedly, including broadband communications within tire scope of universal
service, upgrading of access networks across the European Union would entail huge costs to
incumbent operators. It might also hurt new entrants who would be under increasing
pressure to contribute to a universal service fund. Although not bome by the consumer
directly, such charges are indirectly subsidized by higher retail costs. The provision of
broadband communications as a part of universal service could nonetheless be facilitated, if
the principle of technology neutrality" were applied in such a way as to refer to the options
available in die delivery of die elements of the universal service bundle. Developments in
satellite, mobile, and fixed cellular broadband access capabilities lead to the conclusion diat
diese technologies could, over time, become alternatives to xDSL technologies in geographic
292 BEUC. Universal Service in Telecommunications: European Consumers' Rights to
Telecommunications Services , (BEUC/341/98). November, 1998.
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areas characterized by lower fixed line density and longer local loops, thereby decreasing the
costs of broadband access.
It should also be noted that mandating the provision of broadband services at this stage
would also have the effect of extending the current scope of universal service. On this
subject OFTEL argues "universal service is about finding ways of meeting the needs of
those remaining few whom the unregulated market might choose not to serve. It is not
about predicting what will be required in die future and requiring it advance. Neither is
it about prescribing what is required for future economic growth and prosperity'1"293.
Certainly, whedier broadband access should be available to anyone, anywhere, including
remote and low population density areas, is ultimatelyT an issue of social policy.
The issue of including mobile services witiiin die scope of universal service obligations
might be solved in one of two ways: mobile services could be introduced as a substitute for
fixed services, where diere are cost advantages; and mobile services could be included as an
extra service, supplementing the existing universal service bundle.
Mobile communication might be included in die scope of universal service as a
substitute for fixed communications. In particular, mobile technologies could provide cost
advantages in providing access to unconnected households in less densely populated areas.
An interesting view has been expressed by WIK~)4, which concludes that comparing the
fixed and mobile alternatives is not a case of comparing "like with like". For example, the
cost characteristics of the network entail different pricing methods. Moreover, and perhaps
more importandy for universal service, mobile telephony still enjoys a "social image" very-
much different to that of fixed telephony, which could render the inclusion of mobile
communications in universal service difficult. However, the increasing mobile penetration is
likely to diminish its "social status" over time and secondly, social acceptance of mobile
phones as part of universal service could be facilitated by- technically restricting dieir use to
die basic functionality provided by fixed services.
The fundamental difference between fixed and mobile services is that a mobile
service normally connects individuals (as opposed to households) and it does so
293 OFTEL. Universal Telecommunications Services — Consultation . July, 1999. paragraph 2.11.
294 Wissenschafftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste GmbH. Study on the re-examination of
the scope of universal service in the telecoms sector in the European Union, in the context of the 1999
review .
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(almost) wherever individuals are. If the use of a mobile service is not restricted, mobile
services could provide not onlv any-to-any connectivity, but also anywhere-to-anywhere
connectivity. Ensuring anywhere-to-anywhere connectivity in Europe would be a
significant extension of the current scope of universal service, and would go much
further than using mobile communications as a substitute for fixed, where to do so is
cost-effective. If the choice is made to continue limiting the scope of universal service
to the provision of any-to-any connectivity, then using mobile technologies would
require the implementation of technical restrictions on the use of mobiles when
provided as part of the universal service bundle.
Whether the universal service bundle should be extended to ensure anywhere-to-
anywhere connectivity is a question that warrants two observations. Firstly, such a
decision is a social policy question, the answer to which depends on what is considered
essential to participate in the information society. However, even if mobile service were
to be essential, this should not be sufficient to require its inclusion in the universal
service bundle. As noted by OFTEL, mobile telephony is already provided by the
market to anyone on request and the critical question is therefore one of coverage and
affordability2 b. (The question is whether mobile services should be subsidized.)
Competition between mobile operators has, however, already led to significant
decreases in retail prices for mobile services in most Member States.
Despite tire different commercial and regulatory histories of the fixed and mobile
sectors, a consistent approach across sectors needs to be developed in terms of the provision
of services to particular customer groups. Article 8 of the directive requires that Member
States, where appropriate, take specific measures to ensure equal access to, and the
affordability of, fixed public telephone services, including directory services, for disabled
users and users with special social needs. A broad range of measures has been adopted by
Member States to implement Article 8.
In Denmark, universal service obligations include the provision of relay and text
telephone services to deaf persons, deaf-and-blind persons, and persons with impaired
speech or hearing. Providers of public voice telephony must ensure that all their customers
have access to tire appointed universal service provider's relay telephone services and text
295 OFTEL. Universal Telecommunications Services — Consultation . July, 1999. paragraph 5.30.
182 The Consumer Market of Fixed/Mobile Convergence
telephone services. Specific groups of handicapped persons may benefit from services at
reduced rates. The universal service provider may implement low-usage subscriptions, in
which case it is obligated to actively and regularly give guidance to individual end users as to
which type of subscription is the most favourable. In France, the universal service
obligations imposed on the universal service provider require special tariff schemes for
certain categories of persons with low incomes or subject to a handicap.
In the United Kingdom, BT has license obligations requiring it to provide a Light User
Scheme (which entails rebates of the line rental if the phone line is not used frequently) and a
Limited Service Scheme (with low connection and rental costs, but with a bar on outgoing
calls). OFTEL has made recommendations to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
to introduce a new license condition that would place upon all telecommunications operators
offering fixed retail services an obligation to provide equal access to basic
telecommunications services for people with disabilities. The Department of Trade and
Industry is also currently reviewing die provision of text phones at an affordable price296.
Fixed/mobile convergence raises questions in relation to operators' obligations to
distinct classes of customers. In other words, whedier such obligations will be affected by
the convergence of fixed/mobile services ultimately depends on whether the universal
service bundle evolves to include mobile services, or whether it should include such services
based on the doctrine of technology neutrality. Fixed/mobile convergence brings widi it
increased pressure to subject both fixed and mobile services to a similar range of obligations
as regards the provision of socially beneficial services.
Under Article 6 of the ONP open voice telephony directive, which applies to bodi
fixed and mobile services, subscribers have the right to have a listing in publicly available
directories and to verify and, if necessary, correct or request die removal of diat entry.
Directories listing all subscribers (except those who have indicated diat diey do not wish to
be listed) must be available to users in a form approved by the NRA, whether printed or
electronic, or both, and must be updated on a regular basis. Moreover, at least one directory
2% OFTF.L. Universal Telecommunications Services — Consultation . July, 1999. The Royal
National Institute for the Blind (RNIB) in the United Kingdom identifies the provision at affordable price
of telecoms equipment adapted to visually impaired people as a major issue. In a brochure entitled
Telephones — what features do disabled people need? , RNIB notes that, in many cases, little would be
required to make telecoms equipment useful to people with disabilities.
Consume! Protection in the Telecomiiuimcations Seen 183
enquiry service covering all listed subscriber numbers must be available to all users, including
users of public pay telephones.
Article 6 also requires that all organizations that assign telephone numbers to
subscribers meet all reasonable requests to make available tire relevant information in an
agreed format on terms which are fair, cost-oriented, and non-discriminatory. While the
scope of Article 6 does not require further amendments to cater for developments in
fixed/mobile convergence, the implementation of drat provision into domestic law by some
Member States raises some doubts as to tire effectiveness of Article 6 in a converged
environment. In Belgium, for example, mobile numbers are not included in publicly
available directories and enquiry services297.
Such a policy of exclusion is not necessary to ensure tire protection of privacy.
Appropriate information to consumers on their rights not to be included in a directory
should suffice298, and is likely to restrict significantly tire scope, and thereby the utility, of
directories. This will be even more important with tire growth of fixed/mobile converged
services and the introduction of personal numbers.
Under Article 9 (b) of the directive, fixed and mobile users must have free access to
emergency- services using tire dialling code 112, as well as any other dialling codes specified by
NRAs for use at national level299. Emergency services on the 112 number can thus be
reached on an EU-wide basis by mobile users using the GSM specifications, which
incorporate an ETSI standard that allows users to dial emergency services without a SIM-
card, i.e., cost free and without a subscriber agreement with the mobile operator in whose
territory the call is made. Since access to emergency services is thereby- secured, tire
convergence of fixed/mobile services does not appear to raise new regulatory- concerns.
However, tire technological progress that will make fixed/mobile offers possible could
be used to enhance tire effectiveness of emergency^ services. For example, a number of
companies have developed techniques that enable operators to deteimine a subscriber's
location quite precisely. This can be done using either a GPS receiver built into tire handset,
297 Article 109 of the 1991 Law on the Reform of Certain Public Economic Enterprises.
298 As provided for by the Data Protection Directives.
299 This can also be accomplished by technical means; see, most recently: European Commission.
Decision 99/645/EC of 15 September 1999 on a common technical Regulation for the attachment
requirements for TETRA access to emergency service . (OJ 1999 L255/40).
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or by measuring the time difference of the arrival of signals at different base stations. The
fonner mediod clearly has limitations because it requires everyone to use a specialised
handset. Hie network-based solution is preferable because it requires the use of software
integrated with the network, and can thus be incorporated more easily. A workshop held in
May 1999 in Brussels called for the extension of regulations to include location determination
for emergency calls made using mobile telephones'0". The argument is all the more
convincing when the following figures, based on statistics compiled in the United States, are
taken into account:.
♦ More than 50% of emergency calls will originate from a mobile handset.
♦ 2% of emergency calls are time-critical. For every 1000 mobile emergency calls, two
lives could be saved if the caller's location is known.
♦ 10% ofmobile callers cannot explain exactly where they are '01.
In die United States, die FCC has mandated'02 that mobile operators be able to
determine the location of a mobile 911 call (911 being die American equivalent of die
European 112 number) widiin a range of 100 feet (approximately thirty metres) by October
2001. This obligation is to be read in conjunction widi the 1999 Wireless Communications
and Public Safety Act, which prohibits the use of location information for purposes other
than emergencies without the express and prior authorization of die subscriber. However,
concerns have been expressed that this prohibition is couched in language that is too broad
to effectively protect subscribers from die misuse of private information, and it has been
suggested that users should be able to turn off die tracking device at die push of a button'"'.
In the EU, die telecommunications data and privacy protection directive'04 and the data
3°° European Commission. Workshop on Policy and Regulatory Issues for Location-Based Mobile
Services — Raising the Awareness of Industry and Regulators . DG XIII, Brussels, 05.05.99 — 05.06.99.
301 HBF Group, The U.S. Experience , in: European Commission. Policy and Regulator)' Issues for
Location-Based Mobile Services — Raising the Awareness of Industry and Regulators . DG XIII, Brussels.
05.05.99 - 05.06.99.
302 47 USC § 251 (c)(3). In this paragraph the term Network element is defined vert' broadly to
encompass not only facilities or equipment, but also more immaterial elements such as features, functions,
and capabilities.
303 U.S. Privacy Advocates Fret Over Plans for Tracking Cell-Phone Users' Locations . Wall Street
Journal Europe 23 November 1999.
304 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications
sector. (OJ 1998 L24/1).
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protection directive'03 already provide for an extensive regulatory framework that addresses
most of the concerns that have been expressed in the United States. It should be noted in
particular, that Article 7 of tire data protection directive authorizes the processing of personal
data where that processing is necessary "to protect the vital interests of the data subject".
Another major issue is the question of who should pay for the implementation of
emergency location-based services306. Both mobile networks and handsets will require
upgrading, but it is also likely that the call centres used by emergency organizations will need
to be adapted in order to receive and use this information.
305 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data. (OJ 1995 L281/31).
306 European Commission. Report on the Workshop on policy and regulator)' issues for location-




The principles of universal service were set as early as in 1973'" '. Basically, tire concept rests




Thus, universal service must be offered at all times (the specified quantity), be accessible
independent of locality, and be at an affordable price. The scope of the universal service is,
in principle, for the Member States to decide on. Tire Member States may impose tire
universal service obligations (USO) on telecommunications service providers, as long as they
respect Community law'"". However, the Member States are forced to include a defined set
of services in dreir USO, such as access to dre Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
in order to access voice, fax and data communications'09, directory services, public
payphones, and measures for disabled users or users with special social needs '1". Furdrer, but
not according to dre principles of USO, the ONP framework requires Member States to
offer additional services and features. These are:





♦ selective call barring (all according to Directive 98/10, Articles 9 (c) and 14,
application ofONP to voice telephony)
In addition to this, the recommendations 92/382 and 92/383'" encourage the Member
States to ensure the availability of packet-switched data services (PSDS) and ISDN on their
307 European Commission. Communication on the Consultation on the Review of the Situation in
the Telecoms Sector . (COM 93/159 final)/ 23.04.93.
308 See: Directive 98/10 on the application ofONP to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment . (OJ L 101/24). 26.02.98.
309 In Annex I of Directive 97/33 (interconnection in telecommunications), it is an indication ofwhat
speed the institutions had in mind, where it is stated that PSTN must be at a minimum of 2400 baud.
This would at least be suitable for advanced Internet, such as www. surfing.
310 For a closer view on these sets of services see Directive 98/10, especially Articles 5-8.
311 European Council. Recommendations of 5 June 1992 on the harmonized provision of a minimum
set of PSDS in accordance with ONP Principles . (OJ L 200). 18.07.92.
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respective territory. Finally, Directive 97/66312 (processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy) requires the Member States to ensure that users can take advantage of
features concerning itemized billing, calling line information, and call forwarding which
safeguard their privacy rights.
Obviously the existence of USO means that the services discussed would not be
offered under market conditions as they would, of course, not be profitable. The service
provider is therefore bound to make a loss as regards the services covered under USO. The
rest of this chapter discusses more closely this area, its problems, and what might be a
solution.
Policy officials and various interested parties sometimes argue for subsidized
telecommunications services on the basis of equity, that such subsidies are a legitimate
instrument with which to combat poverty. From an economic perspective this is not usually
an efficient or effective way of combating poverty'. Economists argue that if poverty is the
policy concern, the focus of that policy' should be to increase the income of those
impoverished, rather than to subsidize die goods and services tliev consume. Giving these
families more income allows them to spend it in a way that matches their expenditure on
individual items with die values they place on diose items. Subsidizing a service amounts to
the state spending on someone else's behalf, what diey could more profitably (i.e., with
higher utility) have spent themselves. This simply follows from the fact tiiat no one
understands the preferences of other individuals as well as they understand their own.
Nevertheless, rather dian boost income direcdy, policy makers and regulators have
sometimes pursued what has been referred to as a "regulatory safety net" involving goods
and services that are widely considered to be essential. Interventions based on regulatory'
safety net arguments often do not involve beneficial externalities, but rather an entitlement
approach. Examples include food stamps in the USA and "free" (tax funded) or subsidized
national health services in European countries. Hie state will sometimes intervene in the
case of services that are considered potentially unaffordable for many households, providing
a safety net for those who do not or cannot provide for themselves due to the size of the
payments required. The question is whether basic telecommunications service falls into this
312 Directive 97/66 of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector . (OJ L 24/1). 1998.
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category, tliat the price of connection and periodic rental is so high as to remove die
household's ability to choose to take out a telephone subscription or not.
Payphones can be seen as one way of overcoming this problem. The price of calls
from a payphone can be thought of as incorporating connection and call charges into a timed
(per minute) charge, enabling those households who do not take out a full private
subscription to purchase a lesser amount of service. Thus, even if non-subscription to the
network of some households is due to the size of expenditure, access to payphones enables
households to consume a positive level of telecommunications service.
It is suggested that in higher income countries, if comer solutions exist at all regarding
private voice telephone service, it would apply" only to a handful of the most impoverished
households. Excluding the quite large numbers of households who do not want a phone in
their home, or use a mobile phone, non-subscription will in most cases not be explained by
die fact that households cannot possibly afford it, but because given their modest incomes
they find other tilings that they judge to be more important on which to spend their money.
In such cases the earlier demonstration applies — that as a rule people are made better off, not
byr the state subsidizing selected goods and services, but by providing them with more
income. This allows them to balance their expenditure on goods and services to suit the
values they personally' place on them.
In support of this argument one can say that if all else remained the same, ceteris
parabus, the withdrawal of all payphones would separate those who did not have a private
phone into one group that then decides to subscribe, resulting in an increase in private
subscriptions, and those who decided to remain phoneless. One reason for the increase in
subscriptions would be that with no payphones, many households would face a choice
between a private subscription and having virtually no access to telecommunications services
at all.
Most of those with television but without a telephone could presumably afford to
subscribe to the public telephone network, but choose to spend tins income in other ways.
Certainly, quite a large number appear to have chosen the TV before the telephone. In much
poorer countries, however, it seems likely that any level of purchase is unaffordable for some
households on very meagre incomes. In such cases, households absolutely cannot consume
a positive level of service — they are at a comer solution.
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In principle, if no beneficial externality exists and consumers are not at a comer
solution, then there is no economic case for subsidizing the service. In this case, for
particularly poor families' income, assistance is the recommended treatment.
But even when a beneficial externality does exist, the case for intervention should take
account of the state's or the industry's (or more accurately, subscribers') ability to pay, and on
the state's ability to efficiently implement and continue to operate a scheme on its merits, free
of interest group capture — considered to be a common outcome by very many economists
where state mandated subsidy schemes operate. If poverty7 is the principal concern, income
support is the efficient and effective means of dealingwith it.
It is sometimes stated that the consumption of certain goods or services should be
encouraged because they are socially desirable. An obvious example is the consumption of
culture goods. Tire argument includes not only those goods for which consumption can be
shown to entail beneficial externalities, but is also applied to other goods and services that are
considered desirable for people to consume. As such, merit good arguments tend to refute
the notion of consumer sovereignty. Implicitly at least, those who make such arguments are
claiming that individuals frequently do not know what is in their own best interest. Even if
this were true, the main weakness with merit good arguments is that someone must decide
which are tire merit goods, i.e., what is it that people should be doing more of, and
presumably also, which are the merit bads; the implication being that merit goods are in some
way subsidized, while firings defined as merit bads are additionally taxed'1'.
This sort of paternalism is not always widely supported by voters. However, in a limited
number of cases it clearly is, most notably in the cases of compulsory tax funded
education'14, and in those countries, which have it, universally available free (at the point of
delivery7) or subsidized health care. The choice of these particular services as merit goods
seems to be explained not by7 any paternalistic policy7 per se systematically identify7 what tire
authorities consider are merit goods and bads, but because there appears to be widespread
313 Where a merit bad also involves externality7 costs, economists frequently recommend penalty taxes,
but the economic rationale comes from the identified externality cost, and not from any decision on the
part of policy makers to classify the consumption of things as meritorious or disagreeable.
314 Fully tax funded education is not enough by itself to guarantee adequate consumption of
education. Some parents will still not require their children to attend school, or to attend regularly. In
this case the state makes education to a certain age compulsory in an effort to impose a minimal level of
education consumption.
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agreement in the policy reflected through repeated events that are part of the democratic
process. In other words, the policies are so un-contentious to a majority of voters that any
political party that did not support them would find it difficult to get enough political support
to be asked to form a government.
As stated above, the economic case for a universal service policy involving some
customers getting subsidized access to POTS, rests on the existence of significant beneficial
externalities. These are principally in die form of network externalities. If the intention is to
internalize the externality relating to those households that are considering whether to
subscribe to the network or not, targeting would need not to be based not on low income,
but rather on whether household do not value the telephone highly. If die subsidy were
based on a means test, such people would be ineligible for a subsidy, even though the benefit
to existing subscribers of their subscription to the network (the externality) appears to be
much die same as for low-income households.
Targeting low income earners confuses the efficiency arguments relating to the
internalization of a network externality with policies intended to alleviate poverty which, as
argued above, are generally best dealt with through income support.
It is sometimes argued that access in the house to a private telephone is essential if
people are not to be socially excluded. It ".. .provides a basic support for social and
economic participation in modem western society'"15. "The telephone has become a
necessity."316 It has been suggested that a "right of access to a telephone [may] derive from
die fact of citizenship'"17.
Arguments that refer to social exclusion, electronic citizenship, and electronic
democracy, and which tend to be in support of a more expansive universal service policy, do
not appeal directly to market failure, although an implicit market failure argument can be
found. Mostly the arguments are rhetorical and based on descriptions designed to convey to
die reader how valuable access to the telecommunications network is today, and how this
value will increase in the future.
315 S. Graham, J. Cornford and S. Marvin, The socio Economic benefits of a universal telephone
network . Telecommunications Policy 20. 1:3-10.
316 C. Milne, Opening the debate on universal service hi the UK . Telecommunications Policy 15.
1:85-86. 1991.
317 |. Taylor and Webster, Universalism: Public Service and citizenship in the Information age .
Information. Infrastructure and Policy 5, 3. 217-233. 1996.
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The telephone provides a means of contact among friends and relatives, and provides
access to professional organizations, information services, and even assists them in finding a
job. It is common for access to the telecommunications network to be described as a right
of citizenship. In much of the socio/political literature is the (often implicit) claim that the
telephone is so valuable that in a developed country it is one of the basic necessities of life,
rather like running water, electricity, and health care. By implication therefore, most of those
who do not subscribe to the network are either:
♦ so income constrained that they cannot afford a subscription, even though the
telephone is highly valued (a necessity). In this case, non-subscription would be an
important indicator of poverty.
♦ not informed about the value that they can get from a telephone subscription
♦ are informed about the things that can be done with a telephone, but not all people
value the telephone as highly as many people think they do
In the case of income constraint, tire socio/political literature^18 claims that if people do not
have a telephone subscription they will tend to be significantly "socially excluded", with all
the problems this entails. It is suggested that not having a telephone is a cause of social
exclusion.
There are thus a number of hypotheses that come out of this literature. The ones that
stand out are: not having a telephone (A) results in social exclusion (B), and being socially
excluded (B) results in antisocial behaviour (C) — such as criminal activity, drug abuse, and
dependence on welfare. The exact causal relationships are likely to be a good bit more
complex than hinted at in these relationships. It has been claimed, for example, that not
having a telephone is a cause of continued unemployment. The suggestion is that having a
telephone subscription makes it easier for potential employers to contact job applicants, and
this is becoming especially important as the proportion of work, which is temporary, is
318 The socio-political and socio-economic literature referred to in this chapter is mainly: M. Cave, C.
Milne and M. Scanlan Meeting Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications
Sector ECSC-EC-EAEC Brussels Luxembourg, Study for DG IV. 1993,; C. Graham, ]. Conford and S.
Marvin, The socio-economic benefits of a universal telephone network . Telecommunications Policy, 20
1:3-10, [1996], C. Milne Opening the debate on universal service in the UK , Telecommunications Policy
15. 1:85-86. 1991.; and J. Taylor and C.W.R, Universalism: Public service and citizenship in the
information age . Information. Infrastructure and Policy 5.3 217-233.
Universal Service 195
increasing319. Thus, if (D) represents not having a job, the causation may go: (A) causes (D)
which gives rise to (B) which results in (C). Interestingly, ifwe have (A) does this give us (C)?
To put the later relationship another way, if all those households that do not have a
telephone were given one, die hypothesis is diat it would lead to a decline in antisocial
behaviour, and a decline in the associated costs bom by society.
In terms ofmarket failure, there are at least two identifiable cases in the socio/political
literature concerning social exclusion: (i) a theory about labour market failure, that not having
a telephone gives rise to transaction costs and an information gap resulting in labour market
failure which results in social exclusion; and (ii) not having a telephone leads to externality
costs of antisocial behaviour being bom by society.
The first of these (i) is really a new theory of unemployment to which there appear to
be two main aspects: firstly, it is a theory of long term unemployment — that those without
phones find it significantly harder to get work and secondly, in times of high labour demand.,
it suggests an explanation as to why a significant amount of unemployment persists. Neither
of these labour market issues has been developed, as far as have been recognized. They are
really matters for labour market economists to investigate, and therefore, no further attention
will be given to them in this study. The main focus of the socio/political debate has been on
(ii) above.
The second type of market failure (ii) is an externality argument that households
without a phone are in danger of being excluded and are not taking account of the costs that
would be bom by society when deciding whether or not to take out a telephone subscription.
These costs are those associated with an increase in antisocial behaviour resulting from their
social exclusion. They include those related to expenditures on the justice and criminal
system, taxation costs to fund social security payments such as the unemployment benefit,
and the social and private costs of drug abuse3"0.
It is also likely that many non-subscribers are income constrained. However, it is
important not to get the two issues confused, as the policy prescription is normally quite
different in each case. If the intention is to alleviate poverty, then income support is typically
the appropriate policy. In the case of the spill-over costs to society, however, the text book
319 Graham et al. 1996.; Milne 1991.
320 It is also easily developed into a theory about social class as the particular family experiences are
inherited by the next generation.
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solution is to provide a subsidy such that the price of the telephone to those households at
risk of social exclusion causes them to behave as if they were accounting for tire costs bom
by society of their non-subscription (i.e., antisocial behaviour), when considering whether to
take out a telephone subscription.
Now let us examine what has been discussed so far in this section. One can take the
socio/political argument regarding social exclusion and reassemble it as a number of
economic arguments in order to focus on its policy aspects, as they are essentially economic
in their operation. What proponents of tire social exclusion argument are saying is that tire
telephone is especially important and should not be left to impoverished individuals to decide
simply by giving them additional income (although this might help). It is suggested that what
they need is a telephone.
Tire socio/political arguments are rhetorical. No empirical evidence is cited in support
of their claims. Indeed, it is not something that lends itself easily to empirical investigation.
From an economic perspective, a problem arising from this is that one cannot get a sense of
the market failure dimension in order to design a policy which internalizes tire externality-
costs — one can not even get a rough estimate of the benefits in order to compare them with
costs.
These arguments do not appear to give enough to recommend a policy initiative. A
different sort of argument is required, and for this one needs to go back to the concept of
merit goods. That is a fairly limited subject area, being those things for which a majority' of
voters appear to agree, through repeated democratic events, that there should be a nrinimum
level ofpublic access — a safety- net.
It is for these "voter agreed" merit goods that most exceptions occur to the
economists' usual preference for consumer sovereignty, and it is where subsidized access to
specific meritorious goods and service over-rides the economists' preference for poverty- to
be dealt with through income support rather than by subsidizing individual items.
Now let us look at the case that people are not informed about the value they can get
from a subscription to the telephone network. As far as basic service is concerned, it is
unlikely that those without telephones are not fairly well informed about its uses. It is
suspected that for most non-subscribers, their non-subscription will not be because they do
not understand what can be done with a telephone, and hence fail to value it appropriately.
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As for point (iii) above, there is some evidence supporting the suggestion diat some
people do not value the telephone nearly as highly as others. A survey done for OFTEL
indicated that approximately one third of unconnected households in the UK (about
450,000) were not interested in having a telephone in their home121. Moreover, more
households in EU countries (and other OECD countries) have televisions than have
telephones, and given the higher up-front payment typically required to buy a television set
than is required to gain a telephone subscription, especially by poor people who often cannot
get credit, it seems likely diat many poor households value television more highly than a
telephone.
This may also be die case for cable television. In a study in the USA involving a fairly
poor area ofNew Jersey, 50% of those households diat did not have a phone in their home
had cable TV1™. Indeed, in dieir answers to interviewers, these households said that cable
TV added more to their quality of life dian did a telephone. It dius seems likely that at least
for many marginalized households, cable TV is also valued more highly than a telephone 'A
One argument is that competition will lead to a substantial fall in household
subscriptions, as a profit oriented operator would have no interest in serving unprofitable
customers, which were considered to exist in large numbers. In those cases where network
development is not complete, it is argued that liberalization will result in die incumbent
deciding not to roll out its network to areas it considered would be unprofitable; mainly
sparsely populated rural areas. The argument is frequently also cited where liberalization is
being partnered with privatization of the incumbent. This is because while liberalization
makes ongoing cross-subsidization between the incumbent's services inefficient and difficult
to maintain, privatization would be sure to refocus the minds ofmanagement away from the
pursuit of several (often conflicting) objectives that exist under public ownership, to a
primary objective of profit maximization. Thus, where under state ownership, management
were required to also pursue die social objectives including universal service, liberalization,
especially when partnered with privatization, would see universal service objectives jettison124.
321 The UK General Household Survey, 1995, in OFTEL's consultative document.
322 Mueller and Schement. 1996.
323 Compaine and Weinraub. 1998. 16-17.
324 This argument is supported by mainstream economics. In describing assumptions employed to
analyze the role of asymmetric information and the incentives of the actors, Laffont and Tirole. 1993.
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There are a number of scenarios where liberalization and privatization will not affect
negatively on household penetrations rates, if no official universal service obligations are
imposed. It is worth looking at these, although it is argued below that while they would likely
play an important part in mitigating against reductions in penetration rates, in some
circumstances other effects may predominate, which put the pursuit of universal basic service
in doubt.
The first of these concerns unprofitable customers that have telephones at the time of
liberalization/ privatization, those perhaps at most risk. (These are mainly those generating
low revenues, chiefly poor households, and those in vert? high cost areas.) These customers
are likely to continue receiving service, whether or not mandatory universal service
obligations operate following liberalization/privatization. This is because the main network
assets required to provide service to these households are already in place, and to a very great
degree are irreversible (i.e., they are sunk costs).
At this part of the study the case of liberalization accompanied by privatization of the
incumbent operator will be examined. If at the time of sale the authorities refused to provide
ongoing compensation to the operator for serving loss-making customers, bidders would
take that into account in the price theyr offered the state for the operator. Bidders would
know that some of the network assets would not be able to generate a profit if valued at
replacement cost, and the value of those assets would be written down in the offer to reflect
this. The state would get a lower price for the operator, assuming all else remained the same,
than had the state agree to pay the net USO costs, or to regulate for a USO tax to be
recovered from subscribers'23.
It is sometimes argued that the cause of universal service would be advanced if the
incumbent operator were permitted to price discriminate, and were also freed from tariff
averaging requirements. Some support for this argument can be found in economic analysis.
No network operator could survive by pricing all its services at LRIC. This is because
in a telecommunications network, there are many costs which are not incremental to any
particular service, such that operators must on average charge above the incremental costs of
the services they sell if they are to provide investors with a sufficient return on their
325 In the later case the state would likely get less than if the net USO cost was paid out of general
taxes because of the negative effects such a tax would have on the industry.
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investment to continue attracting the necessary capital needed to stay in business. But, so
long as the price of a service at least covers the incremental cost of providing diat service,
there will be no cross-subsidy 6.
In wealthy countries, all but a very small number of households would be offered
service at a rate diev could afford. There would, however, likely be a very small number of
high costs, low income, households that place a relatively high value on having a telephone in
their home, but the price of service would be more than they could pay or wanted to pay,
given their modest incomes. These households are the core of the universal service problem
— they will need targeted assistance if diey are to subscribe. In conclusion, most universal
service costs are created by tariff averaging and access deficits. However, in high cost low-
income areas, a small number of universal service needs would likely remain.
Having more frequent reviews is not a recommended solution as die price cap would
increasingly resemble rate of return regulation, which tends to remove die incentive for the
operator's management to lower costs at all levels.
In die short to medium term, the impact of competition on universal service is difficult
to predict. In die medium to long term, competition leads to lower costs, provides a timelier
introduction of new technologies and new services, and leads to lower consumer prices.
Competition provides incentives for firms to invest in and introduce technologies that give
them a cost or service quality advantage over their competitors. No odier arrangement is, in
practice, more effective at providing services efficientiy dian competition. In die
telecommunications industry, however, market power is relatively enduring, and regulators
need to find cost effective ways of overcoming diis which enables competition to evolve
without die regulations diemselves causing die incumbents' assets to be stranded.
Where competition is permitted, and the incumbent operator has significant net USO
costs imposed on it, die incumbent is quite reasonably likely to argue that it is neidier
equitable nor efficient for its competitors not to also contribute to those costs. To leave out
competitors from making a proper contribution does, in principle, provide diem widi a cost
advantage, as they do not have to mark up any of dieir prices as die incumbent will need to
do in order to recover the net USO cost. Such an outcome could be described as
326 An incremental cost test provides the proper floor price for the existence of cross-subsidization.
(See Baumol, et al. 1982.).
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discriminatory and a cause of competitive distortion. Where competition is not well
established and the likely she of the net incremental cost of die USO (i.e., die economic cost)
is not so large as to effectively hand non-contributory competitors a winning cost advantage,
it can not be considered that a strong case can be made for setting up an official contributor}'
scheme. There are several arguments, which lead to this conclusion:
♦ The industry is characterized by high entry barriers, especially high sunk costs and
continuing regulator}- uncertainty.
♦ Incumbent operators are well placed to recover USO costs in diose markets in which
they face little or no competition. This is largely because a firm based tax imposes
different effective marginal tax rates on competitors.
♦ NRAs suffer from acutely inferior information about the costs and benefits of USOs
compared to die information held by die incumbent. In most Member States, NRA's
relative inexperience exacerbates die difficulty? of dieir task. Largely because of this,
on average, net USO costs agreed with NRAs run a significant risk of being inflated,
which, if it occurred, would result in competitors contributing to net costs of die
incumbent that do not in fact exist '- ;
Considering die three points above, Member States that are quick to set up contributory
schemes, even though competition is in its infancy?, are not sending a competition friendly
message to potential entrants and investors. The suggestion is that the audiorities have acted
to the strategic advantage of the incumbent. In diose cases where the state also retains a
significant financial interest in the incumbent, observers may connect early action to
implement a contributor}' system with die visible incentive of die audiorities to prefer the
incumbent. In short, die early implementation of an official USO contributory scheme could
be seen as a lack of policy and regulator}? independence '"8.
327 While rate based regulation in the USA (which has mainly been replaced by RPI-X control over a
weighted basket of services) did result in relatively unprofitable periods for some monopoly utilities,
where competition has been permitted casual observation suggests that cost measures relating to the
incumbent have moved down over time, not just due to technology improvements, but also as regulators
have repeatedly refined their cost measurement skills.
328 The same can happen for a private incumbent, particularly where government is focussed on the
short term benefits that can be provided to consumers by imposing tough regulations on the incumbent.
Such policies can, however, stifle investment leading to a relatively worse situation for consumers in the
long term.
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The universal service costs are not so large as to force the incumbent into a
competitively weaker position compared to its competitors. No contributory scheme is
necessary, at least until competition becomes well established. If the size of tire net USO
cost is such as to competitively' disadvantage the incumbent, either competitors should bear a
share of die liability, or the state should pay the USO costs out of general taxes.
Assuming a single service industry329, die impact of a significant USO liability levied
periodically on firms providing telecommunications services according to some estimate of
their market activity, is radier similar to the effects of a transactions tax.
Cross-subsidization and die long term implication of universal service subsidies on die
telecommunications industry- can be analyzed in terms of public choice. To do so one has to
move the focus from suppliers of network services to demanders of those services. In
adopting diis approach, it is assumed a public utility to be a coalition of consumer interests
who have agreed to band togedier to form a network, as diere are economic advantages for
each of diem in doing so, mainly in the form of lower unit production costs and network
externalities. The following analysis concerns the strategic interaction involved in group
formation and continuance.
Coalitions of interest can be seen as comprising several more narrow interest groups
who have banded togedier because, while narrow groups have different interests to each
odier, there are often similar interest which bind them togedier. However, none will agree to
remain in die grand coalition if they can do better by leaving it. In this regard several
coalitions of interests could decide diey have enough common ground to leave die public
network and go it alone. Examples often show up in the provision of so-called public
goods, where splinter groups have broken away from the majority public provision330.
These include the existence of private health services even diough publicly funded
health care is available to all, where private education flourishes diough die availability of
329 Making the analysis with multiple services adds nothing to the explanation except unnecessary
complication.
330 'So called is used because it is the fact that they are not pure public goods; that partly explains the
existence of several consumer clubs in addition to those provided publicly. (T° he a pure public good
requires that the enjoyment I get from my consumption of the good does not deplete your enjoyment of
it, and that the producer is unable to exclude anyone from consuming it. A lighthouse is a frequently
noted example.)
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publicly funded education is ubiquitous, and where private pension schemes operate even
though the state scheme provides for everyone.
The pricing of public utility services such as telecommunications is not usually
organized as a vote. But politicians and government institutions do tend to represent voter
(and sometimes also other) interests, and thus, while the linkage is much less direct than users
actually voting on prices, die voter connection has been found to be a highly useful one with
which to analyze the structure of telecommunications (and other utility) prices, especially
because until quite recently prices for telephone service in most Member States. By setting
price at average cost there are no monopoly profits earned by the network. Average
cost includes a fair return on capital.
An interesting judgement"1 f the Court ofJustice held that an undertaking providing an
express mail service may, in certain circumstances, be required to pay postal dues to the
operator responsible for die universal postal service. The court argued drat in the case of a
service of general interest, postal dues must enable compensation to be paid for any losses
diat may result from operating die universal service. In this case, in Italy, the collection,
carriage, and deliver)- of mail are, in principle, services provided exclusively by the State. Any
contravention is punishable by a fine. Since 1998 the State has provided the service through a
joint stock company — Poste Italiane SpA — in which the Ministry for the Treasury is die sole
shareholder. The Court acknowledged that an undertaking such as Poste Italiane is
responsible for operating a service in the general economic interest, since it secures the
universal postal service, irrespective of the profitable of the sector being served. In order to
enable such an undertaking to perform that special task, it may prove necessary not only to
permit it to offset its profitability sectors against its less profitable sectors, but also to require
suppliers of postal services not forming part of die universal service to pay postal dues which
contribute to the financing of the universal service and enable diat service to be provided in
conditions of economic stability. Furthermore, die Court considers that when the
undertaking providing the universal postal service supplies an express mail service, it must
also be required, under die same conditions, to pay the postal dues.
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This chapter -will discuss whether there exist any licensing requirements which cut across the
fixed and mobile sectors, capable of hindering the entry of operators into the emerging
fixed/mobile sector. The licensing directive and the licensing environment are discussed in





The licensing directive"" defines a framework for national licensing and authorization
regimes, which notably prohibits the limitation of die number of licenses that may be granted
and prefers the tightest possible regulatory regime and general audiorizations (as opposed to
individual licenses). The licensing directive also provides for a degree of harmonization of
national license award procedures and tire conditions which may be attached to licenses.
Despite die preference for general authorizations indicated in die recitals to die
directive" ', Member States still enjoy a broad discretion in establishing licensing categories
and in utilizing individual licenses. In this regard, die licensing directive does not specify any
telecommunications service categories for which a general audiorization or an individual
license may be required, witii the consequence diat the provision of identical services is
subject to divergent requirements across the Member States. The licensing directive allows
Member States to require an individual license in die following circumstances"4:
♦ to allow die licensee access to radio frequencies or numbers
♦ to confer particular rights with regard to access to public or private land
♦ to impose obligations and requirements relating to the mandator}- provision of public
telecommunications networks and/or services
♦ to impose specific obligations on operators with SMP
♦ for the provision of public voice telephony services, the establishment and operation
of public telecommunications networks, and the establishment of networks
involving the use of radio frequencies
Moreover, the number of individual licenses issued may be limited in order to ensure, inter
alia, the efficient use of radio spectrum"3. In practice, die regulatory framework established
by the licensing directive has resulted in diverging national licensing schemes, with only a few
Member States (the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands) relying mainly on general
authorizations for die provision of a full range of communications services over fixed
332 The Licensing Directive: European Parliament and the European Council. Directive 97/13/EC
of 15 December 1997 on a common framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the
field of telecommunications services. (0| L 117/15).
333 In particular, Recital 7.
334 Article 8 of the Licensing Directive.
335 Article 10 of the Licensing Directive.
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networks. Mobile networks, on the other hand, are universally subject to individual licensing
procedures"6.
In all Member States, only a limited number of individual licenses are available for the
provision of mobile networks and services, consistent with the terms of the licensing
directive, because of spectrum insufficiency. To date, the majority of mobile licenses have
been granted following a "beauty parade'"'7, although recourse to auctioning procedures is
being increasingly used for the allocation of additional spectrum capacity"8.
Scarcity of spectrum and the consistent practice in the Member States of licensing
mobile service provision, together with authorization of the use of appropriate radio
frequency spectrum, raise the issue of how access to frequencies can be obtained by new
fixed entrants in a fixed/mobile converged environment. Some fixed entrants have
expressed concern that insufficiency of spectrum may prevent hem from playing a
constructive role in a fixed/mobile converged environment. To some degree, these concerns
can be addressed by implementing appropriate conditions for spectrum trading, and through
he release of additional spectrum for telecommunications purposes (some of which might
currently be used inefficiently for non-telecommunications purposes or by government
bodies).
Hie situation regarding mobile operators seeking licenses for he provision of fixed
services is not subject to any comparable restrictions. According to he terms of he licensing
directive, licenses for fixed services should be available to all potential market actors, without
qualification. This has recently enabled a number of mobile operators to obtain fixed
licenses to complement heir GSM operations (e.g., AirTel in Spain,WIND in Italy, and Viag
in Germany). These GSM operators will here fore be in a position to maintain national
coverage based on mobile technology, while gradually establishing a fixed network presence.
Over time, hese operators may be able to bypass he fixed incumbent operator to a
significant degree. In die United Kingdom, all mobile operators' licenses automatically
include a fixed operator license.
336 See ETO, Second Interim Report on Categories of Authorizations, Report to the European
Commission . July, 1999.
337 In Sweden, the licenses where given, for free, to the operator with the most beaut)- power . It is
interesting to notice that TELIA, the Swedish incumbent, was not one of them. See further, the glossary.
338 For instance, the NRA in Germany held a frequency auction on 28 October 1999. In Austria,




Number portability refers to the ability of end users to retain dieir telephone numbers when
they change their chosen network operator/service provider, their location, or their service.
These types of portability are known, respectively, as operator portability"9, geographic
portability, and service portability. The absence of number portability means that changing
service providers requires an end user to change his or her telephone number. This can act
as a restriction to customers, who will be reluctant to use an alternative operator if they must
change their numbers. In tins situation, consumer concerns overlap with competition law
concerns to die extent that new entry may be seriously hindered unless number portability is
mandated. To date, whedier and when to introduce number portability has been decided
solely on a fixed-to-fixed and mobile-to-mobile basis. Hie increased use of personal
numbers is, however, paving die way for number portability to be introduced across sectors
(e.g., fixed/mobile/paging). Hie existence of personal numbers should result in the greater
take-up of fixed/mobile converged services, since such services rely on calls being directed to
a subscriber's fixed or mobile handset, depending on their location.
The existence of personal numbers in a Member State which has a clear identifying
number prefix, facilitates portability in a converged services environment by overcoming
many of the problems usually associated with tariff transparency when a number is ported
across different platforms characterized by different retail pricing structures, namely, the
premium attached to its acquisition and its identifiability import clear tariff messages to
consumers. Personal numbers thereby create the opportunity for converged services to be
provided for incoming calls '40.
The Commission has addressed consumer and competition concerns in the fixed
environment by mandating, in a revision to the interconnection directive in 1998, the
introduction of operator portability by all fixed local access providers by 1 January 2000 (with
tlie exception of those Member States granted a transition period for full liberalization) '41. In
339 Operator portability can be further segmented into local number portability, mobile number
portability, and non-geographic number portability (for services such as freephone and special rate
services).
340 Because personal numbers are a marketing tool for businesses, they also indirectly involve the
called party in the tariff-setting process because they often share part of the burden of financing the
service (personal calls are often treated as free calls by small businesses).
341 See: European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/61/EC of 24 September 1998
amending Directive 97/33/EC with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection . (OJ
L 268/37). 1998.
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addition, the Commission has the ability to grant a deferment of this obligation where a
Member State is able to demonstrate that such an obligation would impose an excessive
burden on certain organizations'42. No Member State has requested such a deferment,
despite the range of potential issues, which might have arisen from the so-called "Y2K"
problem as from 1 January 2000'4 '.
Hie introduction of number portability on fixed networks is steadily growing across the
EU. Number portability is already available on the fixed networks of seven Member States,
with its introduction also foreseen in Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain by July 2000 at
the latest. Portugal and Greece — both of which were granted transition periods from full
liberalization — are scheduled to introduce number portability on fixed networks by January
2002 and 2003, respectively. Ireland will introduce number portability by January 2001,
having only fully liberalized its telecommunications market in December 1998.
As regards mobile networks, there is no explicit obligation under Community law that
mobile operators provide number portability. The Commission was of tire view at the time
of its proposed amendment to the interconnection directive in 1998, that the obligation of
mobile operators to offer carrier selection and number portability should be examined
further. Accordingly, the United Kingdom and Tire Netherlands are the only Member States
in which number portability is currently mandated'44 between mobile networks. However,
number portability is scheduled to be introduced in Denmark, Italy, and Sweden in the near
future'44, while the telecommunications market commission in Spain has tire power to
intervene if mobile operators cannot agree on the technical standards for number portability.
Germany is awaiting an ETSI determination on standards before the introduction of number
portability for mobile operators. The ODTR has proposed the continuation of the current
system of partial number portability in the short term in Ireland, but has decided to move in
principle towards full number portability in the long term, if further study suggests that this is
necessary. The introduction of number portability in Belgium, France, Greece, and Sweden,
on the other hand, is not currently on tire regulatory agenda. It is also not foreseen in
342 Article 20(2) of the Interconnection Directive.
343 Namely, the potential for systems failures to occur because software has not been programmed to
recognize date figures with three zeros in the date.
344 Status Report on European Union Electronic Communications Policy . This report is regularly
updated and can be found at http:/ /www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecornpolicv/tcstatus.htm.
345 It is hoped that this will be in force by the end of 2001.
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Finland due to the apparent lack of consumer demand, while Portugal has yet to take a
position on the issue.
Opinion from members of industry on extending number portability to the mobile
sector was polarized in the study by analysis146. Some fixed incumbents and most mobile
operators considered that it was not necessary to impose number portability on mobile
operators and some fixed incumbents favoured the extension of the policy to mobile
operators because the reasons for number portability are the same in the fixed and mobile
sectors (on the basis of the principle of technology neutrality). This view was also supported
by a minority of mobile operators (usually third and fourth operators). A third group of
operators expressed the view that number portability could be applied equally to both
sectors, but only where justified in both instances. Independent service providers in both the
fixed and mobile sectors took the view that number portability should not be restricted to
one sector of the market if services were to truly converge. Consumer groups echoed these
comments.
The rationale for the introduction of number portability between fixed networks, both
based on consumer empowerment and choice and because of the ability of such a policy to
lower entry barriers, appears on first inspection to be more problematic in a purely mobile
environment. A number of key technological, regulatory, and market issues, which are
material to whether number portability should be mandated on mobile networks are:
♦ different market characteristics
Mobile operators argue that the market characteristics, which caused number
portability to be mandated for fixed networks, do not appear to be present in tire
mobile sector now. Research undertaken by the telecommunications industry
indicates that the demand for number portability' on mobile networks continues to
be relatively low'4 .
It is tire lack of such demand by end users that has led the regulator to decide
against tire introduction of number portability in Finland. Moreover, the high levels
of chum'48 experienced across all national mobile markets suggest that, with or
546 Fixed/Mobile Convergence and the 1999 Review.
347 For example, a major European mobile operator indicated in its response to our industry
consultations that less than 5% of its customers request the porting of their numbers.
348 Calculated to be on average a 25% churn rate across Europe.
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without number portability, mobile subscribers do not at present feel constrained to
remain with an operator, but rather will migrate to whichever operator can best serve
their particular needs. This is diametrically opposed to tire situation in the fixed
sector, where the costs of switching operators continue to be high14'.
Some consumer groups have countered that tire willingness of consumers to
churn can be explained in part by their desire to upgrade mobile handsets because of
tire rapidly increasing functionality35". However, some NRAs and various consumer
groups believe that tire relative costs of mobile chum may become more important
as markets mature technologically.
♦ costs
It is argued by mobile operators that tire costs associated with implementing number
portability for mobile operators do not appear to be justified in light of prevailing
market conditions, in particular given the high level of churn and the relative lack of
demand.
The considerable, and sometimes unforeseen, costs associated with the
introduction of number portability have already been witnessed in the fixed sector.
The cost issue continues to be the foremost concern of the fixed community with
respect to number portability, and many new entrants consider it to be a significant
economic burden that is not offset by greater access to die incumbent's customers.
Odier operators, however, argue that the high cost of the IN technology"1 necessary
to facilitate portability is justified in die long term, given its utility in providing more
advanced services such as personal numbering services and VPNs. Significant costs
349 For example, fundamental technological differences between the fixed and the mobile sectors also
mean that a mobile subscriber can in one-day change operators, while that process on the fixed network
may take weeks, if not months. In addition, allowing an alternative fixed operator into a residence is a
significant consumer decision, which, in most EU Member States, also requires negotiations with the
fixed incumbent operator (who, in most cases, owns the drop line into the home).
350 Chum on prepaid cards has onlv one penalty - the cost of the mobile handset.
351 Number portability can be provided using on-switch solutions, in which the information required is
held in individual switches from which calls are forwarded, or more complicated off-switch solutions, in
which the information required is held in a central database, though operational copies or subsets of this
data may be held more locally. Although there has been agreement within ETSI on a market standard
concerning number portability, two separate implementation schemes are currently supported by different
industry groups. One of the alternatives being favoured by several operators is the special Signalling
Relay Function, which is based partly on proprietary standards (which does not facilitate the adoption of a
uniform pan-European solution).
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will also be incurred by mobile operators in relation to the modification and
development of operational support systems, such as diose associated with billing,
the maintenance of customer records, and fault monitoring. It is also reported that
such modifications will pose significant technical and operational difficulties, which
should not be underestimated by operators '3-.
♦ tariff transparency
Any advantage to be gained by the introduction of number portability may be offset
by the further erosion of price transparency in the mobile sector. The operator
serving a subscriber who avails himself of operator number portability will no longer
be identifiable by the subscriber's telephone number. These concerns are no less
applicable to intra-network calls (Le., mobile-to-mobile calls within the same
network), where tariffs for such calls are generally, less than those for inter-network
calls. The popular and widespread tariff incentives used to generate greater intra-
network traffic could become difficult to sustain with the introduction of number
portability, because the identity of the network would become irrelevant.
Consumers have already complained to NRAs in The Netherlands and the
United Kingdom - the only two Member States in which number portability has
been implemented in practice by mobile operators — regarding the further threats to
tariff transparency '3 ' costs. According to that operator, high chum rates indicate that
customer loyalty to any given mobile operator is rare.
The cost allocation methods used regarding both number portability and
carrier selection are the subject of a separate study in the "1999 Review" process
undertaken by European Economic Research Ltd and entitled "Study on allocation
of costs regarding number portability and carrier selection/pre-selection".
♦ termination on mobile networks
352 See, for example: Arcome SA/Smith. Technical Options and Costs for achieving Number
Portability: Pinal Report. 290ctober 1997.
353 In the context of the 1999 Review, a separate study on Tariff transparency in a multi-operator
environment is being carried out by OVUM on behalf of the Commission.
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When considering the extension of number portability to mobile operators one
should not ignore the fact that diere are different prices for the termination of
mobile-to-mobile, mobile-to-fixed, and fixed-to-mobile calls '14.
In the United Kingdom, the effects of number portability on different
termination tariff levels has led to consumer concern where numbers have been
ported between mobile operators, largely because the old termination charges were
also ported along with the original numbers. In order to address this problem,
OFTEL has intervened during the course of 1999 by requiring, in effect, that the
same rates be charged across all mobile operators in order to avoid diis problem.
This policy constitutes a de facto application of a fixed termination rate policy for
interconnection, which effectively rules out the possibility for competition in the
termination of calls to mobiles (something which die Monopolies & Merger
Commission has foreseen as a possibility in its recent calls to mobiles
investigation)'11.
Number portability should not be mandated if its effect is to undermine the
potential growth of a competitive market for call termination. Until competition for
call termination materializes, however, regulation of call termination on mobile
networks may be thought by NRAs to be necessary '16.
♦ distinct policies
Number portability was introduced at EU level primarily for geographic numbers.
This policy was driven by die desire to foster local loop competition through the
introduction of new entrants into local access markets. That policy orientation is not
applicable to the mobile marketplace because numbers are operator-specific, rather
than particular to a given local geographic territory. One solution to this problem
was advocated by OVUM, namely, to mandate enhanced tariff transparency services
354 The primary means which a mobile customer has to identify those differential tariffs is its
understanding of the particular tariff packages of a given operator, which is immediately identifiable by its
number prefix. This is not comparable to the fixed sector, where numbers are location-specific.
355 Monopolies & Mergers Commission Report on references under Section 13 of the
Telecommunications Act 1984 on the charges made by BT Cellnet and Vodafone for terminating calls
from fixed networks, December 1998 (hereafter the MMC Report).
356 Insofar as an increasing number ofmobile operators are being found to have SMP in their
respective national market[s] for interconnection , this is already occurring by virtue of the application of
the cost-orientation principle contained in Article 7(2), the Interconnection Directive.
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such as "advice of charge" services, where the caller is provided at the point of call
with information on the maximum tariff one will pay for any given call'5'.
Despite the views described above, it appears that number portability may be necessary
to facilitate fixed/mobile convergence, given that customers might be offered integrated
service packages using one number for both mobile and fixed communications338.
Eventually, the process of convergence can be best facilitated by the introduction of
personal numbers, which have the potential to be used across fixed and mobile. Such
personal numbers may have a price premium attached to them in light of their relative
importance to consumers.
It can be considered whether there are likely to be market distortions if only some
Member States mandate mobile number portability. There is some concern that tire
patchwork availability of number portability may lead to cost differentials between Member
States. However, the current nationally defined scope of mobile markets ensures that all
operators in each market will bear the same portability burden. Numbers are currently
ported only intra-nationally and numbering plans only support such an allocation.
Although there are arguments to suggest that the market access issues associated with
portability in the fixed sector do not apply in the mobile sector'39, the view is that it is
appropriate to mandate number portability between mobile operators. Ultimately, the
increase of consumer choice is an important factor, which not only provides an even greater
stimulus for competition, but also acts as a counterweight to market power being abused.
357 The mobile industry does not, at least at this present juncture in its historical development, display
any of the characteristics of a commodity service.
358 This view is supported by OVUM in its tariff transparency study, in particular in relation to
fixed/mobile service number portability. OVUM are of the opinion that the difficulties associated with
tariff transparency are likely to be greater in this instance, as the price differentials between fixed and
mobile services are greater.
359 For example:
1. There is little evidence to date suggesting that there is significant consumer demand for number
portability between mobile operators. In a country such as Finland, where mobile penetration now
exceeds 70% of the population, and where the number ofmobile connections exceeds the number of
fixed connections, there appears to be no meaningful consumer demand for number portability.
Moreover, the high levels of churn exhibited by all EU Member States suggests that consumers do not
feel that the need to change numbers acts as a disincentive to changing mobile operators.
2. The pro-competitive rationale for introducing number portability in the fixed sector is less
persuasive in the mobile sector. Portability is a desirable pro-competitive goal, but not as critical an issue
in the mobile sector.
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Similarly, the principle of technology reliability would appear to be most appropriate to apply
in a proportionate manner in those circumstances.
The fixed and mobile sectors have developed under completely different competitive
conditions. In addition, fixed and mobile services are not totally substitutable services, at
least not at this stage of their commercial development. The cost of porting numbers
between sectors and the technical requirements necessary to achieve tins are unlikely to be
identical in the fixed and mobile contexts, which would act as a competitive disadvantage to
those operators having to bear greater costs. Because of the technical difficulties inherent in
achieving the results of such portability, its expense would be likely to outweigh its benefits.
Moreover, any benefit in terms of competition is likely to be counterbalanced by a loss of
tariff transparency, given tire differences between fixed and mobile tariffs. In these
circumstances, consumer concerns regarding tariff transparencywould be significant.
With rare exceptions, the fixed incumbent operator will provide tire most ever-present
and competitive fixed/mobile package"'". In such an environment, the possibility of
foreclosure of competitors and the creation of potential network effects may be significant.
Accordingly, it may be tire case that such a converged operator should be required to provide
the portability of its number to odrer providers of integrated packages. If this is deemed to
be the case, and a more mature market sees the proliferation of fixed/mobile packages, tire
pressure to extend number portability obligations to all operators providing converged
packages, regardless of the particular market sector in which they operate, may be irresistible.
In particular, if service offerings continue to include multiple numbers (including mobile
numbers) that are forwarded to the converged numbers, it will be difficult to justify
portability requirements for all numbers other than the mobile numbers.
The most appropriate and least disruptive means of achieving full number portability
across market sectors (or segments) is through die increased use of personal numbers, which
can diemselves be ported between operators. This one number solution, whereby any
operator is sheltered behind die operator-anonymous personal number, is the most
appropriate means of achieving a fully converged environment. As discussed earlier, by
attaching a premium to die acquisition of such numbers, consumers are likely to be highly
360 Only in Greece, for example, has the first mobile license not been granted to the fixed incumbent.
In the United Kingdom, the fixed incumbent, BT, was restricted until recently from holding a 100%
interest in the first mobile operator, Cellnet.
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sensitive to tariffing issues; most importantly, parties calling such numbers will often be
sharing the costs of calling a personal number with its owner '''1, rather than bearing the full
costs of the call, as occurs today. As network convergence progresses, the move from a
series of IN-sensitive switches communicatingwith one another to a single switch controlling
both fixed and mobile numbers will make personal numbers more attractive to consumers.
To conclude, the issue of number portability, will mean the end of tire usual association
in the minds of consumers of particular quality standards, service packages, termination
charges, and brand image with particular mobile operators. (This phenomenon does not
occur in the fixed sector, where numbers are geographic-specific, rather than operator-
specific.) Insofar as the "caller pays" principle continues to apply to such communications, it
is arguable that the calling party is not price-sensitive to the level of termination changes for
such services. On the other hand, evidence from consumers using personal numbers
suggests that they are more price-sensitive to high termination charges.
361 As discussed earlier, business users will have ever)7 incentive to encourage their business associates
or customers to use their personal number; in order to do so, market behaviour suggests that they are





Carrier selection can normally be accomplished in two ways - on a call-by-call basis or
through carrier pre-selection:
♦ Call-by-call carrier selection (or "easy access") exists where the default carrier is
determined by the incumbent operator, but customers can override this
determination and choose their (preferred) local, long distance, or international
operator by dialling a short access code before ever}' call.
♦ Carrier pre-selection (or "equal access") exists where the local, long, distance or
international operator is pre-selected by tire customer, but can be overridden on a
call-by-call basis.
The carrier pre-selection option is generally considered to be a second regulator}' step,
following the implementation of the call-by-call carrier selection option.
Hie origins of carrier selection lie in the desire of regulators to introduce competition
for local, long distance, and international calls which, under a fixed monopoly environment,
were charged at a premium (while purely local calls provided by a monopoly operator were
subsidized with high long distance and international revenues). It was felt that because long
distance and international services were the most price-sensitive, the introduction of
competition for the origination of such calls was a regulatory imperative. It was believed that
die full benefits of liberalization would only become available at die local level at a later stage
in die liberalization process (i.e., because the roll-out of local networks was a risky and time-
consuming endeavour). At the time of its introduction, many alternative local access
operators took the view that a mandated pre-selection process, while generating price
competition for long distance and international calls, could act as a disincentive to investment
by new entrants in the local loop'6".
The interconnection directive, as amended16', impliedly mandates the introduction of
call-by-call carrier selection for all fixed providers by the dates set for liberalization (in most
cases, 1 January 1998). While it also requires the introduction of carrier pre-selection, with
362 On the basis that, during the critical period of initial network rollout, international service
providers at the expense of the fixed incumbent operator were seizing the most lucrative revenue streams,
thereby making it difficult for new local network entrants to compete because of their lack of geographic
ubiquity.
363 See: Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring
universal service and Interoperability through application of the principles ofOpen Network Provision
(ONP). (OJL 199/32). 1997.
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call-by-call override, for fixed local access providers, with SMP no later than 1 January 2000,
or no later than two years after the date for full liberalization in those Member States that
have been granted transition periods.
Similar to its policy on number portability, die Commission has die ability to grant a
deferment of the obligation to implement carrier pre-selection where a Member State is able
to prove that such an obligation would impose an excessive burden on certain operators'64.
The United Kingdom was the only EU Member State who requested such a deferment until
December 2000, on the basis diat BT's switches have no latent carrier pre-selection
functionality, and tiiat service could not practically be in place by 1 January 2000 deadline'6'.
The interconnection directive further gives Member States the discretion to extend die
obligation to provide carrier pre-selection with call-by-call override to fixed operators widiout
SMP, where diis obligation would not impose a disproportionate burden on such operators
or create a barrier to market entry. (NRAs are also allowed to leave diis policy to market
forces.)
The majority of Member States have implemented their carrier selection obligations
into national law. Indeed, most Member States have favoured a staggered approach to the
introduction of carrier selection services, preferring to limit its initial applicability to certain
call types, such as national and international calls. The interconnection directive does not
contain any such fragmentation. It contemplates diat any interconnected operator will be
audiorized to demand pre-selection.
Mobile network operators are not specifically subject to the carrier selection obligations
of the interconnection directive. Accordingly, it has been left to the discretion of the NRAs
to determine if and when carrier selection should be extended to such operators.
As regards carrier pre-selection on mobile networks, Denmark and Finland are die only
Member States where this type of indirect access is currendy available on mobile networks'66.
Opinion from industry- was sharply divided on the issue of whether carrier selection should
364 Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal
service and Interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP).
(OJ L 199/32). 1997.
365 At present, the United Kingdom and the Commission are assessing the most appropriate means of
providing an interim solution until full carrier pre-selection is implemented (e.g., through the use of
diallers).
366 See: Status Report on European Union Electronic Communication Policy ,
(http:/ /www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy/tcstatus.htm
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be extended to the mobile sector, and on what terms. On the one hand, international
service providers and consumer groups take the view that the introduction of such a
policy is a pro-competitive and consumer-empowering measure, which is also justifiable
on grounds of technology neutrality. On the other hand, most fixed incumbent
operators and mobile operators argue that carrier selection should not be mandated in
the mobile sector. In particular, they argued against the principle of extending carrier
selection to the mobile sector simply because of its implementation on fixed networks.
They also argued that the characteristics of the mobile market, particularly in terms of
mobile network architecture, investment requirements, and growth rates are very
different between die two sectors, all of which have a bearing on whether such a policy
should be adopted. Some of these operators were concerned that the extension of
carrier selection to the mobile sector could hinder tariff innovation and undermine the
pre-paid card market16'.
As regards the possible application of a carrier selection policy to die mobile sector, the
arguments raised in die context of the discussion on number portability are of equal
importance. In addition, a number of other relevant market-related issues are summarized
below:
♦ stimulating long distance competition
In most Member States, there are at least three mobile operators currently offering
consumer choice in the origination of long distance and international calls. In
addition, the incentive for mobile operators to offer competitive rates for their long
distance and international services should, in principle, ensure that they also seek the
most competitive rates from their preferred long distance and international
providers'68.
♦ roaming and international calls
The vast majority of international traffic on mobile networks is traffic generated by
customers roaming in another country. Consequently, total outbound international
367 In this regard, a number ofNRAs have made the point that fixed operators faced similar problems
and that such arguments are not conclusive on the issue of consumer welfare, given that carrier selection
will not replace and is not substitutable for prepaid services.
368 Additional factors to be taken into account are that mobile operators bv and large do not
differentiate between national long distance and local call tariffs.
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traffic from customers on their home network often represents only a tiny
proportion of total roamed traffic for manymobile operators169.
♦ technical
From a technical perspective, as a result of fundamental changes in the Inter
Operator Tariff ("IOT") charging principles, which took effect on 1 April 2000 as a
result of the introduction of the so-called TAP3 system, the existing inability of
mobile operators to bill for variable international call rates"" has been overcome.
♦ tariff transparency
The multiple tariff packages offered by mobile operators are already very complex.
While evidence of the fact that healthy competition exists in the origination of
mobile traffic, these tariff packages are also a source of some concern for consumers.
Adding another alternative price package for international calls, which might mean
the loss of some or many of the functions otherwise available on international calls
provided by the home network operator '71, has the potential to create an unnecessary
degree of confusion among consumers.
♦ quality of service
A number of mobile operators have remarked that if carrier selection were to
become widespread, they would not be able to guarantee sufficient quality of service,
if it resulted in irregular traffic spikes on their networks. By not being able to control
their traffic volumes'72, it is claimed, mobile operators are concerned that they will
369 Namely, for many mobile operators, often less than 5% of total calls originated in mobile
operators' home countries are terminated in another country. For a small number of operators, however,
that figure can be significantly higher (up to 20%).
370 Consequently, variable mobile rates are not available (e.g., 30% discount on Belgium-to-Greece
calls for three months, 15% off all calls from Belgium-to-Nordic countries, 10% for all of an individual
customer's calls, and so forth).
371 For example, m some Member States, Short Messaging Service (SMS) functionality and voice-mail
retrieval facilities may be lost in the event that another operator carries the international leg of the call.
372 This is illustrated by the heavy promotion of off-peak calling options, which has proven to be very
popular in Member States such as Italy.
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also not be in a position to control key technical quality aspects of their service17'.
Although die quality of service line of argumentation does not have the same
dimension in the fixed sector, where spectrum constraints are not an issue,
consumers and indeed access providers have sought to rebut the quality of service
argument by arguing that die majority of traffic carried by indirect access providers is
substitutional in nature (rather than additional), which does not create significant
capacity problems regarding peak and off-peak tariffs. Moreover, it is claimed that
die delivery of a call off the systemwill not damage an operator's network integrity174.
A regulatory imbalance such as the lack of carrier selection on mobile networks might
exclude fixed operators from competing for the international voice traffic of mobile
subscribers, while allowing mobile operators to offer alternative voice services to the
subscribers of fixed operators. Mobile operators have argued that, to the extent that price
differentials continue to exist as between international calls generated on fixed and mobile
networks, it is arguable that consumers will have a strong incentive to use their fixed lines to
make most international calls from their "home" Member State. Although the same option
would not be available where consumers are travelling outside their home Member State, at
least partial substitution exists in die form of prepaid calling cards and mobile VPNs for
business customers. Most importandy, it is argued that die introduction of carrier pre¬
selection might result in the disappearance of various tariff package offers, and an increase in
peak hour capacity (which is expensive to achieve on a cellular network).
Most convincing is the argument diat pre-selection provides only an incremental
benefit beyond call-by-call selection, while at the same time being a relatively expensive
means of providing such a small benefit. Consequendy, pre-selection on mobile networks
would be very cosdy to implement, while at the same time providing litde additional value to
373 For example, a major European mobile operator claimed that it has been required to make
approximately over 1,000 modifications to its network per week in response to the recent take-up of
prepaid card offers. The types of network modifications which need to be made, range from software
programming adjustments to physical network changes and moves. For example, certain coastal areas in
the summer of 1999 experienced unprecedented heavy network congestion during that period, as tourists
availed themselves of these new tariff packages. These traffic patterns had not been evidenced in earlier
years.
374 In the alternative, it is claimed that, to the extent that the indirect access provider results in the
creation of incremental rather than substitutional traffic, it will in any event benefit from an
interconnection profit rather than a retail profit.
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consumers to offset that cost373. Ultimately, tlie opening up of the mobile sector through
indirect access is highly relevant in determining whether or not direct access to mobile
networks should be mandated in a manner similar to that in which access is mandated to
fixed networks.
The option of providing carrier selection for domestic long distance calls (as opposed
to international calls) on a mobile network is questionable. Because mobile operators do not
differentiate between local and national long distance calls, subjecting a mobile operator to
such a requirement would effectively confine them to being mere transport providers.
Comments received from the mobile industry also suggest that such a requirement would
have a serious negative impact on the willingness of mobile operators to make the large
investments required for third generation mobile systems. The United Kingdom regulator,
OFTEL, supposedly took these investment considerations into account when it made tire
decision to impose a "retail minus" pricing formula3'6 on indirect access to mobile networks,
applying to both national and international calls made on this basis.
Undoubtedly, carrier pre-selection should not be mandated for mobile operators.
There are strong commercial and competition law reasons why mandating such a policy, at
least at this stage in tire development of the market, imposes significant cost burdens on
operators which are not offset by the relative consumer choice benefits. The introduction of
call-by-call carrier selection for international calls made on mobile networks will inject even
greater competitiveness into the market for international mobile traffic than already exists.
It is not convincing that a call-by-call carrier selection policy should be extended to
national calls. To the extent that the Commission takes the view that such an approach is
necessary, one view could be, given the competitiveness of call origination in mobile markets
and the necessary degree of investment which is required in third generation mobile systems
that indirect access need not be charged on a purely cost-based formula. Market forces will
ensure that, should there be significant consumer demand for such a facility, operators will
respond to the actions of other mobile operators obliged to provide such service.
375 The cost-benefit approach is based on the requirements of Article 9 of the Subsidiarity Protocol to
the Amsterdam Treat}'.
376 On the basis that service providers relying on indirect access would need to be very efficient or to
be able to provide some additional value added for consumers.
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One of tlie most difficult aspects of analyzing the communications market since the
widespread take-up of mobile services, is the substitution of fixed calls by mobile calls.
Traffic is certainly generated by the availability of mobile handsets when people are on the
move, but some of this traffic would have been generated at different times on the fixed
network if the mobile option were not available.
Key aspects of service substitution and other types of substitution are explored in
Chapter 4.2, together with the regulatory implications of that substitution. In all cases, it is
very difficult to estimate the precise extent to which substitution is taking place. However,
we can be confident that it is happening and that significant amount of traffic and revenues
are involved in the process.
Chapter 4.2.1
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Perhaps the most obvious form of substitution is service substitution. 'Hits is when a
customer dispenses with die services of a fixed line in favour ofmaking and receiving all calls
over a mobile telephone. There are a number of reasons why a customer might wish to do
this:
♦ living alone
A person living alone with only voice communications requirements may recover the
additional cost of making all calls over a mobile telephone by not having to pay the
fixed cost associated with having a fixed telephone line. For many customers, this
approach will result in a cost saving.
♦ speed of obtaining a line
Obtaining a mobile connection is usually much quicker dian obtaining a fixed
connection to a residence, particularly when a premise has not had a fixed telephone
connection in die past. There is no infrastructure required at the network level for an
additional mobile customer as diere is for a connection to die fixed network (line and
line card).
♦ mobility
There is a strong convenience benefit to using only a mobile telephone for people
who change accommodation regularly (i.e., especially younger consumers). There is
no need to inform the telephone company when moving to organise transfer of die
line and number. Furdiermore, a customer moving from one subscriber trunk
dialling (STD) code area to anodier can keep die same telephone number if diey use
only a mobile.
The standard terminals used by customers of fixed and mobile services tend to be very
different in character. Fixed terminals in most residences are relatively unsophisticated
devices usable only for speaking and listening. Some limited redial and number storage
facilities may be available and an answering machine may also be used, although answering
services from the fixed telephony provider are now proving popular in many countries.
Even the most basic GSM mobile handsets, by contrast, are sophisticated computers
with an extensive range of functionality' (much of which is still unused by most mobile
telephone consumers). However, die functionality which users take for granted in a mobile
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handset is increasing the fixed communications user's expectations of the handset
functionality.
With growing Internet usage in the home, an increasingly large number of household
PCs are being used as communications terminals. Tire flexibility offered by PCs means that
people are able to use their computers as windows to the World Wide Web, for e-mail
access, data processing, and storage, and for voice telephony and videoconferencing.
In spite of tire suitability ofmobile telephones to meet all the communications needs of
some consumers, the future of fixed telephone services is assured. There are a number of
reasons for this, ranging from human requirements to the technical capabilities of mobile
technology, both now and in the future:
♦ Phone calls are often made to households rather than to individuals.
People calling parents do not necessarily want to call father or mother but want to
call home. The availability of a general contact point for a family is probably too
useful to be dispensed with, even when mobile penetration approaches 100% of tire
population.
♦ Even where a mobile telephone meets tire voice communications requirements of an
individual, the ability of mobile services to meet all of that person's data
communications requirements is extremely limited. Even a few years ago, discussing
tire data communications requirements of private individuals would have seemed
ridiculous. However, Internet usage has grown enormously in recent years, and that
growth is set to continue.
♦ Current data rates available over GSM (typically 9.6 kbits/s) are completely
unacceptable to most users, who are able to access tire Internet at speeds of around
28.8 kbits/s from home. This situation will not be resolved by tire arrival of higher-
capacity mobile technologies, such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), because
over the same time period we expect that higher-capacity fixed access technologies
such as xDSL and cable modems will maintain the significant performance
advantage enjoyed by fixed access for data communications.
As well as service substitution, substitution of individual calls from the fixed to tire
mobile telephone network is a growing phenomenon. It is increasing as tire price difference
between fixed and mobile calls falls, and as tire incentive to use a fixed telephone where
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possible for calls diminishes. The spread ofmobile telephony to the mass market has created
many opportunities to make calls when it would not otherwise be possible to do so. Calls are
made while travelling or from places where access to a fixed telephone is limited or
impossible. Many of these calls would never have occurred without access to a mobile
telephone. However, some calls are made under these circumstances which would have
taken place at another time on the fixed network. These calls are said to have been
substituted from the fixed to the mobile network. There is little doubt diat call substitution is
taking place. It is very difficult to estimate die scale of the substitution, but it is generally
regarded as significant and increasing.
In addition to die type of call substitution described above, there is a trend towards
people choosing to use their mobile over an available fixed telephone. This is generally for
reasons of convenience: the mobile handset may be more easily accessible, or die number of
the called part}' may be programmed into die mobile handset. In addition, diere may be a
price incentive to use a mobile. As well as being more convenient, using a mobile can often
be cheaper than using a public payphone for short calls.
The fact diat substitution at botii a service and a call level is taking place demonstrates
that, in the mind of the consumer, there is a blurring of the traditional distinction between
fixed and mobile services. Such a situation is likely to require a regulatory framework that is
consistent in its fundamental approach towards both fixed and mobile services, in order for a
thriving converged market to develop.
Chapter 4.3
The Consumer Demand for New Data Services Offered by
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While simple voice has been the predominant service provided over mobile networks, a wide
variety of data services are beginning to be offered. In the short term, the range and
complexity of these services is likely to increase significandy. This chapter reviews the
reasons for this change, and highlights some of the indicators, which suggest that demand for
mobile data sendees will rise rapidly.
The nature of information exchange by customers using fixed networks is rapidly
evolving from voice-based to machine-based interactions. This is happening not only in the
business sector, but also among the consumer sector, where the remarkable growth of the
Internet has fuelled demand for data communications.
The growth in use of the Internet over the last three years has been dramatic. In
several countries, over 50% of traffic on national and international trunk routes is now data,
and the same is true of transatlantic routes. In 1998, the number of global hosts (computers
that deliver basic Internet services) was estimated at nearly 30 million, having grown at over
80% per annum for each of the preceding three years. It is forecast to continue to grow
rapidly, as illustrated in figure 15377:
Figure 15.
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377 For more information, see the NetworkWizard domain survey at www.nw.com. The network
wizard is owned by the ISC. The ISC started with a grant from the UUNET Communications Services
(UCS). The ISC then became a fund administered by the Internet Multicasting Service, with in kind and
financial support from a variety of corporate sponsors such as Usenix and Network Solutions, Inc.
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This impressive growth of the Internet has been fuelled by:
♦ easy access
The network can be accessed through any of the communications networks in
existence in the world today.
♦ significant externality gains
Through connecting to the network, each user has access to an extraordinary range
of information, as well as to the 100 million Internet users worldwide.
♦ low or zero connection costs
At its simplest, access to this communications web can be free (assuming a PC with
modem is available), with calls charged at local rates.
With the falling cost, increasing availability, and dramatic improvements in
performance of the PC, consumers have increasingly turned to buying PCs for the home' \
At the end of 1998, approximately 18% of Western European households had a PC. Of
these, about 40% were connected to the Internet. By 2003, it is anticipated that 60% of
households will have a PC, of which over 80% will be connected to the Internet. There are
likely to be well over 70 million home users of the Internet by that time.
PCs are often sold with the software required to access the Internet pre-loaded, making
Internet access very easy. Subscriptions to Internet service providers are also readily available
through a variety of sources, such as major retail chains and newspapers. The combined
effect of easy availability of affordable PCs and low-cost Internet access from home (in some
cases even the calls are free) has led to rapidly increasing usage of the Internet among
consumers over the last three years. It is quite likely that in the near future there will be more
computers connected to the Internet among households than in companies. This rise in
residential usage will be fuelled by the development of alternative access methods and
terminals, such as digital TV set-top boxes and games consoles connected to a TV, which are
designed to enable Internet access without the need to buy a PC.
In addition to the PC growth the SMS (text messaging) has grown substantially in
volume over the past two years. Although this cannot be properly regarded as mobile data
because of its very limited data carping capability, it is likely that it is an important pioneer to
378 See NUA Internet Surveys, Section Demographics at www.nua.ie.su. For a follow up article see:
Low income homes get online in the UK . NetYalue. 25 May 25 2001.
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the more widespread use of mobile data, indicating that consumers would like to
communicate using means other than straightforward voice. Further, there has been a
substantial increase in demand for portable computing devices such as laptop PCs and
personal digital assistants. These devices now offer comparable levels of performance to the
larger fixed machines. Within Western Europe, the proportion of PCs in the home which
are portable rises as high as 22% in tire United Kingdom. These devices can provide
significant benefits to tire user by enabling them to access tire Internet and to download files,
e-mail, and applications while on the move. It is likely that tire substantial growth of Internet
usage in tire consumer sector will create demand for similar services to be provided in a
mobile environment.
Tire nature of consumers' requirements for mobile telephony is changing. As fixed
Internet penetration rises in tire residential sector and as ownership of portable computing
devices increases, there will be greater demand for access to mobile data services while on tire
move. Tire existing GSM network offers a relatively poor service in this area, particularly
when compared with the performance of dial-up services over fixed lines with which
consumers are familiar in the home environment
If the potential for mobile data is to be realized, it is clear that networks will need to be
transformed. Speed, reliability, and cost will all be improved, both through technologies that
are becoming available to enhance existing 2G networks, and through 3G technologies.
Three technologies are becoming available to increase data rates on GSM networks before
the introduction of 3G networks:
♦ high-speed circuit-switched data (HSCSD)
♦ general packet radio service (GPRS)
♦ enhanced data for GSM evolution (EDGE)
The initial implementation of HSCSD offers speeds of up to 56 kbits/s by increasing the
channel data rate from 9.6 kbits/s to 14.4 kbits/s, and permits the aggregation of up to four
channels per user. Given that today's data applications tend to generate traffic in short
bursts, and that when in use these channels are unavailable to other users, this is a relatively
inefficient and expensive means of delivering certain types of data service, such as Web
browsing.
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GPRS will overcome this difficulty by introducing a packet-switched service. This
enables channels to be made available to a number of users simultaneously, thus allowing
more efficient use of the limited amount of spectrum that operators have available to them.
GPRS was generally available from around the second quarter of 2000 and offers up to 115
kbits/s by aggregating up to eight 14.4 kbits/s channels. GPRS requires various software
upgrades to die network and is being rolled out by a number of operators in advance of full
3G services. During 1999, several operators such as Cellnet, Sonera, T-Mobil, and Sonofon
all announced that they had contracted with equipment manufacturers to provide GPRS
equipment. On 10 November 1999, Cellnet made the world's first live GPRS call over a
GSM network, followed byMobilkom on 23 November.
GPRS is considered to be one of the ideal bearers for WAP (wireless application
protocols) applications. WAP is a mediod of slimming or cutting down web-based content
so that it can be delivered effectively to handsets at the relatively slow bearer rates currendy
available. WAP requires content to be marked up by using a special language, and delivers
content to a specialized handset. It allows the provision of advanced, interactive, and real-
time mobile data services such as Internet-based news services or mobile banking. WAP-
based services developed rapidly in 1999 in Europe, as did imode (an alternative standard) in
Japan'79.
At the end of 1999, WAP sites were making slimmed web-based content available to
customers in a number of European countries. In October, for example, Nokia and the
Woolwich bank announced die launch of Internet banking services with secure access using
WAP technology'80. In November, Nokia and Genotronics announced a global partnership
for the delivery of e-business financial services, and Telia announced that it was to extend its
WAP services. Sonera has launched trials of its Zed portal, a website which will enable users
to access tailored information on die Internet from their mobile handsets. The service is
expected to be launched spring 2002.
379 Rivalry started by a next generation of portable devices sets fire to the mobile war . Financial
Times.
38° por a description of the companies and the companies announcements see their respective web¬
sites and for a good market analysis see the Financial Times, Wednesday July 18, FT Telecoms section,
especially the article, Mobile Services: The Hunt is on for Killer Applications .
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EDGE is likely to be offered from the year 2001, and will enable operators to
introduce 384 kbits/s services within their existing GSM networks. EDGE will require
significant hardware and software changes to the network, as it will use a different
modulation scheme from that used for existing 2G GSM networks. The higher data rates
offered by EDGE will encourage users to generate more traffic. Although EDGE increases
spectral efficiency, it is unclear whether 2G networks using this technology will be able to
support the level of traffic generated by data services within existing spectrum allocations.
Nevertheless, for GSM operators that currently have a low utilization of existing spectrum
allocations, EDGE represents a plausible route forwrard.
3G services, which are scheduled to begin rollout within Europe during 2002, will offer
a number of enhancements to consumers. These include:
♦ higher-speed data services
3G will in theory offer speeds of up to 144 kbits/s or 384 kbits/s for wide-area
coverage to a moving terminal, and 2 Mbit/s in certain areas to a stationary? terminal.
(This will give full graphical content on the Internet, videoconferencing, and real¬
time video.)
♦ the potential for lower-priced voice services
3G services make much more efficient use of the available spectrum than existing
2G GSM services. (This will give lower mobile voice tariffs, cheaper services, and an
easier possibility for new entrants.)
The introduction of new advanced networks, which are capable of supporting data
communications at high rates, will enable business users to access a wide range of new
services. Although the consumer will also benefit from these services, the price premium for
mobility will mean that they will still have a significant requirement for fixed data access.
This demonstrates that, for the foreseeable future, consumers will require a combination of
fixed and mobile services to meet their evolving communications requirements.
Chapter 4.3.1
Economic Efficiency and Market Failure
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This section considers the evidence of continuing and rapid subscriber growth in the
Internet, noting that the Internet looks to be at an early stage of development with less than
20% of households in most countries presendy subscribing.
The Internet appears to be most developed in the USA, as can be seen in figure 16,
which show the worldwide distribution of Internet users381.
Internet Usage by Location (1995)
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This should not be surprising, given that the Internet was almost entirely an American
phenomenon until the early 1990s'82. The residential penetration rate in the USA was
estimated to be 33% at the beginning of 1999. This figure is approximately equal to the
381 NUA Internet Surveys. For regularly updates, see: www.nua.ie/su.
Internet Surveys, see NUA in the Glossary.
382For example, of the 217 Nets existing in mid-1988, only 23 % were
For a description NUA
non-US (Merit statistics).
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percentage of the US population using the Internet383. In Europe, higher rates have been
assessed for Internet users in the Nordic countries, with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
with the next highest penetration rates, as shown in figure 17. The more up to date data
regarding Internet penetration tends to come from less official sources, mainly from within
the industry itself, although in the EU a recent European Commission sponsored survey by
Gallup provides us with very recent figures. The difficulty of obtaining official updates of
these statistics is perhaps best explained by the fact that the Internet is a global, mainly
unregulated collection of many computer networks, built by independent companies of
different national domicile.
Between 1992 and 1997, average growth rates in the EU were approximately 50% per
annum but at times it has been much higher than this for some countries, and estimates
suggest that with the possible exception of those Member States which already have very
high residential penetration, healthy growth will continue for some time into the future.
Given these growth rates, data which is even 6 months old can be out-of-date. The data
presented, however, has a value in conveying the impression that we are at a fairly early stage
of development in the Internet where growth rates are very high indeed.
Figure 17.
383 Data showing residential access as a percentage of total households is not commonly available,
although where estimates exist they tend to show figures that are 20%-30% below the penetration rate of
individuals as a percentage of the total population.
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One factor which will help drive growth in the next decade will be the growth in
the speed of the Internet, explained by improvements in software, processing speeds,
and the adoption of new high speed access technologies. In the latter case, these include
xDSL technologies over copper loops and other high speed fixed wire and radio
spectrum based alternatives. In a recent workshop in Brussels, organized by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Internet and Telecoms Convergence
Consortium (MIT ITC) which looked at Internet regulatory issues for the next decade,
organizers spoke of the "Internet being 5 to 10 times larger and 50 tolOO times faster
than it is today"384.
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Computers in homes will currendy provide the upper limit for residential Internet
subscription rates. Recent estimates of PC penetration differ, as can be seen from the
diagram. However, estimates suggest that PC penetration varies significantly between
Member States. Internet access to the home can also be expected to vary substantially
between Member States, with some countries having residential subscription rates of less
than a quarter of that of other countries. It has been suggested that perhaps the most
384 This diagram is taken from Jupiter, and Morgan Stanley DeanWitter. Regularly updates can be
found at the Web-site: www.iupiter.com.
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important factors in explaining these differences are culture and language and a liberal
telecommunications regulatory environment, although where there are large differences in
per capita DGP, we would expect income to also be a factor.
To give an idea of how time used between a varieties of consumer products in the
market, the penetration and time scale from American consumers is used, which might not
differ very much from a European average user385. An illustration of this is given in figure 18,
on page 255.
The task in this section is to provide an analysis of any Internet market failure issues
which may warrant official intervention, possibly including subsidies for specific Internet
services. The relevance of this part of the study is that it is the view that Internet telephony
will probably show substantial growth in the Market and will take market shares, at least from
the fixed lines.
Market failure is the feature economists look for in order to see if there may be a case
for overriding market outcomes. If market failure is found, one can usually add two
provisos before recommending intervention:
♦ The market failure must be substantial.
♦ The regulatory intervention envisaged must credibly be expected to improve the
overall situation.
For this purpose, some Internet services are discussed in terms of broad categories in
order to assess whether there exists significant market failure.
♦ IP telephony and IP fax
♦ e-mail and multi-cast
IP telephony and IP fax offer technologically different means of having a telephone
conversation and sending a fax. For IP services the information is sent by a stream of
packets in something very slightly less than real time, and getting quicker. The switched
circuit alternative (PSTN) provides a completed circuit for the duration of the phone call or
fax. If people have a telephone and a fax machine, they will be able to make and receive
telephone calls and send faxes, whether they are connected to the Internet or not.
383 See further, Bill Gates, The Speed of Thought. (Microsoft).
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Nevertheless, there is no market failure here. One subscription does not direcdy confer
benefits on others, even though there appears to be a linkage leading to tins effect. Virtually
any economic activity will have cause and effect linkages and multiplier effects. These are not
a sign of market failure. This is consequendy not a basis on winch to introduce Internet
related subsidies.
Beneficial externalities are involved with both one-to-one e-mail and multi-cast e-mail.
Taking ordinary e-mail first, the network externalities involved with this service are based on
the same argument as for the telephone network. Each additional person who has e-mail
results in an additional benefit going to those who already have it, but those considering
whedier to subscribe or not tend not to take this into account. This means that private
benefits understate social benefits.
Regulated prices for inputs, such as interconnection, vary quite a bit from one Member
State to another, rather less for reasons of cost, but mainly because NRAs tend to be on a
learning curve to discover what these costs are. However, while this will have led to some
distortions, as widr "free service" in die UK, the lower end of ISP subscription prices from
die Eurodatareport for January 1998 are in fact roughly similar from one Member State to
another, and grouped around 100 Euro per annum. (The obvious difference in some is likely
to be explained by a different level of service being offered.) The indications are that prices
paid by subscribers do not suggest any substantial market power problems in this part of die
industry.
The share market values of those companies which are listed are not determined by
dieir current earnings, but by their expected future earnings. If from today it became clear
that the Internet would grow no more, the share value of diese companies would fall on die
news to a fraction of their present value. For most such companies current profits are
modest and frequendy negative, and certainly do not explain die impressive rise in share
prices. Shares in Freeserve, a subsidiary of Dixon's die UK electronics retailer, were sold
earlier in 1999 and resulted in a share-market value for die company of approximately 3
billion Euro. Yet for the 52 weeks ending May 1 Freeserve reported a loss of 1.4 million
Euros on revenue of just 4 million Euro >86. At least in the medium to long run, it is expected
386 Financial Times 12/7/99. The share price of Freeserve later declined, reportedly because investors
came to realize that this market has low entry barriers.
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future profits that are driving these prices, and to earn these future profits firms need to have
a substantial customer base, which Internet firms are currently seeking to acquire. Hie
situation is not unlike that which prevailed around the turn of the century in the USA, where
there were as many as 4,000 telephone companies all vying to sign up customers by offering
very low prices '87.
As opposed to the physical access resources provided by a fixed wire telephone
company, Internet subscribers can fairly easily switch from one provider to another, but
clearly investors are betting that customers will tend not to float freely between providers. In
the case of ISPs (Internet service providers), customers do face non-trivial switching costs.
They will have an e-mail address registered and they will have overcome any initial teething
problems getting the ISPs' software to operate on their PC. Moreover, because information
is imperfect they cannot be sure that switching ISPs will in actuality provide them with a
better price/quality ratio.
The bottom line is that at current subscription and growth rates, and paying regard to
existing incentives to price services at very low levels, there is no evidence that ISP prices
need to be regulated lower than they are presently in order to capture network benefits. On
tire contrary, it appears that the market is managing this situation quite well.
The universal service issues peculiar to broadcast messaging can be investigated by
looking at the underlying cost structure of substitute technologies, and the relative value of
these technologies as perceived bv end users. At present, broadcast information can be sent
using television, but only the postal system provides an acceptable level ofmessage deliver}-.
A case for government intervention can consequently be made when Internet
subscriptions stagnate, and the additional welfare of converting to broadcast e-mail is
positive. This point has not been reached yet, and perhaps few if any countries will be there
in die next five years. Because computers and information technology are complicated to
use, there is a possibility that Internet penetration will stagnate at levels well below those for
die telephone. Government intervention to infiuence the provision of Internet services to
public institutions is mainly explained by politics and the fact that government institutions
tend to be involved in die provision of services, which are considered merit goods.
387 AT&Ts patents had expired in 1894.
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It can be established that die market in which ISPs sell to users appears to be pretty
competitive virtually right across die EU. However, calls from Internet users to ISPs are
mainly delivered over the telecoms network, normally die incumbent's network. As well as
payments to die ISP, subscribers who do not have a leased line connecting diem to dieir ISP
also have to pay metered charges to dieir telephone company. Indeed die part of die
telephone bill which results from calls to the ISP will typically be greater dian the ISP's
charge over die same period, and often substantially greater.
If die market for the provision of telecoms infrastructure was effectively competitive,
subscribers would be offered alternative packages, some ofwhich would involve un-metered
service, thus addressing die first concern. One of die reasons incumbent telephone
companies may not offer such packages is because regulations prevent diem from doing so.
Where diere is a dominant incumbent, regulatory rules are often adopted to prevent the
incumbent from using packages strategically to make competitive entry less attractive.
Consequentiy, regulations themselves can prevent packages (or a full range of packages) from
being offered by die incumbent. Anodier reason packages are not offered is because
incumbent operators are still very dominant and may not yet be used to responding in
creative ways to customers' needs. A range of service packages based on these cost
differences can lower total Internet expenses, allowing customers to select a tariff offering
which is most suitable for them388.
Absent regulation preventing the incumbent from entering into such arrangements,
very large customers tend to be able to negotiate dieir own deal, which mitigates against
market power widiout necessarily fully overcoming it. For public institutions like schools
and hospitals, it will normally pay for them to negotiate as a group to get die best deal. As is
outlined above, inflexibility introduced by regulations, and also due to the market power of
the incumbent, can result in public institutions paying more dian diey might otherwise pay if
all relevant markets were effectively competitive. These factors may mean that intervention
by the authorities can result in public institutions obtaining lower priced Internet access than
diey would do odierwise.
388 Customers' willingness to pay also differs, and this is another reason incumbents may offer
different packages. In theory, the welfare implications of price discrimination on the basis of either
factor, can often be positive. See Philips (1983).
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However, there are also some competition concerns with this type of intervention. In
many instances market power will not endure in the medium to long term. Utility networks
tend to be exceptions, but this is less true in telecommunications, as alternative Internet
access technologies exist and are being developed and constantly improved. In the UK, for
example, tire government's intervention which resulted in OFTEL obtaining tire agreement
of BT to price the usage of its telecommunications network for providing Internet service to
schools at or near a price floor representing BT's approximate incremental cost'89, followed a
similar offer several months earlier by tire Cable Television Association in which its members
also agreed to provide free connections for all schools passed. The Cable industry was not
well pleased, suggesting that OFTEL had entered an agreement with the incumbent which
undermined tire public relations program of the Cable industry'9". In a number of Member
States, ADSL will be available in the next couple of years from several competing companies.
One factor holding back the demand by residents for Internet access is likely to be a
lack of information about what can be done with tire Internet. In this regard tire Internet is
like most information goods: it is an experience good, which means that people tend to have
to experience it before they can fully appreciate its value. Therefore, a significant number of
people may be said to undervalue an Internet subscription and its essential compliments: a
computer, a modem, and a telephone network subscription.
Does this in itself warrant a level of state involvement to provide public access? Tire
Internet is already developing very rapidly with tire numbers of subscribers growing
extremely quickly. In 1998 the annual growth in Internet hosts was 52.3% for OECD
countries. Indeed, firms selling information goods (as Internet services mainly are) have
every incentive to find ways around consumers' lack of experience. Free trials and
establishing a reputation amongst your targeted audience are typically used by firms selling
information to get consumers to buy their service.
389 For this purpose OFTEL said special offers by BT to schools regarding network usage would not
be in breach of non-discrimination regulations. OFTEL set incremental price floors, below which BT
could not charge.
39° qy,e (J[y js ln the process of implementing an extension of this scheme to include other public
institutions. It has the reluctant agreement of fixed wire access providers in the UK. One representative
told us they could hardly disagree, especially as OFTEL said it would be announcing the participants to
the media.
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A sound argument must be based on the idea that there is something special in a good
or service which causes the majority of voters to agree that it should be made available to
everyone through safety-net provision. The idea here tends to be that impoverished people
are too concerned about meeting their basic needs to make the necessary medium or long
term planning in regard to things like education and healthcare. Providing such services





This chapter started with a discussion of the consumer expectations in the market of
fixed/mobile convergence. It sought to show that die majority of die customers in the
telecommunications market would subscribe to a form a converged service, and
consequentiy, the regulatory regime for such services need to be carefully measured. As
shown, die regulatory regimes of the two different markets, fixed and mobile, are indeed
different.
The fixed market focuses on the incumbent operators' activities, and tries to ensure
diat new operators diat are entering that market can compete on bodi equal temis and on a
fair basis. The mobile market, on the other hand, has always been more competitive and
the regulation of the mobile market has not been as established as it is for die fixed
market. The chapter also tried to show that the obligations put on die incumbent operator
in the fixed market in particular, the universal service obligations, have no correspondent in
die mobile market.
Hie chapter then discussed die substitution of fixed widi mobile services and sought to
show that such substitution is in fact taking place bodi at die service level and at die call level.
As market convergence develops, the distinction between fixed and mobile services is not
very clear. This situation, in turn, requires that the regulatory framework has to be
consistendy kept in the approach taken towards die two markets. If this is not case, there
could be concern that die development of die converged is distorted.
Chapter 5 will focus on tiiese issues and will try to identify die challenges diat face
competition law in its application to diis converged market.
PART III
CHALLENGES TO THE APPLICATION OF
COMPETITION LAW IN A CONVERGED
ENVIRONMENT
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Chapter 4 of Part II described how the fixed and mobile communications markets have
developed and how they are expected to converge in die coming years. Having established
some of the business and technology trends, this chapter will consider die regulatory
framework diat is appropriate for converged fixed and mobile services. As described in
Chapter 4, diere are different regulatory regimes widiin die national regulatory audiority
(NRA) frameworks for fixed and mobile communications. In addition to die sector-specific
regulation of telecommunications as a whole by the NRAs, the sector is subject to more
general competition and consumer legislation.
This was illustrated by Analysis'91 in a study, and the figure shows die position of the
fixed and mobile regulatory regimes on a regulatory range. It shows how regulation of these
markets has been dominated by die NRAs. Even those issues that in odier sectors would be
dealt with by competition autiiorities, general consumer councils, or ombudsmen, are often
handled by the NRA.
Hiere are many historical reasons why regulation has evolved in diis way'92. However,
most of these concerns are effectively addressed by creating a genuinely competitive market
for services. Price, quality of service, contractual terms, and die cost of roaming are all issues
which can be effectively addressed by laying down die proper incentives to develop a market
where operators and service providers seek to meet the needs of consumers, widi a view to
winning their business. Furthermore, issues such as privacy and healdi risks can increasingly
be addressed by general legislation regarding privacy and consumer protection (as well as the
threat of legal action through the civil courts). Only a small number of issues, such as access
to emergency services and possibly number portability and carrier pre-selection, would
require sector-specific regulatory action'9'. As a consequence, the most appropriate
regulatory framework for converged services has to be one in which there is a progressive
391 See: Squire, Sanders & Demsey, Study for EC DG Information Society . Brussels-Luxembourg,
2000. (98/48487).
392 See for a good historical view: Naftel, J.M. The Natural Death of a Natural Monopoly:
Competition in EC Telecommunications after the Telecommunications Terminals Judgement, European
Competition Law Review 105. 1993; and S. Taylor, Article 90 and Telecommunications Monopolies ,
European Competition Law Review. 322. 1994.
393 Universal service in a competitive environment was one of the most difficult areas in the whole
process of liberalization. Especially the issues of service public in French law and in other Member
States legal systems was difficult to bridge. On this subject see: Lyon-Caen, Les Services Publics et
lEurope: Quelle Union? . 1997.; and Special Edition ofAJDA (L'actualite juridique - Droit
Administratif) and L. llapp L., Public service or universal service? , Telecommunications Policy 391.
1996.
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transfer of regulation from specialist sector-specific regulators to more general competition
law and consumer protection authorities.
This Chapter explores the options by which this might be achieved over time.
There are a number of regulatory principles currently being developed at the Community
level, in the context of the respective consultation processes for the 1999 Review'4 and tire
Convergence Green Paper'9', which should guide tire creation of a future regulatory model to
facilitate the phenomenon of fixed/mobile convergence.
394 Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and associated Services
— The 1999 Communications Review . (COM 99/539 final). 10.11.1999).
395 European Commission. Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and
Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation . (COM 97/623 final).
03.123.1997. In this Green Paper the Commission sees the convergence of the three sectors at the same
time although the convergence of telecommunications and IT effectively began already in the 1980 s. A
good analysis of the convergence theory is presented in a study by: T.F. Baldwin, D.S. McVov and C.




In the transition from sector-specific regulation to the application of competition rules, there
will be pressure to assimilate significant market power concepts into the traditional "market
definition" analysis provided under competition rules. A future regulatory model should
facilitate this process of assimilation. Some commentators and telecoms operators have
voiced their concerns that "a hybrid regulatory approach to competition analysis is emerging,
which is confused and confusing'""'6.
This criticism reflects the increasing tension between regulatory and competition law
approaches to market definition and the assessment of market power in the telecoms sector.
Currendv, there are two legal standards at Community level in fire telecoms sector which
shape die approach taken by regulators towards potentially anti-competitive market
behaviour:
♦ dominance
This is die legal standard used by ex post competition rules (Article 82 EC) to
determine die boundaries between competitive and anti-competitive behaviour
evidenced in particular forms ofmarket conduct'"'7.
❖ significant market power (SMP)
This is the legal standard used by the existing ex ante EU telecoms regulatory
framework to justify the imposition of certain behavioural rules designed to ensure
that competition in die provision of particular services remains vigorous '98.
396 See: Dr. Cento Veljanovski, Loma McGregor Market Definitions in Telecoms: 'ITie Confusing
Proliferation of Competitive Standards . C.T.I ..R. 25. 1999.
397 Article 82 EC reads: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
• directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
■ limiting production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
■ applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; and
■ making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
The test of dominance is also used under the EC Merger Regulation: Regulation 4064/89 on the
Control of Concentration between Undertakings , to address issues of market structure. According to
Article 2 of that Regulation, a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result
ofwhich effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial
part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market .
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Although a sector-specific approach to the identification of broad markets subject to
the market power of die fixed incumbent operator may have been required during die early
stages of liberalization, the current twin-track standards of dominance and SMP' '" should be
assimilated into the traditional market definition analysis under EC competition rules.
Relevant markets defined for regulatory purposes are currendy distinct from those identified
for competition law purposes400. This is because markets defined for die purposes of ex ante
regulation have been based on particular forms of end-to-end communications rather dian
on individual economic markets defined under EC competition rules. Indeed, markets
identified ex ante for regulator}' purposes comprise many different products and services,
across which the degree of effective competition may vary dramatically.
For example, the concept of SMP under the interconnection directive401 s based on die
premise that there exist four broad telecommunications markets:
♦ die market for fixed public telephony networks and/or services
♦ die market for public mobile telephony services and/or networks
♦ die market for the provision of leased lines
♦ the national market for interconnection4"2
398 The Interconnection Directive: European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/33/EC
30 June 1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles ofOpen Network Provision (ONP) . (OJ 1997
L199/32); The ONP Framework Directive: European Council. Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990
on the Establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation
of open network provision . (O) 1990 LI 92/1); The Leased Lines Directive: European Council.
Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines . (0|
1992 L165/27); European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/62/EC of 13 December
1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony . (OJ 1998 L321/6) —
replaced by: The ONP Voice Telephony Directive . European Parliament and European Council.
Directive 98/ 10/EC of 26 February 1998 on the Application of open network provision (ONP) to voice
telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment. (OJ 1998
LI01/24).
399 In the United Kingdom, a three-track approach has been adopted: the Market Influence test is used
through ex ante to restrict the ability of operators with influence on the market to distort competitive
markets, through the inclusion of certain obligations in their license conditions (see OFTEL. Draft
Guidelines on Market Influence Determination . April 1999).
4°° "phis is implicitly referred to in the Access Notice, which provides that one important factor to be
taken into consideration is whether the market definition used for ONP purposes is appropriate for use in
applying the competition rules. See, in particular The Access Notice: European Commission. Notice on
the application of competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector — framework,
relevant markets and principles . (OJ 1998 C265/2).
401 Directive 97/33 of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to
ensuring universal services and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network
Provision (ONP) . (OJ L 199/32). 1997.
402 See Annex I and Article 7(2) of the Interconnection Directive.
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This approach is relatively static, as it mandates specific forms of market behaviour (e.g.,
cost-orientation, non-discrimination, and so on) without taking into account the effects of
convergence and rapidly changing markets. The access notice40 ' states that "any attempt to
define particular product markets in [the Notice] would run the risk of rapidly becoming
inaccurate or irrelevant. The definition of particular product markets is best done in die light
of a detailed examination of an individual case". According to the Commission notice on
market definition, "market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of
competition between firms" and die "competitive constraints diat the undertakings involved
face"404.
403 The 1998 Access Notice was first published in a draft form on 11 March 1997, with a call for
comments. (OJ C 76/9). 1997. It is also well worth mentioning that the background stud}' for the
Access Notice was made excellently by: Coudert Brothers, Competition Aspects of Interconnection
agreements in the Telecommunications sector . June 1995. They concluded against issuing guidelines or
notices, and favoured the enactment of a specific regulation under Article 83 EC. This study is highly
recommended.
404 The Notice on Market Definition: European Commission. Notice on the definition of relevant
market for the purpose of Community competition law . (OJ 1997 C372/5).
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Identifying Market Power in a Converged Environment
To the extent that mobile operators can provide services which are partial or actual
substitutes for tiiose provided over fixed networks, the key issue is whether one can identify
market power in such a converged marketplace on the basis of existing case law and
administrative practice. To the extent that no operator(s) can be identified as dominant in
such an environment, it is arguable that market distortions arising from industry structure
may not be capable of being resolved adequately through the application of competition rules
alone.
Associated Markets Dominance
The close market proximity of the fixed and mobile sectors raises die question whedier
competition rules can be used to curb anti-competitive practices taken in a particular market
or market segment, if market power exists in another market or market segment. In 1991,
die Commission found that Tetra Pak4'b had abused its dominant position by engaging in a
variety' of anti-competitive practices, including predatory pricing. In so holding, the
Commission identified two main product markets, one related to aseptic packaging and the
other to non-aseptic packaging. On the aseptic packaging market, the Commission found
that Tetra Pak held a dominant position, which was further reinforced by the existence of
technological barriers and patents held by Tetra Pak, which hindered market entry . No
similar finding was made regarding the non-aseptic packaging market406, although the
Commission noted that Tetra Pak had "a market share which could be considered even on
its own as demonstrating the existence of a dominant position".
Nevertheless, the Court40' held that Tetra Pak was "in a situation comparable to that of
holding a dominant position on die markets in question as a whole". The Commission's
rationale was based on die associative links between die two markets, which could be relied
upon to condemn anti-competitive conduct on the non-aseptic market. The scope of
405 European Commission. Decision 92/163/EEC of 24July 1991 relating to a proceeding pursuant
to Article 86 of the EEC Treat)' (IV/31043, Tetra Pak II) . (OJ L 72/1). 1992.
406 Although, as was noted by the Commission, Tetra Pak had a market share which could be
considered even on its own as demonstrating the existence of a dominant position .
407 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International v. Commission [ 1994] ECR 1-755; on appeal, Case 333/94P,
Tetra Pak InternationalSA v. Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951.
280 Challenges to the Application ofCompetition Las in a Converged Environment
application of Article 82 EC could diereby be extended to reach conduct, which may occur
over a number of associated or interrelated markets. In saying so, the Court modified its
previous jurisprudence from the Continental Can case408, where it was held that there was no
need to establish a causal link between the existence of dominance and its abuse. In
particular, die Commission took die view that die association between die aseptic market and
the non-aseptic market was significant because the key products, which die cartons are used
to package, are die same on bodi die aseptic and non-aseptic markets, i.e., liquid milk
products and fruit juices409. At the level of demand, die large majority of users of die
products offered by Tetra Pak in die non-aseptic market are also active in the aseptic market.
The significance of die Court's analysis in die Tetra Pak case in die fixed/mobile
context lies in the fact that neidier die Court of First Instance nor the Court of Justice
considered it necessary to demonstrate, for the purposes of Article 82, diat: Tetra Pak's
dominant position on die aseptic packaging market permitted, or at least facilitated, its
predatory or foreclosing practices on the non-aseptic packaging market; or Tetra Pak's
conduct in the non-aseptic packaging market was intended to strengdien Tetra Pak's
dominant position on die aseptic packaging market41". This consideration may lead to the
conclusion diat Article 82 can be used to condemn anti-competitive practices implemented
by an undertaking on a market on which it is not dominant, where extremely close links can
be shown to exist between dominated and non-dominated markets. In such cases, it is
implicit that the market power held in one market or market segment can be held to be
leveraged into another market or market segment.
While the Tetra Pak case concerned closely related horizontal markets, die access
notice points out that die analysis used in that case is equally applicable to closely related
vertical markets411, which are commonplace in the telecoms sector41". Hie close associative
408 Case 6/72, Utiroemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission. [1973] ECR 215
(Continental Can Case).
409 Based on Tetra Pak's reply to the Statement ofObjections, the Commission estimated that about
90% of Tetra Pak's sales involved liquid dairy products and fruit juices.
410 Paragraph 104 of the Commission's Decision.
411 The Access Notice: European Commission: Communication on the application of the competition
rules to access agreements in the telecommunication sector-framework, relevant markets and principles .
(OJ 1997C76/9). .
412 For example, at paragraph 65, the Commission notes that it is often the case that a particular
operator has an extremely strong position on infrastructure markets, and on markets downstream of that
infrastructure .
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links between the fixed and mobile markets suggest that the reasoning in Tetra Pak can be
used to address the anti-competitive conduct of a dominant firm whose interests cut across
both die fixed and mobile sectors, especially where clear dominance in the fixed sector results
in the leveraging of fiiat market power to provide converged or integrated service offerings.
In a fixed/mobile integrated environment, an incumbent fixed operator engaging in
predatory or market foreclosing practices will be particularly vulnerable to scrutiny under the
Tetra Pak doctrine. The Tetra Pak doctrine may be of more limited application in a fully
converged environment in which fixed and mobile networks and services form part of a
single, unified product market.
Double Dominance
Double dominance refers to die situation where an undertaking enjoys a dominant
position on two separate product markets. The Commission and the European Court of
Justice have dealt with die issue of double dominance through die development of three
different, aldiough related, doctrines, namely,
♦ the doctrine of automatic/necessary abuse
♦ die doctrine of illegal extension or strengdiening of a dominant position
♦ the doctrine of equality of opportunity
The doctrine of automatic/necessary abuse has been developed by the Commission
and the Court ofJustice under Article 82 in conjunction with Article 86 (l)41j, and concerns
state measures contravening the competition rules. The doctrine has been relied upon to
prohibit the grant of an exclusive right to an undertaking where the mere exercise of that
exclusive right infringes Article 82, or where the grant of the exclusive right has placed the
undertaking in a situation where it is of necessity induced to abuse its monopoly position4'4.
413 Former Article 90 (1). The current Article 86 (1) provides that in the case of public undertakings
and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither
enact nor maintain into forces any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89 .
414 See, for instance: Case 41/90, Hofner andElser v. Macroton [1991] ECR 1-1979; Case 179/90,Merci
Conven^ionali Porto di Genova v. Sidenirgica Gabrie/i [ 1991 ] ECR 1-5889); Case C323/93, Societe Civile Agricoh du
Centre dlnsemination de !a Crespelle [1994] ECR 1-5077; Case 387/93, Banchero [1995] ECR 1-4663.
282 Challenges to die Application ofCompetition Law in a Converged Environment
The doctrine of the illegal extension or strengthening of a dominant position has been
relied upon by the Court of Justice and the Commission in Article 82 cases " ', and in cases
involving the application of Article 82 in conjunction with Article 86 (1). In the GB-INNO-
BM416 case, the Court ofJustice held that a Member State may not grant an exclusive right to
an undertaking, where such a grant would put the undertaking in a situation which it could
not have attained by its own conduct without having infringed Article 82.
The doctrine of equality of opportunity, developed by the Court ofJustice417, was used
by the Commission in die GSM decisions418, which challenged measures of the Spanish and
Italian governments requiring the payment of a fee from the second GSM licensee in their
respective national territories, when the first licensee had not been required to pay a fee. The
Commission considered that the measures in question placed an undue burden on the
second entrants, and emphasized the need to ensure the equality of opportunity for all
market actors, especially in a situation where the first licensee (die incumbent operator)
already enjoys a number of advantages due to its dominant position in odier markets.
The Commission has relied heavily on the doctrine of automatic abuse in its telecoms
liberalization directives adopted under Article 86 (3). It was last relied upon in the second
cable directive41' as justification for the requirement imposed on Member States to ensure
that telecoms networks and cable TV networks be operated by structurally separate legal
entities. The Commission required, where Member States grant a telecoms operator that is
already dominant on service markets using telecoms infrastructure, a special or an exclusive
right to build and operate a cable TV network, that it not be placed in a situation where
improvement to either network would generate a conflict of interests, because it may lead to
415 See Case 311/84, Centre Beige d'etucies de marcbe — Telemarketing (CBEM) [1985] ECR 3261 - where it
was held that an undertaking abuses its dominant position in a particular market when it reserves to itself
an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a
neighbouring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from such
undertaking.
416 Case 18/88, Regie ties Telegraphes et ties Telephones v. GB-INNO-BAI S^4 [1991] ECR 5941.
417 See: Case 202/88, Trance v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223 (The TerminalEquipment Case).
418 European Commission. Decision 95/489/EC of 4 October 1995 concerning the conditions
imposed on the second operator ofGSM radiotelephony services in Italy. (OJ L 280/49). 1995; and
European Commission. Decision 97/181/EC of 18 December 1996 concerning the conditions imposed
on the second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Spain . (OJ L 76/19). 1997.
419 European Commission. Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EC
in order to ensure that telecommunications networks and cable TV networks owned by a single operator
are separate legal entities. (OJ 1999 LI75/39).
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a loss of business for one of the networks. An operator with such double dominance has an
incentive to abuse its dominant position and delay the emergence of new advanced
communications services, thereby restricting technical progress at the expense of users,
contrary to die tenns of Articles 82 and 86 (1). The Commission also considered that
"different fonns of anti-competitive behaviour are likely to occur unless sufficient
transparency of the operations of die undertakings is ensured"420.
In taking the view that accounting separation has not proved to be sufficient to prevent
all forms of anti-competitive behaviour, and that the dominant telecoms operator must be
monitored so that it does not abuse its resources, die Commission recommended diat die
legal separation of operations occur as a "minimum requirement to ensure compliance widi
Article 86.. .during the crucial phase of the full opening of the sector to competition'*421.
The developing doctrine of automatic abuse, and die principles set forth in die second
cable TV directive, could be important in a fixed/mobile converged environment in two key
respects:
♦ If one takes the view that Article 86 (1) continues to apply to dominant operators on
a de facto basis, even after exclusive rights have been formally removed, since they
"continue to enjoy rights to use radio frequencies which they have been historically
granted otherwise than according to objective, proportional and non-discriminatory
criteria" (i.e., special rights)42-, die link between die special or exclusive right and the
abuse is direct, widi incumbent operators continuing to need to satisfy special
obligations. In tiiese situations, the Commission retains its ability to adopt Article 86
(3) decisions concerning incumbent operators.
♦ Operators with double dominance on both fixed and mobile markets may be
encouraged to abuse dieir position because of a conflict of interest, in the same way
as the Commission concluded operators would be in the markets for cable TV and
fixed telecoms networks. The Commission has dierefore also taken the view tiiat, in
die case of double dominance, operators are likely to adopt anti-competitive
420 Recital 11 of the Second Cable TV Directive.
421 Id.
422 Recital 7 of the Second Cable TV Directive.
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behaviour, which justifies the Commission taking preventative measures (i.e., legal
separation) to ensure that such abuses do not occur.
Because mobile operators do not enjoy special or exclusive rights within the meaning
of that expression under Article 86 (1), it is arguable that the double dominance approach
used in the context of incumbent fixed and cable TV networks, has less relevance in the
context of fixed incumbent and mobile networks. Moreover, there appears to be less
economic incentive, for operators in both the fixed and mobile sectors, to develop the
arrangements that generate the types of conflicts of interest which exist currendy, where fixed
and cable TV operations are operated and controlled by a single operator. The range of
structural ex ante competition law responses, designed to identify or make more transparent
potential abusive practices in situations of double dominance, appears to provide regulators
with an appropriate and proportionate regulatory tool to prevent abusive practices.
If goals such as structural separation and separate accounting are to be achieved
through "soft law" such as recommendations or notices, operators with market power
should be put on notice that — to the extent that such transparency measures are not
adopted — the responsibility of proving that they have not infringed Article 82, where a
prima facie infringement is alleged, will lie with them. In these circumstances, they
would be obliged to deny any inference of abusive conduct arising from the lack of
transparent market behaviour.
Chapter 5.1.2
Product Market under Competition Rules
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Under die jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and die administrative
practice of die Commission, die traditional view has been diat demand substitution
constitutes the most immediate and effective disciplinary force on suppliers of a given
product or service. Indeed, die Commission has consistentiy defined a relevant product
market solely in terms of "all those products and/or services which are regarded as
interchangeable or substitutable by die consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics,
dieir price, and intended use"42'. The Commission supplements diese product
characteristics/price/intended use criteria widi an analysis of whether consumers of a
particular product or service would be likely to switch to readily available substitutes in die
short term and at a negligible cost, in response to a small (in die range of 5 to 10%) but
permanent increase in the price of the products under consideration.
The Commission has historically given due weight to die competitive constraints
arising from supply-side substitutability in only a limited range of circumstances. Potential
competition is also considered to be generally of less immediate significance and, in any case,
to require die analysis of additional factors. The Commission's traditional demand-led
approach should take greater account of die complexity of the telecoms sector, in particular,
by according greater weight to supply-side considerations. The technological ability of
virtually all market actors to provide a broad range of voice and data services will mean that,
in many cases, market power may be only a transient phenomenon (or, in the alternative,
dieoretical market power may mask the fact that there exists littie or no incentive to effect
423 See, for example: Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission 11978] ECR 207.
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abusive practices). This is particularly the case with innovation markets4"4, in respect of
which competition law, because of the relative lack of historical data on patterns of supply
and demand, is often ill equipped to deal. Although the Commission is under an obligation
to consider the cross-elasticity of supply and demand, it assesses alleged barriers to entry on a
much shorter timescale than would an economist. Under this type of analysis, entry barriers
might be seen to be pervasive.
The determination of a relevant product market in the telecoms sector should
increasingly take into account supply-side substitutability because technological developments
allow operators to provide a very broad palette of services. Tire technology-push of services
in the mobile industry, for example, has been relatively successful in generating demand-pull
over time.
The timeframe widiin which relevant product markets are assessed might need to be
longer term, as market snapshots in rapidly changing markets may give a false impression of
actual market power. In tire alternative, the concept of potential competition should be
assessed more expansively.
In its 1995 Infrastructure Green Paper42', tire Commission indicated that telecoms
infrastructure consisted of telecoms transmission capacity, and that such capacity was
available from at least three separate sources:
♦ fibre and copper cables
♦ radio links
♦ satellite links
424 The innovation markets approach pioneered in the United States is based on the promise that
firms can compete in a separate market to make new products or to provide new services. Antitrust
authorities are, on the basis of this approach, obliged to consider the effects of a transaction on future
competition in terms of current commitments to R&D. In defining markets, the Commission also looks
at competition and innovation in technology and R&D when it is felt to be appropriate, but less willing to
do so than its counterparts in the United States, the Department ofJustice, and the FTC. See: John
Temple Lang, European Communitv Antitrust Law: Innovations Markets and High Technology
Industries , F'ordham International Law Journal Vol. 20. 3:March 1997. 717-818.; See also: Lawrence B.
Landman, Innovation Markets in Europe , E.C.L.R. 21 1998. 21-31.; See also: Jean-Francoise Pons,
Innovation and Competition , EC Competition Policy Newsletter. February 1998.
425 'I'he Infrastructure Green Paper: European Commission. Green Paper on the liberalization of
telecoms infrastructure and cable television networks, Part II . (COM 94/682 final). 25.01.1995.; Part II
of the Green Paper, together with Part I, formed the basis for the consultation on the liberalization of
telecoms infrastructure and are considered essential elements of the overall 1998 telecoms liberalization
package.
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Hie underlying technology of diese transmission platfonns detemiines to a significant degree
whether these platforms can be viewed as true substitutes, which thereby determines whedier
they fall within die same relevant product market.
In determining the scope of fixed infrastructure markets, diere is also scope for
distinguishing between networks based on the entities to which access to die network is
provided. In this regard, it is commonplace to distinguish between the provisions of
infrastructure at the wholesale level (operator-to-operator), and at the retail level (access to
infrastructure offered to end users). For example, demand for die lease of transmission
capacity and die provision of related services to diird party service providers (i.e., carriers'
carrier services) occurs at die wholesale level of the market426, while demand on the part of
subscribers for connection to the local loop is at the retail level.
Given die potential scope for growtii in die demand for local loop access brought
about, inter alia, by the growth of fixed/mobile integrated service packages, die emerging
differences in die characteristics of local loop access are likely to play an important role in die
level of service integration which will take place. A number of trends have been identified
diat are likely to have a significant impact on die scope of local loop access in die immediate
to near future:
♦ die introduction of broadband platforms in the local loop as operators rollout xDSL
technologies, digital cable, broadband wireless, and odier digital transmission systems
♦ die deployment of these alternatives raising die issue whedier the data transfer
capabilities of the mobile sector can eventually reach a level comparable to that
achieved by fixed networks
♦ the explosive growth in die demand for data services, coupled widi the steady
decrease in voice telephony prices towards cost
♦ die downward spiral in the price of voice service, largely offset by the increased
demand, which has generated large volumes of data traffic. By die same token, die
surge in databased traffic, particularly driven by increased Internet usage, has meant
426 See, for example: Case No. IV/M.683, GTS-Hermes Inc./HITTail BV (O) 1996 C157/13); Case
No.IV/M.1069, WorldCom,/MCI (OJ 1999 LI 16/1);. Case No. IV/35.830, Unisoiirce (OJ 1997 L318/1);
Case No IV/35.617, Phoenix/Global One (OJ 1996 L239/57); and Case No. IV/JV.2, Enel/FT/DT. (OJ
1999 C178/15).
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that the pricing of local access for both voice and data applications is perceived in the
industry as being of equal importance.
♦ the increased level of substitutability between fixed and mobile services:
• Mobile penetration rates equal or surpass diose of the fixed sector.
Historically, mobile services have been considered a complement to fixed
services, with each product competing for a different pool of customer
minutes of use. As mobile penetration rates increase across the EU,
however, many believe that mobile and fixed technologies are increasingly
competing for a single pool of minutes of use. Mobile penetration across the
EU stood at approximately 26% as of 1 January 1999, with mobile
penetration in several Member States soon expected to exceed that of the
fixed sector. As reported by the Finnish Ministry of Transport &
Communications in September 1999, the penetration rate for mobile
telecoms in Finland is the highest in the world, now exceeding 70% of the
population, with the result that mobile customers now exceed the number of
fixed customers in that country. The issue of substitutability not only affects
the definition of product markets at the retail level, but also raises the
question whether the incumbent fixed operator should be considered to
continue to enjoy a privileged position, given die mobile options available to
consumers427.
• Mobile operators introduce pricing plans that encourage subscribers to use
mobile phones as substitutes for their fixed phones or which encourage
subscribers to treat their communications needs as bundles of products.
To date, these pricing plans have taken two forms. Firstiy, most EU
operators have introduced pricing plans with large bundles of minutes or
even unlimited usage, specifically designed to encourage substitution for
fixed usage. For example, Libertel of The Netherlands offers a subscription,
"OnePlus", that offers subscribers a flat rate tariff formula throughout die
day, while it is possible to bundle a fixed amount of airtime with each
427 See the approach in the United States, for example in the Third Annual CMRS Competition
Report, FCC 98/91. June 1998.
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subscription of Belgacom Mobile, the largest mobile operator in Belgium.
Secondly, some operators offer their subscribers technologies and pricing
plans that encourage use of their mobile phones while they are at home or
near home. For example, Denmark's Sonofon launched a service called
"Home-zone" in 1997. The scheme offers mobile tariffs close to fixed
network tariffs for phone usage in a small, geographically defined local calling
area, i.e., the home-zone, and conventional cellular tariffs outside the home-
zone. To the extent that such bundled packages need to be offered by non¬
affiliated mobile operators over unbundled local loops, competition occurs
among competitors in obtaining unbundled local loop access. Unless
alternative forms of access are available as between competitors (e.g.,
bitstream access for competitor X providing Internet access, and fully
unbundled twisted copper pairs for competitor Y providing broadband
services), tire number of alternative operators that the local loop can sustain
will always be limited428. Moreover, the cost and conditions of different
forms of local access might differ.
♦ on a more general level, the continuing blurring of the traditional barriers between
tire worlds of telecoms, broadcasting, and information technology
The introduction of digitalization is bringing an increasing range of market actors into
upstream relationships with local access providers. In this changing environment, operators
are relating to one another in a manner which increasingly resembles the media world, rather
than tire telecoms world.
In contrast to local access, numerous market actors provide backbone infrastructure on
either a national, regional, pan-European, or global basis. In this regard, the Commission has
identified a market for tire provision of terrestrial transmission capacity, which is generally
intended for use by third parties, such as other fixed and/or mobile telecoms organizations,
428 In other words, consumers make an all or nothing decision to replace one operator with another
for their full range of telecoms requirements (contra the position of using an incumbent fixed operator
for local and long distance calls, while using an alternative operator on the basis of carrier selection to
provide international service). For a discussion on the Competition issues in the last mile, see: S. Parker,
Competition in the last mile remains illusive , FT Telecoms. 16 July 2001.
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resellers, and ISPs42'. Throughout the EU, this market is highly competitive, being
characterized by a significant number of operators4
In a number of signatory states (e.g., Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom, The
Netherlands, and Switzerland), the recent consultation processes reviewing fixed wireless
spectrum allocation (both WLL and MWS) have highlighted the significance of bandwidth.
Allocations of 112 MHz, or at least a willingness by the regulator to allow the accumulation
of smaller allocations, will facilitate tire development of viable wireless fixed networks capable
of delivering broadband multimedia services. Such networks will provide new alternative
delivery platforms, which can be rapidly deployed to circumvent the control over access to
customers exerted by incumbent cable and narrow-to-medium bandwidth wireline operators.
Related issues in relation to the pricing of spectrum for MWS andWLL are developing.
For example, the pricing formulas proposed in a number of Member States that are
considering allowing the accumulation of WLL frequencies are such that it will be
economically unsustainable for operators to attempt to acquire multiple licenses. Willie the
spectrum pricing mechanisms currendy being proposed (and the auction mechanisms
favoured in a number of other countries) reflect attempts to introduce market-driven pricing
mechanisms, they also highlight the difficulty of identifying the market in such circumstances.
To date, die spectrum bandwidth debates have centred on access to, and use of, fixed
spectrum. However, as more Member States turn to consider die issues ofUMTS spectrum
allocation, many of the issues will be revisited, in bodi a mobile and a converged context. If
anything, the range of services diat could potentially be provided over third generation
mobile platforms is greater than that contemplated by the MWS concept. The UMTS
licensing structure currently favoured in the Member States will see the introduction of a
three tiered system, in which there will be a class of pure service provider licensees who will
not install or operate networks nor, consequently, will they be allocated spectrum.
429 See most recently, for example: European Commission. Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of
Council Regulation No. 17 concerning Case No. IV/37.130 — Far/andNetivork . (OJ 1999C77/2).;
European Commission. Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 concerning Case
No. IV/37.182 — Esat/Coras Iompair Eireann (CIE) . (OJ 1999 C181/19).
430 See, for example: Commission approves formation of pan-European telecommunication networks
by British Telecom and its European partners . (IP/99/404). 18 June 1999; and European Commission.
Decision, 99/574/EC of 27 July 1999, relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC and Article 53
of the EEA Agreement (Case IV/36.581 — Telecom Developpement) . (OJ 1999 L218/24).
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These licensees will develop then businesses on the strength and range of available
services. Accordingly, it can be anticipated that there will be early development of innovative
and disparate services as these service providers seek to create new markets. The issue of
spectrum pricing and the most appropriate means for tire market to value spectrum is
generating heated debate in tire Member States. There are real concerns drat auctions leading
to artificially high prices will starve third generation mobile network operators of funds better
spent on what will be extremely expensive network roll-out costs, or that network access and
call charges will be so high as to retard third generation mobile from becoming a mass
market platform for years.
Of course, new fixed/mobile packages, which introduce home-zone concepts (e.g., as
recently introduced by the third mobile operator in Spain, Amena), draw a distinction
between local calls and long distance/international calls. However, these commercial
practices reflect little more than a particular tariffing policy, and it is thus improbable that a
mobile network will be capable of being segmented in die same way as a fixed network (i.e.,
between die local and backbone segments). Accordingly, die calculation of die costs of
access to a mobile network will also be likely to be fundamentally higher dian those
experienced for die fixed sector.
One should, however, be aware of several recent access related requests in the mobile
sector, which might result in a re-assessment of whether access to mobile infrastructure is
viable in the future. These events include:
♦ die existence of "mobile wash" practices, whereby a third or fourth entrant in a given
national mobile market seeks to obtain indirect national roaming rights by taking
advantage of the international roaming rights of a third part}7
♦ die emergence of fixed/mobile converged services, which require access not only at
die terminal level (e.g., SIM cards), but also at the network level (e.g., intelligent
network platforms,WAP servers, etc.)
♦ the preliminary view of die Commission that tiiere is a market for "national roaming
rights"4"'1
431 See: Case No. IV/37.500, Viag/T-Mobil. (OJ 1999 C144/9). This may lead to the conclusion that
this form of access constitutes a relevant market and/or forms part of a broader market for mobile
carriers' carrier services.
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♦ the emergence of so-called virtual network operators (VNOs) in the Nordic
countries, Italy, and Germany
4 the emergence ofUniversal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)4'2
The combined effect of these developments will determine in part whether a market or
markets are developing in relation to access to mobile infrastructure and die conditions upon
which such access is available.
Where die physical connection is made using the PSTN, the ISP must be
interconnected with the local access provider. For these purposes, an ISP might be treated
either as a business customer of the relevant local access provider, which will be the
incumbent operator in die majority of cases, or as another telecoms operator. If treated as a
business customer, die ISP will be required to pay line rental charges. However, the
relationship is significandy different if the ISP is categorized as being another telecoms
operator. In diis case, the ISP is considered to be a terminating operator and can dierefore
benefit from originating charges paid by the incumbent operator. As indicated above,
however, the ISP can circumvent the PSTN by running a leased line direcdv to its customer
where this is a financially viable alternative.
Where die end user is a subscriber to a mobile telecoms network, the ISP will require
access via the subscriber's network. Unlike fixed access, however, mobile access is not
segmented into local access and odier means of access.
As regards fixed local access, it is important to note that, except in limited
circumstances, it is currendy provided via a conventional local loop, as in the case of a
normal voice call.
Accordingly, the Commission currently considers that a relevant market exists for die
provision of Internet access services4".
432 European Parliament and European Council. Decision No. 128/1999/EC of the 14 December
1998 on the coordinated introduction of a third-generation mobile and wireless system (UMTS) in the
Community . Finland became the first EU Member State to award four national UMTS licenses to: (i)
Sonera; (ii) Radiolinja, the mobile unit of the second operator, Helsingin Puhelin Oyj; (iii) Telia Mobile of
Sweden; and (iv) Suomen Kolmegee, a consortium of regional operators in which Sweden's Tele2 has a
20% shareholding.
433 See, for example: European Commission. Decision of 8 July 1998, WorldCom/MCI. Case IV/VI.
1069. (OJ 1999 LI 16/1).; and European Commission. Decision of 4 August 1998,
Cegetel/Canal+/America Online/Bertelsmann . Case IV/JV.5.
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Other features may also be supplied as part of the basic access package, such as search
engines, gateway, or content services (including games, special news services, etc.). However,
according to existing Commission administrative practice, each of these additional enhanced
services might comprise a discrete product market4 4.
The differences which currently exist between tire fixed and mobile sectors, are likely to
continue to exist in the short to medium term, and be reflected in terms of:
♦ the price premium, which continues to apply to mobile communications
♦ tire likely migration ofvoice services to the mobile sector, whereas heavy content and
data transfers will be drawn primarily to dre fixed sector
♦ the lack of full substitution between fixed and mobile services
In light of these factors, it is not clear whedrer fixed and mobile services will ever constitute
anything more dran partial substitutes in dre short term to medium term.
There is likely to be strong supply-push matched by strong demand-pull drat migrates
voice services to mobile networks. By the same token, the growth of Internet-related
communications probably means that fixed networks will play the key role in dre
transmission of high bandwidth and broadband communications. Third generation mobile
systems provide great opportunities, but are also matched by great commercial uncertainties.
From the supply side, there will be an ever-increasing blurring of the distinction between
voice and data, so that the two elements will be seen to constitute part of dre same market.
Distance will quickly cease to become a defining characteristic of product markets. The
regulation of competitive conditions and dre withdrawal of regulatory distortions will, over
time, mean drat distance is increasingly perceived as a relevant element of tariffing policy,
radrer than as a defining element for relevant product markets.
434 Each of these may constitute a separate market such as markets for: (i) the provision of paid
subscriber content over the Internet; (ii) the provision of advertising over the Internet; and (iii) Website
production and related services. This level of differentiation is said to occur because these activities are
frequently carried out by separate undertakings and require substantially different inputs.
Chapter 5.1.3
Geographic Market under Competition Rules
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Case law defines a relevant geographic market as "the area in which the undertakings
concerned are involved in die supply and demand of relevant products or services, in which
die conditions of competition is sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished
from neighbouring geographic areas because, in particular, conditions of competition are
appreciably different in those areas"4". It is the accepted practice of the Commission to
determine that die scope of a geographic market in the telecoms sector refers to:
♦ the extent and coverage of a network and die customers that can economically be
reached and whose demands may be met
♦ the legal and regulator}- framework underpinning the right to provide service (i.e.,
licensing requirements)
Having regard to die licensing and regulatory framework governing die provision of
domestic and international voice and data services on fixed networks in most Member States,
die relevant geographic market for these services is likely to be national. However, die
demand for customized packages of corporate telecoms services exists in at least these
distinct geographic markets: at global, cross-border regional, and national levels416.
As regards carriers' carrier services, the Commission has decided that, by their very
nature, carrier services can be provided at least on a national, cross-border regional, and pan-
European basis4". Country pairs are also seen to be relevant indicators of geographic
markets for certain types of long distance operators, with country pairs often providing a
strong guide to analysts regarding market power with respect to capacity-sensitive wholesale
traffic (e.g., including Internet capacity).
Unlike the fixed sector, the geographic scope of the mobile retail services market is
more difficult to assess, essentially because of the existence of services such as international
roaming and die ability of subscribers to take out foreign subscriptions. Early Commission
decisions concerning the mobile sector considered that there was an increasing trend towards
a European market for GSM service provision. The technical compatibility of foreign GSM
435 Section 6 of the Form CO relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to Regulation
(EEC) 4064/89, as well as Section 6 of Form A/B under Regulation 17.
436 See, for example: European Commission. Decision of 20 May 1999 . Case IV/36. 592. (OJ 1999
L218/14)., Cegetel + 4
437 See, for example: European Commission. Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation .
17 concerning Case IV/37. 130. (OJ 1998 C233/17); and European Commission. Decision of 27 July
1999,. (Far/andNetwork) Case IV/36. 581. (OJ 1999 L 218/24). Telecoms Development
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networks, the presence of international roaming agreements, the establishment of
independent service providers, which resell airtime on a pan-European basis, and the pattern
of cross-shareholdings amongst parent companies and investors influenced the
Commission's views in this regard4'8.
A further issue is whether the geographic market for mobile services could be greater
than national, but smaller than totally European in scope (i.e., regional). The evolution of
such a market is unlikely to take place as long as current roaming charges do not make
subscriptions outside a user's home territory attractive. Indeed, the identification of regional
markets seems to be a highly artificial exercise in die mobile context. The physical location
where a customer roams on any given occasion can be highly arbitrary, and may vary
depending on die age, lifestyle habits, and socio-economic status of a customer at any given
point in life. The mere fact that a party crosses a border to consume a mobile service should
not determine die scope of the relevant geographic market. Rather, the issue should be
assessed in terms of whether there are any pricing pressures or constraints raised by
competitors in different territories which influence a consumer's choice of operator in the
relevant geographic territory. (Refer to die supply-side analysis above, which reinforces the
conclusion that the relevant geographic market should be national.) Therefore, for the
immediate future, the only geographic market in which there are likely to be competitive
pressures on prices is national.
In assessing the scope of the relevant geographic market, the Commission may
consider whether the subscribers of a mobile network in a given Member State would be
likely to switch their subscriptions to mobile operators located in other, especially
neighbouring, Member States in die short term and at a negligible cost in response to a
hypothetical small (in die range of 5% to 10%), but permanent relative price increase in the
tariffs charged by die subscribers' existing mobile operator and its competitors.
The number of subscribers who might be willing to switch their subscriptions to a
mobile operator of a neighbouring Member State would be negligible. However, die number
of subscribers who would switch their subscriptions to a competing national mobile operator
in response to a price increase in die tariffs of their existing provider is very high. The very
high levels of churn diat currendy occur in each national market illustrate tiiis fact.
438 European Commission. Decision of 27 March 1995 . Case IV M.538.(OJ 1995 C96/3), (Omnitel)
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Trans-border merger activity, however, may change the assumptions in this regard.
The merger of mobile operators covering contiguous geographic territories may result in the
creation of regional geographic markets. This could be achieved, for example, by the
internalization of costs between affiliated operators, thereby overcoming the need to pay
international roaming charges altogether. Such a trend would have the possibility of leading
to regional rather than national tariff schemes, which might prove to be very attractive for
certain types of consumers, especially business users.
The existence of international roaming capabilities for digital mobile services raises the
issue whether the relevant geographic market could soon be pan-European41Although the
relevant services are capable of being consumed internationally, tire competitive pressures on
mobile pricing, servicing, and handset prices continue to be strictly national in their effects.
Mobile operators under homogeneous conditions throughout the EU cannot, therefore,
provide services. Moreover, there is little pricing pressure exerted on tire tariffs of operators
from one Member State by operators from another Member State.
Clearly, tire mere provision of international telecoms services does not enlarge the
scope of tire relevant geographic market from one which is fundamentally national to one
which is pan-European. The competitive relationship between mobile operators is solely
vertical in relation to the provision of roaming. Under a roaming relationship, a mobile
operator of a visited Member State simply acts as the agent of a mobile operator from
another Member State whose customer is visiting or transiting the former Member State.
The customer in question remains at all times the customer of the home network. Mobile
services can, therefore, be multi-country in nature without influencing the scope of overall
geographic market definition.
For the reasons expressed above, however, the merger of mobile operators may
establish the sorts of synergies able to attract consumers on a pan-European basis, at least in
the business segment of the market. Where the same parent does not control mobile
operators, the creation of a pan-European market would envisage that operators engage in
"preferred roaming" relationships. Subject to receiving clearance by the Competition
439 In any event, given the ubiquity ofGSM technology, there appears to be no reason why a pan-
European geographic market should be limited to the EU Member States and Norway. At the very least,
all Central and Eastern European countries should be included in any such geographic market definition.
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Directorate under its powers of exemption contained in Article 81 (3), preferred roaming
relationships could be the basis upon which pan-European markets are created in the future.
In die recent Deutsche Telekom/0ne20ne Decision, die Commission noted that the
market for mobile communication services is primarily determined by the extent and
coverage of the network (and die customers diat can economically be reached and whose
demands may be met) and by the prevailing legal and regulatory system. However, after
referring to the decisions in Cases IV/JV.4 (Orange/Viag) and M.1430
(Vodafone/Airtouch), in which the geographic market in die mobile sector was held to be
national, die Commission expressly left the definition of die scope of die geographic market
open (since a dominant position would have been neither created nor reinforced by the
transaction on any relevant market definition).
In considering die effects of the transactions in the United Kingdom in the Deutsche
Telekom/One20ne Decision, die Commission did not expressly define the scope of the
geographic market. In considering the effects on die German market, die Commission
referred to the possibility diat the relevant market could be the German market for mobile
telephony services or a Europe-wide market. In passing references, it also appears that the
Commission contemplated that there may be a market for the provision of services "between
Germany and die United Kingdom". In considering whedier die German market for mobile
telephony services was the relevant market, the Commission took the view that die presence
of bodi parties in the relevant national market, while at die same time simultaneously offering
pan-European services, would mean that it was unlikely tiiat the market was national.
The internationalization of communications services for business customers means that
traditional national licensing for die provision of services is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
As the penetration of mobile communications increases, this trend will continue, as large
businesses increasingly view dieir communications needs on a pan-European basis. Seen in
diis context, traditional SMP calculations based solely on national licensing regimes are
becoming obsolete.
Despite the phenomenon of mobility, mobile markets continue to remain stubbornly
national in character. Real competition between operators for mass-market customers
occurs at the national level. Similarly, mass-market customers see their needs as being
fundamentally national in scope, while providing diem with die facility of national roaming
(during which time they continue to remain die customer of the home operator).
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Aside from local offerings of fixed/mobile integrated packages, the greatest growth of
such packages is likely to be seen amongst multinational companies whose needs encompass
both fixed and mobile delivery mechanisms. This phenomenon is likely to have an expansive
effect on the scope of the geographic markets for the latter type of customer, particularly as
regarding virtual private networks (VPNs). The Commission envisaged the possibility of the
existence of country pair mobile markets in Deutsche Telekom/0ne20ne. It cannot
envisage, at least at this stage in the development of the mobile market, how mobile
customers or operators would be envisaged so that mobile markets could be broken down in
terms of country pairs.
Chapter 5.1.4
Dominance and Oligopolistic Markets
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Having tried to identify a range of potential product and geographic markets which span the
fixed/mobile divide, and which may be relevant in a converged environment, another critical
task must be undertaken, namely, the identification of those market actors who, by reason of
their impact on the market, are legitimate objects of regulation.
Currently, there are two legal standards in use at Community level: firstly, the test of
dominance which allows competition authorities to have anti-competitive behaviour ex post;
and secondly, the test of SMP which allows NRAs to intervene ex ante against a potentially
much broader range of market actors in order to ensure a level of legal certainty in the
commercial relations ofmarket actors in the telecoms sector. This dual approach is followed
throughout the Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom, where an
intermediate category of actors with market influence are subject to an additional layer of
regulation under their license terms. Each of these regulatory categories is described below.
Dominance is defined for EC competition law purposes as a "position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independendy of its competitors, customers, and ultimately consumers44". Dominance is
measured in terms of both its product and geographic dimensions. The primary indicator of
dominance is market share, although this factor alone is not conclusive in die absence of
other indicators of dominance. The European Court of Justice has effectively held diat a
reputable presumption exists diat an entity is dominant in a relevant market if it holds over
50% market share441. Undertakings with market shares over 40% may be considered to be
dominant in appropriate circumstances44-.
Hie amended leased lines directive, the ONP voice telephony directive, and die
interconnection directive require Member States to identify organizations that have SMP for
440 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207.
441 Case 62/86,Ak^o Chemicals BV v. Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359. It should be noted that this Case
explicitly refers to a market share being persistently over 50%. There is thus a need to examine changes in
the pattern of market shares over time, rather than examining a simple snap-shot market share at any
given point in time. This is especially true as the post-liberalization marketplace matures, where the first
mover developing a technologically new market product or service may hold a temporary market share of
100%. For example, such a situation mav arise in relation to the emergence of fixed/mobile-integrated
services.
442 In United Brands, Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, a market share ranging
from 40% to 45% was, of itself, not held to warrant a finding of dominance; however, a combination of
other factors indicated that the undertaking in question was dominant in the circumstances.
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the purposes of the regulatory obligations imposed by those directives. An organization is
presumed to have SMP when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular telecoms
market in the geographic area within which it is authorized to operate. NRAs may,
nevertheless, determine that an organization with a market share of less than 25% in a
relevant market has SMP. They may also determine that an organization with a market share
in excess ofmore than 25% in a relevant market does not have SMP. In either case, the SMP
determination, in addition to market share calculation, is to take into account:
♦ tire organization's ability to influence market conditions
♦ its turnover relative to the size of the market
♦ its access to financial resources
♦ its experience and expertise in providing products and services in the market
In addition, the interconnection directive adds another two conditions:
♦ its control of tire means of access to end users
♦ its international links
The determination of SMP by an NRA involves several stages, including tire
identification of the relevant market. The definitions of these relevant markets are set out in
the various ONP directives. For example, tire revised ONP voice telephony directive
prescribes relevant markets for tire provision of fixed public telephone networks and/or tire
provision of fixed telephony services. Although NRAs have no discretion in defining tire
scope of tire relevant market(s) under ONP rules4 '1, they have considerable discretion in
determining tire criteria to be used in measuring tire market shares of the various actors in
those markets, and in deviating from the 25% market share SMP presumption (where such a
determination can be objectively justified). The discretion exercised by tire NRAs in
determining SMP has led to a patchwork of regulatory standards in the EU; this has
unintentionally resulted in a greater degree of regulator}7 uncertainty for actual and potential
market entrants.
For example, tire situation has arisen where a second mobile operator such as Esat
Digifone in Ireland has been held not to have SMP with a market share of between 24 and
25%, whereas Omnitel, tire second mobile operator in Italy, has been determined to have
443 NRAs, however, have considerable discretion in determining the products and services that make
up the markets identified in the Interconnection Directive.
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SMP in the national market for interconnection with as little as an 18% market share. These
discrepancies are exacerbated when one considers that SMP triggers certain types of
obligations in some Member States, but not others. Indeed, the NRA's discretion to select
tire appropriate market measurement criteria becomes more critical as market shares
approach the 25% threshold. There are attempts being made at Community level to
harmonize the approaches taken by NRAs in measuring SMP444. Specifically, the
Commission has referred Member States to the market definition notice for purposes of
calculating market sizes and market shares even for ONP purposes. The notice provides that
the calculation of market share can be undertaken with reference to both value and volume
data. Despite the apparent existence of a harmonized set of market measurement criteria,
several difficulties remain in relation to tire use of such criteria. These difficulties include:
♦ confusion over the choice ofmarket measurement criteria based on value or volume
There is significant confusion between Member States in the implementation of
alternative market measurement criteria. For example, it is possible to calculate
market shares based on volume in a variety ofways:
• called minutes for switched traffic
• network size or capacity
• speed
• network configuration (e.g., access points, nodes)
• traffic flows
• number of subscribers
This leads to the fragmented application of competitive standards, which remain
identical only in name. Greater consistency in approach is required, as the provision
of telecoms services solely within national boundaries is becoming increasingly
obsolete. Tins is not to suggest the use of one market measurement criterion over
another. On the contrary, it recognizes that several measurement criteria may be
applicable in various instances and that the NRA is entitled to have the discretion to
strike the right balance between them. For example, many established firms will
444 See, in particular: DG XIII. Determination of Organizations with Significant Market Power
(SMP) for implementation of the ONP Directives . 1 March 1999.
http: / /www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/ telecompolicy/en/cormmmication-en.htm#misc
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capture a higher share of a market by value rather than by volume, as they are likely
to seek and retain high value customers while losing low value customers to newer
entrants. However, current SMP tests are subject to a number of criticisms:
• a lack of clarity on what products and services are to be included in the
calculation
This is especially the case for markets designated for SMP purposes, as they
are sectoral in nature and therefore comprise many different products and
services. For example, the market for public mobile telephony services
and/or networks may include such services as: the rental of mobile phones;
the conveyance of outgoing calls; the connection to mobile phones; handset
sales; disconnect charges; and national and international roaming services.
The introduction of fixed/mobile integrated products will only lead to
further confusion in this regard, as such services may fall across the
fixed/mobile divide.
• a lack of clarity on tire geographic allocation of value/volume data
It is well recogni2ed drat the telecoms sector poses its own specific
difficulties with regard to the geographic allocation of turnover. This is due
in part to fire differences in application worldwide of the "called party pays"
and "calling part}- pays" principles and the arbitrariness of attributing
geographic revenues based on the international setdements regime. One of
dre most recent deliberations by an NRA under dre SMP rules involved Italy,
where the NRA decided on 7 September 1999 that three operators were to
be considered to have SMP. The second mobile operator, Omnitel, was
deemed to have SMP in the national market for interconnection, with as little
as 18% market share. On 7 September 1999, the Italian NRA, the
Communications Audiority, adopted a Decision (No. 197/99) concerning
the identification ofSMP operators in Italy443.
♦ regulator}? framework
445 Decision 197/99 of 7 September 1999 . Published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic
(GU RI).
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The Communications Authority assesses the position of SMP annually, after hearing
the opinion of die Competition Authority. By Decision 97/99, die
Communications Audiority has revised the number of SMP operators notified for
the first time since April 1998. Article 1. 1. of Presidential Decree D.P.R. 318/97
presumes a position of SMP when an operator holds more than 25% of a market.
However, this presumption can be modified on the basis of a set of criteria defined
under die same article. These criteria, togedier with dieir interpretation by the
Communications Authority in Decision 197/99, are detailed below.
♦ The parties' market share in respect of the products or services.
These markets, as defined by both the Interconnection Directive and D.P.R. 318/97,
are:
• die market for fixed networks and services
• die market for leased lines
• the market for mobile networks and services
• the market for interconnection
According to Decision 197/99, the current level of competition in Italy does not
permit a further partition of these markets (e.g., a distinction between die market for
analogue and digital mobile services). In order to calculate market shares, the
decision was based on the revenues generated in each market. Widi respect to the
market for interconnection, die authority considered only the market for termination
both on fixed and on mobile numbers. It is worthwhile noting diat, given the
growing importance of termination on mobile networks, this was considered by the
audiority as a particular bottieneck facility.
♦ die relevant geographic market.
According to Decision 197/99, die current level of competition in Italy does not
justify a distinction of different geographic markets within die national territory.
Therefore, all markets mentioned have been considered be national in scope.
♦ other structural characteristics, such as:
• the parties' ability to influence market conditions. In the Decision, die
Authority considered die following parameters as falling widiin die scope of
this category: the number of competitors in the market; die existence of
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barriers to market entry; the existence of barriers for consumers to migrate
to different providers; and the level ofvertical integration,
their turnover in relation to the overall and absolute value of the market
the control of the means of access to final users. In the decision, the
authority considered that the following parameters must be taken into
account: the number of subscribers; access to scarce resources (such as




Chapter 5 sought to develop further the discussion in Chapter 4, which described how fixed
and mobile communications have developed over the years and how they are expected to
develop over the coming years. It considered more specifically the framework for converged
fixed and mobile services, with special emphasis on the different markets. The complexity of
the sector was noted, as well as the desire by die consumer protection audiorities to let
specialist regulators handle die problems.
Hie chapter also considered the possibility of allying competition rules in this area by
discussing the level of a competition in die market for services. The desirability' of a market
where operators and providers were given encouragement to meet die needs of die
consumer trying to win their business was also considered.
(What could perhaps have received more attention in die chapter is die issue of privacy,
but die view has been taken diat diat issue could be addressed by general legislation through
die civil courts.)
In the next chapter die transfer from sector-specific regulation to general competition
rules will be addressed. Sector specific regulation should only- apply, it is argued, in one area,
namely, emergency services. Number portability and carrier pre-selection may not be a
problem since both of these were regulatory tools to open a monopoly environment in the
fixed sector. In reality, that issue is likely to be resolved by cost/benefit analysis by- either the
consumer or the operator.
Chapter 6
The Application ofMarket Access in a Converged
Environment
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This chapter discusses the key issue in a fixed/mobile converged environment. It is in the
context of this issue that policy choices and trade-offs between consumer choice and a
competitive market become most controversial. The controversy focuses primarily on
whether compliance with die principle of technology neutrality requires die migration of die
existing access regime for fixed networks into die mobile sector, or die adaptation of die
former to resemble die latter in the event of greater competition for call origination in the
fixed sector. In this regard, the Scandinavian experience of growth of die mobile market
overtaking that of the fixed market is important. In determining whether die interconnection
directive should be extended to mobile operators, it is absolutely essential diat consideration
be given to whether likely market developments will require a limitation, ratiier than an
expansion, of die scope of die directive.
A discussion of interconnection per se is beyond die scope of the terms of reference
for this study. However, some observations regarding the study conducted by OVUM446
merit mention. OVUM's proposals concerning the fomi of a revised interconnection
directive, which would cover both voice and data communications, include die following:
♦ It should focus on the wholesale level (i.e., network interconnect services, access
services and facilities, but not resale services) and should only address the supply of
inputs for retail services.
♦ It should provide a single regulatory framework for fixed and mobile services.
OVUM acknowledges the differences between die two industries, but is of die
opinion that die best way to accommodate differences is not through separate
regulation, given the growing importance of mobile services and die potential of
fixed/mobile converged services.
♦ It should serve as an instrument of transition from market-opening legislation, such
as the current interconnection directive, to die wider use of competition rules.
Accordingly, it should be consistent widi competition law principles.
OVUM's proposals concerning the transitional revision of the content of die
interconnection directive, in order to move from varying degrees of competition to full
competitiveness, include the following:
446 OVUM. A Review of the Interconnection Directive, Final Report to the Information Society
Directorate . October 1999.
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♦ It should divide the total interconnect service market into sub-markets, with the
separate application of interconnection regulation to each sub-market, in order to
take account of different levels of competitiveness.
♦ It should include a three-tier model of proportionate regulation, which distinguishes
between:
• operators without market power





The public policy goal of ensuring any-to-any connectivity, which underpins regulatory
intervention in the field of interconnection, is less obvious in the case of access issues.
Because a request for access inevitably involves the use of another operator's resources, there
are a number of policy issues relevant to whether access to any given network or service is
necessary in particular circumstances. These policy issues vary greatly as between different
commercial sectors and delivery platforms, especially in light of the different historical
patterns of network and service evolution. The NRAs of individual Member States are
currently dealing with a variety of access issues affecting fixed/mobile convergence, i.e.,
requests by new entrants for access to the local loop of the incumbent fixed network
operator and/or requests by virtual network operators or mobile service providers to access
the radio access network of mobile network operators, including requests for national
roaming services. Such requests can give rise to important questions relating to future
market structure, the extent to which competition has developed, and the liberalisation
measures required to promote competition. This section addresses issues affecting requests
for access to the networks of fixed or mobile operators enjoying significant market power
(SMP) or dominance.
The voice telephony directive447 and the interconnection directive448 lay down rules
concerning the provision of access to the networks of operators, which have been designated
by NRAs as having SMP. Although the provisions on access in the interconnection directive
(Article 4.2) apply both to fixed and mobile operators with SMP, the special network access
provisions in die voice telephony directive (Article 16) apply only to fixed network operators
with SMP. Under die ONP Directives, access is one of the services, which must be made
available to quakfying operators. However, the relevant provisions on access/special
network access in the interconnection directive and voice telephony directive do not create
an automatic right of access. They only place obligations on operators with SMP to respond
to reasonable requests for access and lay down harmonised procedures, including criteria for
NRAs, when dealing with requests for access.
447 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 98/10/EC of 26 February 1998 on the
application ofOpen Network Provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment. (OJ 1998 LI01/24).
448 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal services and interoperability
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP) . (OJ 1997 L199/32).
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NRA practice throughout the EU demonstrates that various broad policy goals are
applied with different weight by NRAs in die assessment of access requests by
competitors4-". Some of these factors are:
♦ user interests
This criterion reflects the Community's goal of delivering telecoms services to end
users in a way which secures the maximum consumer benefit, both in the short and
longer terms. The availability of access alternatives, for example, will have an
immediate impact on die choices and prices available to consumers.
♦ promotion of fair and sustainable competition
This reflects the broad policy goals of expanded consumer choice, quality, and die
promotion of economic efficiency. NRAs diroughout the EU have expressed their
commitment to ensure diat both die short and the longer term future of competition
is secured through the adoption of the access regimes adopted by Member States.
♦ stimulating innovative market offerings and providing users widi a wide range of
telecoms services at national and Community levels
As OFTEL of die United Kingdom has noted ".. .a straight refusal of die request
that mobile networks should be under an obligation to supply access could have the
effect of seriously restricting choice".
♦ relative market positions of the parties
OFTEL took into account the relative bargaining positions of the parties in a dispute
over access to mobile networks between a small, newly founded operator (INMS)
seeking a service from well-established market operators (Vodafone and BT Cellnet).
Importandy, in determining whether access to particular networks should be mandated,
NRAs have also considered:
♦ die regulatory framework in which die specific telecoms market affected by die
access request has developed
♦ the expectations of those who have invested in building networks under a given set
of conditions
449 See, for example: OFTEL. Statement on National Roaming . (uly 1999 and Statement on Mobile
Virtual Network Operators . October 1999 ; see the BIPT's (Belgian NRA) public consultation
documents on the Evolution of the mobile telephony market towards the third generation . July 1999.
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♦ the likely impact which changes in that regulatory framework may have on the
security of investments already undertaken, and whether that impact may create
uncertainties that discourage future investments in new services and new or
expanded networks
Requests for access to the public telephone network infrastructure of a fixed SMP
operator may be made under Article 16 of the voice telephony directive or Article 4.2 of the
interconnection directive. Both of those provisions require SMP operators to deal with
reasonable requests for access to dieir networks from organizations providing telecoms
services. Article 16 of the voice telephony directive adds that this obligation may be limited,
on a case-by-case basis, where:
♦ there are technically and commercially viable alternatives
♦ the requested access is inappropriate in relation to the resources available to meet the
request
Technically and Commercially Viable Alternatives
In evaluating access requests to fixed networks, it is highly relevant that there are no
legal constraints to building competing fixed local access networks. There may also be other
technically viable alternatives for providing the services planned by the organization
requesting access (e.g., cable-TV networks and the resale of services offered by an existing
operator). If these alternatives are judged to be commercially viable, there would be grounds
for an NRA to deny access in a particular case. In determining the issue of commercial
viability, the interpretation of the essential facilities concept under competition rules will
usually be determinative.
Recently, in the Bronner Case, the Court ofJustice explained the issue of commercial
viability in die following terms: "for such access to be capable of being regarded as
indispensable, it would be necessary ... to establish that it is not economically viable to
create a second scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers with a circulation
comparable to that of the daily newspapers distributed by die existing scheme" '1". In diat
450 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschrifterwer/ag [1998] ECR 1-7791.
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case, Advocate General Jacobs explained the policy choices in terms of tire balance between
short term and long term goals, so that "if access ... to a facility were allowed too easily there
would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities ... thus, reducing
competition in die long term". In substance, die Court considered diat access cannot be
granted exclusively on die ground diat, by retaining a facility7 for its own use, a dominant
undertaking retains an advantage over its competitors. Because the availability of spare
capacity" may vary in different parts of a network, access requests need to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. The burden of proof should be on the network operator to show that
there is insufficient capacity in a particular location to satisfy die request for access.
The access issue affecting fixed networks, which is of fundamental importance to
fixed/mobile convergence, is die availability of unbundled local loops. How regulators
address local loop unbundling is likely to have an important bearing on the scope and speed
widi which die market can provide fixed/mobile converged offerings. It appears that
independent mobile operators require access to die functionality- embedded in die local
switch in order to provide converged fixed/mobile products to the incumbent fixed
operator's customers. To date, numbers have been readily available in both die fixed and
mobile sectors, albeit at some expense in various Member States for certain commercially
advantageous numbers. In a fixed/mobile converging environment, numbers will become
increasingly important as many of die key marketing strategies revolve around die ability of
customers to retain one number, regardless of whether they are reached on their fixed or
mobile phone. The underlying network intelligence necessary7 to identify such numbers,
however, is embedded in a local switch or centralized database. Consequendy, operators
wishing to provide fixed/mobile converged products assert that they require the unbundling
of diis intelligence in the fixed network.
Hie debate over unbundling the local loop in Denmark initially arose as a result of the
Danish fixed incumbent operator's offer of a converged fixed/mobile service (the Duet
service), to which mobile competitors also sought access. Some operators take die view diat
die unbundling of fixed networks is so important for die provision of fixed/mobile services
that fixed operators launching new converged products should be obliged simultaneously to
make unbundled local loop access available to competitors, so diat they can compete
immediately in the provision of such services. To the extent that competitors are denied
access to a fixed incumbent's local loop, the "first mover" advantage enjoyed by that fixed
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incumbent for access to the Internet in particular, and higher bandwidth services in general,
may be very significant. The ART in France, for example, has ruled that France Telecom
cannot offer ADSL Internet access services without also offering competitors access to
sufficiendy unbundled local loops.
The availability, affordability, and scope of unbundled local loops on die fixed
incumbent's network are currentiy die subject of major debate at bodi Community and
Member State levels. Even where LLU has been introduced in principle, essential aspects of
its implementation continue to be a work in progress. Some of die key aspects of die LLU
debate are discussed below.
The Role ofLLU
The local access market is generally considered to include access, local and long
distance traffic, Internet access traffic, and high-speed services to consumers. An operator
who operates in die local loop has direct access to die customer, whedier via its own
infrastructure or dirough equipment leased from a third party.
The number of genuine alternative local loop providers competing with fixed
incumbent operators is currendy relatively low across the EU, and competition has been
concentrated in the higher-activity areas, which provide higher returns on capital. Alternative
market operators in the local loop in most EU countries are limited primarily to:
♦ operators having deployed their own high bandwidth optical fibre networks for large
corporate customers
♦ cable TV operators, including relatively new operators who have immediately
deployed networks allowing them to offer telecoms services, and older cable TV
operators who are now modernising their networks in order to provide telecoms
services
The local copper loop infrastructure of fixed incumbents has to date been able to
deliver only narrowband services. Flowever, xDSL technologies, which are currendy being
developed (and already deployed in some Member States) will make it possible to convey
broadband services over existing copper loops. Access to the incumbent fixed operator's
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copper loops, enhanced bv xDSL technologies, is potentially attractive to new entrants, for
two sets of reasons:
♦ Despite die existence of a number of alternative access options to consumers,
including mobile operators, cable modems, higher bandwidth radio links, powerlines,
and satellites, none of diese alternatives has as yet been commercially exploited to
deliver broadband services on a large scale. Alternatively, they display commercial or
technical features, which limit their potential in the short term43'. Access to
enhanced local loops, by contrast, will allow operators to provide end-to-end
broadband services on the local market in the short term, thereby preventing the
fixed incumbent operator from extending or leveraging its dominance on the market
for narrowband local services into emerging broadband services.
♦ LLU, with access to enhanced xDSL loops, is potentially attractive to new entrants,
as compared to investing in their own local loops, because:
• It replaces a large up-front capital investment cost widi a rental cost which
reduces die risk ofmarket entry.
• It allows die entrant to benefit from the economies of scale enjoyed by the
incumbent.
• It provides a low cost and relatively quick means of obtaining access to all
die customers served in a given geographic area.
Thus, provided that it can be required without damaging the competitive development
of alternative local loop providers, the introduction of LLU makes the traditional customer
base of the fixed incumbent contestable by new operators, while also providing a means of
giving consumers a choice in relation to die deliver)- ofmore advanced services which require
higher bandwiddi, thereby encouraging growth in the market. LLU can be particularly useful
in die early stages of competition when new entrants have limited networks by providing a
mechanism to stimulate growth and competition.
451 See, e.g.: OFTEL. Access to bandwidth: Bringing higher bandwidth services to the consumer,
Consultation Document . December 1998. The ART in France, similarly concluded that, mobile
networks will probably continue to focus on providing low-speed cellular services and satellite networks .
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LLU is an access service which:
♦ is provided at a point between the network termination point (at the customer's
premises) and die line-side of the access provider's local switch
♦ provides access to the local loop from die point of interconnect to the network
temiination point
There are two major variations of LLU, die first consisting of physical access to die
transmission medium in die local loop (where access is defined in physical terms ), and die
second consisting of bitstream access (where a bitstream service is provided which does not
require die physical control of the twisted copper pair).
In order for new entrants to be able to deliver dieir own higher bandwidth retail
services, a number of alternative means of access to an incumbent's access network have
been identified by NRAs throughout the EU which are based on diese two groupings of
physical or bitstream access:
♦ partial baseband leased circuit approach, where the local loop operator provides a
telecoms service with defined characteristics to die new operator (i.e., effectively a
leased line between die customer and the local exchange)
♦ bitstream access or xDSL access, where the incumbent owns and operates xDSL
modems on each access line and die customer continues to contract with die local
loop operator for access to die network, and receives telephony from die local loop
operator, while acquiring higher bandwidth services from die new operator
♦ permanent virtual circuit access, where the local loop operator provides odier
operators with higher bandwidth access to the end customer using a point-to-point
data service between die higher bandwiddi customer access lines and the service
provider's own site
♦ the simplest option, indirect access, where the higher bandwidth access line is
connected to a broadband public switched network, but where die customer is still
owned by die fixed incumbent operator
Access may be facilitated through co-location, virtual co-location, or direct connection (or
remote co-location). Access can be local or remote. A number of diose alternatives have
been adopted atMember State level.
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Currently, LLU is mandated in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, and The
Nedierlands. As a result of the undertakings offered by the fixed incumbent operators in the
Telia/Telenor case452, LLU was also to have been mandated in Sweden and Norway.
Despite die decision of the Swedish and Norwegian operators not to carry out die planned
merger, LLU was provided by Telia during die first quarter of 2000.
In die United Kingdom and France, the respective NRAs, following public
consultations during the course of 1999, have also decided to introduce LLU. In botii
Member States, the majority of market operators indicated dieir preference for achieving
LLU through die partial baseband leased circuit option (simply described as unbundled local
loop or raw copper in France), possibly complemented by die permanent virtual circuit
access option. In France, the bitstream access option was globally rejected by most
respondents, arguing that it has no or only a few advantages compared with access to partial
baseband leased circuits, and is beset with greater implementation difficulties.
In die United Kingdom, the incumbent fixed operator, BT, was strongly opposed to
LLU in die form of partial baseband leased circuits, and advocated recourse to die
permanent virtual circuit access option. In BT's opinion, the implementation of die latter
option would render unnecessary any other option. OFTEL, however, has taken the view
that there is a clear case for implementing LLU in die forni of die partial baseband leased
circuit option, and has scheduled its mandator}* introduction for 1 July 2001. (OFTEL had
already endorsed BT's preferred option of bitstream access, which means diat two
implementation options will be available in die United Kingdom.) The Irish NRA, the
ODTR, was also conducting industry consultations on LLU in late 1999. In Sweden, the
NRA conducted a public consultation during the course of 1999, which ended with the NRA
submitting a proposal for a legislative amendment mandating LLU. The issue of LLU has
yet to arise in either Greece or Portugal, as derogations were granted to these Member States.
The focus of regulatory attention in the countries where LLU is available has recendy
shifted dramatically from die fundamental issue of whether LLU should be available as a
452 The governments of Sweden and Norway submitted LLU commitments to the European
Commission's Merger Task Force for the purpose of obtaining regulator)' approval of the merger between
their respective national fixed incumbent operators, Telia, and Telenor: Commission clears merger
between Telia (Sweden) and Telenor (Norway) with substantial conditions . Press Release. (IP/99/746).
13 October 1999.
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matter of principle, to questions regarding its cost, collocation details, and other technical
elements necessary to its provision. For example, Tele Danmark and Denmark's alternative
operators have been in dispute during 1999 over whether Tele Danmark may add additional
charges to the cost of leasing Tele Denmark's raw copper, as originally determined by the
Danish Telecommunications Industry Committee.
In Austria, the NRA has been called upon to resolve disputes between Telekom
Austria and new entrants concerning the general terms and conditions for access to the local
loop4". The pricing method chosen by the NRA follows tire principle of forward looking
LRAIC-ohentation. In Germany, tire requirement drat dre NRA approve LLU prices has led
to an ongoing process of dispute resolution. In February 1999, dre Reg TP fixed dre price
for access to dre local loop at DM 25,40. Such price should in theory apply up to 31 March
2001, but the Reg TP Decision has been appealed. Further complaints are expected
regarding dre process of deliver}' of LLU.
One Member State, The Netherlands, has couched the introduction of LLU in a
manner designed to encourage build or buy decisions by new operators (similar to the
position adopted in Canada). Specifically, OPTA has prescribed a transition period of five
years during which LLU pricing will evolve from a tariff based on historical costs to a tariff
based on current costs. After this period, the fixed incumbent operator, KPN Telecom, will,
in principle, be free to determine die tariff for dtis service on a commercial basis with other
operators.
The issue of pricing and the difficulties involved with the implementation of LLU have
also been addressed during the public consultation processes in France, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom. Respondents in France, however, have argued diat a solution to the
problems involved widi LLU implementation should not be a precondition to die
introduction of LLU requirements in principle widiin the French regulator}' framework. In
all three Member States, attention has been drawn to the problems entailed in rebalancing
tariffs, geographical de-averaging, and access to network information and interference issues.
In France, the majority of respondents agreed with the principle of cost-orientation for LLU
pricing, but opinions diverged as to which reference model should be chosen (LRAIC or
453 For a discussion ofwhich, see: Martin Brodey, Unbundled Access to the Local Loop in Austria ,
C.T.L.R. 1999.
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historical costs). The ART has not as yet indicated any particular costing formula preference.
In the United Kingdom, OFTEL presented in its 1998 December consultation document
three options for setting die price for LLU:
♦ line rental, less retail costs (retail minus)
♦ LRIC, plus a mark-up to account for costs that are common to the line and other BT
services
♦ LRIC, plus lost profit from line rental and calls (known as ECPR, the efficient
component pricing rule)
Following public consultation, OFTEL has indicated its preference for the second
option. In its consultation paper on local loop unbundling, Ireland's ODTR takes die initial
view that LRIC is the appropriate basis for LLU pricing. It contends that cost-oriented
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Regulators are being asked whether the same degree of access to networks afforded by fixed
operators with SMP should be mandated for the mobile sector (including the equivalent of
LLU). The answer to tire question depends largely on whether regulators wish to simply
mirror tire fixed environment, or whether a competitive number of mobile operators will be
able to provide consumers with a sufficient degree of choice and competition.
Tire ongoing debate regarding which, if any, types of access should be afforded to
mobile networks stems from a number of regulatory assumptions, which this chapter seeks
to explore both individually and collectively. In summary, tire regulatory assumptions, which
have an influence on the access debate concerning mobile networks, are as follows:
♦ Spectrum scarcity is a barrier to entry.
Although a finite amount of spectrum means that tire number of mobile operators
can never be infinite, it is also true that this is a regulatory- barrier, which can at least
be partially overcome, even if not wholly overturned, if regulators adopt different
practices to tire allocation of frequencies.
♦ The mobile sector is oligopolistic.
Regulators are uncomfortable with the existence of only a handful of operators in a
market, especially if an oligopolistic environment exists from tire outset, with little
likelihood of expansion in tire number of operators as tire market matures. Although
a total of four mobile operators per Member State may cause concern in the longer-
term, recent patterns of commercial negotiation, combined with the advent of other
regulatory policies, suggest that tire number of providers of mobile services in the
eyes of consumers could realistically be seven to eight (and possibly more) in many7
Member States. When coupled with an appropriate spectrum allocation policy, tire
disappearance of high entry7 and exit barriers will further assist in tire entry of new
providers ofmobile services.
♦ Inbound calls to mobiles are a bottleneck.
It is generally understood by NRAs that mobile termination charges display
bottleneck tendencies, similar to those found on the networks of fixed incumbents,
despite the fact that, unlike tire fixed sector, there is usually no dominant operator to
tire origination of calls. To tire extent that mobile operators are adopting new tariff
plans, increasing their European footprints, and becoming subject to competitive in-
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house provision of mobile services tlirough the use of UMTS technology (see later),
the existence of a bottleneck for termination may be transient in nature. In this way,
the market for mobile termination may increasingly display the hallmarks of
competition, which the MMC has foreseen. Moreover, the functional level of
competition relevant to die delivery of a call to its ultimate destination is at die inter-
operator level. This embodies die concept of a natural market for interconnection;
die fact that a given call can only terminate on one number is largely irrelevant if
there is competition in the transmission of die call to die final operator.
♦ Inbound revenues subsidize outbound charges.
This proposition may be true, although:
• It may only be true at a particular historical point in die development of die
mobile industry.
• It fails to take into account die fact that odier parts of the mobile value chain
are heavily subsidized in many Member States (e.g., prices for handsets),
which would need to be rebalanced similar to the manner in which full tariff
rebalancing should occur in die fixed sector.
• Cross-subsidization by a non-dominant entity does not infringe the
competition rules.
♦ Prices should be cost-oriented to encourage economic efficiency.
In a network industry, parties with dominance should not be permitted to charge
competitors for necessary industrial inputs at prices which are not related to cost, at
least where no skill, foresight, or industry has been expended by die dominant entity.
However, in a competitive market, access prices should, in principle, be driven by
competition, not regulation. To die extent diat diose wholesale prices are excessively
high, this may reflect some form of market failure rather than an economic
inefficiency, which should be cured through additional forms of access regulation.
Each of diese propositions is evaluated in diis chapter.
Requests for access to die radio access network of a mobile operator widi SMP can be
made under Article 4.2 of the interconnection directive. As to how far, and on what
conditions, access to mobile networks is already mandated across die EU, die pattern is
mixed. In some Member States (i.e., in Denmark and die United Kingdom), mobile network
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operators are already required to provide some form of service provider access. However, in
most Member States, this issue is currently under review or is at least on tire regulatory
agenda. NRAs have universally indicated a strong interest in carping out public enquiries on
the issue, in order to obtain industry input on different issues, including:
♦ how access to mobile networks should be resolved in the future
♦ howmobile access would affect the structure of competition
♦ what benefits and expenses to both end users and society as a whole lie in
introducing new forms of access and drird party utilization of existing mobile
networks
In Denmark, tire National Telecommunication Agency's Decision that Sonofon had
SMP in the mobile market, and was therefore required to meet tire reasonable requests of tire
Virtual Network Operator "Sense" for access, stemmed from Sense's request for an
interconnection agreement with Sonofon for a number of bearer services and teleservices,
from a request for details of the interface between tire mobile terminal and Sonofon's GSM
network, and between Sonofon's GSM network and Sense's network. Sense requested that
the National Telecommunication Agency decide whether its request was a "reasonable
request" under the terms of the Danish Interconnection Act.
On balance, tire understanding of Article 16.1 of tire voice telephony directive and the
operative elements of the access notice suggests that only where all mobile operators in a
given national territory refuse to grant access to their networks, and no further licenses are
available, could a service provider assert that there is no technically viable alternative for
bringing its services to tire market.
Under the interconnection directive, NRAs are required to recognize the legitimate
interests of both parties when dealing with requests to networks with SMP. Existing mobile
operators in order to protect a period of exclusive use of their network may therefore
legitimately invoke justifications based on the recoupment of initial investment.
During such periods, the imposition of unbundling obligations on mobile operators
would clearly require stronger justification. However, once the initial costs of a mobile
network operator have been recovered, the question is whether it would be appropriate to
require some form of unbundled access for service providers. Ongoing consultation
processes in manyMember States may produce some valuable answers.
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Once it is detennined that access should be granted, the issue of charge becomes
critical. Unlike the voice telephony directive, tire interconnection directive does not explicitly
mandate cost-orientation for access, and presumes that such charges should be commercially
negotiated between the parties. Seen in this context, where commercial negotiations fail,
NRAs may be called upon to resolve disputes and to set a charging fomrula for access.
♦ As noted above, an NRA may require cost-orientated access for a particular type of
access, provided tire obligation is proportional to tire aim pursued. However, a
recent request for indirect access to mobile networks filed with OFTEL by the
company INMS indicates that this may not be dre common outcome. OFTEL
concluded drat, although access should be mandatory in the specific circumstances
of the case, it should be charged to dre requesting operator at retail-minus prices (i.e.,
at retail prices less any savings for those elements of dre retail service which the
indirect operator will substitute for those of the network operator), rather than at
cost-oriented prices (as used for indirect access to fixed networks).
Charging for access to mobile networks at purely cost-based rates would ignore the
competitive conditions under which network investment has taken place in the mobile sector
and dre relative immaturity' of the sector compared to the fixed sector.
The key criticism to which dre retail minus formula is prone, is drat historically it has
been applied to utility sectors. In utility sectors, the concept of a retail price is relatively
uncontroversial. However, in a volatile mobile sector characterized by multiple tariff
packages, the concept of a retail price may prove to be more elusive. Similarly, dre cost of
those elements, which will be subtracted from the retail price (dre minus element) are not
certain in each case because of the nature of a mobile network, which is less susceptible to a
precise breakdown of its various constituent elements dran is a fixed network (see discussion
below on VNOs).
For these reasons, dre preference should be given to dre negotiation by the parties of
access on commercial terms. The level of competitiveness of mobile markets throughout dre
EU will be an essential element in determining whether, and dre extent to which, access to
mobile networks should be mandated. Tire collective impact of a number of different
market and regulatory' developments should be taken fully7 into account when determining
critical issues relating to access to mobile networks.
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There are a number of outstanding issues relating to various aspects of access to, or
termination on, mobile networks, which will no doubt be the subject of continuing
assessment by NRAs in die period up to die year 2002. Their relative importance will
escalate witii the introduction of diird generation mobile systems.
As defined in the Commission Green Paper on a Common Approach in die Field of
Mobile and Personal Communications in the European Union434, roaming is the "facility,
supported by commercial arrangements between operators and/or service providers, which
enables a subscriber to use his/her radio telephone equipment on any odier network, which
has entered into a roaming agreement in die same or anodier country for bodi outgoing and
incoming calls".
It should be noted that die roaming is, in principle, international (i.e., limited to
roaming between operators established in different countries), but is also now available on a
national basis (i.e., used between operators established in die same country). Roaming can be
implemented either manually (by the customer) or automatically (by the operator/service
providers). A variation of national roaming occurs when the operator applies different prices
to zones within the scope of its own network. In such cases, users making calls outside their
home coverage zone, defined by dieir mobile operator, will usually be charged a higher tariff.
Distinctive regulator}' issues have arisen over the past few years in the context of
roaming, for example, die scope of the GSM MOU Association Agreement. In early 1998
(Case IV/96.153 GSM International Roaming) the Commission's Competition Directorate
reviewed die standard international roaming agreement of the GSM MoU Association, which
is designed to ensure that GSM mobile phone users in one country can use the GSM
network in another country. In its decision433, die Commission envisaged that:
#■ Nodiing in die agreement would prevent a consumer in one country from taking out
a subscription with a network operating in anodier country.
♦ Commercially sensitive information provided to odier operators in die context of
roaming agreements would not be capable of being used for other (anti-competitive)
purposes.
454 COM (94) 145 final.
455 IP/98/147. 11 February 1998.
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The Commission is currently considering the introduction of a proposed inter-operator
tariff for roaming, which should result in lower prices for consumers in the European Union.
At die time of writing, the Competition Directorate was about to launch a sectoral enquiry
into the competitiveness of international roaming practices.
The initiation of a sectoral inquiry into international roaming practices would provide a
competition-based analysis designed to determine whether regulator}7 bottlenecks or market
failures exist or are likely to materialize. As such, sectoral enquiries provide an appropriate
mechanism through which regulator}7 and competition policies can be linked.
National roaming allows a mobile network operator to access the networks of other
operators to provide service to its own customers, typically in areas where the operator does
not itself, have coverage. National roaming is considered to be beneficial for three reasons:
♦ It allows mobile network build-out to be economically sustainable.
♦ It can be pro-environmental.
♦ It may facilitate competition.
A number of NRAs have mandated that national roaming be afforded to third and fourth
mobile operators, so as to enable them to compete effectively with the more established
mobile operators during the initial rollout of their networks. Mandated national roaming has
a typical lifespan of three years, after which new entrants are required to have rolled out their
own networks.
Most recently, concerns have arisen that, in a highly competitive market of three or
four mobile operators, mandated national roaming is unnecessary7, as it is a service which will
in all likelihood be offered by one of die existing operators on commercial terms. Later
entrants in the mobile sector have also expressed reservations about the competitive
disadvantages of national roaming.
National roaming became a significant regulatory issue in the third generation mobile
systems licensing process in the United Kingdom, threatening to delay the award of licenses.
The government decided that all four GSM network operators (2nd generation) would be
required to allow UMTS licensees (3rd generation) to roam on their GSM networks. In
August 1999, however, the High Court held that the United Kingdom government's attempt
to impose additional conditions to this effect on die GSM licensees was unlawful. In
October, die High Court of Appeal overturned the High Court judgment, holding that die
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government's powers are sufficiently broad to be able to modify licenses in tire manner
prescribed. Consistent with its approach to costing for indirect access, OFTEL ruled that
roaming on second generation networks by third generation operators would be at the retail
plus formula.
The United Kingdom's decision to mandate national roaming, so as to supplement
third generation coverage (which is set at a significantly lower level of penetration than GSM
levels) until the year 2009, should be contrasted with the approach adopted by the ACCC,
the National Competition Authority in Australia416. The ACCC's analysis consisted of two
steps:
♦ Identify tire relevant markets affected and analyze the current level of competition.
♦ Compare the level of competition likely to occur without mandator}' roaming at the
current level of regulator}- intervention (the with/without or but/for test).
Similarly, it concluded that market forces would lead to competition between existing
operators, preventing the imposition of exorbitant charges. Although the ACCC accepted
that the price of national roaming remained an issue, it noted that there were also risks
involved in prices being imposed by a regulator using a top-down methodology.
In another development over the course of 1999, the Finnish Competition Agency (the
FCA) ruled on Telia Finland's dispute with Sonera and Radiolinja over national roaming
rights in late September 1999. It concluded that both operators had priced national roaming
so high that Telia Finland had no chance of providing national mobile services. The FCA is
now attempting to set rates for national roaming with Sonera and Radiolinja. However, the
Director of the FCA has declined to indicate whether the FCA favours any particular pricing
model (e.g., retail-minus, cost-plus, or variants thereof). The FCA's express intention is to
ensure that the roaming rates and conditions agreed by the parties promote competition by
introducing new competitors. In addition, the FCA has made it clear that indirect access
arrangements are not, in its view, substitutes for national roaming.
National roaming can assist new mobile entrants greatly by allowing them to obtain
access to tire broadest possible customer base, subject to a commitment to a relatively rapid
456 Public Inquiry into Declaration of Domestic Intercorner Roaming under Part XIC of the Trade
Practices Act 1997 . At: www.accc.gove.au/contract/istelecom.htm.
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network roll out. This form of entry assistance greatly increases the overall competitiveness
of any given national market.
To the greatest extent possible, operators should be encouraged to reach commercial
agreement on national roaming without NRA involvement. A recent competition-based
analysis in Australia concluded that, in markets with three or four existing mobile operators,
there may be sufficient commercial incentive for existing operators to offer national roaming
to new entrants without the need for regulatory intervention mandating national roaming.
A practice has arisen in Germany, and most recently in Finland, whereby a third or
fourth entrant in the national mobile market has sought to circumvent national roaming rules
(or the lack thereof) by taking advantage of the international roaming rights of a third part}',
but using them solely in a national context. A mobile wash request referred by the
Commission's Competition Directorate-General is currently before the NRA and
Competition Authority for resolution. When the Telia Finland—Sonera and Radiolinja
negotiations broke down (see above), Telia Finland commenced service provision by
accessing Sonera's network through the acquisition of services from Swisscom under
international roaming agreements of the latter with Sonera and Radiolinja respectively (i.e.,
the use of the so-called mobile wash technique). After three weeks, Sonera terminated
Swisscom's roaming agreement and denied Telia Finland access to its network. In addition to
the proceedings before the Finnish Competition Authority, Telia Finland filed a complaint
against Sonera and Radiolinja with the European Commission, alleging that the conduct of
the Finnish mobile operators infringed Articles 81 (1) and 82.
Hie matter was referred by the European Commission to the Finnish NRA, which in
turn passed the matter to the Finnish Competition Authority for final resolution. Before the
final resolution of the case, the European Commission has refused to grant interim relief to
Telia Finland, and the company has entered into service provider arrangements with the two
Finnish mobile operators.
The availability of mobile wash practices indicates that the number of national
competitors in any given Member State could be raised substantially. This could have a very
positive effect on the growth on the overall competitiveness of the sector. Regulators should
exercise caution in mandating the use of mobile wash practices, preferably leaving it to the
relevant market actors to negotiate commercial agreements. The realization that all mobile
operators need to be able to negotiate international roaming arrangements means that those
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operators seeking to obtain national roaming rights on the basis of another operator's
international roaming rights will be in a good position to do so. Similarly, by obtaining access
in this way to another operator's home markets, they leave themselves open to providing a
similar services on their home market.
The benefit of SIM lock devices, for both consumers and operators, is that they help
deter the theft of handsets. However, they also have the effect of locking a customer handset
to a particular network operator or service provider. The Commission has alleged that the
SIM lock device could be used to prevent consumers who had purchased a mobile handset
from later choosing which mobile phone best suited their needs, thereby raising serious anti¬
competitive concerns. The investigation, which was launched by the Commission in 1996,
demonstrated that whilst most operators did not feel it necessary to use tire SIM Lock
feature, tire risk of anti-competitive uses had been foreseen in certain countries, notably in
France and Denmark, where special rules had been adopted to oversee its use. This was not,
however, the case in all Member States4'7.
Tire SIM lock investigation4'8 was concluded in August 1996, pursuant to which tire
Competition Directorate-General received assurances that SIM locking devices would allow
end users to unlock their mobile handsets on the basis of information provided by the
network operator/service provider. The practical effect of tire SIM Lock decision is that
consumers are no longer charged what were often significant amounts of money, for tire
ability to link their own handsets to another operator or service provider. The
implementation of that decision in practice, ensures the competitiveness on a pan-European
basis ofmultiple service options for consumers.
In February 1999, OFTEL published a consultative document setting out its proposals
for the implementation of indirect access to mobile networks. Responses covering the key
issues were received from a mix of consumer groups and industry players. OFTEL noted
that there is already significant competition in the sector at the service level, and that adding
to tire number of competitors would not necessarily guarantee a greater degree of
competition. Nevertheless, OFTEL indicated that that there should be an obligation to
provide indirect access on the part of the two mobile networks that were parties at the time
457 The Commission takes action to prevent anti-competitive practices in the mobile phones sector .
Commission Press Release. (IP/96/791). 8 August 1996.
458 Case IV/35.914, SIM hock [8 August 1996] Commission Press Release IP/96/791.
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to the two current disputes on indirect access for mobile networks, namely, BT Cellnet and
Vodafone.
OFTEL proposed that indirect access should also be made available at a retail-minus
level (as for national roaming of a new entrant third generation operator on a second
generation network), and prescribed the way in which it would detennine charges, should it
be called upon to do so43'. OFTEL's grounds for tins approach were as follows:
♦ Article 4 (1) of tire interconnection directive provides that organizations authorized
to provide public telecoms networks have an obligation to negotiate interconnection
(i.e., not another form of access) with other such organizations.
In substance, OFTEL's arguments in favour of a retail-minus pricing system for
indirect access were that:
♦ It ensures that competition is focused on those elements of the total retail call where
the operator and the network operator are genuinely competing.
♦ It avoids a major change in the regulatory framework (which would increase
regulator}7 risk).
♦ It avoids regulatory intervention dictating the pace of change in retail pricing.
OFTEL considers that such intervention would be both unnecessary and potentially
damaging in a new market in the United Kingdom that is already becoming
effectively competitive.
OFTEL received a large number of comments460 in response to its consultation
documents regarding the indirect access principle. The comments relating to charging are of
particular interest. In particular, INMS, a new entrant, argued that prices for calls to mobiles
are maintained at artificially high levels by reason of the calling part}7 pays convention, which
prevails in the EU. INMS also objected to the retail minus pricing mechanism on the basis
that it would distort competition in downstream service markets, particularly in relation to
competition in call origination. INMS proposed that cost-based pricing would be more
appropriate, arguing that the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), on which retail-minus
459 Under the Interconnection Directive, if negotiations between the indirect access operators and the
network operators do not result in agreement, and the dispute is referred to the Director General of
Telecommunications, he has to consider the issue in light of the criteria set out in Article 9(5) of the
Interconnection Directive.
460 The comments referred to can be downloaded from the Oftel WEB site: www.C3ftel.uk
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charging is based, cannot be supported in such a context. INMS sought to demonstrate drat
die assumptions required to support ECPR are not redected in the conditions found in tire
mobile market. INMS went on to claim that ECPR, particularly end user pricing, is
inappropriate, inherently discriminator}*, and in breach of ONP principles. The alleged
discrimination could occur in three different ways, by producing:
♦ a profit squeeze
♦ the price follower effect
♦ an inherently distortive market price
INMS argued for tire adoption of cost-based prices, addressing tire argument that cost-
based pricing may damage network competition, by noting that later entrant mobile
operators such as Orange and One-2-One are extremely unlikely to exit the market (given tire
state of tire development of competition).
It is claimed that QIA would require indirect access be provided, under tire
interconnection directive, Annex II461 , to operators satisfying the following conditions:
♦ variety, whereby a QIA operator should provide a wide range of telecoms services, as
well as offering two-way communications
♦ innovation, which means that a QIA operator should show a commitment to
investment in better quality services by providing innovative market offerings
♦ multi-access, whereby a QIA operator is allowed to access indirectly tire subscribers
of operators with SMP. By obtaining multi-access, a QIA operator might claim that
it could:
• offer service provision to rural areas
• improve resilience
• in certain circumstances, offer its services to any of the existing mobile
network companies through a roaming agreement
It was also argued that UIA, which would allow anyone with Annex II status to obtain
indirect access, would damage the prospects for those operators seeking to establish a wide
461 A description of these operators can be found in the Appendix J: European Parliament and
European Council. Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to
ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability through the Application of the Principles of Open
Network Provision (ONP) . Annex II, Part IV 8.2..
346 Challenges to die Application ofCompetition Law in a Converged Environment
range of telecoms services, because margins on voice would be cut so dramatically that this
would erode the revenue streams needed for small start-up operations seeking to deliver
innovative offerings. In contrast, QIA would lead to a substantial transfer of profits from
network operators to indirect access operators, which would ensure that effective
competition is stimulated.
The QIA approach would, if implemented, create de facto special rights in those
operators, which could satisfy its standards. However, tins would put an NRA in the
invidious position of having to determine whedrer an operator satisfied certain qualitative
criteria, which would be difficult to establish (i.e., tantamount to the establishment of a
selective distribution system under competition rules). As such, the QIA approach would be
inappropriate, except in those instances where the market was more mature and where
limited reserves necessitated market entry by only a limited number ofnew entrants.
A mobile VNO is a special form of mobile service provider with typically at least one
switch (MSC), a home location centre (HLR), an authentication centre (AUC), and its own
series of subscription identities (SIM cards), but with no access network of its own because it
does not have an allocation of spectrum. A mobile VNO, however, might have access to a
mobile network identity' number (IMSI) series, as well as mobile network telephone numbers
(pursuant to its mobile network code (MNC) that identifies it as having access to spectrum).
A mobile VNO buys capacity from existing operators at non end user rates, which it
then sells to end users at retail rates. Because it could in theory do so, without rolling out its
own infrastructure, and could establish itself at minimal cost in a number of countries, a
mobile VNO could provide pan-European services. A mobile VNO is able to market and
sell its services in its own name and is generally responsible for the major portion of the
production of those services.
The mobile VNO business model may be used as a relatively simple means of
increasing a mobile operator's existing geographic footprint. Mobile VNOs have recently
been a major regulator}' issue in the Nordic countries, where a mobile VNO called Sense
Communications sought to establish a regional footprint and was consistently denied
interconnection at interconnection rates by mobile operators in the region. Although NRAs
in tire region did not permit operators to deny the Sense Communications access to their
networks, the prices offered for access were not referable to actual costs. The mobile VNO
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issue is likely to arise again, especially if entry into the mobile sector is considered to be
restricted as a result of spectrum scarcity.
OFTEL has been consulting on the structure of die access regime for mobile networks
in the United Kingdom for some time. After beginning its indirect access consultation, it
moved rapidly to mobile VNOs, which it refers to as MVNOs.
In its June 1999 consultation into MVNOs, OFTEL considered whedier, in die
absence of commercial agreement, regulatory intervention might be necessary to ensure that
would-be MVNOs can access existing mobile networks. OFTEL invited public comment
on a range of issues, including its proposal to adopt a retail minus charging model,
implemented on die basis set out in its February 1999 consultation document (on whether
indirect access should be mandated). It went on to request: comment on the definition of
MVNOs; assessments of demand; views on whether there is a basis for requiring network
operators to make MVNO services available in the absence of competition; comments on
which operators should be liable (if there were an obligation); suggestions as to the terms
(particularly in relation to charging) for service provision; and die identification of key,
technical considerations.
The results of the June 1999 consultation and OFTEL's conclusions are found in its
October 1999 Statement on MVNOs462. OFTEL concluded that it is not yet clear whether
the interconnection directive applies to the provision of services to MVNOs, noting that if
die interconnection directive is determined to apply to MVNOs in the future and OFTEL is
asked to resolve a dispute, it would consider the impact of MVNOs on competition and
consumers under the criteria set out in Article 9 (5) of the interconnection directive. In
considering the economic benefits and costs of MVNOs, OFTEL concluded that it is not
clear that innovation leading to the development of a wider range of value added services or
converged services is necessarily dependent on regulatory action to help establish MVNOs.
It decided that many converged fixed/mobile services could be provided if companies
combined fixed services, indirect access, and mobile service provision. In considering
whether MVNOs are necessary to address barriers to entry, OFTEL concluded that the
development of effective competition was possible and that the market is moving towards
such competition. OFTEL also noted that MVNOs are irrelevant in addressing the issue of
462 por reference anJ possible download, see www.Oftel.uk. Follow instructions given on the screen.
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spectrum scarcity, unless they have a subsidiary effect of increasing die intensity of
competition between the underlying networks. However, OFTEL did acknowledge that
MVNOs may be able to reduce costs for customers, by making it easier for consumers to
change network operators. Similarly, ifMVNOs can switch the underlying networks used by
them and arbitrage the network's tariffs, prices could be pushed down. However, the prices
of incoming calls to mobiles would not necessarily also decrease, since many calls will still be
carried for significant parts of the transmission on mobile networks.
In a policy reversal, die Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications
appears to have taken a position contrary to die decision earlier in 1999 of die NRA, which
had favoured mandating network access for mobile VNOs. In a White Paper on telecoms
submitted to the Norwegian Parliament in December 1999, the Ministry based its position
on the negative impact which such a policy would have on investment in die mobile sector.
In die first half of 1999, the Commission concluded an investigation into the rates
charged for fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-fixed call termination, and die retention rates of
fixed incumbents in dieir interconnection arrangements with mobile operators. During die
course of diat investigation, the intrinsic difficulties of equating mobile termination charges
with fixed termination charges were bome out, widi mobile tariffs generally being
characterized by relatively low origination charges offset by relatively high termination
charges.
The Commission closed diat aspect of its investigation dealing with termination
charges on mobile networks, after being satisfied that market developments were addressing
its concerns regarding excessive pacing. Between February 1999 and August 1999,
significant reductions in die price of fixed-to-mobile calls occurred in a number of EU
Member States. In a number of instances these reductions were the result of NRAs
requesting that die price of such calls be lowered.
In September 1999, die Information Society Directorate General (DG INFSO)
indicated diat it considered as appropriate, where justified and respecting die principle of
proportionality, die definition by the NRAs (or the national competition audiorities) of an
upper benchmark for call termination on mobile networks. Mobile retail tariffs should,
however, rely on competition. Moreover, die conditions set out by the national authorities
for die determination of call temiination charges should be sufficiendy fiexible in order to
allow mobile operators to offer specific termination charges, and to reflect various
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competitive economic conditions. DG INFSO also recommended that these conditions be
reflected in the retail charges offered by the fixed operators to subscribers and that fixed
operators provide subscribers with the necessary infonnation on call termination charge
applied by tire mobile operators. It is expected that such a policy will have as an effect to
increase customers' awareness and foster the emergence of price competition in the mobile
call termination market.
In addition, a growing number of NRAs are designating mobile operators as having
SMP with respect to tire termination of all calls on tire national market for interconnection,
thereby subjecting such operators to cost-oriented termination rates. More recently, it was
announced in mid-November 1999 that a private action was being brought against certain
mobile operators in various EU Member States for excessive mobile call termination charges.
Chapter 6.3
Consumer Protection Measures
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The scope and content of consumer protection rules governed by various provisions of the
ONP voice telephony directive often vary according to both tire type of operator providing
the service (e.g., fixed or mobile) and die market position of such operators (e.g., operators
with significant market power). The continued application of these criteria is called into
question in the light of fixed/mobile convergence. In a fixed/mobile converged
environment, die parameters of universal service obligations and die responsibilities of those
operators which are designated to provide universal services, may need to be redefined,
especially- in light of die multiple categories of market operators, which are subject to
consumer-oriented obligations.
The ONP voice telephony directive, which defines the bundle of universal services to
be provided to consumers, requires Member States to ensure diat all reasonable requests for
connection to die fixed public telephone network at a fixed location, and for access to fixed
public telephone services, are met by at least one operator. Member States may, if necessary-,
designate one or more universal service providers, so diat service is available diroughout die
whole of die national territory-.46' Designated providers must provide a connection to the
fixed network diat is capable of allowing users to make and receive national and international
calls, and diat is capable of supporting speech and facsimile and data communications.464
Member States must also ensure diat public pay telephones are provided so as to meet
the reasonable needs of users in terms of both numbers of public telephones and dieir
geographic coverage465, and may, where appropriate, take specific measures for disabled users
and users widi special social needs.
The definition of the universal service bundle, however, is only- one aspect of die
directive. The directive is also concerned with achieving an appropriate balance between die
development of new services and die sustaining of competition on die one hand, and die
protection of consumers in dieir relationship widi service providers on the odier. To diis
end, die directive defines different categories of operators, to which die range of obligations
defined in die directive applies to varying degrees. The directive distinguishes between
mobile operators and fixed operators, by excluding die former from many- of die obligations
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♦ Mobile operators are subject only to five key obligations set forth in the directive:
• Article 6 on directory and enquiry services
• Article 9 (b) on access to operator assistance services and enquiry services
• Article 9 (c) on free access to emergency services
• Article 10 (1) on an operator's obligation to provide consumers with a
contract
• Article 11 (1) on the publication of information on standard terms and
conditions
♦ Fixed operators are subject to the following categories of obligations:
• The provision of universal service is ensured through the designation by the
Member States of universal service providers.
« Significant market power is used as the criterion to distinguish further
between remaining fixed operators.
Organizations with significant market power are subject to additional obligations
relating to:
• quality of service
• the provision of additional facilities (calling line identification, direct dialling-
in and call forwarding)
• tariff principles (cost-orientation, transparency and unbundling of services)
• cost-accounting principles400
Moreover, distinctions are also drawn among fixed operators in terms of the types of
consumer obligations relevant to individual types of service, such as:
• universal service40
• access to fixed networks
• public telephone services
• voice telephonyr sendees
466 Article 8.
467 In some cases, designated universal service providers come under additional obligations, provided
that they also enjoy significant market power. This is true in the case of Article 15 on the provision of
additional facilities and Article 17 on tariff principles and cost-orientation..
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For instance, only providers of voice telephony services, together with designated
universal service providers with significant market power, are under tire obligation to provide
the additional facilities listed in Article 15 of the directive. In light of the fact that Member
States, pursuant to Recital 6 of the directive, should take into account the ability of an
operator to provide universal services in designating such an operator, this has in effect
meant that the designated universal provider in each Member State has been tire incumbent
fixed telecoms operator, which not only enjoys significant market power, but invariably has a
dominant position.
The limited applicability of the provisions of tire directive to mobile operators and tire
use of tire concept of significant market power as the differentiating element between fixed
operators raise difficulties in a fixed/mobile converging environment because distinct issues
are tackled using tire same set of regulator}' triggers, namely, tire first set of problems involves
questions of redistribution and concerns tire definition of tire universal service bundle. For
example, who should have tire right to what service at what cost, who should pay for those
services, who should provide the services, and how?
The second set of issues, by way of contrast, simply addresses consumer protection
issues. These measures address how best to prevent harm to consumers and to prevent the
occurrence of competitive market distortions characterized by significant disparities between
both telecoms suppliers and consumers, and among suppliers themselves.
Regulatory measures addressing information-related obligations are derived from the
asymmetric power enjoyed by telecoms operators as compared to consumers, 'these types
of measures apply to all operators, regardless of their relative importance in the market and
whatever the level of competition on that market, and also apply irrespective of the
technology used. Such measures mainly deal with obligations designed to counterbalance
consumers' relative lack of information and bargaining power, by requiring operators to
provide consumers with sufficient information on their services and tariffs. This may also
include positive obligations such as tire provision of an itemized bill or selective call barring
services, which allow tire consumer to control his or her level of consumption. In tire latter
case, recourse to a de minimis rule or to commercial criteria (such as the length of time an
operator has spent on the market) is envisaged if deemed necessary in order not to hinder the
development ofnew market entrants.
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The example of Denmark is instructive in this respect. Denmark has adopted a set of
telecoms-specific, technology neutral, obligations in tire field of consumer protection4'".
Some smaller market players have complained to tire Danish NRA, the NTA that the
requirements are disproportionate, both in economic and administrative terms, and have
argued that an exemption should be available to smaller market actors. The NTA, however,
is of tire opinion that a system of exemption would be difficult to manage in practice.
Exempting some providers, it believes, on tire basis of their size, would not be appropriate
given the regulation's objective of protecting consumers, implying that regulator)' constraints
should apply whatever the size of tire operator. However, the NTA has considered the
option of differentiating between operators according to the types of customers (whether
they are individuals or enterprises) they serve and tire services to which their customers
subscribe. For example, the NTA suggests that operators could be subject to stricter
obligations, notably in terms of tire range of services offered to subscribers, where tire
amount paid by consumers varies with tire level of"1' consumption.
In light of the above, there is a need to reconsider whether certain obligations regarding
cost-orientation should be mandated, and to assess whether competition law will be sufficient
of itself to tackle the abuse ofmarket power with regard to retail pricing issues. In doing so,
consideration should be given to the fact that universal service providers will in any event
remain subject to the obligation to provide affordable services. Similarly, as regards the
provision of additional facilities (e.g., calling line identification, call forwarding, and direct
dialling in), where such measures are not necessary for the protection of the consumer (Le.,
where their provision does not assist consumers in controlling their consumption patterns),
the issue then becomes one ofwhether these measures are essential and therefore need to fall
within the scope of the universal service umbrella; or non-essential and can be best left to the
marketplace to provide via competitive service offerings.
Thus, it is suggested, firstly, that a distinction be established between universal service
obligations and consumer protection measures. Universal service would be provided, as is
now the case, by one or a few operators, subject to specific obligations in terms of the
468 Executive Order No. 581 of 6 July 1999 on the Provision of Telecommunications Networks and
Services .
469 Telestyrelsen. Udredning vedrorende regulering af udbudet af telenet og teletjenester . September
1999.
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services to be provided and their tariff levels. Secondly, as a matter of principle, consumer
protection measures should apply to all fixed and mobile operators. The uniform application
of consumer protection measures to mobile and fixed operators was supported by the
majority of telecoms market players, principally on the ground that any other policy would
confuse consumers and distort competition.
To die extent that a service is regarded as being truly essential, it should be provided by
die designated universal service provider(s). It appears to be unnecessary to impose such an
obligation with respect to tire mandated provision of additional facilities on service providers
with SMP. Only when consumer protection measures are adopted because of die risks of
abuse of market power, should additional distinctions be drawn between operators. In these
circumstances, before imposing any new obligations, consideration should be given to
whether the market is satisfying consumer demands. Consideration needs to be given to
whedier operators and business users can, in a fully competitive environment, derogate by
contract from consumer protection standards, which would odierwise apply to all end users.
In the alternative, consumer protection measures in the telecoms sector could be expressed
to apply only to relations between operators and consumers acting outside dieir trade,
business, or profession. Such a possibility would be consistent with other Community
horizontal consumer protection legislation, which seeks to address consumer issues
associated solely with private individuals acting outside the scope of their professional
activities (e.g., the unfair contract terms and distance selling directives). It would also accord
with the realities of sophisticated corporate consumers of communications services.
As regards die content of the universal service obligation, and consistent with the
principle of technology neutrality, the limitation of the universal service bundle to fixed
networks may need to be reconsidered.
Broadband/High Access Speed
The European regulatory framework does not impose any obligation on universal service
providers regarding the provision of particular bandwidth. Where Member States have
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included in their definition of universal service a reference to minimum access speeds, these
have never exceeded 2,400 bits/second4
The provision of broadband communications as a part of universal service could
nonetheless be facilitated if the principle of technology neutrality were applied in such a way
as to refer to the options available in the deliver)' of the elements of the universal service
bundle. Indeed, developments in satellite, mobile, and fixed cellular broadband access
capabilities lead to the conclusion that these technologies could, over time, become
alternatives to xDSL technologies in geographic areas characterized by lower fixed line
density and longer local loops, thereby decreasing die costs of broadband access. It should
also be noted that mandating the provision of broadband services at fiiis stage would also
have die effect of extending die current scope of universal service. As OFTEL puts it,
however: "universal service is about finding ways of meeting die needs of diose remaining
few whom die unregulated market might choose not to serve. It is not about predicting what
will be required in die future and requiring it in advance. Neidier is it about prescribing what
is required for future economic growdi and prosperity"471.
On die odier hand, those who argue that broadband access should be included in the
scope of universal service base their claims on a prediction ofwhat might be essential in the
future for the full participation of all citizens in the information society, and on the need to
avoid the emergence of a group of communications "have nots".
Whether broadband access should be available to anyone, anywhere, including remote
and low population density areas, is ultimately an issue of social poke)'. There is no
justification for including broadband access as part of universal service at this stage of the
development of the market. If it were decided to include broadband service in the future as
part of the universal service obkgation at Community level, a procedure linked to die
feasibikty of providing broadband access to everyone within a given Member State, should be
made available, whereby Member States could defer such an obligation on a case-by-case
basis.
470 BEUC. Universal Service in Telecommunications: European Consumers' Rights to
Telecommunications Services . (BEUC/341/98). November 1998.
471 OFTEL. Universal Telecommunications Services . Consultation, July 1999. Para. 2.11.
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Mobile Services
Including mobile services within die scope of universal service obligations might occur for
two separate reasons:
♦ Mobile services could be introduced as a substitute for fixed services, where there are
cost advantages in so doing
♦ Mobile services could be included as an extra service, supplementing die existing
universal service bundle.
The fundamental difference between fixed and mobile services is that a mobile service
normally connects individuals (as opposed to households) and it does so (almost) wherever
individuals are. If the use of mobile service is not restricted, mobile services could not only
provide any-to-any connectivity, but also anywhere-to-anywhere connectivity. Ensuring
anywhere-to-anywhere connectivity in Europe would be a significant extension of the current
scope of universal service, and would go much further than using mobile communications as
a substitute for fixed services where to do so is cost-effective. If the choice is made to
continue limiting die scope of universal service to the provision of any-to-any connectivity,
then using mobile technologies would require die implementation of technical restrictions on
the use of mobiles when provided as part of die universal service bundle. Whedier die
universal service bundle should be extended to ensure anywhere-to-anywhere connectivity is
a question which warrants two observations. Firstly, such a decision is clearly a social policy
question, the answer to which depends on what is considered essential to participate in the
information society. Secondly, even if mobile services were deemed to be essential, this
should not be sufficient to require their inclusion in the universal service bundle.
As noted by OFTEL, mobile telephony is already provided by die market to anyone on
request and the critical question is therefore one of coverage and affordability. There seems
to be no compelling reasons to move from guaranteeing affordable any-to-any voice
communications for all EU citizens to ensuring anywhere-to-anywhere connectivity. As
mobile services increasingly substitute for fixed services, it seems much more appropriate to
require mobile operators to contribute to an overall universal service fund (if deemed to be
necessary), as already occurs in a number of Member States.. The principle of affordability
should include die concept of platform neutrality, which would mean that universal service
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should be provided via the most economic means available. In this context, defining at the
Community level the scope and operation of the "pay or play" principle in a fixed/mobile
converging environment is of paramount importance.4" The balance between what is
essential and what is affordable need not be frozen in time. On the contrary, these concepts
should evolve together, consistent with societal trends and technology improvements.
Introducing a dynamic definition of universal service in EC legislation47' that is reviewed
regularly by the Commission in consultation with regulators and consumers is a flexible
solution that takes account ofMember States' different approaches.
In Denmark, universal service obligations include the provision of relay and text
telephone services to deaf persons, deaf-and-blind persons, and persons with impaired
speech or hearing. Providers of public voice telephony must ensure drat all their customers
have access to the appointed universal service provider's relay telephone services and text
telephone services. Specific groups of handicapped persons may benefit from services at
reduced rates. The universal service provider may implement low-usage subscriptions, in
which case it is obligated to actively and regularly give guidance to individual end users as to
which type of subscription is the most favourable. In France, the universal service
obligations imposed on the universal service provider require special tariff schemes for
certain categories of persons with low incomes or subject to a handicap. In the United
Kingdom, BT has license obligations requiring it to provide a light user scheme (which entails
rebates of the line rental if the phone line is not used frequendy), and a limited service
scheme (with low connection and rental costs, butwith a bar on outgoing calls). OFTEL has
made recommendations to tire Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to introduce a new
license condition drat would place upon all telecoms operators offering fixed retail services,
an obligation to provide equal access to basic telecoms services for people with disabilities.
472 Jean-Michel Hubert, the President of the French NRA, recognized, in his speech delivered at the
Semaine des Telecoms on 1 December 1999, that the growth in the use of mobile services tends to give
them the character of providing a non-statutory universal service function (primarily because of the
breadth of their geographic coverage). In 1997, the contribution of mobile operators to the universal
service fund was lowered in France on the condition that, inter alia, mobile operators improve their
coverage of the French territory.
473 That universal service is a dynamic concept was recognized as early as 1996 in: European
Commission. Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Universal service for telecommunications in a fully
liberalized environment — an essential element of the Information Society . COM (96) 73 final.
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Hie Department of Trade and Industry is also currently reviewing die provision of text
phones at an affordable price474.
Under Article 6 of the directive, which applies to bodi fixed and mobile services,
subscribers have the right to have a listing in publicly available directories and to verify and, if
necessaryy correct or request die removal of, that entry. Directories listing all subscribers
(except diose who have indicated diat they do not wish to be listed) must be available to
users in a fonii approved by the NRA, whether printed or electronic, or bodi, and must be
updated on a regular basis. Moreover, at least one directory enquiry service covering all listed
subscriber numbers must be available to all users, including users of public pay telephones.
Article 6 also requires that all organizations, which assign telephone numbers to subscribers,
meet all reasonable requests to make available tire relevant information in an agreed fonnat
on terms, which are fair, cost-oriented, and non-discriminatory.
While the scope of Article 6 does not require further amendments to cater for
developments in fixed/mobile convergence, the implementation of diat provision into
domestic law by some Member States raises some doubts as the effectiveness ofArticle 6 in a
converged environment. In Belgium, for example, mobile numbers are not included in
publicly- available directories and enquiry- services473.
A policy of exclusion is not necessary to ensure the protection of privacy. Appropriate
information to consumers on their rights not to be included in a directory should suffice476,
and is likely- to restrict significantiy die scope, and thereby7 the utility7, of directories. This will
be even more important widi the growdi of fixed/mobile converged services and die
introduction of personal numbers.
Tlie Commission should ensure that Member States comply-widi die terms ofArticle 6
(2) of the ONP voice telephony7 directive, which provides diat:
♦ Subscribers have the right to have an entry- in publicly available directories.
474 OFTEL. Universal Telecommunications Services . Consultation, July 1999. The Royal National
Institute for the Blind ( RNIB ) in the United Kingdom identifies the provision at affordable price of
telecoms equipment adapted to visually impaired people as a major issue. In a brochure entitled
Telephones — what features do disabled people need? , RNIB notes that, in many cases, little would be
required to make telecoms equipment useful to people with disabilities.
475 Article 109 (C) of the 1991 Law on the Reform of Certain Public Economic Enterprises .
476 As provided for by the Data Protection Directives. See also Section 6.1.
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♦ Directories of all subscribers who have not expressed opposition to be listed,
including fixed, mobile, and personal numbers, are available to users.
♦ At least one telephone directory enquiry service covering all listed subscriber
numbers is available to all users, including users of public pay telephones.
The exclusion of mobile numbers from public directories listings because mobile
numbers are personal does not appear to be sufficient reason for failing to comply with
Article 6 of the ONP voice telephony directive. Consumers always have die option of being
excluded from the director}* altogether; insofar as this right of exclusion is not the subject of a
disproportionate fee, the privacy of a mobile subscriber can be maintained.
Emergency Services
The widespread availability of mobile telephones has been both a benefit and a burden
to the emergency services. The benefits are clear: in the event of an accident, fire, or crime,
many passers-by now cany a mobile telephone and can contact the appropriate service
rapidly. However, in some cases, mobile telephone users waste the time of the emergency
services bv making calls for help when experiencing relatively trivial problems. Under Article
9 (b) of the directive, fixed and mobile users must have free access to emergency services
using the dialling code 112, as well as any other dialling codes specified by NRAs for use at
national level477.
Emergency services on the 112 number can thus be reached on an EU-wide basis by
mobile users using the GSM specifications, which incorporate an ETSI standard that allows
users to dial emergency services without a SIM-card, i.e., cost free and without a subscriber
agreement with the mobile operator in whose territory the call is made. Since access to
emergency services is thereby secured, the convergence of fixed/mobile services does not
appear to raise new regulator}* concerns. However, the technological progress that will make
fixed/mobile offers possible could be used to enhance the effectiveness of emergency
services. For example, a number of companies have developed techniques that enable
477 This can also be accomplished by technical means. See, most recently: European Commission.
Decision 99/645/EC of 15 September 1999 on a common technical Regulation for the attachment
requirements for TETRA access to emergency service . (O) 1999 L255/40).
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operators to determine a subscriber's location quite precisely. This can be done using eidier a
GPS receiver built into the handset or by measuring die time difference of die arrival of
signals at different base stations. The former method clearly has limitations because it
requires everyone to use a specialized handset. The network-based solution is preferable
because it requires die use of software integrated with die network and can dius be
incorporated more easily. A workshop held in May 1999 in Brussels called for die extension
of regulations to include location determination for emergency calls made using mobile
telephones.
The argument is all die more compelling when the following figures, based on statistics
compiled in die United States, are taken into account:
4 More than 50% of emergency calls will originate from a mobile handset.
♦ 2% of emergency calls are time-critical; for every 1000 mobile emergency calls, two
lives could be saved if the caller's location is known.
♦ 10% ofmobile callers cannot explain exactly where they are478.
In die EU, the telecommunications data and privacy protection directive4 " and the data
protection directive48" already provide for an extensive regulatory framework that addresses
most of die concerns that have been expressed in the United States. It should be noted in
particular that Article 7 of die data protection directive authorizes die processing of personal
data where that processing is necessary "to protect die vital interests of die data subject".
However, amendments to die telecommunications data and privacy protection directive may
need to be adopted because die current text of Article 9 limits the power of emergency
organizations (law enforcement agencies, ambulance services, and fire brigades) to override a
478 In the United States, the FCC has mandated that mobile operators be able to determine the
location of a mobile 911 call (911 being the American equivalent of the European 112 number) within a
range of 100 feet (approximately thirty metres) by October 2001. This obligation is to be read in
conjunction with the 1999 Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act, which prohibits the use of
location information for purposes other than emergencies without the express and prior authorization of
the subscriber. I lowcver, concerns have been expressed that this prohibition is couched in language
which is too broad to effectively protect subscribers from the misuse of private information, and it has
been suggested that users should be able to turn off the tracking device at the push of a button.
479 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications
sector. (OJ 1998 L24/1).
480 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data . (OJ 1995 L281/31).
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limitation on access to location information only with respect to calling line identification
services.
Another major issue is the question of who should pay for the implementation of
emergency location-based services4Sl. Both mobile networks and handsets will require
upgrading, but it is also likely that the call centres used by emergency organizations will need
to be adapted in order to receive and use this information.
To ensure location-based emergency services, amendments to the current regulatory
framework may be needed, especially in the context of data protection rules. The question of
who (i.e., the state authorities or the operators) should bear the cost of providing location-
based emergency services needs to be addressed by the European Commission and the
Member States in consultation.
481 European Commission DG XIII. Report on the Workshop on policy and regulatory issues for




Chapter 6 discussed the changeover from sector-specific regulation to the application of
competition rules. It focussed, in particular, on the concept of significant market power
(SMP).
It tried to show that the scope of the relevant product and service markets vary among
the different Member States, which is why the Commission needs to balance against the
application of subsidiarity, the need for greater certainty. The reason for this is, of course,
that otherwise the divergent approaches could distort the markets, with market power
measured differently at tire national level.
Chapter 6 argued that whatever market definition is adopted in the converged
environment, it will only be those mobile operators that are owned by tire incumbent fixed
operators that can be dominant in such a market. However, this dominance is not gained
from the possible market share, but from the strategic influence which that operator can, or
will have, over competition in tire mobile sector.
Chapter 7 will now focus on the application of tire general competition rules in this
converged market of fixed and mobile services.
Chapter 7
The Application ofCompetition Rules in a Converged
Environment
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The speed and scope of the transition from ex ante sector-specific regulation to die ex post
application of competition rules will depend largely on the extent to which competition rules
can adapt traditional analytical tools to the structural and behavioural challenges of
technological and commercial convergence in the fixed and mobile sectors. In this part of
die study, die extent to which existing European Court jurisprudence and Commission
administrative practice can effectively address actual and potential market failure in a
converged fixed/mobile environment, is examined. To this end, die following key issues are
examined.
A key issue will be what types of abusive behaviour occur as a result of fixed/mobile
convergence, and whether these specific types of abuse are susceptible to control under
competition rules. Primarily, the integration of fixed and mobile services will bring greater
potential for die bundling of services and the subsequent lack of transparency in commercial
dealings, which may require the introduction of a series of structural ex ante obligations in
order for anti-competitive practices to be capable of detection, or even to be prevented from
occurring. Given die privileged market position of fixed incumbent operators, there is a
question whether they are under an obligation of prior disclosure to competitors before they
introduce fixed/mobile integrated packages and pricing schemes for such packages.
As a result of die future convergence of mobile and fixed terminal equipment, which
may act as a gateway for the Internet and other content-rich applications, it is arguable diat
certain competition law remedies may be required to ensure die openness of such gateways.
Widi die growing number of new entrants in die fixed sector seeking to forge alliances
with a limited number of mobile operators in order to provide integrated fixed/mobile
service offerings, competition rules will need to be applied to determine which types of
exclusive relationships will be accepted or refused.
Applying the Essential Facilities Doctrine
In light of die Judgment of die European Court of Justice in Oscar Bronner v.
Mediaprint, it is arguable diat the essential facilities doctrine (a key legal element which would
odierwise need to be satisfied, if access requests to dominant operators over all forms of
infrastructure were to be mandated) may be more difficult to apply. It is therefore
foreseeable diat ex ante sector specific regulation may continue to be necessary to regulate
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certain types of access issues, as competition rules may not always be able to produce
satisfactory results of themselves.
The essential facilities doctrine emerged from the general obligation to deal imposed on
dominant undertakings under Article 82 EC. Hie starting point for the development of the
essential facilities doctrine under EC law was the recognition of the freedom to contract in
early competition cases, such as Volvo and Renault48-.
At this point it might be useful to discuss the essential facilities doctrine in the USA.
The doctrine was inspired from developments in US law, so some attention should be given
to the evolution of US law. As preciously established, there are differences between EU and
US competition laws. The doctrine in Europe is associated with Article 82 EC. The
attention should therefore be on the in the corresponding provision in US law, namely the
Sherman Act, s. 248j.
Conclusively*, as said by Professor Eleanor Fox484:
Principally, US antitrust law proscribes only that which artificially lowers output and
raises price (with a few exceptions); even a dominant firm has the right to compete
hard and may do so even if it excludes competitors. EC competition law, among
other things, protects small and middle-sized business firms from unfair exclusions
and has a broader sweep against abusive practices.
482 Case 238/87, V'oho v. Veng [ 1988] ECR 6211; and Consorrgo italiano del/a componentistica di ricambio per
aiitoveicoli (CICRA) and Case 53/87, Max/car v. Renault [1988] ECR 6039. At para. 16 ofAlax/car v. Renault,
the Court ofJustice held that the exercise of an exclusive right could be prohibited where a dominant firm
holds the exclusive right. The Court cited three cases as examples of potentially abusive behaviour in the
context of a refusal to deal: (1) an arbitrary refusal to deliver spare parts to independent repairers; (2) the
fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level; or (3) a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a
particular model even though many cars of that model remain in circulation (provided that such conduct
is liable to affect trade between Member States).
483 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding 5 10.000.000 if a corporation, or, if an)' other person $ 350.000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishment, in the discretion of the Court. 15 USC § 2.
484 See: E.M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access . 1997. In this work, Professor Fox
refers to mainly two articles, where the divergence between Article 82 EC and s.2 of the Sherman Act are
studied. The two articles are: P. Jebsen and R. Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant
Undertakings: The Regulation of competition under Article 86 of the European Union . (64 Antitrust LJ
443). 1996; and E.M Fox. Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European
Community . Notre Dame Law Review 981. 1996. See also the good work of: J. Temple Lang, Defining
Legitimate Competition: Companies Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities .
Fordham Law Journal 437. 1994. 521.
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In relationships between holders of a dominant position and their competitors, Article 82
prohibits refusals to supply under certain circumstances while under US law, undertakings in
a dominant position enjoy in principle die same freedom to deal as others.
Inroads were gradually made into the rule of freedom of contract, firsdy, in relation to
refusals by dominant undertakings to supply dependent customers483, and secondly, in
relation to refusals by dominant undertakings to supply new customers480. It was these
developments that supported the emergence of the essential facilities doctrine, to which the
Commission expressly referred in its far-reaching decision in B&I/Sealink487. In that case,
tire Commission decided as follows:
A dominant undertaking which owns and controls and itself uses an essential facility
(i.e., a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide
services to their customers), and which refuses competitors access to that facility or
grants access to competitors only on terms less favourable than those which it gives
its own services, thereby placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage,
infringes Article 82.
The owner of an essential facility, which also uses the essential facility, may not impose
a competitive disadvantage on its competitor, also a user of die essential facility. ".. .That is
485 In Commercial Solvents, the Court ofJustice held that an undertaking which has a dominant
position in the market in raw material and which, with the object of reserving such raw materials for
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of such
derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its
dominant position... ]oined Cases 6&7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] ECR 223. This view
was upheld by the Commission in such cases as: Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister andHugin Cash Register v.
Commission 11979] ECR 1869, and by the Court ofJustice in such cases as: Case 27/76, United Brands v.
Commission [1978] ECR 207, and Case 311/84, Telemarketing [1985] ECR 3261.
486 In Magill, the court held that refusal by the owner of an intellectual property right to grant a
copyright license, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot of itself
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, but that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor
may, in exceptional circumstances, involve an abuse. In Magi/i\ the Court found such exceptional
circumstances in the fact that the refusal in question concerned information concerning the weekly
schedules of certain television channels, the supply ofwhich was indispensable for carrying on the
business of publishing a general television guide. See for example: European Commission. Decision
89/589 of 4 November 1988, London European/Sabena . (OJ 1988 L317/47).; European Commission.
Decision 89/205 of 21 December 1988, Magill v. BBC, RTE and JT7/). (OJ 1989 L78/43); and European
Commission. Decision 92/213 of 25 February 1992, British Midland Aer Lingus). (OJ 1992 L96/34).
487 The essence of this complaint was that Sealink, a car ferry operator which was also the owner of
I lollvhead Harbour, intended to introduce a timetable which would seriously disrupt the scheduled
services of B&I, a competing car ferry operator using Hollyhead Harbour, by causing two Sealink vessels
to pass while the B&I ferry was berthed at the harbour, thereby in turn preventing the loading or
discharging of vehicles and passengers. European Commission. Decision of 11 June 1992, B&I Line v.
Sealink Harbours Ltd. and Sealink Stena Ltd.). (C.M.L.ll. 255). 1992.
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so even if [ the owner's] actions make, or are primarily intended to make its operations more
efficient. Subject to any objective elements outside its control, such an undertaking is under a
duty not to impose a competitive disadvantage ... without objective justification".
This doctrine was further developed in the Ladbroke case488, and its application appears
to have reached its outer limits in a case concerning the Society for World-wide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications s.c. (S.W.I.FT.)489. S.W.I.F.T. operates a specific
international telecoms network, which offers data communications and processing to
financial institutions worldwide. Following a complaint by La Poste that S.W.I.F.T. had
refused access to its network on the ground that La Poste was not a bank, the Commission
concluded that S.W.I.F.T. held a monopolistic position in the market for international
payment networks and was, therefore, an essential facility. Although it settled the case,
S.W.I.F.T. maintained that it did not constitute such an essential facility, as alternative
networks were available; the exclusion of La Poste had no appreciable effect on the structure
of competition in the French banking sector, and La Poste already competed on the banking
and fund transfer market in France without having access to S.W.I.F.T.'s network.
Post-Access Notice
Following tire adoption of the access notice in August 1998, tire Commission sought to
outline the precise scope of the doctrine of essential facilities in tire particular context of the
teleconrs sector. Specifically, the access notice provides that a dominant access provider will
be obliged to provide access to a service provider where no other service provider has been
given access by the access provider to operate on that services market, and access to this
facility is essential.
In determining whether a particular network infrastructure constitutes an essential
facility, die access notice acknowledges that it must be "generally essential in order for
488 Case T-504/93, Tierce Tadbroke SA v. Commission [1997] ECR 1-923, where the Court of First
Instance determined that a refusal by PMU to allow Ladbroke access to television pictures of French
horse races that were available only from PMU, and that were not broadcast in Belgium, in order to
broadcast them in its Belgian betting shops, could not fall within Article 82. In particular, the Court
determined that access to the televised broadcasts of horse races was not indispensable to Ladbroke.
489 This case is not reported, however, its commented on by: J. Usher, The Law ofMoney and
Financial Services in the European Community. (Oxford: EC Law, 1999). 71.
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companies to compete" on tlie related market and tliat the "refusal of access must lead to the
proposed activities being made either impossible or seriously and unavoidably uneconomic".
In addition, it is necessary to satisfy the following elements before access on this basis is
mandated:
♦ The network operator from whom access is sought must have sufficient capacity to
satisfy the request4''".
♦ Hie refusal to grant access must amount to a restriction of competition, a failure to
meet demand or an attempt to block the emergence of new service.
♦ Access must be offered at a reasonable price and on non-discriminatory terms and
conditions; and there must be no objective justifications for the refusal..
In its first express reference since the adoption of the access notice to the doctrine of
essential facilities, the Court of First Instance in European Night Services' " reviewed a
Commission decision to exempt a joint venture between several national railway operators
and Eurostar to provide overnight passenger rail services between points in the United
Kingdom and the Continent through the Channel Tunnel. The Commission had exempted
the agreements for a period of eight years but required that services be made available to the
joint venture's competitors on the same terms as the joint venture, including access to
locomotive, train crew and paths on each national network and in the Channel Tunnel, all of
which the Commission considered to be essential facilities.
49° '['|lc Qf any comments on capacity limitations by the telecoms industry during the extensive
consultation process for the Access Notice suggests that this is generally not seen to be a realistic problem
in the fixed telecoms sector. Any concerns, which may arise in this regard, would appear to be limited to
particular capacity concerns stemming from issues such as collocation rather than with respect to
transmission capacity or other transmission elements. In any event, the Access Notice suggests that, in
the event that capacity is insufficient to cover all requests for access, the infrastructure owner is obliged to
ration access according to transparent and objective criteria. Indeed, this approach would appear to be
consistent with the approach mandated in the Interconnection Directive, which provides that any
conditions for interconnection relating to the protection of network integrity must be proportionate and
non-discriminatory in nature, and based on objective criteria identified in advance. It must not give any
preference in that regard to its own telecoms services. If necessary, it may need to reduce its own use of
capacity in order to allow other operators a fair share. See, in particular: Kevin Coates, DG IV, EU
Competition Rules and Access Problems in the Telecoms Sector . International Business Lawyer.
July/August 1997.
491 joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, European Night Services Etd. (ENS) v. Commission [1988]
ECR 11-3141.
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On appeal, with respect to the interpretation of an essential facility, the Court of First
Instance stated:
...the Court considers that neither the parent undertaking nor the joint venture thus
set up may be regarded as being in possession of infrastructure, products or services
which are "necessary" or "essential" for entry to the relevant market unless such
infrastructure, products or services were not "interchangeable" and unless, by reason
of their special characteristics - in particular the prohibitive cost of and/or time
reasonably required for reproducing them — there are no viable alternatives available
to potential competitors of the joint venture, which are thereby excluded from the
market.
In applying this test, the Court held that the Commission could not treat the supply of
train tracks, special locomotives, and crews to the joint venture by its parent undertakings as
necessary or essential services, on the grounds that it could not be accepted that a possible
refusal to supply the joint venture's competitors with special locomotives for the Channel
Tunnel would have the effect of excluding such competitors from either penetrating the
relevant market or continuing to operate on it. In particular, the Commission had not
demonstrated why tire joint venture, which had such a small market share (i.e., between 5 to
8% of the total market for the transport of business travellers for whom scheduled air travel,
high-speed rail travel, and tire rail services to be operated by ENS are interchangeable modes
of transport), could have any influence whatsoever on the functioning or structure of tire
markets in question49".
492 However, the Court noted that a refusal to supply access could possibly have an effect on
competition had the Commission determined the railway operators to be dominant on a different market
(i.e., the market for business and leisure travel). This appears to be consistent with the terms of the
Access Notice, which provides in respect of access to a facility' deemed to be essential, that it would be
insufficient to demonstrate that one competitor needed access to a facility in order to compete in the
downstream market. It would be necessary to demonstrate that access is necessary for all except
exceptional competitors in order for access to be made compulsory. See, fn 67 of the Access Notice.
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In any event, tlie Commission's analysis failed to demonstrate that competitors could
not obtain die locomotives in question either direcdy from manufacturers or indirecdy by
renting them from odier undertakings491.
The approach taken by the Court of First Instance in European Night Services was
also supported by the Court of Justice in Oscar Bronner v. Mediaptint4'4. Bronner alleged
diat die Mediaprint group was abusing its de facto dominant position in Austria on the
market for home-delivery schemes, by not allowing Bronner access to its nation-wide home
delivery service for daily newspapers against payment of reasonable remuneration. While
diere were a number of regional or local networks used to deliver newspapers and
periodicals, Mediaprint's network was the only7 nation-wide network. In support of its claim,
Bronner argued diat services such as postal delivery7 did not represent equivalent alternatives
to home delivery7, as delivery7 to the subscriber in die early7 morning hours could not be
guaranteed by7 such means. In addition, Bronner argued that it would be entirely unprofitable
for it to organise its own home delivery service in view of its small number of subscribers.
Accordingly, Bronner alleged that Mediaprint's network was an essential facility for die
purposes ofEC competition rules.
Even if diere were only one nation-wide home delivery7 network in Austria and die
owner of that scheme held a dominant position in the market for newspaper distribution
services, die Court ofJustice held that these factors were not sufficient to determine diat the
refusal to grant access amounted to an abuse. On the basis diat the case law on the abusive
exercise of intellectual property7 rights was applicable to the exercise of any property right
(relying on Magill), die existence of an abuse where diere is an alleged essential facility' is
based on the following preconditions:
493 In a similar manner, the Access Notice states in relation to an essential facility that if there were no
commercially feasible alternatives to the access requested, then unless access is granted, the party
requesting access would not be able to operate on the service market. Indeed, the Reference Paper (the
WTO Reference Paper) attached to the schedule of specific commitments of the Community and the
Member States annexed to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS,
but now known as the World T rade Organization) defines an essential facility as meaning facilities of a
public telecommunications transport network and service that: ... (b) cannot feasibly be economically or
technically substituted in order to provide a service .
494 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag [1998] ECR 1-7791.
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♦ The "refusal of the service comprised in home deliver,' must be likely to eliminate all
competition in the daily newspaper market [i.e., downstream market] on the part of
die person requesting die service".
♦ The refusal to allow access to the network must "be incapable of being objectively
justified".
♦ The service in itself must be indispensable to carrying out diat person's business,
inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-
deliver]' scheme"493.
In his opinion, Advocate General Jacobs added that "die mere fact by retaining a
facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor cannot
justify requiring access to it"496. This approach appears on first review to be much more
limited in its scope than the equivalent test set forth in the WTO Reference Paper, to which
the European Community is legally committed. TheWTO Reference Paper leaves open die
possibility of essential facilities being controlled by a limited number of undertakings in the
telecoms sector. Specifically, die WTO Reference Paper defines essential facilities as
"facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or service diat: .. .are exclusively
or predominandy provided by a single or limited number of suppliers (emphasis added)". As
regards realistic potential alternatives, die Court stated that, "It does not appear that diere are
any technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even
unreasonably difficult, for any otiier publisher of daily newspapers to establish, alone or in
cooperation with other publishers, its own nationwide home deliver]' scheme and use it to
distribute its own daily newspapers.".
495 In Magill, such exceptional circumstances included the fact that the refusal in question, inter alia: (i)
prevented the emergence of a new product for which there was potential consumer demand; (ii) was not
justified by objective considerations; and (iii) was likely to exclude all competition in the secondary market
for television guides.
496 This requirement appears to be at odds with both the Opinion of the Advocate General (which the
Court is not bound to uphold) and the terms of the Access Notice. Specifically, Advocate General Jacobs
reiterates the principle that it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of Article
86 is to prevent distortion of competition — and in particular to safeguard the interests of consumers —
rather than to protect the position of particular competitors. In addition, footnote 67 to the Access
Notice provides in relation to the essential facilities doctrine that it would be insufficient to demonstrate
that one competitor needed access to a facility in order to compete in the downstream market. It would
be necessary to demonstrate that access is necessary for all except exceptional competitors in order for
access to be made compulsory. The Court ofJustice, on the other hand, refers to all competition on the
part of any given competitor.
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'Ilie Court added that it was not sufficient to argue that such potential alternatives were
not economically viable by reason of the small circulation of the daily newspaper(s) to be
distributed. Rather, it would be necessary to demonstrate that it was not economically viable
to create a second home delivery scheme with a circulation comparable to that of the daily
newspapers distributed under by the existing scheme (i.e., on the same scale as the existing
network). In this regard, Advocate GeneralJacobs pointed out that:
It would be necessary to establish that the level of investment required to set up a
nation-wide home distribution system would be such as to deter an enterprising
publisher who was convinced that there was a market for another large daily
newspaper from entering the market. It may well be uneconomic as Bronner
suggests, establishing a nation-wide system for a newspaper with a low circulation.
In tire short term, therefore, losses might be anticipated, requiring a certain level of
investment. But the purpose of establishing a competing nation-wide network would
be to allow it to compete on equal terms with Mediaprint's newspapers and
substantially to increase geographical coverage and circulation.
Willie not referred to in the Court's judgment, the opinion of the Advocate General also
notes that the spectacular growth of Brunner's publication hardly seemed consistent with the
view that Mediaprint's home delivery system was essential for it to compete on the
newspaper market497.
Applicability of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to the Telecommunications Sector
Following Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint and European Night Services, the legal standard of
proof appears to have been significantly raised for a party' alleging that a facility is truly
essential under EU competition rules. Indeed, it appears that both the Commission and the
Courts have recently adopted a much more cautious approach on this issue than they have
historically.
497 Ibis factor would also apply to an examination of whether the refusal of the service comprised in
home deliver)- be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the
person requesting the service , as noted above. It is questionable whether Bronner would have enjoyed
even greater growth had it had access to a nation-wide home delivery scheme. Indeed, it is arguable that
such access would not have allowed it to achieve comparable market shares to Mediaprint in the
downstream newspaper market.
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The adoption of a higher standard by the Court to prove the existence of an essential
facility, thereby taking into consideration the legitimate business interests of die access
provider, is likely to have a significant impact on the telecoms sector, where the costs of
rolling out, maintaining, and operating networks are substantial. In diis regard, the
Commission's practice in die period prior to the adoption of the access notice did not leave
much scope for accounting for die legitimate business interests of holders of telecoms
facilities in downstream markets, and had been criticized for seeking to protect competitors,
rather than competition. It has also been argued that it tended to discourage investment in
such access facilities4 >s. In restricting die scope of die essential facilities doctrine, Oscar
Bronner v. Mediaprint and the access notice entail an assessment of the effects on
investment in die longer term, i.e., that the level of investment required for network rollout
and the overall effect on competition are legitimate objects of review4".
It is worthwhile noting Advocate General Jacobs in diis regard:
The justification in terms of competition polity for interfering with a dominant
undertaking's freedom to contract requires a careful balance of conflicting
considerations. In the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of
consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities, which it has
developed for die purpose of its business.
...For example, if access to a production, purchasing, or distribution facility
were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop
competing facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the short term it
would be reduced in die long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant
undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were,
upon request, able to share the benefits"1".
498 See, for example: D. Ridvard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under
UK and EC Competition Law . 8 E.C.L.R. 438. 1996.
499 In the Access Notice, it is expressly recognized that it mat' be necessary for new market entrants to
recoup their investment before being required to provide access. Consequently, at para. 91 it is stated
that, Relevant justification [to provide access] could include.. .the need for a facility owner which has
undertaken investment aimed at the introduction of a new product or service to have sufficient time and
opportunity to use the facility- in order to place that new product or service on the market.
500 Any such analysis in the telecoms sector will of course be required to take account of the progress
of liberalization in the relevant market. In light of the industry structure and regulation of the telecoms
sector in any given Member State, such an analysis would need to take into account whether the NRA in
each case favoured the development of a services or infrastructure competitive model.
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While the Advocate General, followed by the Court, rejected tire application of the
essential facilities doctrine in cases where control of tire facility- merely gives its holder a
competitive advantage, neither the Court nor the Advocate General ruled out the possibility
of applying tire essential facilities doctrine in individual cases. In particular, the opinion of the
Advocate General does not rule out the possibility7 that the costs of replicating a facility may¬
be so high that they amount to an insurmountable barrier to entry-, because they7 allow tire
access provider to have a "genuine stranglehold on the related market". In this regard, he
refers to situations where tire "duplication of tire facility is impossible or extremely difficult
owing to physical, geographical or legal constraints or is highly undesirable for reasons of
public policy".
Following recent case law, it is clear that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
the doctrine of essential facilities cannot be relied on as the sole or principal tool to regulate
ex post interconnection and access relationships in tire telecoms sector. But to the extent
that a number of key- observations of tire Advocate-General in Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint
are followed by tire Court in future proceedings or amplified by the Commission in its future
administrative practice, fire doctrine of essential facilities may7 still play7 an important role in
tire telecoms sector. In particular, in the fixed/mobile context it is conceivable that an
operator with a "genuine stranglehold on a related market"3"1 can be found to have control
of an essential facility to which access is sought; and incumbent fixed operators, which have
benefited from a monopoly regime and network expansion funded by7 the state, can be
considered to control an essential facility. In light of these significant exceptions to the test in
Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, it is arguable that tire doctrine of essential facilities continues to
have resilience in the telecoms sector, and will be able to address many types of anti¬
competitive behaviour by7 operators with dominance.
Realistically7, tire doctrine of essential facilities is unlikely7 to be used to attack a particular
form of refusal to deal in tire absence of other grounds of legal challenge. The doctrine of
non-discrimination, tire obligation of dominant operators to provide unbundled access, tire
dependence of operators on an entity currently providing them with access which might be
denied in tire future, and the denial of access to parties seeking to vertically integrate their
operations, are all grounds on which a challenge to a denial of access are likely to be based
501 For example, a mobile market when compared to a fixed market.
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(with greater chance of success than a claim relying solely on the doctrine of essential
facilities). Consequendy, practice suggests that any perceived negative effect of Oscar
Bronner v. Mediaprint case should not be exaggerated by regulators.
Collective Dominance and Oligopolistic Markets
Traditionally, Article 81 has been considered to be an inadequate enforcement tool to address
anti-competitive issues arising from oligopolistic market structures'"". It is arguable that the
legal standard necessary for a finding of collective dominance is so high that there may be a
continuing need for sector-specific ex ante regulation in sectors characterized by a relatively
small number ofmarket actors (e.g., the mobile sector).
Dominance may not only be found to exist in respect of a single entity, but may also be
held to exist collectively in conjunction with other competitors. In a mobile sector
characterized by few players, die potential application of this doctrine may have a significant
impact on the effect of competition rules in a fixed/mobile converged environment.
However, this concept, described as collective dominance or joint dominance, appears to be
still very much in its developmental phase, in particular as there appears to be a clear
divergence in the case law between Article 82 case law and cases decided under the merger
regulation.
Approach under Article 82
According to the case law of the European Court concerning Article 82, undertakings
that have links between themselves that allow them to present themselves on the market as a
single, integrated undertaking can be judged to be collectively dominant. In Municipality of
502 See, for example: B. J. Rodger, Oligopolistic Market Failure: Collective Dominance versus
Complex Monopoly , European Competition Law Review. 1995:1. 21-29.; ). Briones, Oligopolistic
Dominance: Is there a Common Approach in Different Jurisdictions? A Review of Decisions Adopted
by the Commission under the Merger Regulation . European Competition Law Review. 1995:6. 334-347;
B. ]. Rodger, Market Integration and the Development of European Competition Policy to Meet New
Demands: A Study of the Control ofOligopolistic Markets and the Concept of a Collective Dominant
Position Under Article [82] of the EC , Legal Issues of European Integration. 1994: Vol. 2. 1-26;
R. Smith and D. Round, Competition Assessment and Strategic Behaviour , European Competition Law
Review. 1998.225-236.
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Almelo v. Energiebeclnff Ijsselmij NV50', a case concerning regional electricity distributors in
The Netherlands, tire Court of Justice determined that a collective dominant position could
exist where die undertakings holding diat dominant position were linked in such a way that
they adopted the same conduct on the relevant market. This was confirmed by die Court in
Centro Servizi Spediporto Sri v. Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Sri504, where die Court added
diat die links between the undertakings in die group, which caused diem to adopt the same
conduct on die market, also implied that diere was no competition between them503. These
cases preceded Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports SA and Odiers v. Commission506,
where die Court of First Instance, upholding a Commission Decision, stated diat, "as a result
of die close relations which shipping companies maintain with each other widiin a liner
conference, they are capable togedier of implementing in common on die relevant market
practices such as to constitute unilateral conduct. Such conduct may involve infringements
ofArticle 86 if die odier requirements for die application of diat provision are also met.".
Hie Court ofJustice's judgment in Bagnasco and Odiers v. Banca Populare di Novara
and anodier case3"7 provides additional guidance in diis respect. This case concerned a
Commission decision rejecting an allegation diat several Italian banks could be considered to
be collectively dominant, simply by virtue of die fact of their membership in the Italian
Banking Association (die ABI), in which almost all Italian banks were members. The
Advocate General supported die Commission's view508, concluding;
In my opinion, die banks belonging to die ABI do not hold a collective dominant
position on the Italian banking market, because membership of that association does
not create between the various banking institutions economic links which are so
close as to cause diem to adopt the same commercial strategy. Membership of the
ABI does not preclude the banks belonging to it from trading on die market
individually. ABI members present diemselves on die market as undertakings
pursuing independent commercial strategies which are die same only as regards diose
503 Case C-393/92, Centro Servieq Spediporto Sri v. SpedisgoniMarittima del Go/Jo Sri [1994] ECR 1-1477.
504 Case C-96/94, Bagnasco and Others v. Banca Bopniare diNovara [1995] ECR 1-2883.
505 This last requirement appears to be supported by several authors. See, for example: J. Temple
Lang, European Union Law-Managing Economic Change . S. Roche & Temperley.
506 Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-28/93, [1996] ECR 11-1201.
507 Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96, [1999] ECR 1-135.
508 The Court did not refer to this aspect of the case in its judgment.
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services in respect of which ABI has adopted a decision restrictive of competition
which is followed by all its members and which falls within tire scope of Article 81
EC. If die view is taken that the members of the ABI hold a collective dominant
position, the same could be said of all professional associations in a particular
economic sector, and the decisions adopted by those associations could in all cases
be assessed on the basis of Article 81. This would give rise to a systematic recycling
of die facts constituting an infringement of Article 81 whenever there was possibility
ofArticle 82 being applied on grounds of abuse of a collective dominant position. In
this connection, I think there is a clear difference between the degree of integration
among the undertakings belonging to a professional association such as the ABI and
that among the undertakings forming a shipping conference. The latter may hold a
collective dominant position, as the Court ofJustice and the Court of First Instance
have recognized, because, in relation to customer, they present themselves on the
market as one and the same entity. Undertakings belonging to a professional
association, on the other hand, do not act on the market as an integrated entity.
Therefore, it seems that the following factors must be present in order to sustain the
existence of a collective dominant position under Article 82 EC:
* The economic links between two or more undertakings are so close as to cause them
to adopt die same commercial strategy, thereby presenting themselves to customers
on die market as being one and die same entity or an integrated entity.
4 The undertakings are, collectively, free from effective competition, in accordance
witii the criteria, which have been developed for single dominant undertakings, and
diere is no significant competition between the companies in question.
Oligopoly simply refers to a small number of participants on a relevant market309. A
tight oligopoly refers to the situation where market participants are few and interdependent
widi one odier to a lesser or greater extent. Such interdependence is not die result of any
collusion, but is die result of the particular characteristics of die market in question, namely,
diat if any participant were to adopt a particular commercial strategy, die odier participants in
the market would react in a similar manner, more or less immediately. Accordingly, in such
an environment, it is difficult to gain a competitive advantage. Unlike collective dominance,
509 The Court ofJustice has ruled that Article 82 EC cannot apply to oligopolistic scenarios.
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however, the parallel conduct in question is carried out by independent undertakings, acting
in the absence of agreement or collusive behaviour between them1'".
Approach under the Merger Regulation
In France & Others v. Commission3", die Court of Justice confirmed that the
Commission may adopt preventative measures under the merger regulation widr respect to a
concentration, which could create or strengthen a collective dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded within die common market. In
particular, the Court stated:
In die case of an alleged collective dominant position [in die context of die merger
regulation], the Commission is dierefore obliged to assess, using a prospective
analysis of die reference market, whether die concentration which has been referred
to it leads to a situation in which effective competition in die relevant market is
significantly impeded by the undertakings involved in die concentration and one or
more undertakings which together, in particular because of correlative factors which
exist between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the market and act to a
considerable extent independently of their competitors, their customers, and also of
consumers.
In this case, the Court ofJustice relied upon a number of structural links between the
merging undertakings, Kali und Salx GmbH and Mitteldeutsche Kali AG and Societe
Commerciale des Potasses et de 1'Azote (SCPA), in order to determine that the merger would
create a position of collective dominance on die market for potash-salt-based products for
agricultural use in the EU (with die exception of Germany). Such structural links included
the fact diat both were members of the same export cartel, and diat they had privileged
product distribution links with each odier. Despite consideration of the structural links
between the parties in France & Others v. Commission, die necessity of identifying such
structural links has been largely ignored by die Court of First Instance in a subsequent case,
510 Case 85/76, Hoffman - Fa Roche & CoAB v. Commission [1979] ECR 461.
511 Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France & Others v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375.
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Gencor Ltd v. Commission3'2. In this case, consistent with the sweeping language used in
the access notice, the Court of First Instance held that tire existence of structural links was
only an example of the situation in which a collective dominant position may exist, but not a
legal precondition for the existence of such a position, nor was it the case drat dre links in
question needed to be structural radrer dran simply economic. In addition, dre following
factors were considered by dre Court in its examination of whedrer the parties, which operate
in dre international platinum mining market, had a collectively dominant position: high
concentration levels, stable and symmetric market shares31'; similarity of cost structures;
stagnant demand and few growth prospects; inelastic demand; transparent pricing;
homogenous products; and low levels of technological innovation. Ultimately, the Court of
Justice implied that no structural links are necessary to establish joint dominance under the
merger regulation, aldrough drey may be highly relevant3'4.
The Court of Justice appears to have adopted a slighdy alternative approach when
examining collective dominance under the merger regulation, adopted under Article 82 EC.
This may be justified to a certain extent by dre different policy objectives pursued by tirese
two legal instruments. Article 82 is an instrument for dealing widr abusive conduct on
relevant product and geographic markets, whereas the merger regulation is more concerned
with dre effect of a merger on market structure in drose markets. Whether the two emerging
legal standards will, over time, merge may be decided by dre Court ofJustice in dre pending
Article 82 EC case of Compagnie Maritime Beige3'3. In the Gencor/Lohnro case, the
findings of the Court on collective dominance were not limited to the merger regulation, but
also apply by implication to abusive practices falling within dre scope ofArticle 82.
There are two elements of dre decision that distinguish dre case from dre earlier cases.
Firsdy, the post-merger oligopoly would have had drree (as opposed to only two) members.
512 Case T-102/96, GencorCtdv. Commission, [25 March 1999] Not yet published.
513 In Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v. Commission [1998] ECR 1-1375, the Court
ofJustice noted that a market share of 60% cannot of itself point conclusively to the existence of a
collective dominant position on the part of the undertakings concerned.
514 See para. 273. As Professor Korah notes, as a result of the judgment, the need for links to
establish joint dominance becomes of minor importance; see V. Korah, GencorFtd v. Commission.
Collective Dominance , European Competition Law Review. 1999. 337-341.
515 Case C-395/96P, Compagnie Maritime Be/ge v. Commission, Opinion of the Advocate General dated 29
October 1998 .
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Secondly, the nature of tire products involved and die history of competition on the market
was critical.
In die telecoms sector, the Commission indicated in Vodafone/AirTouch, Case No.
IV/M. 1430, that, unless die merged entity' divested one of its joint controlling interests in
die third German mobile operator, its joint control of die largest mobile operator in
Germany would have created a duopolistic market situation.
Until recentiy, tiiere existed an enforcement gap in die extent to which traditional
competition rules under Articles 81 and 82 EC could address particular types of market
failure in highly concentrated parts of the communications sector. Recent case law in die
context ofmergers, however, suggests that die traditional evidentiary burdens for establishing
collective dominance have been largely dismanded because: (i) there are no formal links
which need to be established between competitors to establish collective dominance
(Gencor) and (ii) a merger creating an oligopoly situation in an apparendy historically
dynamic consumer market may be deemed to be anti-competitive (Airtours). The net effect
of diese recent cases may be that certain concentrated markets within network industries,
such as diose found in die communications sector, may fall afoul of this expansive view of
collective dominance under the merger regulation. Moreover, it appears that die logic of this
case law when reviewing competitive structure under die merger regulation might also be
extended under Article 82 EC to die assessment of abusive practices.
The application of the doctrine of collective dominance, in its current form, is perhaps
not appropriate in a dynamic market such as die telecoms sector. Mere pricing parallelism in
a concentrated but expanding market need not be indicative of collusive behaviour. Nor
does high pricing in a particular part of die value chain by all market actors necessarily
amount to tacit collusion. Conduct of diis type in the telecoms sector may be the result of
only transient or residual market failure or the existence of some other form of bottleneck
service or network infrastructure. In diese situations, it would be more appropriate to deal
widi a lack of price elasticity or high prices by targeted regulatory intervention which
addresses market failure, radier than relying on die doctrine of collective dominance. The
doctrine of collective dominance is ill equipped to address the high level of competition
which exists across die sector.
If fixed/mobile convergence leads to a situation where the restrictive practices of
certain operators, such as diose controlling essential technologies for handsets, effectively
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reduce overall competition and innovation (i.e., become a bottleneck), it is arguable that a
light form of ex ante regulation would be a more effective means of regulating digital gateway
issues than ex post competition rules. An ex ante approach could also ensure that public
interest objectives are clearly defined in a precise legal framework, thereby providing legal
certainty for investors. This would also leave room for case-by-case analysis and a
complementary role for the EC competition rules, which are better designed to tackle




Chapter 7 discussed the conversion from sector-specific regulation to the application of
competition rules. This conversion is dependent on the degree to which competition rules
can acquire the analytical tools necessary to deal with the technological and commercial
aspects of convergence in the fixed and mobile markets.
The chapter sought to show how the jurisprudence of tire European Court and
decisions of tire European Commission could address potential market failure. To this end,
the chapter examined, firstly, how market power could be identified after total convergence
between fixed and mobile markets. Secondly, it examined whether application of the
essential facilities doctrine could adequately replace sector-specific regulation, especially
reflecting interconnection and access questions.
Under tire final part of the chapter concerned with tire merger regulation and
oligopolistic markets, attention was drawn to tire growing number of new entrants, especially
in the fixed sector. It was shown that the fixed sector operators merged or went into
alliances with a limited number ofmobile operators in order to make fixed/mobile customer
offerings. Competition rules need to be applied to this area, developing a clear indication of
those relationships that should be accepted or refused.
In tire following chapter, tire conclusions of the studywill be presented.
Chapter 8
Recent Developments and Conclusion
Recent: Developments and Conclusion 395
In addition to what has been discussed in this thesis, it is important to note the recent
developments in tire European telecommunications sector. The new regulatory framework
evolved from a response to the conclusions of the special European Council of Lisbon of 23
- 24 March 2000. It also built on the Communication on die results of die public consultation
on the 1999 Review of die Electronic Communications Sector and the principles and
orientations for the new regulator)' framework1'6.
The Commission proposed, in July 2000, a package of measures for a new regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services. The package consists of
five proposed European Parliament and Council directives under Article 95'17, one
Commission directive to be adopted under Article 86518, and one proposed Commission
Decision on a regulator)- framework for radio spectrum1'
The Commission also proposed a European Parliament and Council Regulation for
unbundled access to die local loop which was adopted in December 2000 and entered into
force on 2 January 2001l20. The Commission proposal for a Regulation for unbundled access
to the local loop was adopted by the EP and Council in December 2000 and has been in
force since 2 January 2001.
Before submitting these proposals, the Commission had examined the impact of
convergence on this sector and had conducted an examination of the use in the Community
of radio spectrum by Member States and by non-governmental bodies.
The new proposals when implemented are intended to provide a coherent, reliable, and
flexible approach to the regulation of electronic communication networks and services in fast
moving markets. The proposals provide a lighter regulatory touch where markets have
become more competitive, yet ensure that a minimum of services are available to all users at
an affordable price and that the basic rights of consumers continue to be protected.
516 (COM (2000)239)
517 Directive (2002/21 /EC) om a Common Regulatory Framework, OJ L 108, 24.04.2002 p. 33.
Directive (2002/19/EC) on Access and Interconnection, OJ L 108, 24.04.2002 p. 7. Directive
(2002/20/EC on Authorisation, OJ L 108, 24.04.2002 p. 21. Directive (2002/22/EC) on Universal
Service and User's Rights, O) L 108, 24.04.2002 p. 51. Draft Directive on Data and Privacy, OJ L 201,
31.07.2002 p. 37
518 Directive on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Services OJ C 96, 27.03.2001 p. 2-7
519 Directives in the New Regulator)' for Electronic Communications Networks and Services and the
Decision on Radio Spectrum, 24 april 2002, OJ L 10, 24/04/2002.
520 Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000
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The new regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services
will be applied in all Member States from 25 July 2003.
Tire purpose of new regulatory framework is to ensure harmonization across tire single
market and guarantee legal certainty. Article 15:1 of tire Framework Directive requires the
adoption of a Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets. This will identify
those product and service markets within tire electronic communications sector, the
characteristics of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set
out in the specific directives. This is without prejudice to markets that may be defined in
specific cases under competition law. The markets identified in the recommendation will be
markets defined in accordance with the principles of competition law.
The recommendation plays an important role in achieving both of these objectives, as
it seeks to ensure that the same product and services markets will be subject to a market
analysis in all Member States and that market players will be aware in advance of the markets
to be analysed. It will only be possible for NRAs (National Regulatory Authorities) to
regulate markets which differ from those identified in the recommendation, where this is
justified by national circumstances and where the Commission does not raise any objections,
in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 7(4) and 15(3) of the Framework
Directive. As competition and convergence develops, it is expected that the range ofmarkets
identified in the recommendation will in die future be reduced.
The importance to entrants of obtaining unbundled access to the local loop "the last
mile" across die European Union was acknowledged by the European Commission in the
Fifth Report on the Implementation of Telecommunications Regulatory Package'21 and was
reaffirmed by die Commission in die 1999 review522 process. The Commission took die
position diat the liberalization of the local loop of telephone lines owned by former
government telecommunications operators which have enjoyed a long period of legal
monopoly, will enhance competition and benefit consumers by leading to lower prices for
services such as local calls, Internet access and other products. Those product ranges will be
521 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic
and Social Committee nd the Committee of the Regions, Fifth Report on the Inrplementation ofthe
Telecommunicaitons Regnlatoiy Package, (COM (1999) 537), 11.11.1999
522 Communication from the Commission on the 1999 Communications review, Towards a new
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associted services, (COM (1999) 539), 10.11.1999
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broadened to include innovative broadband offerings, which can be provided with xDSL
technology.
The Commission and die EFTA Surveillance Authority launched in July 2000 die
Second Phase of the Local Loop Unbundling Sectoral Enquiry under a Decision of 27 July
1999 under Article 12 of Regulation 17/196252'. The Commission and die EFTA
Surveillance Audiority directed die Second Phase Enquiry to obtain the views of new
entrants in terms of their understanding of how fixed incumbents have been able to satisfy
the terms of Regulation 2887/2000524. The primary purpose of Regulation 2887/2000 is the
establishment of harmonised conditions for unbundled access to die local loop.
The result of the Second Phase Inquiry was presented in the Commission's Sevendi
Report on die Implementation of die Telecommunications Regulatory Package, adopted on
26 November 2001.
The key conclusions were:
■C Progress in die development of competition in local broadband access markets
is not satisfactory, and should be speeded up by NRA's,
C The implementation of the Regulations has been very disappointing,
■C The number of fully unbundled lines represents a small percentage of die total
access lines in Europe,
^ Shared access was operational in only four Member States,
S In most Member States, the number of high-speed access lines held by new
entrants is not comparable to the number of the incumbent's retail access lines.
■S NRAs need to take action to ensure that wholesale DSL is offered to entrants
on non-discriminatory terms.
The general trend in the framework directive is towards less detailed ex ante regulation,
for operators without significant market power (SMP), and more ex post checks based
essentially on competition rules. In a new recommendation,525 die Commission identifies 18
523 Regulation No 17/62, implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ No 013, 21.02.1962)
524 Regulation No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000
on unbundled access to the local loop (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000 pp. 4-8).
525 Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic
communications sector suseptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Driective 2002/21 /EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulator)' framework for electronic networks nd
services. C(2003)497 Brussels, 11/02/2003
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markets in the telecoms and media sector, in which the national regulators can impose
regulatory rules to prevent a company from abusing its dominance in such a sector. This
recommendation is possibly as important as the Framework itself.
Under the rules laid out in tire recommendation, NRAs should undertake an analysis of
die listed markets and assess if these markets are subject to a situation where one market
operator has a significant market power. If there is such a dominant position, NRAs will be
able to impose sector specific obligations, but they will have to consult other NRAs in the
European Regulators Group (ERG). If the ERG accepts the imposed measures, the
Commission can still veto them if it thinks they are not in line with the EU's competition
rules.
It could be interesting to note that one of die essential markets mentioned in the
recommendation deals with broadband access. In this market, die incumbent telecoms
groups control about 80 % of die EU's high-speed telephone lines. In the preparations of
die recommendation the incumbent telecoms groups have lobbied the Commission to keep
broadband access out of this list of "relevant markets".
This leads, in this writer's view, to the conclusion that the new regulatory framework
will deal with problems due to lack of effective competition. However, the markets
identified by the Commission in the recommendation require the NRAs to analyze certain
specific markets. One of those markets is the minimum set of leased lines, identified in the
Universal Service Directive526. It also identifies the provision of access to and use of the
public telephone network at a fixed location. Further, the Access Directive527 gives the
NRAs die possibility to limit obligations concerning access systems to undertakings with
significant market power, after an analysis, and this limitation is at the discretion of the
individual Member State. It would perhaps have been better to give this power to a
European Regulator or to directly apply competition law, more so perhaps as the NRAs
define relevant markets appropriate to national circumstances. This could be a problem
when defining relevant geographic markets in their territory. The definition of relevant
markets must change over time as the characteristics of products and services evolve and the
526 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services (Universal Service Directive) 24 April 2002
527 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks
and associated facilities (Access Directive) 24 April 2002.
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possibilities for demand and supply substitution change. It is especially important where the
characteristics are continually evolving, and new products and services appear and where tire
way in which such products and services are produced and delivered evolves because of
technological evolution. Tire new satellites and the laser-based services are examples of such
technological evolution. Tire convergence of fixed/mobile services where similar services
can be delivered over different types of network is another example. From this it follows
that it will be necessary over time to re-examine the markets identified in tire
recommendation. This, in this writer's view, could be better served by a European Regulator
applying competition law than by national NRAs with obvious national interests.
Tire experience of tire initial phase of liberalisation in the European Union is that ex
ante regulation has served as an important complement to competition law in dealing with
two particular types of problems that market entrants have faced following liberalisation.
Tire first is tire need for a market entrant or potential competitor to obtain access to existing
networks belonging to other operators in order to serve customers. Tire second is tire fact
that tire competitive provision ofmany electronic communications services also depends on
negotiating interconnection with other networks to facilitate the necessary connectivity.
This experience does not necessarily imply that these two problems will persist
indefinitely or in all circumstances. The evidence arising from the establishment of mobile
cellular networks, and from the establishment of widespread voluntary agreements to
exchange Internet traffic on a best efforts basis, indicates that there have not been persistent
obstacles to market entry in these two areas. In addition, technology and markets in this
sector can change rapidly, so that an obstacle to the development of competition at one point
in time can subsequently be removed or disappear over a given horizon.
It is considered that tire criteria for identifying markets for the purposes of the new
regulatory framework should include an overall assessment of the effectiveness of
competition law alone in addressing the market failures concerned. Such an assessment will
draw on die experience gained from tire application of competition law and the imposition of
ex ante regulatory obligations in tire electronic communications sector as a complementary
instrument. Only markets where national and Community competition law is not considered
sufficient by itself to redress market failures and to ensure effective and sustainable
competition over a foreseeable time horizon should be identified for potential ex ante
regulation.
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What would therefore be the best way to identify relevant markets?
♦ The first criterion is whether a market is subject to high and non-transitory entry
barriers. The presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers, although a
necessary condition, is not of itself a sufficient condition to warrant inclusion of a
given defined market. Given the dynamic character of electronic communications
markets, possibilities for the market to tend towards a competitive outcome, in spite
of high and non-transitory barriers to entry, need also to be taken into consideration.
♦ The second criterion, therefore, is whether a market has characteristics such that it
will tend over time towards effective competition. This criterion is a dynamic one
and takes into account a number of structural and behavioural aspects which on
balance indicate whether or not, over the time period considered, the market has
characteristics which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory
obligations as set out in the specific directives of the new regulatory framework.
♦ Hie third criterion considers the sufficiency of competition law by itself (absent ex
ante regulation), taking account of the particular characteristics of the electronic
communications sector.
As the title of Annex I of the Framework directive makes clear, all the market areas
listed therein need to be included in the initial version of the recommendation in order that
NRAs can carp' out a review of existing obligations imposed under the 1998 regulatory
framework. If they were not included, Article 15(3) of the Framework directive would
require NRAs to notify them individually to the Commission under the procedure set out in
Article 7 of the Framework directive.
However, Article 15(1) of the Framework directive requires the Commission to define
markets in accordance with the principles of competition law. The market areas set out in
Annex I of the Framework directive cannot all be regarded as having been so defined. Where
NRAs have imposed obligations on SMP operators in market areas under the 1998
regulatory framework, they should therefore analyze whether there is effective competition
on the corresponding competition law markets identified in the annex to the
recommendation.
Provided that NRAs analyze relevant markets using the product or service market
definitions listed in the annex, there is no need to notify the Commission in accordance with
Article 15(3) and Article 7(4a) of the Framework Directive. However, it is this writers view,
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that national interest could be given preference over the obigatio to ensure fair competition
in the telecommuncations sector.
This work has considered the legal fundamentals of EC telecommunications law.
Part I of this Stud}- examined EC telecommunications law on its way to full
liberalization, from the 1987 Green Paper to the fully liberalized market, which was in place
in 1998. The considerable achievement over this ten-year period must be acknowledged. It
was also shown how Article 86 was used by the Commission to force the liberalization
process. The disagreement between the Commission on the one hand, and the European
Council on the other, as to the legal basis on which to carry out die Community's objectives,
a disagreement which eventually led to die 1989 compromise, is dien discussed. The
compromise led to the Commission agreeing to, in the future, obtain die Member States'
support before enacting any directives under Article 86. The important terminal equipment
directive later strengthened that link.
The conclusion was drawn that "enforcement is die key to success", with some
consideration being given to the energy7 and postal services. Part I ended with a more
practical discussion of interconnection, which is considered to be the key element of
Community Telecommunications policy.
Part II examined consumer expectations in the converged fixed/mobile market. It
showed that die majority of the customers in die telecommunications market will actually
subscribe to some form of converged service, and tiiat die regulatory7 regime for diat kind of
service needs therefore to be carefully tailored to these new circumstances. It noted that the
regulatory regimes of die two different markets are indeed different. This dien allowed a
discussion of the substitution of fixed widi mobile services, a phenomenon which is in fact
taking place bodi at die call level and at the service level. Further, it showed that the
distinction between fixed and mobile will be less clear as the convergence of the markets
develops, and tiiat diis requires that the regulatory framework be consistent in its approach
towards die two markets. Part II concluded diat if diis were not the case, there would be a
concern diat die development of die converged markets might be distorted.
Part III developed further the discussion under part II, and considered die framework
for converged fixed and mobile services, widi a special emphasis on the different markets.
The complexity of the sector was noted and to some extent die desire by the consumer
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protection authorities to let specialist regulators handle the problems. It also discussed die
possibility of allowing competition rules in die area by firsdy, discussing die level of
competition in die market for services, and secondly, the desirability of a market where
operators and providers were encouraged to meet the needs of die customers to win their
business. It continued to discuss the changeover from sector-specific regulation to die
application of competition rules, with a special emphasis on significant market power. It also
showed diat the Commission needs to balance against the application of subsidiarity, die
need for greater certainty, as die scope of die relevant product and service markets vary
among the different Member States. The perhaps obvious reason for this is that odierwise
this divergent approach could distort the markets, ifmarket power is measured differendy at
the national level. Part III dien argued tiiat whatever market definition is adopted in die
converged environment, it will only be those mobile operators that are owned by the
incumbent fixed operators that can be dominant in such a market. Part III ended widi a
discussion of the conversion from sector-specific regulation to the application of competition
rules. It showed that diis conversion is dependent on the degree to which competition law
can acquire the analytical tools to deal with the technical and commercial aspects of
convergence in die fixed and mobile markets.
The liberalization process in die telecommunications sector was mainly developed by
three important Court ofJustice cases. Firsdy, the British Telecommunications case>28 was an early
example of the application of competition rules in the telecommunications sector. Secondly,
die Tetra Pak case3'0 answered the question whedier competition rules can be used to restrain
anti-competitive practices in a particular market or market segment, if market power exists in
another market or market segment. The Court found that Tetra Pak was "in a situation
comparable to that of holding a dominant position on the markets in question as a whole".
In die literature, diis is referred to as Associated Markets Dominance. Thirdly, Oscar Bronner v
Mediaprinf ' , examined die essential facility doctrine, and that ruling, though restrictive,
suggests that the doctrine may still be of relevance in die telecommunications field. In
particular, die case showed diat it is likely diat an operator with strength on a related market
528 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission [1985] ECR 873 (British Telecommunications Case).
529 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Internationa/v. Commission [1994] ECR 1-755; on appeal: Case C-333/94P,
Tetra Pak Internationa/SA v. Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951.
530 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenver/ag [1998] ECR-I-7791.
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(a mobile market compared to a fixed market) can be found to have control of an essential
facility to which access is needed. In particular, incumbent fixed operators, which have
benefited from a monopoly regime and its network, funded by the state through taxes, can
be considered to control an essential facility.
At this point in the conclusion, it could be of interest to consider the reflections from
industry, three years after the liberalization of the telecommunications market and to examine
what impact the European Community's liberalization programme has had in practice.
Hie reality in the marketplace indicates that aims and reality still differ widely within the
telecommunications market. In particular, progress on liberalizing the link between homes
and local exchanges (the local loop unbundling or as it is referred to "the last mile") remains
slow and painful in most Member States"1. As shown by ECTA, a total or near total control
of all DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) lines by incumbent operators are shown in Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. In the UK
most of the around 20 operators who signed up to locate equipment in British
Telecommunications' exchanges, afterwards pulled out leaving around five possible
competitors. The situation is a serious worry for Erki Liikanen, European Union
Information Society Commissioner, whose commitment to local loop unbundling as a
cornerstone of a competitive, broadband Europe made it possible for the Information
Society Directorate to pass the local loop unbundling legislation in very quick time. The
legislation came into force on 1 January 2001.
It is this writer's view that the winners to date from local loop unbundling in Europe
are the incumbents. One proof of this could be that many of Europe's incumbents are now
working ahead of competition to launch services under the assumption that their customers
are connected, and that most of them will be either too laid-back or too uncertain to change
service providers. A good example of this scenario is France, where competitive operators
have been forced to fight severely to secure a reasonable deal for France Telecom's
Netissimo service. While France Telecom's competitors have been forced to devote a lot of
time and money in fighting court battles, France Telecom has taken the opportunity to go
ahead with a very ambitious service rollout.
531 For a full update on the developments in the local loop unbundling see,
www.Fctaportal.com/ccta2001 home /dsl iulyOl.htm. This website will be updated on a regularly basis.
The figures are from ECTA (European Competitive Telecommunications Association).
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Tying up competitors' resources in time consuming legal battles is just one of the many
weapons available to the incumbents. As Erki Liikanen put if '2, pricing and co-location
issues remain the greatest source of dispute. Erki Liikanen has urged the regulators (NRAs)
in the Member States to take a much more active role in ensuring cost-oriented wholesale
tariffs and adequate co-location arrangements to counter discriminator}' behaviour. As said
earlier in the study, it is also this writer's view that the NRAs are very weak players in the
telecommunications markets throughout the European Union. This weakness could well be
one of reasons why the telecommunications markets are slowing down, and at the expense of
the customers.
"Today's situation is clearly a failure", is a statement made by ECTA5", who is calling
on die Commission and national regulators to develop a new model that "incorporates both
a carrot and a stick'" '4. "Despite die best intentions of policy makers, many competitors are
beginning to feel that local loop unbundling may simply never fly'"". "What we have right
now is simply window dressing for a liberalized market'"'6. One suggested solution
envisages a new set of regulations based loosely on die US model, which ties incumbent's
ability" to move into new markets to their ability to prove full liberalization of their own local
networks. Anotiier proposition would see incumbents prevented from offering their own
DSL product until at least two others are providing competitive broadband services. Finally,
Erki Liikanen has called upon the spectre of prosecution under the European Community's
competition rules for Member States failing to comply widi open market principles.
It should, however, also be mentioned in this conclusion that some players in the
telecommunications markets see the downturn as good news for the spread of optical
wireless, or free-space lasers. In this technology, a laser beam sends a signal through die air,
radier dian along a glass fibre, to a receiver a short distance (about two kilometres) away.
Free space lasers are an option. They do not even have to have a license to operate and
532 In a speech to the European Commission in July 2001, quoted in the Financial Times. (18 Jul)' 18
2001).
533 Phil Evans, ECTA's Managing Director in an interview with the Financial Times. (18 July 2001)
reporter Sarah Parkes.
534 Phil Evans, ECTA's Managing Director in an interview with the Financial Times. (18 July 2001)
reporter Sarah Parkes.
535 Phil Evans, ECTA's Managing Director in an interview with the Financial Times. (18 Julv 2001)
reporter Sarah Parkes.
536 Phil Evans, ECTA's Managing Director in an interview with the Financial Times. (18 July 2001)
reporter Sarah Parkes.
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thereby reduce tire costs and time it takes to bring a system on line. The attributes of free
space laser are such that the technology can also work inside buildings connecting users to a
LAN (Local Area Network). Free space lasers can also work between buildings where the
aim could be to connect them in a LAN, rather than to plug into tire long-distance backbone.
Optical wireless is now also making advances into tire mobile networks, where it connects
base stations to tire fibre backbone; in what is know as the back-haul link5'7, which will
further reduce the cost, for the benefit of tire consumer.
The rest of this conclusion discusses a regulatory model that is appropriate for tire
converged fixed/mobile market and considers key requirements for tire application of
competition rules in tire future.
In the converged telecommunications market, fixed communications will continue to
be important and most customers will use both a fixed and a mobile service. The demand
for converged services from a single supplier will therefore grow, as the vast majority7 of the
customers will subscribe to some form of converged service. As shown in this study7, tire
regulations for fixed and mobile services are very7 different. In summary, regulation in tire
fixed market focuses on tire incumbent operator and seeks to ensure that other operators can
compete on a fair basis. The mobile market has been far more competitive and the different
mobile markets in tire European Union have not had as extensive regulations as those
applying in the fixed market.
Universal service obligations, for example, which are placed solely7 on the fixed
incumbents, have no relevance in the mobile sector. From a customer's point of view, the
substitutability7, at the service level and at the call level, of fixed and mobile services, can lead
to confusion regarding tire distinction between the two. Customer concerns in tire
converged market are best tackled by creating competition in tire services. As discussed in
this study, price, quality7, and contractual terms are best handled by service providers
competing to win tire customers' business. Another concern is, of course, health and safety,
537 For further information on this interesting development in the telecommunications market, see BT
project together with Impenal College and University College, (two parts of London University). A
separate report can be downloaded from www.ft.com / fttelecoms. Of special interest is Ms. Carbonneau's
research in the free space links, where she concludes that free space links can offer 99.9% reliability. This
is perfectly acceptable, she says, especially to people who have no alternative .
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but such concerns could be met by legal actions in civil courts under general consumer
protection legislation.
It is this writer's view that only one issue requires sector specific regulation, namely
access to emergency services. In this study, carrier pre-selection and number portability are
discussed as possible issues that could need sector specific regulation, but as those issues
were used to liberalize the telecommunications market, there cannot be a need after
liberalisation to regulate those issues specifically.
As it is most likely that the fixed and mobile sectors will continue to converge, the
interests of all players in the telecommunications market are best served by removing the
regulator}' powers from specialist sectoral regulators, relying instead on general competition
law, and, in the consumer area mentioned above, on consumer protection authorities.
A transition to an environment governed by competition law, apart from access to
emergency services would admittedly require a vast regulator}- process. This should be
handled by the European Commission, as coordinator, and the different NRAs in the
Member States, as implementers of die regulator}- regime, given their power to enforce
competition law in the sector.
Future regulation should be based on competition law, drawing on a full understanding
of markets under Article 81 and Article 82 of die EC Treaty. Key issues concern access and
abuse of market power. Other competition issues which will have to be addressed are cross-
subsidizations and mergers. These issues are especially significant for the incumbent
operators, given the opportunities open to them because of their dominance. They could be
addressed not only by die merger regulation but also with notices, guidelines, or
recommendations from the European Commission.
Regarding access, special consideration will need to be given to bottlenecks and market
failure tendencies. Sector-specific regulation could, admittedly, be the best way to address
these problems, at least in the beginning of the transition period, to die application of
competition rules. The main difficulty would then be to identify the market failures and/or
die bottlenecks. Most likely, bottlenecks will appear in the areas of intellectual property rights
and in die control of networks interfaces, servers, and navigators. For this purpose,
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especially concerning intellectual property' rights, Article 12 of Regulation 17/625'8 could be
used as a sectoral approach to identify market failures concerning specific subject matters.
The search for possible market failure or bottlenecks could then be carried out by, obviously,
die Commission being granted die right under Article 12 and by die NRAs.
When these abusive forms of behaviours have been identified, it should be determined
whether diey should be handled under competition rules or by sector specific regulation. As
discussed earlier in this study two different approaches could be adopted.
Firsdy is the asymmetric approach, which will apply only to those operators who have
significant market power, who are in a dominant position. These operators are subject to
structural safeguards so as to protect competition. This is especially significant after die ECJ
judgement in the Tetra Pak case, because their position in a special market can allow them to
exercise market power across die converged service market.
Secondly is the symmetric approach, which should be applicable to diose operators diat
control botdenecks or whose services indicate market failure. In diis area, the regulation
should be consistent with competition law principles and be applicable even if die operator is
not in a dominant position in the converged market or in segments of such market.
It is diis writer's view diat access-related questions could well be die most important
and most significant issues which competition law will have to address. Views from industry
show that frustrated business service providers are now demanding financial penalties for
incumbent operators blocking leased line competition. Some operators even claim that even
diough there are EU directives and recommendations from die European Commission, the
NRAs have done very litde to enforce competitive leased line pricing. They are calling for
the Commission to open proceedings against diose Member States which fail to enforce
cost-orientation under these directives"9. To summarize die views of diis section of industry
it could be said diat EBONE and WORLDCOM, together widi the ECTA340, now want
538 Regulation 17/62 implements Articles 81 and Article 82 EC, OJ L13/204, 1962. Article 12 gives
the European Commission the power to undertake sectoral enquiries whenever circumstances suggest
that competition is being rectricted or distorted in a specific sector of the economy.
539 For an intersting view and for a discussion on these subjects see: Communications Week
International. Articles and comments can be downloaded from l.JRI,:http: / /www.totaltcle.com.
Information and question could be sent to info@total.emp.com.
540 European Telecommunications Association. Reading, England.
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regulators to require incumbents to provide service level agreements for leased lines and
exact penalties for failing to do so.
Finally, according to Yankee Group research, commissioned by EBONE, leased lines
are die preferred technology for broadband access among die 87 large corporations surveyed.
The research also indicates that European businesses pay 150 times more for broadband
local lines than for international lines. Drawing on these examples from industry, die view is
taken diat a competitive market is necessary for die competitiveness of die
telecommunications sector as a whole.
A question raised by diis is whedier these regulatory measures could be taken by
notices, recommendations, or guidelines, sometimes referred to as soft law. It would be, as
this writer sees it, an advantage if this would be the case as it would be more flexible in
addressing technological and market changes. However, as noted by the vast majority7 of the
industry7, if the European Telecoms industry should move towards die new connectionless
competition model, die role of die National Regulatory7 Audiorities has to change to give
diem more enforcement powers, or perhaps even create a European regulatory7 body with
legislative enforcement powers.
Another example of a present barrier to competition, in the context of local loop
unbundling, was given by the industry7 in August 2001. In a negotiation with BT, BT took
die view that all, in this case ten, new entrants were to present a united view before entering
into negotiations. As the operators obviously7 are competitors in the market, it was widi great
difficulty diat a united view could be presented, mainly because die operators clearly did not
wish to present their business strategies in front of dieir competitors. Further, die charge for
interconnection had to be negotiated with BT, which led to a strategic analysis of a possible
affordable cost for the operators and not, as anticipated by the directives, a cost benefit
analysis. Admittedly7, die UK Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) is one of die first
regulators to recognize the problem and has now issued fines against British Telecom for not
complying with die OFTEL regulation.
As far back as August 2000, die European Commission mandated local loop
unbundling across the European Union. Local exchanges should be low rent. New entrants
should enter die market and apply for a place in die incumbent's territory7. Hie idea was that
with just a littie negotiation die new operators should be running dieir interconnection deals,
develop DSL technology, and unblock die access network.
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The telecommunications sector meltdown had, according to industry, nothing to do
with problems widi the technology, not even whether die model for wholesale DSL would
work. It is the collected views of the industry diat meltdown is caused by die immovability
of the incumbents. In July 2001, UK regulator OFTEL made an attempt to solve the
problems by announcing that it was to cut British Telecom's unbundling charges and soften
die terms and conditions for competitive operators. Unfortunately, die modified terms and
conditions only reflected the weaknesses of those they replaced. About a year ago, August
2000, 40 operators were negotiating with BT and OFTEL to try to agree to the terms and
conditions, which would enable them to interconnect to BT's local loop. BT decided to take
what some operators have referred to as die "Fawlty Towers approach" — a carrier would
function much more efficiently without the guests. By the end of die year 2000, die process
seemed intractable and involved endless negotiations. As a consequence of tiiis, many of the
new operators pulled out or scaled back the plans for interconnection to die local loop.
It is now argued by the incumbents and die watchdogs that the telecommunications
downturn stalled die local loop unbundling. It is this writer's view that it was, and is, die
incumbent's immovability and the weakness of the NRAs, and to a significant degree the
operators themselves that caused the telecommunications meltdown. The NRAs must take a
significant share in that responsibility as they took die incumbents' attitude for granted. That
is not die way to negotiate with an incumbent former monopolist.
This behaviour has all been at the expense of the customer. The transition from
monopoly to full competition must lead to a shift from the incumbent operator to all the
actors in the telecommunications market. This will inevitably require the NRAs to strike a
difficult balance between regulatory intervention in the best interest of the customers and the
acknowledgement diat a competitive market could be die best place to provide different
types of consumer benefits. It should, however, be made clear that there is a difference
between consumer welfare and consumer benefits, and it should be made clear diat low cost
consumer benefits should never be at die expense of consumer welfare.
This in turn raises the question when, and for diat matter if, specific universal service
obligations in order to protect consumers are necessary. It is this writer's view diat they
should apply to all market players whatever their market shares, and certainly whatever odier
services diey provide. Not even, in this writer's view, when positive obligations may hinder
market entry, should market power be taken into account, and a new operator should never
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be exempt from these obligations. It is important that these obligations should be applicable
bodi to fixed and mobile operators in a fixed/mobile converged environment.
This view leads then to the question whether sector-specific regulation in any case
should be extended to the mobile sector. This writer's view is that sector-specific regulation
should gradually disappear in favour of horizontal consumer protection rules. Having said
that, it might be necessary to have sector-specific regulation in the areas of service where the
consumers have little or no experience, for instance, in number portability and in pre-carrier
selection, but over time when consumer knowledge increases, it may be possible to rely on
general consumer protection rules.
Undoubtedly, to reach the ideal competitive marketplace governed by Competition law
it is preferred that regulatory intervention should be kept to the minimum necessary, letting
the sector-specific regulation gradually be replaced by the application of competition law.
This scenario can be found in other markets of the World, such as United States, Canada,
and Australia. Within tire European Union, only one Member State, Holland, has a policy of
regulator,' withdrawal and this writer would like to conclude with a quote from tire chairman
of OPTRA, tire Holland NRA, ".. .the regulator should withdraw, or even forego a role, if
the underlying policy objective has been met by the market forces. Such 'sunset clauses' or
appropriate regulatory forbearance would reflect tire dynamic nature of the international
market better than detailed supranational legal provision to be meticulously incorporated in
domestic law1"".
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2G
Second-Generation mobile telephony (digital cellular
voice telephony). The spectrums are within the 880
MHz-915 MHz, 925-960 MHz, 1710-1785 MHz or 1805-
1880 MHz bands.
3G
Third-Generation mobile telephony (a generic term




A process whereby costs are allocated on the demand of
each product and/or service makes on all the company.
Specific cost allocation is based upon studies of
organizational cost drivers and activities.
ACCESS CHARGE
See Interconnect Charge.
Access charge has two meanings. The usage of the
interconnect charge definition and the narrow meaning
of the local access charge. Access charge has therefore
been replaced with Interconnect Charge for clarity of
meaning.
ACCESS CODE
Short numbers beginning with 1 which enable callers to
reach services provided on telecommunications networks
(e.g., 192 for directory enquiries) or to select a choice of
carrier.
ACCESSIBILITY
The segment targeted must be able to be reached and




An electronic funds transfer system governed by
operating rules that provide clearance of electronic
payments with participating financial institutions.
ACCOUNTING ARRANGEMENTS
Agreements MADe between two international operators
at each end of a particular route for the handling of
international calls. They include arrangements for each




The calling user has eliminated a service, which
automatically rejects any incoming calls where the
presentation of the calling line identification.
ACS
Analogue Cellular System.
Cellular system using analogue transmission techniques.




Created by Directive 91/263/EEC, responsible for the
adoption of the Common Technical Regulations (CTR)




A process that includes the following steps:
♦ identifying a need
♦ defining the requirements
«• planning the overall application structure or
architecture





In the UK, BT seeks to make an ADC to interconnecting
operators. Where it is not waived, the ADC is included
as a component of the total Interconnect Charge. The
ADC seeks to recover a share of the total Local Access
Loss, including an element (to date unquantified) relating
to the Universal Service Obligation.
ADSL
AtymmetricDigital Subscriber Line
Part of the DSL group of line-coding technologies
developed by Bell Laboratories to carry high bit-rate
signals over copper pairs. Seen as an alternative to cable-
based networks for residential services.
AFFILIATE
Companies that sell other manufacturers' or retailers'
(sponsoring merchants') products on their Web sites.
Users select a product at the affiliate Web site, but the




Measures undertaken to ensure that the use of a
transmitting device does not disturb receiving equipment
to an extent, which would cause significant loss of
information, intended for that receiver.
AGCOM
Autoritaper la Garanrfe nelle Comunicarfoni
The Italian National Regulatory Authority (NRA),
together with the Ministry ofCommunications.




Entry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given
frequency band allowing the use of that band by one ormore
Radio communications services under specified conditions.




Dialling a telephone number by using the corresponding
letters on the telephone's keypad that corresponds to the




US Analogue Cellular System standard.
Analogue Cellular system
Cellular system using analogue transmission techniques.
Standards used in Europe are inter alia NMT,TACS,
Radiocom 2000, and C-Net.
ANI
Alternative Network Infrastructure
Infrastructure capacity established by Organizations
other than the telecommunications Organizations, for
own use or for offering capacity to other users or to
service providers. When offered to others, it is referred
to as Third Party infrastructure
ANSI
American National Standards Institute (USA)
APC
AeronauticalPublic Correspondence services
Generic term for Radio communications based services,
allowing airline passengers to communicate from a plane
whilst in flight. Systems are being developed based on
both satellite and terrestrial systems. Within Europe, the
Terrestrial Flight Telecommunications System (TFTS) is now
entering service with a number of airlines.
APPLET
A small program that runs within an application. Applets
are commonly used to make otherwise static World Wide
Web pages more interactive.
APPLICATION
A task that a user performs using Telecommunications.
A number of different attributes are used to distinguish
applications type of information to be communicated,
mobility of user, speed of transmission, etc.
APPLICATION INTEGRATION
The process of a) keeping redundant copies of data (in
independently designed applications) consistent, and/or
b) enabling end-users to access data and functionality
from independently designed applications on a single
user interface.
APPLICATION LAYER
The top of the seven-layer Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model, generally regarded as
offering an interface to, and largely defined by, the
network user.
ARBITRAGE
The ability to buy for one price and sell on for a higher
price.
ARCHITECTURE
A framework for a communications system, which gives
definitions of its functions, interfaces and procedures.
ARP
Address Resolution Protocol
Internet protocol (IP) used in IPv4 to map an IP address
to a media access control (MAC) address. A MAC is a
48-bit code for layer 2 networking maintained by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
and hardwired into network adapters. Also called
Ethernet address.
ARPANET
Advanced Research ProjectsAgerny Network
The forerunner of the Internet that was a pioneering
long-haul network. It served as the testbed for many
areas of inter-network technology development and
testing and acted as the central backbone during the
development of the Internet.
ART
Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications
The French National Regulator,- Authority (NRA),




An electronic data interchange (EDI) transaction that
identifies the contents of a container that is en route
from a supplier to a customer.
ASP
Application Service Provider
An organization that hosts software applications on its
own servers within its own facilities. Customers access
the application via private lines or the Internet. Also
called a commercial service provider.
ASSIGNMENT
Of a radio frequency or a radio channel: authorisation
given by an administration for use of a particular radio
frequency or radio frequency channel, subject to specific
conditions. See Article 1 of the Radio Regulations.
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ATM
Asynchronous Transfer Alode
Cell-switching technology, carrying information in fixed-
length cells using statistical multiplexing techniques.
Since the cell size is fixed, ATM can operate at a wide
range of speeds, currently from 45 Mbps to 2.5 Gbps in
long distance. Lower speed (down to 2Mbps) can also be
provided for use in local networks).
AT&T
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
AUCTIONING
License or frequency award procedures, where allocation
is to the highest bidder. This method has been used in a
number of countries outside the European Union and
has been used for GSM in Greece.
AUTHENTICATION SERVICE
A mechanism for the secure authentication of the
identity of network clients by servers and vice versa,
without presuming the operating system integrity of
either.
AUTHORIZATION
Occurs when the merchant, its merchant bank, and the
customer's card-issuing bank work together to verify that
the electronic payment should be permitted given the
customer's credit limit or the amount in the customer's
bank account.
B7
A modem signalling system, based on standards set by
the CCITT (the former name of the world
telecommunications stasndards-making body), for the
transfer of messages between entities in
telecommunications networks that enables the setting up,
routing and clearing of calls and the transfer of ather
relevant information related to the operation of these
networks. The B7 signalling system is used for the
transfer of such messages between different networks as
well as within individual networks.
BABT
British Approvals Boardfor Telecommunications (See BSI.)
BABT can grant approvals for all types of apparatus,
other than CRA, (Call Routing Apparatus), which still
require approval by OFTEL.
BACKHAUL
The link from the cable head to the international
switching centre.
BACK-OFFICE
The business processes and operational functions that
happen internally or through the supply chain. These
functions often include inventor)? management, order
processing and tracking, shipping and receiving,
purchasing and distribution.
BANDWIDTH
The range of frequencies, expressed in Hertz (Hz), that
can pass over a given transmission channel. The
bandwidth determines the rate at which information can
be transmitted through the circuit. The greater the
bandwidth, the more information can be transmitted
through the circuit in a given amount of time. In digital
technology the equivalent measure is throughput, which
is measured in bits per second, Voice telephony typically
requires 64 kb/s but the latest technology? using sampling
techniques allows this to be reduced.
BEAUTY CONTEST
The award of scare resources, such as the right to use
radio spectrum, according to technical criteria, such as
the applicant's ability and commitment to provide the





User-led (versus computer-led) process of exploring data,
data relationships, and trends to improve business
decision-making. Insights derived from BI's inquiry and
analysis techniques are critical to enterprise-wide strategic
planning efforts. BI technology is divided into interactive
query tools, reporting tools, decision support systems,
and executive information systems.
BIOMETRICS
A method of identification or authentication that
measures a unique physical or behavioural biological
characteristic such as a fingerprint, face, voice, or iris of
the eye.
BIPT
Be/giscb Instituut voor Postdiensten en Telecommunicatie.
The Belgian National Regulatory Authority (NRA),
together with the Minister for Telecommunications and
Public Undertakings.
BIT
'Hie minimum unit of binary information as stored in a
computer system. A bit can have only two states, on or
off, which are commonly called ones (1) and zeros (0).
The combination of ones and zeros determines which




(USA: One of the local operating companies of the
former AT&T "BELL SYSTEM" that became
independent through the court-ordered break-up of
AT&T in 1984 following the "MFJ" order).
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BOTTLENECK
An essential facility, which has some tradition in the USA
antitrust policy. The "essential facility" doctrine originally
evolved from a railroad case in 1912. A number of railroads
had controlled the only bridge into St. Louis and denied
access to this bridge to their competitors. The Supreme
Court decreed the bridge a bottleneck and declared denial of
access to be a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman
Act. The main elements of a bottleneck are:
♦ control of a facility by a single firm
♦ facility essential for production
♦ inability of others to practically duplicate the facility
« denial of access with substantial harm to competition
♦ absence of a valid business reason for not providing
access
Interconnection as a bottleneck has received a lot of
attention and from it the need for mandatory
interconnection has been derived.
BPS
Bits Per Second
The basic unit of measurement for serial data
transmission capacity'. Represented as Kbps, or
kilobit/s, for thousands of bits per second; Mbps, or
megabit/s, for millions of bits per second; Gbps, or
gigabit/s, for billions of bits per second; Tbps, or
terabit/s, for trillions of bits per second.
BROADBAND
Transmission equipment and media that can support a
wide range of electromagnetic frequencies. Any voice
communications channel having a bandwidth greater
than a voice grade telecommunications channel;
sometimes used synonymously with wideband. Typically,
the technology of CATV transmission as applied to data
communications; employs coaxial cable as the
transmission medium and radio frequency carrier signals
in the 50 to 500 Mhz range.
BROWSER
A software program used to locate and display
information on an intranet, extranet or the Internet.
Browsers are most often used to access Web pages and




Operates under Section 22 of the UK
Telecommunications Act 1984, which provides a
statutory framework for approvals procedure. BSI draws
up standards and the BABT evaluates equipment against





The tying of one service or product to the supply of
others including some situations where the supply of
services are linked through the use of discounts.
BUSY HOUR
When designing a telephone service, capacity has to be
proved to meet peak rather than average loads. Typically
planning is done for the busiest hour of a typical day.
The need to cater for busy hour loads means that
capacity is often idle.
C7
A modern signalling system, based on standards set by
the CCIl 1 (the former name of the world
telecommunicaiotns standards-making body), for the
transfer of messages between entities in
telecommunications network that enables the setting up,
routing and clearing of calls and the transfer of other
relevant information related to the operation of these
networks. The C7 signalling system is used for the
transfer of such messages between different networks as
well as within individual networks.
CA
Certificate (certification)Authority
Either internal or third party entities that affirm or
electronically vouch for an individual's identity. They are
used to vouch for the identity' of a device, such as a Web
server, a network router, or an application. The certificate
is backed by a profile stored in a database that is
referenced to retrieve a public key or to check attributes
such as permissions and roles.
CACHE
A temporary storage area for instructions and data near a
computer's central processing unit (CPU), usually
implemented in high-speed memory. It replicates
information from main memory or storage in a way that
facilitates quicker access, using fewer resources than the
original source.
CAMEL
CustomisedApplicationsforMobile Network Enhanced Logic
Allows roamed customers to access the value added
services of their home network, even if the visited
network does not support those services.
CAP
Competitive Access Provider
Term applied in USA to companies providing services
directly to customer premises in competition with the
local Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOC's).
CARRIER PRE-SELECTION
Possibility for customers to determine his or her own
default carrier on a semi-permanent basis or thus
avoiding any additional dialling.
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CARRIER SELECTION
The possibility for customers to choose their long¬
distance or international operator e.g. by dialling a code





Systems authorised for the distribution of broadcasting /
television programmes. In many cases also suitable for
the transmission of telecommunications.
CBC
Capacity Based Charging
An emerging system for interconnect charging where the
purchaser rents "capacity'" (e.g. (switching or
transmission capacity in discrete units) from an
established operator. The purchaser pays a fixed price
for access to the network regardless of the actual traffic
utilization, (up to a maximum of the capacity rented).
There may be a separate variable charge for call set up,
signalling etc. This contrasts with "cost per unit/2
charging" where a user pays for actual calls conveyed,
often on a "minute of use" basis.
CCA
An approach used in Incremental Costing to account for
the costs of fixed assets expansion in discounted cash
flow terms. The change in present value of projected
capital expenditure as a consequence of fixed assets
expansion is speed across the consequent additional
capacity of the fixed assets (Not across the units of
capacity in use); thus the present value per unit of
incremental capacity associated with the advancement or
postponement of investment expenditure is derived.
CCITT
Comite ConsultatifInternational de Telephonie et de Telegraphie
International Consultative Committee for Telephone and
Telegraph, an advisory committee within the ITU that
recommends data communications standards. Following




Electronically enabled business interactions among an
enterprise's internal personnel, suppliers, business
partners, and customers throughout a given trading
community.
CDMA
Code Division Multiple Access
Special coding technique for digital radio transmission
whereby information in digital form is combined with a
second coded digital stream to "smear" the information
simultaneously across a wide radio frequency bandwidth.
By using a known coded signal at both transmitter and
receiver, the original information can be recovered at the
receiver. Currently used in some DCS's on an
experimental basis.
CELLULAR SYSTEMS
Mobile Radio communications Networks, usually
covering a large area, in which the area of service iso o "
divided into a number of smaller "cells" each is having its
own transmitter/ receiver equipment (base station), lite
use of cells allows for the same frequency to be re-used
in different cells.
CEN/CENELEC
European Committee for Standardisation and European
Committeefor Electro technical Standardisation
Major European standardisation Organizations.
Responsible inter aha for the preparation of standards
relating to electro-magnetic compatibility under
Directives 89/336/EEC and 92/31/EEC .
CEPT
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administration
(Membership is now confined to National Regulatory
Authority (NRA) and encompasses all the EU Member
States and most of other European countries including
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. CEPT
activities are divided between ECTRA, NRA and ERC).
CGI
Common Gateway Interface
A data-passing specification used when a Web server
must send or receive data from an application such as a
database. A CGI script passes the request from the Web
server to a database, gets the output, and returns it to the
Web client.
CHANNEL
1. In data communications, a one-way path along which
signals can be sent between two or more points.
2. In telecommunications, a transmission path (one-or
two-way) between two or more points provided by a
common carrier.
3. In business terminology, a channel refers to the route
by which a company's products or services are delivered
to the marketplace or end-user. A channel can be
referred to as a marketing, sales, or a distribution
channel.
CHATLINE
A service which allows more than two persons
simultaneously to conduct a telephone conversation with
one another and where the persons concerned are




A system or a program that requests the activity of one
or more other systems or programs, called servers, to
accomplish specific tasks. In a client/server environment,
the workstation is usually the client.
CMT
Comision delMercado de las Telecomunicaciones
The Spanish National Regulatory Authority (NRA),
together with the State Secretary for Telecommunications
and the Information Society.
C-NET
Analogue cellular system standard.
COAX
Coaxial (Cable)
A type of cable generally used for conveing television
pictures.
COCOM
The Organization responsible for determining the
security exports control system for NATO countries and
Japan.
COMPARATIVE BIDDING
License award procedure based on the review and
comparison of the quality of the projects against defined
criteria. This method is widely used throughout the
European Union.
COMPRESSION
The application of any of several techniques that reduce
the number of bits required to represent information in
data transmission or storage, therefore conserving
bandwidth and/or memory.
COOKIE
A permanent code placed in a file on a client computer's
hard disk by a server that the client has visited. The code
uniquely identifies the client. When the PC user returns,
the)' are automatically entered into the site without
relogging in.
CORPORATE NETWORK
Corporate networks are generally networks established by
a single Organization encompassing distinct legal entities,
such as a company its subsidiaries or its branches in
other Member States incorporated under the relevant
domestic company law.
COST CATEGORIES
Specific classes of costs differentiated, according to their
relationship with changes in output. Examples include
fixed, variable, common or sunk.
COST ITEMS
These are specific cost the firm and classified by
Management. Examples include administrative expenses,
maintenance, finance etc.
COST ORIENTATION
This term is usually used in the context that, tariffs and
Interconnect charges should be cost oriented. Cost
orientation implies a relationship with underlying cost of
service but without specifying what that relationship is.
COST OF SERVICE
The cost of providing a particular service, or family of
services, to customers determined using an appropriate
cost standard. The cost is distinguished from
interconnect charges made to other operators for use of
the network and from retail tariffs to end users, both of
which determine the revenue of the firm.
COST STANDARD
In EC legislation this term is synonymous with Cost
Accounting System. A Cost Standard is the principle by
which the pool of costs is allocated to individual services
to determine Service Costs as a basis for financial
reporting or regulator)' or commercial decision-making.
Examples include FDC (Fully Distributed Costing), MC






An enterprise-wide business strategy designed to
optimise profitability, revenue, and customer needs
satisfaction. To accomplish this the enterprise must
organize operations around customer segments, fostering
customer satisfying behaviours and linking processes
from customers back through suppliers.
CROSS SUBSIDY
The financing of losses made in one market by pricing
below incremental costs from profit made in another.
C/S
ClientIServer
The splitting of an application into tasks performed on
separate computing devices — a programmable
workstation such as a personal computer (PC) and a
server. The PC (the client) does some of its own
processing, while the server typically stores information
and software. The two sides are connected by a local-area
network (LAN) or wide-area network (WAN).
CTM
Cordless TerminalMobility
A general term encompassing short-range radio
technology allowing cordless terminals to be used
anywhere within range of the base transmitter.
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CT2
Cordless Telephony
Equipment standard based on an ETSI interim standard.
Current use primarily with Telepoint Applications. A
digital system using frequency shift keying in the 854 to
868 MHz band using the time division duplex.
CTR
Common TechnicalRegulations
Type approval of terminal equipment according to the
procedures ofDirective 91/263/EEC.
CUG
Closed User Groups (CUGs)
refer to entities not necessarily bound by economic links,
but which can be identified as being part of a group on
the basis of a lasting professional relationship among
themselves, or with another entity of the group, and
whose internal communications needs result from the
common interest underlying this lasting relationship. In
general, the link between the members of the group is a
common business activity. Examples of activities likely to
fall into this category are fund transfers for the banking
industry, reservation systems for airlines, information
transfers between universities involved in a common
research project, re-insurance for the insurance industry,
inter-library activities, common design projects, and
different institutions or services of intergovernmental or
international Organizations.
In the context of the Commission Directive
90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the
markets for telecommunications services, individual
cases, and definitions used in Member States are subject
to screening by the Commission. The Directive indeed
refers to the public and not to CUGs. Tire Commission
must therefore ascertain that the definitions of CUG by
Member States doe not exclude voice telephony between
users who have existing common links between
themselves, such that they could not reasonably be
regarded as being members of the public (i.e. any random
person, without distinction of belonging or membership).
See Part I of this Green Paper, COM(94)440,
25.10.1994, section VI (1).
DCS
Digital Cellular System
Cellular Systems, utilizing digital (bit-based) transmission
techniques).
DCS 1800
Standard for micro cellular communications systems
developed by ETSI building on the GSM standard. Such
system operates with very small cells, varying in size
between a few hundred metres and a few kilometres.
Operating at 1800 Mhz.
DECT
Digital Cordless Telecommunications
New Digital cordless standard developed by ETSI.
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
A system designed to support strategic (versus operating)
decisions. Decision support systems allow the computer
rather than the user to make decisions. The system tends
to be user-friendly and emphasize ad hoc query,
reporting, and analysis capabilities. This is in contrast to
online transaction processing, which focuses on low-cost,
fast-response, and predictably structured applications.
DIEL
lire Advisory Committee on Telecommunications for
Disabled and elderly People.
DIGITAL
The generation, storing, processing, and transmission of
all electronic data (e.g., words, numbers, even voices) in
one of two states represented as 0s and Is. Computers
only understand and read digital data.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
String of bits that identifies the originator of a message
or transaction and is the result of the application of the
originator's private key to a one-way hash of the
(encrypted) message file. Also provides message integrity.
DISC






Domain Name System (or Service)
Name resolution software that lets users locate
computers on a UNIX network or the Internet (TCP/IP
network) by domain name. The DNS root name servers
maintain a database of domain names (host names) and
their corresponding IP addresses and are responsible for
one or more top-level domain names, e.g., com or edu.
DOMAIN
A group of nodes on a network forming an
administrative entity. On the Internet, a part of the
naming hierarchy that refers to groupings of networks
based on organization type or geography.
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DOUBLE TANDEM CONVEYANCE
A service provided by a network operator to
interconnected network operators whereby a call passed
on to the operator's network at a tandem exchange (i.e.
one that routes calls between exchanges but not having
direct connections to end users) is passed to another
tandem exchange and then on to a local exchange (i.e.
one that does have direct connections to end users) and
finally on to the end user.
DSI
Detailed Spectrum Investigations
of radio usage, one of the key tasks given the European
Radio communications Office, aiming at the
development of a common European Table of
Frequency Allocations by Directive 91/288/EEC




Digital Short Range Radio
New digital standard developed by ETSI in the Private






Department ofTrade and Industry
DUCTS
The tubes through which cables are laid.
EASY ACCESS
Method for carrier selection whereby the local access
provider determines the default carrier with the







The use of communication technologies to transmit
business information and transact business. Taking an
order over the telephone is a simple form of EC. Internet
commerce is also EC but is only one of several advanced
forms of EC that use technology, integrated applications,
and business processes to link enterprises.
ECP
Efficient Component Pricing
A pricing proposal developed by Baumol and Willig,
which set the Interconnect Charge as the incremental
cost of production, plus the Opportunity Costs (OC)
associated with providing the service to competitors.
OCs may be calculated by reference to:
♦ resources used in acquiring an asset,
♦ alternative asset uses,
♦ unavailable capacity or revenue foregone.
(This has been implemented in the UK and New Zealand
Telecommunications Industries to account for access
deficits).
ECTRA
The European Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory
Affairs
Created as one of the three committees under the CEPT
structure. It includes a number of project teams covering
inter alia licensing, numbering, interconnection mobile
communications, testing and type-approval. Council
Resolution 92/C318/EEC of 19.11.92. on the
promotion of co-operation on Europe-wide numbering,
identified several tasks for ECTRA in numbering co¬
ordination, including the creation of a European
numbering space and the preparation of European
positions for discussions within ITU. ECTRA has set up
the European Telecommunications Office.
EEA
European EconomicArea
Includes all EC and EFTA countries part from
Liechtenstein and Switzerland.
EETT
The Greek National Regulatory Authority (NRA),






The ability of a device, unit, or system to function
satisfactorily in its electromagnetic environment without
introducing unacceptable electromagnetic disturbances to
anything in that environment
ENF
European Numbering Forum
An industry Forum to discuss numbering and
numbering related issues. The ENF is open to any
Organization that has an interest in numbering or
addressing and that is represented at the European level.
The ENF was established in 1994 following the Council
Resolution 92/C318/EEC of 19 November 1992 that
called for industry co-operation in the area of numbering.
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ENO
European Numbering Office
The European Numbering Office called for in the
Council Resolution 92/C318/02 of 19 November 1992
on the promotion of Europe-wide co-operation on
numbering of telecommunications services will be
located in Copenhagen, as part of the European
Telecommunications Office (see also ECTRA).
EPT
Enterprise des Postes et Telecommunications
llie Luxembourg incumbent.
EQUAL ACCESS
The ability for a customer to access any long-range
distance carrier irrespective of the Organization
providing the local loop.
ERC
European Radio communications Committee
One of the three committees created under the new
structure of CEPT. The ERC develops Radio
communications policies, assists ITU conferences and
plays a general co-ordinating role in frequency matters).
ERLANG
A widely used unit of telecommunications traffic
intensity, named after work of the Danish statistician DK
Erlang. One Erlang is the intensity at which one traffic
path would be continuously occupied, e.g. one call per
hour, equivalent to 3600 call-seconds. To measure the
call traffic over a channel, an average may be taken over a
period of time, generally an hour
ERMES
European Radio Messaging System
New digital paging standard developed by ETSI,
supported by Directive 90/544/EEC establishing
harmonised frequency bands for ERAIES and a Council
Recommendation on its co-ordinated introduction.
ERS-IES will permit the reception of tones and/or
numeric or alphanumeric messages.
ERO
European Radio communications Office
The European Radio communications Office (ERO)
called for in the Council Resolution of 28 June 1990
90/C166/02 on the strengthening of the Europe-wide
co-operation on radio frequencies, in particular with
regard to services with a pan-European dimension was
created by the ERC and started operations in
Copenhagen in May 1991.
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
are non-economic reasons in the general interest, which
mav cause a Member State to restrict access to the public
telecommunications networks or public
telecommunications services.
ETHERNET
A baseband local-area network (LAN) developed by
Xerox and supported by Intel, Digital Equipment, and
Hewlett-Packard. It has a bus topology with carrier sense
multiple access with collision detection (CSMA/CD)
access control.
ETI
European Telecommunications Institute (now ETSI)
ETNO
European Public Telecommunications Network Operators
Association
Currently comprising the incumbent operators in Europe
but discussions are ongoing to open up to independent
mobile operators.
ETNS
European Telephony Numbering Space
A numbering space that sits parallel to the national
numbering spaces. Numbers from the ETNS will be
available anvwhere in the European Union (and later on
Europe). When implemented, a services numbered from
the ETNS can be accessed by a single pan-European




ETO Began operations on September 1, 1994. 21 CHPT
countries have signed the MOU on the establishment of
ETO.
ETSI
European Telecommunications Standards Institute.
The European standards Organization in the
communications field, having the task of producing
European Telecommunications standards (ETS), having
European-wide application and acceptance, in the area of
telecommunications.
EUROBIT
European Association of Manufacturers of Business
Machines and Information Technology Industry.
EUTELSAT
European Telecommunications Satellite Organisation
Created by the Eutelsat Convention and the related
Operating Agreement.
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
An exclusive right exists where the operation of a mobile
network or the provision of a mobile service within a
given area is reserved by a Member State to a single
public or private operator. (See draft Commission
Directive of 1 December 1993 amending Directives
88/301/EEC and 90/388/EEC with regard to satellite
communications).
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EXTRANET
A collaborative, Internet-based network to link an
enterprise with its suppliers, customers or other external
business partners and to facilitate intercompany
relationships. Extranets use Internet-derived applications
and technology to become the secured extensions of
internal business processes to external business partners.
FAC/FDC
¥ally Allocated Costs/ Fully Distributed Costing
A cost standard, which allocates all of an Organization's
costs to services. FAC generally include the costs direcdy
attributable to the service, plus a share of indirect costs
and general overheads. The rules for determining theo o
shares of the indirect costs and overheads are usually




Washington DC, USA regulatory agency established by
the Communications ACT of 1934, charged with




The commonest form of multiple access. The
transponder bandwidth is divided into a number of sub-
bands, each centred on its own carrier. Then, using the
FDM method, a number of transmission channels are
multiplexed on to each carrier.
FINNET GROUP
The Finnish incumbent grouping of local network
operators.
FIRST COME/FIRST SERVES LICENSING
License award procedure, where licenses are awarded in
order of application, normally within the limits of the
frequencies available. This method is used extensively
for private mobile radio systems and satellite services.
FPLMT
Future Land Public LandMobile Telecommunications
A terrestrial mobile communications system that will not
be fully defined until the year 2000, and which is in direct
competition with satellite mobile telephone systems using
LEO satellites. Now called IMT - 2000.
FREE PHONE SERVICE
A service that is (can be accessed) free of charge to the
customer. The access code "800" is generally associated
with this freephone.
FRIACO






Modelled on Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and
prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position and
agreements which restrict or distort competition.
GATEWAY
A conceptual or logical network station that serves to
interconnect two otherwise incompatible networks,
network nodes, sub networks or devices. Gateways
perform a protocol-conversion operation across a wide
spectrum of communications functions or layers.
Gil
Global Information Infrastructure
US term for worldwide information infrastructure or
superhighway. See also Nil
GOLDEN NUMBERS
Golden numbers are telephone numbers that distinguish
themselves from all other numbers in a given number
range because they are attractive to have, are easy7 to learn
or remember, subjectively pleasing or are in use and
known by the general public or client base. Golden
numbers may have a big commercial value. For instance,
the digits that relate to "FLOWERS" on the standardised




Satellite system used, inter aha, for maritime, air and
terrestrial navigation providing extremely accurate
location and positioning information for ships, planes,
vehicles or individuals throughout the world that carry a
GPS receiver.
GREEN PAPER
In the European Union context the European
Commission consultative documents setting out basic
policy goals for public debate. Key Green Papers issued
in the Telecommunications Sector are the 1987 Green
Paper on the development of a common market for
Telecommunications services and equipment
COM(87)290, the 1990 Green Paper on Satellite
Communications COM(90)490, the Green Paper on a
common approach in the field of mobile and personal
communications in the European Union COM(94)145
and the Green Paper on the Liberalisation of
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television
Networks COM(94)682 Part I and II.
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GSM
The GlobalSystemforMobile Communications
The central standard, developed by ETSI, for digital,
second generation, mobile systems, using I 'DMA
techniques. Directive 87/372/EEC establishing
harmonised frequency bands have supported GSM for
GSM. The system supports Roaming and a broad range
of features. Initially GSM stood for "Groupe Speciale
Mobile" developed under the CEPT).
HDSL
High-Bandwidth DigitalSubscriberTine
DSL technology, which has been standardised in Europe by
ETSI using 2BlQ-coding technology, allows the provision of
2 Mpbs circuits using two copper-based pairs. Seen as an
alternative to optical fibre and traditional methods for the El
connection to business customers.
HERTZ
1 cycle/second, measurement unit for radio frequencies. 1
kHz corresponds to 1000 Hz; 1 MHz corresponds to 1




Heads of NRA's. Since 1992 recognised as a permanent
forum by Council Resolution 93/C 213/01 ofJuly 22, 1993;
OJ 1993 C 213/1. DG IV (Competition) and DG XIII
(Telecommunications) jointly chair the HLC).
HUBBING





lnstitut Beige des Services Postanx et de Telecommunications
The National Regulator)' Authority (NRA), together with
the Minister for Telecommunications and Public
Undertakings.
ICP
Instituto das Comunicacoes de Portugal




Institut Luxembourgeois des Telecommunications
The Luxembourg National Regulatory Authority (NRA).
IMT-2000
InternationalMobile Telecommunications 2000
(2000 stands for 2000 Mhz, the proposed frequency, as
well as the intended start date). See FPLMTS.
IN
Intelligent Networks
Centralised computing intelligence and databases
supplement the basic network so that advanced
telecommunications services such as Freephone can be
more easily offered. The development of IN will require
substantial investment. IN will allow more flexible
services but will introduce greater complexity.
INCUMBENT
Telecommunications organizations granted special and
exclusive rights by Member States or public operator(s),
which enjoy a de facto monopoly' before liberalization.
INDEX
A numerical scale used to show how a variable has
changed over time against a given reference number,
noramlly 100.
INFRASTRUCTURE
From a business perspective, the infrastructure is a
shared resource, the state of which bounds the
adaptability and change capacity of the enterprise. From
a technology perspective, it is the enterprise wide
technology used to support the e-business environment
and includes the hardware, software, physical plant,
communications platforms, network systems, and
database architecture.
INMARSAT
International Maritime Satellite Organisation, established by
the INMARSAT Convention and the related operating
agreement.
INTEGRATION HUBS
An emerging form of super-process ware; rather than a
new technology, they are a way of architecting an
integration solution. They provide real-time
transformation, translation, and routing of messages
across multiple enterprises. 'ITiey support multiple data
formats (including EDI formats and XML) and
multidimensional views of the data.
INTELSAT
The International Satellite Organisation
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INTERCONNECT CHARGE
This is the charge that one operator makes to another
network operator for the conveyance of traffic over the
first operator's network. Any such interconnect charge
for the interconnection of two operators' network should
be considered to have two components:
An initial connection charge reflecting the up-front
cost of physical connection of one network to another
and any consequent costs arising. A conveyance charge
reflecting the transmission cost of traffic conveyed
through on operators' network on behalf of another.
Two further charge elements, which do not relate
directly to interconnect are often incorporated into
interconnect agreements:
♦ A tariff imbalance charge to recover the subsidies
of profit making services to loss making services
where such profits and losses arise our of cost and
tariff imbalances. Without this charge element
competitors would select "overpriced" services
without contributing to the "under priced"
services.
♦ A charge for the USO and Social Obligations
required by the TO.
INTERCONNECTION
Used to describe any task associated with connection of
two networks operated by different Organi2ations. Of
particular concern are the commercial terms of any
agreement between Organizations to interconnect their
networks.
INTERNET
Data communications network based on the Internet
Protocol TCP/IP. TCP/IP was developed as a US
military computer based communications standard which
has over recent years met great success in academic and
later in commercial applications - particularly for
Internetworking among different LAN environments and
servers.
INTRANET
A network internal to an enterprise that uses the same
methodology and techniques as the Internet. It is not
necessarily connected to the Internet and is commonly
secured from using firewalls. Intranets are often used in




A forum consisting of industry representatives and
chaired by OFTEL which meets periodically to discuss
commercial and regulatory aspects of interconnection





A working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) that is developing a security standard for Internet
Protocol (IP). Also, the security standard developed by a
workgroup of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It defines protocols for authentication, privacy,




A networking technique that unifies data and voice
communication into a single medium. Defined in the
Council Resolution on the development of the
integrated services digital network in the Community as a
European-wide telecommunications infrastructure for
1993 and beyond (92/C 158/01). See also Council
Recommendation of 5 June 1992 ISDN offerings in
accordance with ONP principles (92/383/EEC); OJ
L200/10, Common Technical Regulation for ISDN
(95/526/EC); OJ 300/38. The term EURO-ISDN is
used to address an ISDN implementation fully based on
harmonised European standards and in accordance with
the MOU on ISDN). B-ISDN is the next generation of
ISDN services that allow higher bandwidth services to be
provided using the ATM technology.
IT
An umbrella term for all types of automated information




Provisional approval for terminal equipment, established
inter alia for GSM terminals.
ITU
International Telecommunications Union
The UNs specialized agency for telecommunications.
The structure of the ITU has recently been reviewed to
adapt it to the changing information and
telecommunications environment. Formal changes were
agreed at an Additional Plenipotentiary Conference in
December 1992 and came in operation in March 1993.
These have separated the ITU into three sectors:
Standardisation, Radio communications and
Development.
JAVA
A programming language based on C and developed by
Sun Microsystems that extends and complements the
basic capabilities of Hypertext Mark-up Language
(HTML). Java has become a viable alternative to other
programming languages with the rapid growth of the
Internet, as it has the potential to work on an unlimited
number of computing devices and operating systems.




A password or table needed to decipher encoded data.
An encryption key is a string of digits that when used





A system for linking terminals, programs, storage and
geographic devices at multiple workstations over
relatively small geographic areas.
LEO
Eow Earth Orbiting satellite
Non-geostationary satellites in low-earth orbits. LEO
concepts play a particular role in current proposals for
satellite-based Personal Communications services.
LLU
Eoca/Eoop Unbundling
A service whereby a telecommunications organization
provides unbundled access to its local loop to another
telecommunications organization.
LOCAL ACCESS LOSS
In most countries, the cost attributed to the provision
and maintenance of the local loop exceeds the revenues
earned from tariffs charged for local retail access.
Conventionally, the revenues considered in this
calculation include only the initial connection and line
rental charges, they exclude revenues earned from calls
conveyed. The local access loss arises for four reasons:
♦ inefficiencies
♦ tariff imbalances
♦ loss incurred by operators to serve uneconomic
customers (because of the USO)
♦ losses incurred by operators to serve customers
whom they would serve without a USO because
they are profitable once incoming and outgoing call
revenues are included
LOCAL LOOP
A line connecting a customer's telephone equipment
with the local telephone company exchange.
LOTTERY
License award procedure on the basis of lotteries, which
has been used particularly in the United States.
MARKET INFLUENCE
The ability to raise prices above the competitive level in
that market for a non-transitory period without losing
sales to such a degree as to make this unprofitable.
MC
Marginal Costing
A cost standard, which measures the cost of producing
one, more unit of output or the cost saved by producing
one less unit of output holding constant the production
levels of all other products and services to the firm.
MCN
Micro Cellular Networks
Cellular Systems where normal-sized cells in the cellular
mobile radio network are split into very small
geographical areas of between a few hundred metres up
to a few kilometres ("micro-cells"). This technique
confers higher network capacities, lower power
transmitters, higher frequency efficiency through greater
frequency re-use and longer air-time (or lighter handsets)





The apparatus in the local concentrator (exchange)
building where the copper cables terminate and cross




USA: The Court-approved antitrust (Competition Law)
"consent order" separating the local and long distance
businesses of AT&T ("Divestiture") effective January
1984.
MIGRATION
The movement of telephone numbers fromo one range
(often a non-specified range) to another (specified) range.
MNO
Mobile Network Operator
Operator of mobile network infrastructure supporting
the transmission and provision of Radio communications
services. The activities of MNO's in most cases also
integrate mobile Service Provider (SP) functions (direct




Specific radio-based communications services for
numeric and alphanumeric data transmission. Such
services are currently used primarily for closed user
group applications, through for example, remote
database access or data/ E-mail transfer between
portable computers and a home network.
MODEM
A device which converts digital signals from a data-o o
transmitting terminal into modulated analogue signals
which can be carried by a public telephone network.
MOU
Memorandum ofUnderstanding
MOUs in the telecommunications field in Europe have
been entered into between operator's and/ or equipment
manufacturers or other market participants for the roll
out of new products and services.
NARROWBAND
A service or connection allowing only a limited amount
of information to be conveyed, such as for telephony.
This compare with broadband which allows a
considerable aount of information to be conveyed.
NCA
NationalConrpetitionAuthority
In 1962, the Council adopted Regulation 17/62; JO 1962,
13/204; OJ 1959-62, 87, which empowered the
Commission, acting in close and constant liaison with the
competent authorities of the Member States, to take the
requisite measures to apply the competition rules. The
dividing line between the Commission's and the NCA's
competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty is
set out in Article 9(3) of Regulation 17).
NETWORK OPERATORS
Operators that install, manage and operate their own
telecommunications transmission network to provide
public telephony services or public network services.
NETWORK SERVICES
The conveyance of calls, messages and signals over a
telecommunications network, including any necessary
switching; network services may be network
interconnection services, which are provided to other
network operators to enable calls and associated
functions to be passed through interconnected networks,
or basic retail network services which are provided top
other customers such as end users or service providers.
NFG
Network Futures Group
An industry Committee formed to advise OFTEL and






The US concept for ubiquitous availability of
communications infrastructure (both telecommunications
and cable) for the whole range of voice, data, and multi¬
media services, as proposed by the Clinton




Analogue Cellular System standard.
NON-GEOGRAPHIC SERVICES
Telecommunications services that are numbered from
national city area or local community.
NRA
National Regulatory Authority
Directive 88/301 and 90/388 both require Member
States to ensure the separation of regulator)' activities




The Danish National Regulatory Authority (NRA)
NTP
Network Termination Point
Used in a regulator)' sense to refer to the physical and
logical point at the boundary between a customers
system and the public Telecommunications Network.
Precise definitions are service dependant.
NUA
NUA is the authoritative online source for information
on Internet demographics and trends. NUA was founded
in 1996. NUA Internet Surveys was aquired injune 2001
by the Scope Communications Group, Ireland's leading
IT Media Company.
NUMBER PORTABILITY
The possibility for a subscriber to keep his telephone




Used by all operators as an alternative to disconnection
of service. If a customer fails to settle their account
within a specified time period, the operator will offer
OCB with a repayment plan. If a customer defaults on
that payment plan, the operator may disconnect the
service.
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ODTR
Office of the Director ofTelecommunications Regulation
The Irish National Regulator)' Authority (NRA).
OFTEL
Office ofTelecommunications
The UK National Regulator)' Authority (NRA), together
with the Department ofTrade and Industry.
An independent regulator)' body headed by a semi-
independent government official (the Director General
of Telecommunications).
OFTEL is acting in collaboration with the
Government Department, DTI and has the functions of
advising the DTI on the grant of telecommunications
licenses, monitoring the operation of the networks,
enforcing licenses and recommending changes. The
Competition and Services Utilities Act 1992 has




USA: FCC-mandated programme for RBOC's to develop
non-discriminatory standards and procedures for access,
interconnection and use of "bottleneck" facilities.
ONP
Open Network Provision
Defined in Council Directive 90/387/EEC.
A developing set of pan-European standards for ensuring
the provision of the Network infrastructure by European
Telecommunications administrations to users and
competitive service providers on terms equal to those for
the administration themselves.
OPTA
Onafhankelijke Post en TelecommunicateAntoriteit
The Netherlands National Regulator)' Authority (NRA).
OPTICAL FIBRE
Cable made of glass fibres through which signals are
transmitted as pulses of light. It is a broadband medium
that can easily provide capacity for a large number of
channels.
OSI
Open Systems Interconnection model
A standard committee of Member States national
regulator)' authorities (NRA) and others (EC, PTOs and
user representatives), which supervises the European
Commission's development of the ONP programme.
This covers measures aimed at ensuring that services
which are not yet required to be liveralized in all Member
States are regulated in such a way as to guarantee their
supply in accordance woth certain standards of




Private Automatic Branch RLxchange
Telephone switch providing speech connections within
an Organization, while also allowing user access to both
public switches and private network facilities outside the




A charge made by British Telecom to compensate for
freephone calls from pavphones to cover the costs of
running and maintaining BT pavphones. It is charged to
third parties who use freephone numbers originating on
pavphones. BT makes a corresponding internal charge.
The PAC is reffered to in BT's Carrier Price List as the
Pubpic payphone Supplementary Call Conveyance
Charge (PPSCCC).
PACKET SWITCHING
A data communications technique where a message is
broken down into fixed-length units which are then
transmitted to their destination through the fastest route:
although all units in a message may not travel the same
pathway, the receiving station ascertains that all units are
received and in proper sequence before forwarding the
complete message to an addressee.
PAGING
Radio communications based service involving non-
speech, one-way personal selective calling with a tone,
vibration or visual alert. The system may either simply
inform the user that someone is trying to contact him or




Provides shared use of a common radio communications
system for activities similar to PMR. By providing a
shared use PAMR can make more efficient use of the
frequencies available by allocating conversations to free




A telecommunications network in which the user
terminal is a light, handheld portable device that remains
with the individual as he or she moves along.
PCS
Personal Communications Services
A generic term for services which provide person-to-
person calling, independent of location, terminal used,
the means of transmission (wired or wireless) and/or the
choice of technology.
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PDAs
Persona!DigitalAssistants
Portable computer-based and often hand-held devices
combining a wide range of functions, such as diary,
address book, word processor, calculator, etc. and which
may support radio-based links for data transmission
and/or to Local Area Networks.
PDC
Persona!Digital Cellular
Japanese mobile digital standard, which has been
developed in parallel with the Personal I fandy Phone
(PHP) standard (similar to a two-way Telepoint
Application) and the N-Star Mobile Satellite System.
PERSONAL NUMBERS
A user with a personal number can instruct all calls to
that number to be diverted to any other number
(including a voice mail box).
PHYSICAL COLLOCATION
A service offered by a network operator to
interconnected network operators whereby the latter may
place, install and maintain equipment, software, and




PIN is used in GSM and other subscriber card-based




Private radio communications system, usually operating
on a local or regional basis from a single or small number
of radio channels. Users normally have to wait until a
channel is clear before they can use it, as the base station
can only communicate with individual mobiles. Large
users may manage many mobiles from a single base
station (taxi firms). Communication is generally limited
to a single (closed user) group.
POI
PointOfInterconnection
European Interconnection Forum's "Framework
Interconnection Guidelines" description for the actual
connection of one network to another network.
POTS
'Plain Old Telephone Service"
PPN
Personal and Portable Numbers
Personal and portable numbers are numbers, which are
to be independent of network, service provider, location
and terminal used, in contrast to current numbering,
which are country, network, and operator specific. Such
personal numbers would be of general application (and
therefore portable) across mobile and fixed network
services, providing full personal mobility and therefore a
kev element in Universal Personal Telecommunications
(UPT).
PSTN
Public Switched Telephone Network
The complete public telephone system, including








The Swedish National Regulatory Authority (NRA).
PTT
Post, Telegraph and TelephoneAdministration
Telecommunications Operator providing public services
with special rights or duties.
PUBLIC FIXED NETWORK SERVICES
The conveyance of calls, messages and signals over a
telecommunications network, including any necessary
switching; they may be network interconnection services,
which are provided to other network operators to enable
calls and associated functions to be passed through
interconnected networks, or basic retail network services,
which are provided to other customers such as end users
or service providers.
PUBLIC FIXED VOICE TELEPHONY
A service available to the public for the direct transport
on a commercial basis of real-time speech via the public
switched network, such that any user can use equipment
connected to a network termination point at a fixed
location to communicate with another user of equipment
connected to another termination point.
PUBLIC MOBILE TELEPHONYNETWORK
A public telephone network where the network
termination points are not at fixed locations.
PUBLIC MOBILE TELEPHONE SERVICE
A telephone service whose provision consists, wholly or
partly, in the establishment of radiocommunications to
one mobile user, and makes use wholly or partly of a
public mobile telephone network.
PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
A telecommunications network used, in whole or in part,
for the provision of publicly available
telecommunications services.
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QMNC
QualifyingMultinational Corporate Customers
Selected multinational customers meeting certain criteria
and eligible to be direct customers of the joint venture.
QoS
The ability to define a level of performance in a data
communications system. In e-business, QoS governs
access as the site reaches or exceeds capacity and sets
priorities for user sessions.
RACE
Research and Development Programme in Advanced
Communications Technologiesfor Europe
The RACE programme is defined in Council Decision
91/352/EEC of 7 June 1971 adopting a specific research
and technological development programme in the field
of telecommunications technologies. Within the mobile
and Personal Communications line, a number of projects
participate in the work towards third generation mobile
systems (UMTS and MBS). These include MONET,
ATDMA, CODIT, MBS, SAINT, TSUNAMI and
PLATON.
RADIOCOM 2000
Analogue Cellular System standard.
RBOC
RegionalBell Operating Companies
USA: The seven regional holding companies that
control the various BOC's after the court-ordered break¬
up of AT&T in 1984, following the "MFJ" order. Each
RBOC owns two or more "BOCs", but the terms are
often used interchangeable, along with RHC (Regional
1 lolding Company).
RE-FARMING
The re-allocation of radio spectrum (in particular the re¬
allocation of radio spectrum currently licensed for use
with equipment complying with GSM or DCS 1800
standards to allow the use of equipment complying with
3G standard).
Reg TP
Regu/ierungsbehordefiir Telekommunikation und Post
The German National Regulator}' Authority (NRA).
RES
Radio Equipment and Systems Committee
ETSI Technical Committee (TC), with broad
responsibilities in the field of Radio communications
equipment and systems.
RESALE
This concept relates to the use by an independent service
provider of a leased line, which is then made available to
another user. Value added features may or may not be




The terms and conditions for interconnection offered by
operators with SMP status for the purpose of the
Interconnection Directive.
ROAMING
Facility, supported by commercial arrangements between
operators and/or service providers, which enables a
subscriber to use his/her radio telephone equipment on
any other network which has entered into a roaming
agreement in the same or another country for both
outgoing and incoming calls.
RTT
Road Transport Telematics
A range of programmes, aimed at developing the radio-
based technology to provide road users with up to date
information (traffic conditions, route guidance, etc.) and
to support traffic management and control. Particular,
examples of these projects are the EU-programme
DRIVE - Dedicated Road Infrastructure for Vehicle
Safety in Europe, and within the EUREKA programme -
PROMETHEUS.
SCRAMBLING
The act of encoding a signal (eg. a TV programme) so




Synchronous transmission system allowing multiplexing
of signal at different speeds over the same medium, on
an "add-drop" basis. Under SDH, user information is
grouped within "virtual containers" (VCs), which in turn
can are encapsulated into "frames" containing
monitoring information for transmission at higher speed.
SERVICE PROVIDERS
Service providers offer services to end users involving
the use of mobile networks and services. The role of
service providers may van' between that of airtime
reseller to the provision of sophisticated value added
services. Service providers may be independent or form
part of a mobile network operation.
SES
Satellite Earth Station Committee
ETSI Technical Committee (TC), covering inter alia
mobile satellite communications equipment..
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SHARED COST SERVICE
Service for which the cost of the call are shared between
the caller and the called party, generally resulting in the
caller paying local rate and the called party being charged




A service provider by a network operator to
interconnected network operators whereby a call passed
on to the operator's network at a tandem exchange (i.e.
one that routes calls between exchanges but not having
direct connections to end users) is passed on to a local
exchange (i.e. one that does have direct connections to
end users).
SGMS
Second Generation Mobile Systems
A generic term encompassing digital mobile networks
and technology currently being deployed. It includes




A plastic card containing a microprocessor and memory
for use with GSM and DCS 1800 networks. The card
contains details of the subscriber, the subscriber's
services and personal telephone directories. Only
through the use of a legitimate card, can a user enable a
piece of equipment for use on the network. In GSM the
SIM is realized on a SM (Smart Card) that can be used in
any GSM terminal.
SMART CARD
A plastic card with built-in programmable chip used to
enable subscriber access to various communications
services especially in the financial and leisure industries.
SMG
SpecialMobile Group
ETSI Technical Committee (TC), with special
responsibility for GSM, DCS 1800, and the development
ofUMTS.
SOCIAL OBLIGATION
Obligations imposed upon the TO to provide such
services as public telephones, provision of special
equipment for disabled people, emergency service
numbers etc., that would not be provided under strictly
commercial circumstances.
SONERA
The Finnish incumbent long-distance operator.
SP
Service Provider
Service Providers offer services to end users involvingo
the use of mobile networks and services. The role of
service providers ma}1 vary between that of airtime
reseller to the provision of sophisticated value added
services. Service Providers may be independent or form
part of a mobile network operation.
SPECIAL RIGHTS
A special right exists where a Member State within a
given area designates, other than according to objective,
proportional, transparent and non-discnminatory criteria,
several competing undertakings or limits the number
other than according to such criteria or grants one or
more of these undertakings a lasting particular advantage
other than those advantages referred to in Article 87 of
the EEC Treaty. (See draft Commission Directive of 1
December 1993 amending Directives 88/301 /EEC and
90/388/EEC with regard to satellite communications -
see also Exclusive Rights)
SS7
Signalling System 7
Major digital protocol/ signalling system for managing
and transmitting control and routing information in
networks.
SUNK COST
These are costs, which an Organization is either












Independent regional advisory bodies set up by OFTEL.
TDMA
Time DivisionMultipleAccess
Special coding technique for digital radio transmission
whereby information in digital form is packed and
transmitted during pre-arranged time periods. The packaged
information is rearranged so that speech and data appears
continuously. TDMA is the transmission technique used for
the GSM system.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Conveyance of speech, music, and other sounds, visual
images or signals by electric, magnetic, electro-magnetic,
electro-chemical or electro-mechanical means.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
Transmission systems and, where applicable, switching
equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance
of signals between defined termination points bv wire, by
radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means. (See for







Limited mobility service involving the use of a cordless
telephone, carried by the user, to access the public network
from any point within range of shared radio base-stations.






Generic term for interconnected networks and services
available on a pan -European basis.
TERMINAL ID
The EIN Equipment Identification Number. Each piece
of GSM mobile or transportable equipment (the
terminal) has certain information programmed during
manufacture which can be used to uniquely identify the
unit and which the network uses to track stolen




Digital trunked mobile PAMR standard being developed by
ETSI. TETRA is a mobile communications system to be




A digital APC standard developed by ETSI and now
entering into service with a number of airlines. The system
comprises airborne equipment and a series of ground
stations through which telephone users whilst in flight can
initiate calls.
TGS
Third Generation Systems (See UMTS.)
THIRD PARTY
A firm that wishes to provide end-users with a digital service
in respect of which the use of Access Control services is
necessary. Third parties could be retailers or banks, for
example.
THIRD GENERATION MOBILE SYSTEMS
A European 3G mobile communications system will provide
an enhanced range of multimedia services (eg. I Iigh speed
Internet access). 3G networks are expected to enter service in
2002/3 using radion spectrum in the 2GHz hands.
TI
Telecommunications hrfrastrnctiire
The underl)ing physical components associated with the
provision of telecommunications transmission capacity. The
establishment of telecommunications infrastructure may
require rights of way, frequency assignments, ducts,
manholes, poles, cables, aerials, towers, buildings etc.
Telecommunications infrastructure specifically excludes
switching equipment associated with the provision of
switched telecommunications services. See also Alternative






'Ihe Austrian National Regulator)' Authority (NRA).
TO
Telecommunications Organicyitions
Defined in Directive 90/388/EEC as public or private
bodies to which Member States grant special or exclusive
rights for the provision of a public telecommunications
network and, when applicable service.
TRANSCONTROL
Ihe process of converting digital television services from die
format provided by on broadcaster into a format such that it
can be re-transmitted by another broadcaster.
TRANSIT
A transit service is a conveyance service provided by a
network between two points of interconnection. It is,
therefore, a service that links two networks that are not in
diemselves interconnected.
TRUNKNETWORK
That part of a telecommunications network which provides
connections between customer-serving exchanges.
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TROMBING
Sending traffic, which comes from a fixed and is destinated
for a mobile network in the same country via a second
country to take advantage of beneficial accounting rates for
termination of international traffic on mobile networks.
TS
Telecommunications Services
According to Commission Directive 90/388 (as amended
by Commission Directive 94/46) telecommunications
services means services whose provision consists
currently, wholly or partly, in the transmission and
routing of signals on the public telecommunications
networks by means of telecommunications processes,
with the exception of radio and television broadcasting to
the public. In this context, the term telecommunications
services is generally understood to be concerned with the
provision of transmission, switching and other activities
for the purpose of the conveyance of signals, without
regard to the content of the messages transmitted.
TSB
Telecommunications Standardisation bureau. (See CCl l 'l .)
UIFS
Universal Internationa!Freephone Service
ITU-T Recommendation establishing a global Freephone
service behind the country code 800. The




A technology and standard for third generation mobile
digital systems, currendy under development within
ETSI and by the RACE programme. UMTS should
support full personal communications services, delivered
over a combination of fixed and mobile networks. Work
in the framework of the ITU in this field is carried out
under Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunications
System. (FPLMTS).
UNICE
Union ofIndustrial and FLmployers Confederations ofFurope
UNIVERSAL SERVICE
The provision of telecommunications services permitting
access to a defined minimum service of specified quality
to all users everywhere and, in the light of specific
national conditions, at an affordable price. The notion of
Universal Service also includes, in particular, service to
disadvantaged users such as deaf and other disabled
users. Political orientations concerning the scope of
Universal Service have been provided by Council
Resolution 94/C 48/01 and the associated Commission
statement.
UNIX
An operating system originally designed by Bell
Laboratories, Unix has proven to be adaptable to a
variety of platforms. It is the dominant operating system
for critical applications, servers, and high-end




ITU-T Recommendation for establishing a personal
communications environment where the individual can
be reached through a single (personal) number
independent of network or location.
URL
Uniform Resonrce Locator
The character string that identifies an Internet
document's exact name and location, in the form http://
allowed by a domain name or IP address.
USER
Users means end-users, including consumers (e.g.
residential end-users), and service providers, including
telecommunications Organizations where the latter
provide services which are or maybe provided by others.




Special arrangements for collecting contributions to the
cost of Universal Service Obligations and transferringo o
funds to those network operators taking on those
obligations. Universal Service Funds are in operation in
a number of countries, e.g. in US and Australia, and are
normally established under strict regulator)' oversight.
An alternative or supplement to access charges (which
are normally paid directly to the operators of network
infrastructure as a contribution to their cost of Universal
Service Obligations). See also Access Charges.
uso
Universal Service Obligation
The Council Resolution of 7 February 1994, 94/C 48/06,
OJ C 48/1, 16.02.94 on the development of universal
service in the Telecommunications sector, defined a USO
as an obligation to provide a defined minimum service to
all users at an affordable price. By definition, this would
provide an obligation on the TO to provide voice
telephony services at a "loss" or under conditions falling
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Where a single company is active in more than one stage
in the production and supply of a good or service eg.
where a network operator also provides enhanced
services which are carried over the network or supplies
the consumer equipment needed to access services it
provides.
VIRTUAL COLLOCATION
A service offered by a network operator to
interconnected network operators whereby the latter may
select equipment, software, and databases to be placed,
installed and maintained by the former on its premises in
order to allow the latter to interconnect with its network.
VOICE MAIL




A technology offering two-way satellite Internet access.
WARC92
WorldAdministrative Radio Conferences
Global meetings within the framework of the ITU.
Following the recent changes in ITU, these meetings are
now referred to as World Radio Conferences (WRCs).
WARC 92 produced a number of agreements concerning
mobile and other, more specific allocations at both lower
and higher frequencies. These changes will in time permit
wider use of the band 1-3 GHz for mobile services, both
terrestrial and satellite based.
WIRELESS PBXS
Private mobile communications system providing local
area networking; where cabled connections between or
within sites are replaced by radio links; a HiperLan system
specified by ETSI refers to Radio communications sub¬
systems intended to provide high speed, short distance
links between computer systems. Wireless Public Branch
exchanges (PBXs) are telephone switching systems typically
in customer premises providing radio-based links
between subscriber equipment, private mobile
communications systems and /or the public network.
WLL
Wireless VocalLoop
The addition of a radio link to a fixed network in order
to provide a wireless connection for part or all of the
local loop, for instance between the chain and the home.
See DECT.
X-25
CCITT recommendation that specifies the interface
between user data terminal equipment and packet-
switching data circuit-terminating equipment.
X-400
An OSI and International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) standard messaging protocol that allows electronic
mail to move between different mail systems.
X-509
The certificate authority standard administered by the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The X-
509 Certificate is an (ITU) standards-based file format
binding a user or device to a public key.
XDSL
A collective term for all types of digital subscriber ines,
including asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL),
symmetric digital subscriber line (SDSL), and high-data-
rate digital subscriber line (HDSL).
ZERO LATENCY
A business process concept where redundant processes
are eliminated and human tasks are automated or
streamlined to reduce latency throughout the supply
chain to the customer.
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94/C 379/04; OJ C 379/5, 31.12.94
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION of 7 April 1995 on the Communication from the
commission's "Green Paper on the liberalization of Telecommunications infrastructure and cable television
networks" (part one - Principle and Timetable).
A4-0063/95; OJ C 109/310,01.05.95
EUROPEAN PARLLAMENT RESOLUTION of 19 May 1995 on the Commission's Communication to the
European Parliament and the Council "Towards die personal communications environment Green Paper on a
common approach in the field of mobile and personal communications in the European Union" (COM(94)0145
- C4-0061/94) and on the Commission's Communications to the European Parliament and the council on the
consultation on the Green Paper mobile and personal communications (COM(94)0492-C40046/95). A4-
0097/95; OJ C 151/479,19.06.95
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION of 19 May 1995 on the Green Paper on the liberalization of
Telecommunications infrastructure and cable television networks Part II: "A common approach to the provision
of infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Union.
A4-0111/95; OJ C 151/479,19.06.95
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 29 June 1995 on the further development of mobile and personal
communications sector in the European Union.
95/C 188/02; OJ C 188/3,22.07.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 17 July 1995 on a common technical regulation for public land-based European
radio message system (ERMES) receiver requirements.
05/290/EC; oj L 182/21,02.08.95
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 18 September 1995 on the implementation of the future regulatory framework
for Telecommunications.
95/C258/01; OJ C 258/1,03.10.95
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Open Network Provision (ONP) list of standards (fourth issue).
95/C 266/02; OJ C266/2,13.10.95
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COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 95/51 /EC of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to
the abolition of the restriction on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized
Telecommunications services.
95/51/EC; OJ L 256/49,26.10.95
DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data.
95/46/EC; OJ L 281/31,23.11.95
DIRECTIVE 95/47/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 October
1995 on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals.
95/47/EC; OJ L 281/51,23.11.95
COUNCIL DECISION of 6 November 1995 on a community contribution for Tclematic interchanges of data
between administrations in the Community (IDA).
95/468/EDC; OJ L 269/23,11.11.95
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DECISION of 9 November 1995 on a set of guidelines for
the development of the development of the EURO-ISDN as a Trans-European network.
2717/95/EC; OJ L 282/16, 24.11.95
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 27 November 1995 on the industrial aspects for the European Union in the
development of the Information Society.
95/C 341/03; OJ C 341/3,19.12.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 28 November 1995 on a common technical regulation for attachment
requirements for terminal equipment for digital European cordless communications (DECT), public access
profile (PAP) applications.
95/525/EC; OJ L 300/35,13.12.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 28 November 1995 on a common technical regulation for integrated services
digital network (ISDN); telephony 3,1kHz teleservice, attachment requirements for handset terminal.
95/526/EC; OJ L 300/38,13.12.95
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 13 December 1995 on the application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to
Voice Telephony.
95/62/EC; OJ L 321/6,30.12.95
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and
personal communications.
96/02/EC; OJ L 20/59,26.01.96
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 28 February 1996 amending Commission Directive 90/388/EEC regarding
the implementation of full competition in T elecommunications Markets.
96/19/EC; OJ L 74/13, 22.03.96
COUNCIL DECISION of 20 May 1996 adopting a muldannual Community Programme to stimulate the
development of a European multimedia content industry and to encourage the use ofmultimedia content in the
emerging Information Society. (INFO 2000).
96/338/EC; OJ L 129/24, 30.05.96
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION of 22 May 1996 on the Communication from the Commission
to the Council and the European parliament on future developments of the market in Directories and other
Telecommunications information services in a competitive environment [COM(95) 431-C4-0454/95].
A4-0141/96; OJ C 166/106,10.06.96
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ELJRC )PEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION of 12 December 1996 on the Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions on universal service for Telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalized environment.
C4-0205/96
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 21 November 1996 on new policy priorities regarding the Information Society.
OJ C 376,12 December 1996, p. 1
COMMISSION DECISION 96C/3342/3 of 22 November 1996 granting to the Republic of Ireland a
supplementary period for transposition of some provisions of Commission's Directives on competition in
Telecommunications Markets.
OJ C/169/5.
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 17 February 1997 on illegal and harmful content on the Internet.
OJ C70, 6 March 1997
DIRECTIVE 97/13/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a common
framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the field ofTelecommunications services,
OJ LI 17/15, 07 May 1997
DECISION No 710/97/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24
March 1997 on a coordinated authorization approach in the field of satellite personal-communications services in
the Community.
OJL 105/4, 23 April 1997
COMMISSION DECISION No 568/97/EC of 14 May 1997 on the granting of additional implementation
periods to Luxembourg for the implementation of Commission Directive 90/388/EC as regards full
competition in the Telecommunications Market.
OJ L 234/7,26 August 1997
COMMISSION DECISION No 603/97/EC of 10 June 1997 concerning the granting of additional
implementation periods to Spain for the implementation of Commission Directive 90/388/EC as regards full
competition in the Telecommunications Markets.
OJ L 243/48, 05 September 1997
DECISION No 1336/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1997 on a series of
guidelines for Trans-European Telecommunications Network.
OJL 183/12,11 July 1997
COMMISSION DECISION No 607/97/EC of 18 June 1997 concerning the granting of additional
implementation periods to Greece for the implementation of Commission Directive 90/388/EC as regards full
competition in the Telecommunications Markets.
OJ L 245/6,09 September 1997
DIRECTIVE 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30June 1997 on Interconnection in
Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the
principles ofOpen Network Provision (ONP).
OJL 199/32,26 July 1997
COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 22 September 1997 on the further development of a numbering policy for
Telecommunications Services in the European Community.
OJ C 303/1, 04 October 1997
DIRECTIVE 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of die Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council
Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in
Telecommunications.
OJ L 295/23, 29 October 1997
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DIRECTIVE 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1 December 1997 concerning the
processing ofpersonal data and the protection of privacy in die Telecommunications Sector.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 8 January 1998 on Interconnection in a liberalized
Telecommunications Market.
Part 1 — Interconnection Pricing.
COMMISSION NOTICE concerning the Status of Voice Communications on INTERNET under
Community Law and, in particular, pursuant to Directive 90/388/EC.
OJ No C 6,10January 1998.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION amending Rec 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998 on Interconnection
in a liberalised telecommunications market - Part 1 : Interconnection Pricing.
DIRECTIVE 98/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to telecommunication
terminal equipment and satellite earth station equipment, including the mutual recognition of their
conformity : PROPOSAL BY THE COMISSION for a Decision of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the co-ordinated introduction ofmobile and wireless communications (UMTS) in the
Community. Common position with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection.
DIRECTIVE 98/10/EC on the application ofONP to Voice Telephony and Universal Service for
telecommunications in a competitive environment.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on Interconnection in a liberalized telecommunication market.
Part 2: Accounting separation and cost accounting (Part 1 was published on 15 October 1997)
COMMON POSITION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL concerning the coordinated introduction of a
third -generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community.
DIRECTIVE 98/61 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/33/EC
with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection.
DECISION NO 128/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordinated
introduction of a third-generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the
Community.
DIRECTIVE 1999/59/EC of the Council amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards the
value added tax arrangements applicable to telecommunications services.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on Leased Lines Interconnection Pricing in a liberalised
telecommunications market.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION amending Rec 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998 on Interconnection
in a liberalised telecommunications market - Part 1 : Interconnection Pricing
COMMISSION PROPOSAL C(2000)1059 for a Recommendation on Unbundled Access to the Local
Loop.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop enabling the
competitive provision of a full range of electronic communications services including broadband
multimedia and high-speed internet: 2000/417/EC.
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INFORMAL CONSOLIDATED TEXT OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on unbundled access to the local loop,
including the amendments voted by the European Parliament during the plenary session of 26 October
2000. During the plenary debate Commissioner Liikanen stated the Commission position, indicating that
all of them would be acceptable. It will be now to the Council to confirm also the acceptance of the
proposed amendments for final adoption of the Regulation.(This text is subject to revision by Legal
Linguists prior to its definitive adoption.)
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Unbundled
Access to the Local Loop
(final text, adopted by Council 5 December 2000, incorporating EP amendments.)
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop enabling the
competitive provision of a full range of electronic communications services including broadband
multimedia and high-speed internet: 2000/417/EC.
COMMISSION PROPOSAL C(2000)1059 for a Recommendation on Unbundled Access to the Local
Loop. 26 April 2000.
REGULATION NO. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Unbundled Access
to the Local Loop (final text, adopted by Council 5 December 2000, incorporating EP amendments.)
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION C(2002)561 amending Rec 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998, as last
amended by Recommendation 2000/263/EC, on Interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications
market (Part 1 - Interconnection Pricing) 22 February 2002
DIRECTIVE 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services (Universal Service Directive) 24 April 2002
DIRECTIVE 2002/21 /EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services (Framework Directive) 24 April 2002
DIRECTIVE 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services
(Authorisation Directive), 24 April 2002
DIRECTIVE 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks
and associated facilities (Access Directive) 24 April 2002.
DECISON ON THE SPECTRUM POLICY GROUP, 26 July 2002.
COMMISSION DECISION establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services. 29 July 2002.
DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in
the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 31 july 2002.
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COMMISSION DECISION of 21 December 1993 on a common technical regulation for the
general attachment requirements for public pan-] European cellular digital land-based mobile communications.
94/11 /EC, OJ L 8/20,12.01.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 21 December 1993 on a common technical regulation for the
telephony application requirements for public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications.
94/12/EC, OJ L 8/23,12.01.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 18 July 1994 on a common technical regulation for attachment
requirements for terminal equipment interface forONP 248 Kbit/s digital unstructured leased line.
94/470/EC, OJL 194/87,29.07.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 18 July 1994 on a common technical regulation for general
terminal attachment requirements for Digital European Cordless Telecommunications. (DECT).
94/471 /EC, OJ L 194/89,29.07.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 18 July 1994 on a common technical regulation for telephony application requirements for Digital
European Cordless Telecommunications (DECT).
94/472/EC, OJ L 194/91,29.07.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 18 November 1994 on a common technical regulation for the pan-European Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) primary rate access.
94/796/EC, OJ L 329/1,20.12.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 18 November 1994 on a common technical regulation for tire pan-European Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) basic access.
94/797/EC, OJ L 329/14,20.12.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 December 1994 on a common technical regulation for attachment requirements for terminal
equipment interface for ONP 64 Kbit/s digital unstructured leased line.
94/821 /EC, OJ L 339/81,29.12.94
COMMISSION DECISION of 17 July 1995 on a common technical regulation for public land-based European radio message
system (ERMES) receiver requirements.
95/290/EC, OJ L 182/21,02.08.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 28 November 1995 on a common technical regulation for attachment requirements for terminal
equipment for Digital European Cordless Telecommunications (DECT), Public Access Profile (PAP) applications. (Text widt EEA
relevance).
95/525/EC, OJ L 300/35,13.12.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 28 November 1995 on a common technical regulation for Integrated Services digital Network
(ISDN); Telephony 3,1 kHz teleservice, attachment requirements for handset terminals. (Text with EEA relevance).
95/526/EC, OJ L 300/38,13.12.95
COMMISSION DECISION of 10 January 1996 on a common technical regulation for access to Packet Switched Public Data
Networks (PSPDNs) using CClTT recommendation X.25 interfaces. (Text with EEA relevance).
96/71/EC, OJ L 13/23,18.01.96
COMMISSION DECISION of 23 October 1996 on a common technical regulation for telephony application requirements for
public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications, Phase II (Text with EEA relevance).
96/629/EC, OJ L 282/75,01.11.96
COMMISSION DECISION of 23 October 1996 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for
public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications, Phase II (Text with EEA relevance).
96/630/EC, OJ L 282/79,01.11.96
COMMISSION DECISION of 20 May 1997 on a common technical Regulation for die pan-European Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) basic access. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/346/EC, OJ L 148/19,06.06.97
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COMMISSION DECISION of 20 Ma)1 1997 on a common technical Regulation for the pan-European Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) primary rate access. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/347/EC, OJ L 148/24,06.06.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for terminal
equipment to interface to Open Network Provision (ONP) two-wire analogue leased lines. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/486/EC, OJ L 208/44, 02.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for terminal
equipment to interface to Open Network Provision (ONP) four-wire analogue leased lines. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/487/EC, OJ L 208/47,02.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for the terminal
equipment interface for connection to 248 kbits/s digital unstructured ONP leased lines (Amendment 1) (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/520/EC, OJ L 215/41,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for the terminal
equipment interface for connection to 248 kbits/s digital structured ONP Leased Lines. (Text widi EEA relevance).
97/521/EC, OJ L 215/44,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for the terminal
equipment interface for connection to 64 kbits/s digital unstructured ONP 1 eased Lines. (Amendment 1) (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/522/EC, OJ L 215/46,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 0 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general terminal attachment requirements for
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) (edition 2) (Text with EEA relevance).
97/523/EC, OJ L 215/48,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the telephony application requirements for
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECI). (edition 2) (Text with EEA relevance).
97/524/EC, OJ L 215/50,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for terminal
equipment for Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) generic access profile (GAP) applications. (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/525/EC, OJ L 215/52,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for public
pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications. (Edition 2) (Text with EEA relevance)
97/526/EC, OJ L 215/54,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the telephony application requirements for
public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications. (Edition 2) (Text with EEA relevance).
97/527/EC, OJ L 215/57,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for mobile
stations intended to be used with Phase II public digital cellular Telecommunications Network operating in the DCS 1800 band.
(Text with EEA relevance).
97/528/EC, OJ L 215/60,07.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the telephony application requirements for
mobile stations intended to be used with Phase II public digital cellular Telecommunications Networks operating in the DCS 1800
band. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/529/EC, OJ L 215/65,07.08.97
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COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for terminal equipment to be connected to public
circuit switched data networks and ONP Leased Circuits using a CCI'IT Recommendation X.21 type interface. (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/544/EC, OJ L 223/18,13.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 9 July 1997 on a common technical regulation for the general attachment requirements for Data
Terminal Equipment (DET) to connect to Packet Switched Public Data Networks (PSPDNs) offering CCITT Recommendation
X.25 interfaces. (Text with EEA relevance).
97/545/EC, OJ L 223/21,13.08.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 19 September 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for the
terminal equipment interface for connection to 34 Mbit/s digital unstructured and structured leased lines. (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/639/EC, OJ L 271/16,03.10.97
COMMISSION DECISION of 31 October 1997 on a common technical regulation for the attachment requirements for the
terminal equipment interface for connection to 140 Mbit/s digital unstructured and structured Leased Lines. (Text with EEA
relevance).
97/751 /EC, OJ L 305/66,08.11.97
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HBj EUROPEAN UNION
DIRECTIVE 97/33/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
OF 11 JUNE 1997
ON INTERCONNECTION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
WITH REGARD TO ENSURING UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND
INTEROPERABILITY THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF OPEN NETWORK PROVISION (ONP)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
of 11 June 1997
on Interconnection in Telecommunications
with regard to ensuring Universal Service and
Interoperability through Application of the Principles
ofOpen Network Provision (ONP)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 95 thereof,
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Having regard to the proposal from the Commission542,
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee543,
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the Treaty544 in the light of the joint text approved by the
Conciliation Committee on 19 March 1997,
(1) Whereas from 1 January 1998, with transition periods for certain Member States, the provision of telecommunications
services and infrastructure in the Community will be liberalized; whereas the Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on
universal service principles in the telecommunications sector545 recognizes that in order to promote Community-wide
telecommunications services there is a need to ensure interconnection of public networks and, in the future competitive
environment, interconnection between different national and Community operators; whereas Council Directive
90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the
implementation of open network provision546 lays down harmonized principles for open and efficient access to, and use of,
public telecommunications networks and, where applicable, publicly available services; whereas the Council Resolution of 22
July 1993 on the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector and the need for further development in that
market547 recognizes that open network provision measures provide an appropriate framework for harmonizing
interconnection conditions; whereas this harmonization is essential for the establishment and proper functioning of the
internal market for telecommunications services; whereas the Council Resolution of 18 September 1995 on the
implementation of the future regulatory framework for telecommunications548 recognizes as key factors of this future
regulatory framework the maintenance and development of a universal service as well as a specific regulation on
interconnection, and sets out some guidelines on these subjects;
(2) Whereas a general framework for interconnection to public telecommunications networks and publicly available
telecommunications services, irrespective of the supporting technologies employed, is needed in order to provide end-to-end
interoperability of services for Community7 users; whereas fair, proportionate and non-discriminatory conditions for
interconnection and interoperability are key factors in fostering the development of open and competitive markets;
(3) Whereas the abolition of special and exclusive rights in telecommunications means that certain existing definitions need to be
revised; whereas for the purposes of this Directive, telecommunications services do not include radio and television
broadcasting services; whereas the technical conditions, tariffs, usage and supply conditions that apply7 to interconnection
may be different from the conditions that apply at end user/network interfaces;
(4) Whereas the regulatory7 framework for interconnection covers those situations where the interconnected networks are used
for the commercial provision of publicly available telecommunications services; whereas the regulatory framework for
interconnection does not cover cases where a telecommunications network is used for the provision of telecommunications
services available only to a specific end user or to a closed user group, but covers only cases where a telecommunications
network is used for the provision of publicly available services; whereas telecommunications networks which are
interconnected may be owned by the parties involved or may be based on leased lines and/or transmission capacity not
owned by the parties involved;
(5) Whereas, following the removal of special and exclusive rights for telecommunications services and infrastructure in the
Community, the provision of telecommunications networks or services may require some form of authorization by Member
States; whereas Organizations authorized to provide public telecommunications networks or publicly available
telecommunications services in all or part of the Community should be free to negotiate interconnection agreements on a
commercial basis in accordance with Community law, subject to supervision and, if necessary, intervention by national
regulatory authorities; whereas it is necessary to ensure adequate interconnection within the Community of certain networks
and interoperability of services essential for the social and economic well-being of Community7 users, notably fixed and
mobile public telephone networks and services, and leased lines; whereas, for the purpose of this Directive "public" does not
refer to ownership, nor does it refer to a limited set of offerings designated as "public networks" or "public services", but
means any network or service that is made publicly available for use by third parties;
542 (OJ C 313). 24.11.1995. 7.
543 Opinion delivered on 29 February7 1996. (OJ No C 153). 28.05.1996. 21.
544 Opinion of the European Parliament of 14 February 1996. (Oj No C 65). 04.03.1996. p. 69.; Council Common
Position of 18 June 1996. (OJ No C 220). 29.07.1996. p. 13.; and Decision of the European Parliament
of 19 September 1996. (OJ C 320). 28.10.1996. p. 138.
545 (OJ C 48) 16.02.1994. p. 1.
546 (OJ L 192). 24.07.1990. p. 1.
547 (OJ C 213). 06.08.1993. p 1.
548 (OJ C 258). 03.10.1995. p. 1.
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(6) Whereas it is necessary to define those Organizations which have rights and obligations for interconnection; whereas in order
to stimulate development of new types of telecommunications services, it is important to encourage new forms of
interconnection and special network access at points other than the network termination points offered to the majority of
end users; whereas the market power of an Organization depends on a number of factors including its share of the relevant
product or service market in the relevant geographical market, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its ability to
influence market conditions, its control of die means of access to end users, its international links, its access to financial
resources and its experience in providing products and services in the market; whereas, the determination of which
Organizations have significant market power should be undertaken by national regulator}7 authorities taking into account the
situation in die relevant market;
(7) Whereas the concept of universal service must evolve to keep pace with advances in technology, market development and
changes in user demand; whereas the new conditions for the provision of universal service should be assessed in die future
review of this Directive;
(8) Whereas obligations for the provision of universal service contribute to the Community objective of economic and social
cohesion and territorial equity; whereas there may be more than one Organization in a Member State with universal service
obligations; whereas Member States should encourage the early introduction of new technologies like die integrated services
digital network (ISDN) on as broad a basis as possible; whereas at its current stage of development in the Community,
ISDN is not accessible for all users and is not subject to the universal service provisions of this Directive; whereas it may be
appropriate in due course to consider whether ISDN should be part of the universal service; whereas the calculation of the
net cost of universal service should take due account of costs and revenues, as well as economic externalities and the
intangible benefits resulting from providing universal service but should not hinder the on-going process of tariff
rebalancing; whereas costs of universal service obligations should be calculated on the basis of transparent procedures;
whereas financial contributions related to the sharing of universal service obligations should be unbundled from charges for
interconnection; whereas, when a universal service obligation represents an unfair burden on an Organization, it is
appropriate to allow Member States to establish mechanisms for sharing the net cost of universal provision of a fixed public
telephone network or a fixed public telephone service with other Organizations operating public telecommunications
networks and/or publicly available voice telephony services; whereas this should respect the principles ofCommunity law, in
particular those of non-discrimination and proportionality and should be without prejudice to Article 95(2) of the Treaty;
(9) Whereas it is important to lay down principles to guarantee transparency, access to information, non-discrimination and
equality of access, in particular for Organizations with significant market power;
(10) Whereas pricing for interconnection is a key factor in determining the structure and the intensity of competition in the
transformation process towards a liberalized market; whereas Organizations with significant market power must be able to
demonstrate that their interconnection charges are set on the basis of objective criteria and follow the principles of
transparency and cost orientation, and are sufficiently unbundled in terms of network and service elements offered; whereas
publication of a list of interconnection services, charges, terms and conditions enhances the necessary transparency and
non-discrimination; whereas flexibility7 in the methods of charging for interconnection traffic should be possible, including
capacity -based charging; whereas the level of charges should promote productivity and encourage efficient and sustainable
market entry, and should not be below a limit calculated by the use of long-run incremental cost and cost allocation and
attribution methods based on actual cost causation, nor above a limit set by the stand-alone cost of providing the
interconnection in question; whereas charges for interconnection based on a price level closely linked to the long-run
incremental cost for providing access to interconnection are appropriate for encouraging the rapid development of an open
and competitive market;
(11) Whereas, where an Organization with special or exclusive rights in a non-telecommunications field also provides
telecommunications services, accounting separation or structural separation are appropriate means to discourage unfair
cross-subsidies at least above a certain turnover in telecommunications activities; whereas, when an Organization enjoys
significant market power, appropriate accounting separation between interconnection activities and other Telecom activities,
so as to identify all elements of cost and revenue related to those activities, ensures transparency7 of internal cost transfers;
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(12) Whereas national regulator)7 authorities have an important role in encouraging the development of a competitive market in
die interests of Community users, and of securing adequate interconnection of networks and interoperability of services;
whereas adequate interconnection takes account of the requests of the operator wishing to interconnect, in particular
concerning the most appropriate interconnection points, with each operator having responsibility for earning calls and
setting charges to each other up to the interconnection point; whereas negotiation of interconnection agreements can be
facilitated by national regulatory authorities setting down certain conditions in advance, in accordance with Community law,
taking into account the recommendations defined by the Commission so as to facilitate the development of a genuine
European home market, and identifying other areas to be covered in interconnection agreements; whereas in the event of a
dispute over interconnection between parties in tire same Member State, an aggrieved party7 must be able to call on the
national regulatory authority to resolve the dispute; whereas national regulatory authorities must be able to require
Organisations to interconnect their facilities, where it can be demonstrated that this is in the users' interests;
(13) Whereas, in accordance with Directive 90/387/EEC, the essential requirements justifying restrictions on access to and use of
public telecommunications networks or services are limited to security of network operations, maintenance of network
integrity, interoperability of services in justified cases, and protection of data as appropriate; whereas the reasons for these
restrictions must be made public; whereas the provisions of this Directive do not prevent a Member State from taking
measures justified on grounds set out in Articles 36 and 56 of the Treaty7, and in particular on grounds of public security,
public policy and public morality;
(14) Whereas facility sharing can be of benefit for town planning, environmental, economic or other reasons, and should be
encouraged by national regulatory authorities on the basis of voluntary agreements; whereas compulsory facility sharing may
be appropriate in some circumstances, but should be imposed on Organizations only after full public consultation;
(15) Whereas numbering is a key element for equal access; whereas national regulatory authorities should have the responsibility
for administering and controlling national numbering plans, and those naming and addressing aspects of telecommunications
services where coordination at a national level is required, so as to ensure effective competition; whereas in exercising this
responsibility, national regulatory authorities must have regard to the principle of proportionality, particularly as to the effect
of any measures on network operators, revellers and consumers; whereas number portability is an important facility for users,
and should be implemented as soon as practicable; whereas numbering schemes should be developed in full consultation
with all the parties involved and in harmony with a long-term Europe-wide numbering framework and international
numbering schemes as being considered in the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations (CEPT); whereas numbering requirements in Europe, the need for the provision of pan-European and new
services and the globalization and synergy of the telecommunications market require coordination of national positions in
accordance with die Treaty in international Organizations and fora where numbering decisions are taken;
(16) Whereas, in accordance with Directive 90/387/EEC, the harmonization of technical interfaces and access conditions must
be based on common technical specifications which take account of international standardization; whereas the development
ofnew European standards for interconnection mav be needed; whereas in accordance with Council Directive 83/189/EEC
of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and
regulations549, new national standards must not be developed in areas where harmonized European standards are under
development;
(17) Whereas, in accordance with Directive 90/387/EEC, open network provision conditions must be transparent and published
in an appropriate manner; whereas that Directive set up a Committee (the ONP Committee) to assist the Commission, and
provides a procedure for consultation with telecommunications Organizations, users, consumers, manufacturers and service
providers;
(18) Whereas in addition to the rights of recourse granted under national or Community law, there is a need for a simple
procedure to resolve cross-border disputes which lie outside the competence of a single national regulatory authority;
whereas this procedure, to be initiated at the request of either party in dispute, should be responsive, inexpensive and
transparent;
(19) Whereas, to enable the Commission to monitor effectively the application of this Directive, it is necessary that Member
States notify to the Commission the national regulatory authorities which will be responsible for the functions created by this
Directive and the Organizations covered by its provisions;
549 (OJ L 109). 26.04.1983. p. 8. Directive as last amended bv Commission Decision 96/139/EC. (OJ L 32). 10.02.1996.
p. 31.
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(20) Whereas given the dynamic development in this sector, a responsive procedure for adjustment of some Annexes to this
Directive should be established which takes full account of the views of Member States and should involve the ONP
Committee;
(21) Whereas a modus vivendi350 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the
implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance widi the procedure laid down in Article 189b of die Treaty was
concluded on 20 December 1994;
(22) Whereas the implementation of certain obligations must be linked to the date of liberalization of telecommunications
services and infrastructure and, in particular in regard to the relevant Member States, take full account of the relevant
transition periods, including the retention of special or exclusive rights in relation to direct interconnection between the
mobile networks of those Member States and the fixed or mobile networks of other Member States; whereas deferment of
the obligation to provide number portability may be granted where the Commission agrees that the obligation would impose
an excessive burden on certain Organizations;
(23) Whereas this Directive does not, in the case of undertakings which are not established in the Community, prevent the
adoption ofmeasures in accordance with both Community law and existing international obligations designed to ensure that
nationals of the Member States enjoy similar treatment in third countries; whereas Community undertakings should benefit
in third countries from treatment and effective access that is comparable to the treatment and access to the market which is
conferred on nationals of the countries concerned within the Community context; whereas in negotiations on
telecommunications the Community will have to seek a balanced multilateral agreement which provides Community
operators with effective and comparable access in third countries;
(24) Whereas the functioning of this Directive should be reviewed by 31 December 1999, in particular to examine the scope of
universal service and the timetable for number portability; whereas the situation with regard to interconnection with third
countries should also be periodically reviewed, to allow appropriate action to be taken;
(25) Whereas the essential goal of interconnection of networks and interoperability of services throughout the Community
cannot be sufficiently achieved at Member State level, and can therefore be better achieved at Community level by this
Directive; whereas it is desirable, when this Directive is reviewed, to assess the case for the establishment of a European
Regulatory Authority, taking into account i.e. the preparatory work undertaken by the Commission; whereas when effective
competition is achieved in the market, the competition rules of the Treaty will in principle be sufficient to monitor fair
competition ex-post so that the need for this Directive will be reconsidered, with the exception of the provisions on universal
service and the settlement ofdisputes.
(26) Whereas this Directive is without prejudice to the application of the competition rules of the Treaty,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
Scope and aim
This Directive establishes a regulatory framework for securing in the Community the interconnection of telecommunications
networks and in particular the interoperability of services, and with regard to ensuring provision of universal service in an
environment of open and competitive markets.
It concerns the harmonization of conditions for open and efficient interconnection of and access to public telecommunications
networks and publicly available telecommunications services.
Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) "interconnection" means the physical and logical linking of telecommunications networks used bv the same or a different
Organization in order to allow the users of one Organization to communicate with users of the same or another
Organization, or to access services provided by another Organization. Services may be provided by the parties' involved or
other parties who have access to the network;
550 (OJ C 102). 04.04.1996. p. 1.
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(b) "public telecommunications network" means a telecommunications network used, in whole or in part, for the provision of
publicly available telecommunications services;
(c) "telecommunications network" means transmission systems and, where applicable, switching equipment and other resources
which permit the conveyance of signals between defined termination points by wire, by radio, by optical or by other
electromagnetic means;
(d) "telecommunications services" means services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and routing of
signals on telecommunications networks, with the exception of radio and television broadcasting;
(e) "users" means individuals, including consumers, or Organizations using or requesting publicly available telecommunications
services;
(f) "special rights" means rights that are granted by a Member State to a limited number of undertakings through any legislative,
regulatory or administrative instrument which, within a given geographical area, limits to two or more the number of such
undertakings authorized to provide a service or undertake an activity, otherwise than according to objective, proportionate
and non-discnmmatoiy criteria, or designates, otherwise than according to such criteria, several competing undertakings as
being authorized to provide a service or undertake an activity, or confers on any undertaking or undertakings, otherwise than
according to such criteria, legal or regulatory advantages which substantially affect the ability of any other undertaking to
provide the same service or to undertake the same activity in the same geographical area under substantially the same
conditions.
(g) "universal service" means a defined minimum set of services of specified quality, which is available to all users independent
of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price.
2. Further definitions given in Directive 90/387/EEC shall apply, where relevant.
Article 3
Interconnection at national and Community level
1. Member States shall take all necessary measures to remove any restrictions, which prevent Organizations authorized by Member
States to provide public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services from negotiating
interconnection agreements between themselves in accordance with Community law. The Organizations concerned may be in the
same Member State or in different Member States. Technical and commercial arrangements for interconnection shall be a matter
for agreement between the patties involved, subject to the provisions of this Directive and the competition rules of the Treat)'.
2. Member States shall ensure the adequate and efficient interconnection of the public telecommunications networks set out in
Annex I, to the extent necessan' to ensure interoperability of these services for all users within the Community.
3. Member States shall ensure that Organizations, which interconnect dieir facilities to public telecommunications networks and/or
publicly available telecommunications services respect at all, times the confidentiality of information transmitted or stored.
Article 4
Rights and obligations for interconnection
1. Organizations authorized to provide public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications
services as set out in Annex II shall have a right and, when requested by Organizations in that category, an obligation to negotiate
interconnection with each other for the purpose of providing the services in question, in order to ensure provision of these networks
and services throughout the Community. On a case-bv-case basis, the national regulator)' authority may agree to limit this obligation
on a temporary basis and on the grounds that there are technically and commercially viable alternatives to the interconnection
requested, and that the requested interconnection is inappropriate in relation to the resources available to meet the request. Any
such limitation imposed by a national regulator)' authority shall be fully reasoned and made public in accordance with Article 14(2).
2. Organizations authorized to provide public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services as
set out in Annex I which have significant market power shall meet all reasonable requests for access to the network including access
at points other than the network termination points offered to the majority of end users.
3. An Organization shall be presumed to have significant market power when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular
telecommunications market in the geographical area in a Member State within which it is authorized to operate.
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National regulator}' authorities may nevertheless determine that an Organization with a market share of less than 25% in the relevant
market has significant market power. The}' may also determine diat an Organization with a market share ofmore than 25% in the
relevant market does not have significant market power, hi either case, the determination shall take into account the Organization's
ability to influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the size of die market, its control of die means of access to end users,
its access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and services in die market.
Article 5
Interconnection and universal service contributions
1. Where a Member State determines, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, that universal service obligations represent
an unfair burden on an Organization, it shall establish a mechanism for sharing the net cost of die universal service obligations with
other Organizations operating public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available voice telephony services. Member
States shall take due account of die principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality in setting the contributions to
be made. Only public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services as set out in Part 1 of
Annex I may be financed in this way.
2. Contributions to the cost of universal service obligations if any may lie based on a mechanism specifically established for the
purpose and administered by a body independent of die beneficiaries, and/or mar take the form of a supplementary charge added to
the interconnection charge.
3. In order to determine the burden if any which the provision of universal service represents, Organizations widi universal service
obligations shall, at the request of dieir national regulator}' audiority, calculate the net cost of such obligations in accordance with
Annex III. The calculation of the net cost of universal service obligations shall be audited by the national regulator}' authority or
anodier competent body, independent of die telecommunications Organization, and approved by the national regulator}' authority.
The results of the cost calculation and the conclusions of the audit shall be open to the public in accordance widi Article 14(2).
4. Where justified on die basis of the net cost calculation referred to in paragraph 3, and taking into account the market benefit if
any which accmes to an Organization diat offers universal service, national regulatory authorities shall determine whedier a
mechanism for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations is justified.
5. Where a mechanism for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations as referred to in paragraph 4 is established, national
regulator}' authorities shall ensure diat the principles for cost sharing, and details of the mechanism used, are open to public
inspection in accordance with Article 14(2).
National regulator}' authorities shall ensure diat an annual report is published giving the calculated cost of universal service
obligations, and identifying the contributions made by all the parties involved.
6. Until such time as die procedure described in paragraphs 3,4 and 5 is implemented, any charges payable by an interconnected
party, which include or serve as a contribution to the cost of universal service obligations shall be notified, prior to dieir introduction,
to the national regulator}' authority. Widiout prejudice to /Article 17 of this Directive, where the national regulator}' authority finds
on its own initiative, or after a substantiated request by an interested party, that such charges are excessive, the Organization
concerned shall be required to reduce the relevant charges. Such reductions shall be applied retrospectively, from the date of
introduction of the charges, but not before 1 January 1998.
Article 6
Non-discrimination and transparency
For interconnection to public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services as set out in Annex I
provided by Organizations which have been notified by national regulatory audiorities as having significant market power, Member
States shall ensure that:
(a) the Organizations concerned adhere to the pnnciple of non-discrimination with regard to interconnection offered to others.
They shall appl}' similar conditions in similar circumstances to interconnected Organizations providing similar services, and
shall provide interconnection facilities and information to odiers under die same conditions and of the same quality as they
provide for their own services, or those of their subsidiaries or partners;
(b) all necessary information and specifications are made available on request to Organizations considering interconnection, in
order to facilitate conclusion of an agreement; the information provided should include changes planned for implementation
widiin die next six months, unless agreed odierwise by the national regulator}- authority;
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(c) interconnection agreements are communicated to the relevant national regulator)' authorities, and made available on request
to interested parties, in accordance with Article 14(2), with the exception of those parts, which deal with the commercial
strategy of the parties. The national regulatory authority shall determine which parts deal with the commercial strategy of the
parties. In evert' case, details of interconnection charges, terms and conditions and any contributions to universal service
obligations shall be made available on request to interested parties.
(d) information received from an Organization seeking interconnection is used only for the purpose for which it was supplied. It
shall not be passed on to other departments, subsidiaries or partners for whom such information could provide a
competitive advantage.
Article 7
Principles for interconnection charges and cost
accounting systems
1. Member States shall ensure that the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 6 apply to Organizations operating the public
telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services as set out in Parts 1 and 2 of Annex I, which
have been notified by national regulator)' authorities as having significant market power.
2. Charges for interconnection shall follow the principles of transparency and cost orientation. The burden of proof that charges
are derived from actual costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie with the Organization providing
interconnection to its facilities. National regulator)' authorities may request an Organization to provide full justification for its
interconnection charges, and where appropriate shall require charges to be adjusted. This paragraph shall also apply to
Organizations set out in Part 3 of Annex I which have been notified by national regulator)' authorities as having significant market
power on the national market for interconnection.
3. National regulator)' authorities shall ensure the publication, in accordance with Article 14(1), of a reference interconnection
offer. 'Ihe reference interconnection offer shall include a description of the interconnection offerings broken down into components
according to market needs, and the associated terms and conditions including tariffs.
Different tariffs, terms and conditions for interconnection may be set for different categories of Organizations which are authorized
to provide networks and services, where such differences can be objectively justified on the basis of the type of interconnection
provided and/or the relevant national licensing conditions. National regulator)' authorities shall ensure that such differences do not
result in distortion of competition, and in particular that the Organization applies the appropriate interconnection tariffs, terms and
conditions when providing interconnection for its own services or those of its subsidiaries or partners, in accordance with
Article 6(a).
The national regulator)' authority shall have the ability to impose changes in the reference interconnection offer, where justified.
Annex IV provides a list of examples of elements for further elaboration of interconnection charges, tariff structures and tariff
elements. Where an Organization makes changes to the published reference interconnection offer, adjustments required by the
national regulator)' authority may be retrospective in effect, from the date of introduction of the change.
4. Charges for interconnection shall, in accordance with Community law, be sufficiendy unbundled, so that the applicant is not
required to pay for anything not strictly related to the service requested.
5. Tire Commission shall, acting in accordance with die procedure laid down in Article 15, draw up recommendations on cost
accounting systems and accounting separation in relation to interconnection. National regulatory authorities shall ensure that the
cost accounting systems used by the Organizations concerned are suitable for implementation of the requirements of this Article,
and are documented to a sufficient level ofdetail, as indicated in Annex V.
National regulator)' authorities shall ensure that a description of the cost accounting system, showing the main categories under
which costs are grouped and the rules used for the allocation of costs to interconnection, is made available on request. Compliance
with die cost accounting system shall be verified by die national regulatory authority or another competent body, independent of the
telecommunications Organization and approved by the national regulator)' authority. A statement concerning compliance shall be
published annually.
6. Where they exist, charges related to the sharing of the cost of universal service obligations, as described in Article 5, shall be
unbundled and identified separately.
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Article 8
Accounting separation and financial reports
1. Member States shall require Organizations providing public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available
telecommunications services which have special or exclusive rights for the provision of services in other sectors in the same or
another Member State to keep separate accounts for the telecommunications activities, to the extent that would be required if the
telecommunications activities in question were carried out bv legally independent companies, so as to identify all elements of cost
and revenue, with the basis of their calculation and the detailed attribution methods used, related to their telecommunications
activities including an itemized breakdown of fixed asset and structural costs, or to have structural separation for the
telecommunications activities.
Member States may choose not to apply the requirements referred to in the first subparagraph to these Organizations where their
annual turnover in telecommunications activities in the Community is less than the limit set in Part 1 ofAnnex VI.
2. Member States shall require Organizations operating public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available
telecommunications services as set out in Parts 1 and 2 of Annex I and notified by national regulator)' authorities as Organizations
having significant market power which provide public telecommunications networks and/or telecommunications services available
for users and which offer interconnection services to other Organizations, to keep separate accounts for, on the one hand, their
activities related to interconnection — covering both interconnection services provided internally and interconnection services
provided to others — and, on the other hand, other activities, so as to identify all elements of cost and revenue, with the basis of their
calculation and die detailed attribution methods used, related to their interconnection activity, including an itemized breakdown of
fixed asset and structural costs.
Member States may choose not to apply die requirements referred to in the first subparagraph to Organizations where their annual
turnover in telecommunications activities in the Member States is less than the limit set in Part 2 ofAnnex VI.
3. Organizations providing public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services shall
provide financial information to their national regulatory authority- prompdy on request and to the level of detail required. National
regulatory- authorities may publish such information as would contribute to an open and competitive market, while taking account of
considerations of commercial confidentiality'.
4. The financial reports of Organizations providing public telecommunications networks or publicly available telecommunications
services shall be drawn up and submitted to independent audit and published. The audit shall be carried out in accordance with die
relevant rules of national legislation.
The first subparagraph shall also apply to the separate accounts required in paragraphs 1 and 2.
Article 9
General responsibilities of the national regulatory authorities
1. National regulatory authorities shall encourage and secure adequate interconnection in the interests of all users, exercising their
responsibility in a way that provides maximum economic efficiency- and gives the maximum benefit to end users. In particular,
national regulatory- authorities shall take into account
— the need to ensure satisfactory- end-to-end communications for users;
— the need to stimulate a competitive market;
— the need to ensure the fair and proper development of a harmonized European telecommunication market,
— the need to cooperate with their counterparts in other Member States;
— the need to promote the establishment and development ofTrans-European networks and services, and the interconnection
of national networks and interoperability of services, as well as access to such networks and services;
— die principles ofnon-discrimination (including equal access) and proportionality;
— the need to maintain and develop universal service.
2. General conditions set down in advance by die national regulatory authority shall be published in accordance with Article 14(1).
In particular, in relation to interconnection between Organizations set out in Annex II, national regulatory' authorities:
— may set ex ante conditions in the areas listed in Part 1 ofAnnex VII;
— shall encourage coverage in interconnection agreements of die issues listed in Part 2 ofAnnex VII.
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3. In pursuit of the aims stated in paragraph 1, national regulatory authorities may intervene on their own initiative at any time, and
shall do so if requested by either party, in order to specify issues which must be covered in an interconnection agreement, or to lay
down specific conditions to be observed by one or more parties to such an agreement. National regulatory authorities may, in
exceptional cases, require changes to be made to interconnection agreements already concluded, where justified to ensure effective
competition and/or interoperability of services for users.
Conditions set by the national regulator)- authority may include inter alia conditions designed to ensure effective competition,
technical conditions, tariffs, supply and usage conditions, conditions as to compliance with relevant standards, compliance with
essential requirements, protection of the environment, and/or the maintenance of end-to-end quality of service.
The national regulator)' authority may, on its own initiative at any time or if requested by either part)', also set time limits within
which negotiations on interconnection are to be completed. If agreement is not reached within the time allowed, the national
regulatory authority shall take steps to bring about an agreement under procedures laid down by that authority. 'Ihe procedures shall
be open to the public in accordance with Article 14(2).
4. Where an Organization authorized to provide public telecommunications networks or publicly available telecommunications
services enters into interconnection agreements with others, the national regulatory authority shall have the right to inspect all such
interconnection agreements in their entirety.
5. In the event of an interconnection dispute between Organizations in a Member State, the national regulatory authority of that
Member State shall, at the request of either party, take steps to resolve the dispute within six months of this request. The resolution
of the dispute shall represent a fair balance between the legitimate interests ofboth parties.
In so doing, the national regulator)' authority shall take into account, inter alia:
— the user interest,
— regulator)' obligations or constraints imposed on any of the parties,
die desirability of stimulating innovative market offerings, and of providing users with a wide range of telecommunications
services at a national and at a Community level,
— the availability of technically and commercially viable alternatives to the interconnection requested,
— the desirability ofensuring equal access arrangements,
— the need to maintain the integrity of the public telecommunications network and the interoperability of services,
— the nature of the request in relation to the resources available to meet the request,
— the relative market positions of the parties,
— the public interest (e.g. the protection of the environment),
— the promotion of competition,
— the need to maintain a universal service.
A decision on the matter by a national regulator)' authority shall be made available to the public in accordance with national
procedures. The parties concerned shall be given a full statement of the reasons on which it is based.
6. In cases where Organizations which are authorized to provide public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available
telecommunications services have not interconnected their facilities, national regulator)' authorities, in compliance with the principle
of proportionality' and in the interest of users, shall be able, as a last resort, to require the Organizations concerned to interconnect
their facilities in order to protect essential public interests and, where appropriate, shall be able to set terms of interconnection.
Article 10
Essential requirements
Without prejudice to action which may be taken in accordance with Articles 3(5) and 5(3) of Directive 90/387/EEC, the essential
requirements as specified in Article 3(2) ofDirective 90/387/EEC shall for the purpose of this Directive apply to interconnection to
public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services as set out in points (a) to (d) of this
Article.
Where the national regulatory authority imposes conditions based on essential requirements in interconnection agreements, these
conditions shall be published in the manner laid down in Article 14(1).
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(a) Security of network operations: Member States shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the availability of public
telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services is maintained in the event of catastrophic
network breakdown or in exceptional cases of force majeure, such as extreme weather, earthquakes, flood, lightning or fire.
In the event of the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph, the bodies concerned shall make even- endeavour to
maintain the highest level of service to meet any priorities laid down by the competent national authorities. The need to
meet these requirements shall not constitute a valid reason for refusal to negotiate terms for interconnection. Furthermore,
the national regulator)7 authority shall ensure that any conditions for interconnection related to the security of networks as
regards risk of accidents are proportionate and non-disenminatorv in nature, and are based on objective criteria identified in
advance.
(b) Maintenance of network integrity: Member States shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the integrity of public
telecommunications networks is maintained. The need to maintain network integrity does not constitute a valid reason for
refusal to negotiate terms for interconnection. The national regulator)' authority shall ensure that any conditions for
interconnection related to protection of network integrity are proportionate and non-discriminatory in nature, and are based
on objective criteria identified in advance.
(c) Interoperability of services: Member States may impose conditions in interconnection agreements in order to ensure
interoperability of services, including conditions designed to ensure satisfactory end-to-end quality. Such conditions may
include implementation of specific technical standards, or specifications, or codes of conduct agreed by the market players.
(d) Protection of data: Member States may impose conditions in interconnection agreements in order to ensure the protection
of data, to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with relevant regulator!' provisions on the protection of data including
protection of personal data, the confidentiality of information processed, transmitted or stored, and the protection of privacy,
compatible with Community law.
Article 11
Collocation and facility sharing
Where an Organization providing public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services has
the right under national legislation to install facilities on, over or under public or private land, or may take advantage of a procedure
for tire expropriation or use of property, national regulator!' authorities shall encourage the sharing of such facilities and/or property
with other Organizations providing telecommunications networks and publicly available services, in particular where essential
requirements deprive other Organizations of access to viable alternatives.
Agreements for collocation or facility sharing shall normally be a matter for commercial and technical agreement between the parties
concerned. The national regulatory authority may intervene to resolve disputes, as provided for in Article 9.
Member States may impose facility and/or property sharing arrangements (including physical collocation) only after an appropriate
period of public consultation during which all interested parties must be given an opportunity to express their views. Such
arrangements may include rules for apportioning the costs of facility and/or property sharing.
Article 12
Numbering
1. Member States shall ensure the provision of adequate numbers and numbering ranges for all publicly available
telecommunications services.
2. In order to ensure full interoperability of Eiurope-wide networks and services, Member States in accordance with the Treaty
shall take all necessary steps to ensure the coordination of their national positions in international Organizations and fora where
numbering decisions are taken, taking into account possible future developments in numbering in Europe.
3. Member States shall ensure that national telecommunications numbering plans are controlled by the national regulator)'
authority, in order to guarantee independence from Organizations providing telecommunications networks or telecommuitications
services and facilitate number portability. In order to ensure effective competition, national regulator)' authorities shall ensure that
the procedures for allocating individual numbers and/or numbering ranges are transparent, equitable and timely and the allocation is
carried out in an objective, transparent and non-discriminator)' manner. National regulator)' authorities may lay down conditions for
the use of certain prefixes or certain short codes, in particular where these are used for services of general public interest (e.g.
freephone services, kiosk billed services, director)' services, emergency services), or to ensure equal access.
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4. National regulator)- authorities shall ensure that the main elements of the national numbering plans, and all subsequent
additions or amendments to them, are published in accordance with Article 14(1), subject only to limitations imposed on the
grounds of national security-.
5. National regulatory authorities shall encourage die earliest possible introduction of the number portability facility whereby end
users who so request can retain dieir number(s) on the fixed public telephone network at a specific location independent of the
Organization providing service, and shall ensure that diis facility- is available at least in all major centres of population before 1
January 2003.
In order to ensure diat charges to consumers are reasonable, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that pricing for
interconnection related to die provision of this facility is reasonable.
6. National regulator)' authorities shall ensure that numbering plans and procedures are applied in a manner that gives fair and
equal treatment to all providers of publicly available telecommunications services. In particular, Member States shall ensure that an
Organization allocated a range of numbers shall avoid undue discrimination in the number sequences used to give access to the
services ofother telecommunications operators.
Article 13
Technical standards
1. Without prejudice to Article 5(3) of Directive 90/387/EEC whereby the implementation of specified European standards may
be made compulsory, national regulator)- authorities shall ensure that Organizations providing public telecommunications networks
or publicly available telecommunications services take full account of standards listed in the Official journal of the European
Communities as being suitable for the purpose of interconnection.
In the absence of such standards, national regulator)- authorities shall encourage the provision of technical interfaces for
interconnection according to the standards or specifications listed below;
— standards adopted by European standardization bodies such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) or the European Committee for Standardization/European Committee for Electro technical Standardization
(CEN/CENELEQ,
— or, in the absence of such standards,
— international standards or recommendations adopted by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Electro technical Committee (IEC),
— or, in the absence of such standards,
— national standards.
2. The Commission may, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, request standards for interconnection
and access to be drawn up, where appropriate, by European standardization bodies. Reference to standards for interconnection and
access may be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities in accordance with Article 5 of Directive
90/387/EEC.
Article 14
Publication of and access to information
1. With regard to the information identified in Article 7(3), Article 9(2), Article 10 and Article 12(4), national regulator)- authorities
shall ensure that up-to-date information is published in an appropriate manner in order to provide easy access to that information for
interested parties. Reference shall be made in the national Official Gazette of the Member State concerned to the manner in which
this information is published.
2. With regard to the information identified in Article 4(1), iVrticle 5(3), Article 5(5), Article 6(c) and Article 9(3), national
regulator)- authorities shall ensure that up-to-date specific information referred to in those Articles is made available on request to
interested parties, free of charge, during normal working hours. Reference shall be made in tire national Official Gazette of the
Member State concerned to the times and location(s) at which the information is available.
3. Member States shall notify to the Commission before 1 January 1998 — and immediately thereafter in case of any change — the
manner in which the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 is made available. The Commission shall regularly publish a
corresponding reference to such notifications in the Official journal of the European Communities.
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Article 15
Advisory Committee procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the committee set up by Article 9(1) of Directive 90/387/EEC, hereinafter referred to as
the "ONP Committee".
2. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall
deliver its opinion on the draft, within a time limit, which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter, if
necessary by taking a vote.
3. The opinion shall be recorded in the minutes; in addition, each Member State shall have the right to ask to have its position
recorded in the minutes.
The Commission shall take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the committee. It shall inform the committee of the
manner in which its opinion has been taken into account.
Article 16
Regulatory Committee procedure
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 15, the following procedure shall apply in respect of the matters covered by Article
19.
2. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall
deliver its opinion on the draft within a time limit, which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The
opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148(2) of the Treaty in the case of decisions, which die Council is
required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the committee
shall be weighted in die manner set out in that Article. The chairman shall not vote.
3. The Commission shall adopt die measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of die committee.
4. If the measures envisaged are not in accordance widi the opinion of the committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the
Commission shall, widiout delay, submit to the Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a
qualified majority.
If on the expiry of a period of three months from the date of referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the proposed
measures shall be adopted by the Commission.
Article 17
Procedure for resolving disputes between
Organizations operating under authorizations provided by
different Member States
1. Without prejudice to:
— any action that the Commrssion or any Member State may take pursuant to the Treaty;
die rights of the party invoking the procedure in paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Organizations concerned or of any other part)'
under applicable national law;
The procedure set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be available for the resolution of interconnection disputes between Organizations
operating under authorizations granted by different Member States, where such dispute does not fall within the responsibility of a
single national regulatory authority exercising its power in accordance with Article 9.
2. Any part}' having a complaint against another Organization over interconnection may refer the complaint to the national
regulator}7 authority of the Member State that has granted the authorization of die Organization against which the complaint is made.
The national regulator}' authority shall take steps to resolve the dispute in accordance with the procedures and timescale set out in
Article 9(5).
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3. Where there are concurrent disputes between die same two Organizations, the national regulatory authorities concerned shall,
on request of either part}' in dispute, coordinate their efforts in order to bring about resolution of the disputes, in accordance with
die principles set out in Article 9(1), within 6 months of referral. The solutions shall represent a fair balance between the legitimate




1. Member States shall ensure that national regulator)' authorities have the necessary means for earning out die tasks identified in
this Directive, and shall notify to die Commission by 31 January 1997 the national regulator)' authorities responsible for those tasks.
2. National regulaton" authorities shall notify to the Commission by 31 January 1997, and immediately thereafter in the event of
an\' change, the names of those Organizations which:
— have universal service obligations for the provision of die public telecommunications networks and publicly available
telecommunications services set out in Part 1 of Annex I and which are authorized to collect directly a contribution to the
net cost of universal service under the procedure in Article 5(2);
— are subject to the provisions of this Directive concerning Organizations with significant market power;
— are covered by Annex II.
The Commission may request national regulator)- authorities to provide their reasons for classifying an Organization as having or not
having significant market power.
3. The Commission shall publish the names referred to in paragraph 2 in the Official Journal of die European Communities.
Article 19
Technical adjustment
Modifications necessary to adapt Annexes IV, V and VII to the Directive to new technological developments or to changes in
market and consumer demand shall be determined by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in .Article 16.
Article 20
Deferment
1. Deferment of the obligations under .Articles 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), 4(2), 9(1) and 9(3) insofar as those obligations concern direct
interconnection between the mobile networks of that Member State and the fixed ormobile networks of other Member States, and
under Article 5, shall be granted to those Member States identified in die Council Resolutions of 22 July 1993 and
22 December 1994 which benefit from an additional transition period for the liberalization of telecommunications services for as
long as and to the extent that they avail themselves of such transition periods. Member States shall inform the Commission of their
intention to make use of them.
2. Deferment of the obligations under Article 12(5) may be requested where the Member State concerned can prove that thev
would impose an excessive burden on certain Organizations or classes of Organization. The Member State shall inform the
Commission of the reasons for requesting a deferment, the date by which the requirements can be met, and the measures envisaged
in order to meet this deadline. The Commission shall consider the request taking into account the particular situation in that
Member State and the need to ensure a coherent regulaton" environment at a Community level, and shall inform the Member State
whether it deems that the particular situation in that Member State justifies a deferment and, if so, until which date such deferment is
justified.
Article 21
Interconnection with third country Organizations
1. Member States may inform the Commission of any general difficulties encountered, de jure or de facto, by Community
Organizations in interconnecting with Organizations in third countries, which have been brought to their attention.
2. Whenever the Commission is informed of the existence of such difficulties, the Commission may, if necessany submit
proposals to the Council for an appropriate mandate for negotiation of comparable rights for Community Organizations in these
third countries. The Council shall decide by qualified majority.
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1. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 December 1997, and periodically thereafter,
on the availability of rights to interconnect in third countries for the benefit of Community Organizations.
2. 'lhe Commission shall examine and report periodically to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of
this Directive, on the first occasion not later than 31 December 1999. For this purpose, the Commission may request information
from the Member States.
The report shall examine what provisions of this Directive should be adapted in the light of the developments in the market, the
evolution of technology and the changes in user demand, in particular
(a) for the provisions under Article 5;
(b) to confirm the timetable laid down in Article 12(5).
The Commission shall also investigate in the report the added value of the setting up of a European Regulatory Authority to carry
out those tasks, which would prove to be better undertaken at Community level.
Article 23
Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive
by 31 December 1997. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these provisions, these shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such
reference at the time of their official publication. The procedure for such reference shall be adopted by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions of national law, which they adopt in the
field covered by this Directive.
Article 24
Entry into force




This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels,
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ANNEX I
SPECIFIC PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND
PUBLICLYAVAILABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
referred to in Article 3(2)
The following public telecommunications networks and publicly available telecommunications services are considered of major
importance at European level.
Organizations providing the public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available services identified below which have
significant market power are subject to specific obligations with regard to interconnection and access, as specified in Articles 4(2), 6
and 7.
Part 1
The fixed public telephone network
The fixed public telephone network means the public switched telecommunications network which supports the transfer between
network termination points at fixed locations of speech and 3,1 kHz bandwidth audio information, to support inter alia:
— voice telephony;
— facsimile Group III communications, in accordance with ITU-T Recommendations in the "T-series";
voice band data transmission via modems at a rate of at least 2 400 bit/s, in accordance with ITU-T Recommendations in
the "V-series".
Access to the end user's network termination point is via a number or numbers in the national numbering plan.
The fixed public telephone service according to Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony551.
The fixed public telephone service means the provision to end users at fixed locations of a service for the originating and receiving of
national and international calls, and may include access to emergency (112) services, the provision of operator assistance, directory
services, provision of public pay phones, provision of service under special terms and/or provision of special facilities for customers
with disabilities or with special social needs.
Access to the end user is via a number or numbers in the national numbering plan.
Part 2
The leased lines service
Leased lines means the telecommunications facilities which provide for transparent transmission capacitv between network
termination points, and which do not include on-demand switching (switching functions which the user can control as part of the
leased line provision). They may include systems, which allow flexible use of the leased line bandwidth, including certain routing and
management capabilities.
Part 3
Public mobile telephone networks
A public mobile telephony network is a public telephone network where tire network termination points are not at fixed locations.
Public mobile telephone services
A public mobile telephone service is a telephony service whose provision consists, wholly or partly, in the establishment of
Radiocommunications to one mobile user, and makes use wholly or partly of a public mobile telephone network.
551 (OJL 321). 30.12.1995. p. 6.
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ANNEX II
ORGANIZATIONSWITH RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO NEGOTIATE
INTERCONNECTION WITH EACH OTHER IN ORDER TO ENSURE
COMMUNITY-WIDE SERVICES
referred to in Article 4(1)
'lliis Annex covers those Organisations, which provide switched and unswitched bearer capabilities to users upon which other
telecommunications services depend.
Organizations in the following categories have both rights and obligations to interconnect with each other, in accordance with
Article 4(1). Interconnection between these Organizations is subject to additional supervision by national regulatory authonties, in
accordance with /Article 9(2). Special interconnection charges, terms and conditions may exist for these categories ofOrganizations
in accordance with Article 7(3).
1. Organizations which provide fixed and/or mobile public switched telecommunications networks and/or publicly available
telecommunications services, and in so doing control the means of access to one or more network termination points identified by
one or more unique numbers in the national numbering plan. (See notes below)
2. Organizations, which provide leased lines to users' premises.
3. Organizations which are authorized in a Member State to provide international telecommunications circuits between die
Community and third countries, for which purpose diey have exclusive or special rights.
4. Organizations providing telecommunications services, which are permitted in this category to interconnect in accordance with
relevant national licensing or authorization schemes.
Notes
Control of the means of access to a network termination point means the ability to control the telecommunications services available
to the end user at that network termination point and/or the ability to deny other service providers' access to the end user at that
network termination point.
Control of the means of access may entail ownership or control of die physical link to die end user (whether wire or wireless),
and/or the ability to change or withdraw the national number or numbers needed to access an end user's network termination point.
ANNEX III
CALCULATINGTHE COST OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS FOR
VOICE TELEPHONY
referred to in Article 5(3)
Universal service obligations refer to those obligations placed upon an Organization by aMember State which concern die provision
of a network and service throughout a specified geographical area, including — where required — averaged prices in that geographical
area for the provision of that service.
The cost of universal service obligations shall be calculated as die difference between the net cost for an Organization of operating
with die universal service obligations and operating without die universal service obligations.
This applies whether die network in a particular Member State is fully developed or is still undergoing development and expansion.
The calculation shall be based upon the costs attributable to:
(i) elements of the identified services, which can only be provided at a loss or provided under, cost conditions falling outside
nonrial commercial standards.
This category may include service elements such as access to emergency telephone services, provision of certain public pay
telephones, provision of certain services or equipment for disabled people, etc.
(ii) specific aid users or groups of end users who, taking into account the cost ofproviding die specified network and service, the
revenue generated and any geographical averaging of prices imposed by the Member State, can only be served at a loss or
under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards.
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This category includes those end users or groups of end users, which would not be served by a commercial operator, which did not
have an obligation to provide universal service.
In peripheral regions with expanding networks, the cost calculation should he based on the additional cost of serving those end users
or groups of end users, which an operator applying the normal commercial principles of a competitive environment would choose
not to serve.
Revenues shall he taken into account in calculating the net costs. Costs and revenues should be forward-looking.
ANNEX IV
LIST OF EXAMPLES OF ELEMENTS FOR INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
referred to in Article 7(3)
Interconnection charges refer to the actual charges payable by interconnected parties.
The tariff structure refers to the broad categories into which interconnection charges are divided, e.g.
— charges to cover initial implementation of the physical interconnection, based on the costs of providing the specific
interconnection requested (e.g. specific equipment and resources; compatibility testing),
— rental charges to cover the on-going use ofequipment and resources (connection maintenance, etc.),
— variable charges for ancillary and supplementary services (e.g. access to directory services; operator assistance; data collection;
charging; billing; switch-based and advanced services etc.),
— traffic related charges, for the conveyance of traffic to and from die interconnected network (e.g. the costs of switching and
transmission), which may be on a per minute basis, and/or on die basis of additional network capacity required.
Tariff elements refer to the individual prices set for each network component or facility provided to the interconnected part)'.
Tariffs and charges for interconnection must follow the principles of cost orientation and transparency, in accordance with Article
7(2).
Interconnection charges may include a fair share, according to the principle of proportionality, of joint and common costs and the
costs incurred in providing equal access, and number portability, and the costs of ensuring essential requirements (maintenance of
the network integrity; network security in cases of emergency; interoperability of services; and protection ofdata).
ANNEX V
COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS FOR INTERCONNECTION
referred to in Article 7(5)
Article 7(5) calls for details of the cost accounting system; the list below indicates, by way of example, some elements which may be
included in such accounting systems.
The purpose of publishing this information is to provide transparency in the calculation of interconnection charges, so that other
market players are in a position to ascertain that the charges have been fairly and properly calculated.
This objective should be taken into account by the national regulatory authority and the Organizations affected when determining
die level of detail in die information published.
The list below indicates the elements to be included in the information published.
1. The cost standard used
e.g. fully distributed costs, long-run average incremental costs, marginal costs, stand-alone costs, embedded direct costs, etc.,
including the cost base(s) used,
Le. historic costs (based on actual expenditure incurred for equipment and systems) or forward-looking costs (based on
estimated replacement costs of equipment or systems).
2. The cost elements included in the interconnection tariff
Identification of all the individual cost components, which together make up the interconnection charge, includes the profit
element.
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3. The degrees and methods of cost allocation, in particular the treatment of joint and common costs
Details of the degree to which direct costs are analyzed, and the degree and method by which joint and common costs are
included in interconnection charges.
4. Accounting conventions
i.e. the accounting conventions used for the treatment of costs covering;
— the timescale for depreciation ofmajor categories of fixed asset (e.g. land, buildings, equipment, etc.)
— the treatment, in terms of revenue versus capital cost, of other major expenditure items (e.g. computer software and
systems, research and development, new business development, direct and indirect construction, repairs and
maintenance, finance charges, etc.)
The information on cost accounting systems, as identified in this Annex, may be amended in accordance with the procedure referred
to in Article 19.
ANNEXVI
THRESHOLDS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS TURNOVER
referred to in Article 8(1) and 8(2)
Parti
The threshold for annual turnover in telecommunications activities referred to in .Article 8(1) shall be fifty million ecus. (ECU 50
million)
Part 2
The threshold for annual turnover in telecommunications activities referred to in Article 8(2) shall be twenty million ecus. (ECU 20
million)
ANNEXVII
FRAMEWORK FORNEGOTIATION OF INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS
referred to in Article 9(2)
Part 1
Areas where the national regulatory authority may set ex ante conditions
(a) Dispute resolution procedure
(b) Requirements for publication/access to interconnection agreements and other periodic publication duties
(c) Requirements for the provision ofequal access and number portability
(d) Requirements to provide facility sharing, including collocation
(e) Requirements to ensure the maintenance of essential requirements
(f) Requirements for allocation and use of numbering resources (including access to director)- services, emergency services and
pan-European numbers)
(g) Requirements concerning the maintenance of end-to-end quality of service
(h) Where applicable, determination of tire unbundled part of the interconnection charge, which represents a contribution to,
the net cost of universal service obligations
Part 2
Other issues the coverage ofwhich in interconnection agreements is to be encouraged
(a) Description of interconnection services to be provided
(b) Terms of payment, including billing procedures
(c) Locations of the points of interconnection
(d) Technical standards for interconnection
(e) Interoperability tests
(f) Measures to comply with essential requirements
(g) Intellectual property rights
(h) Definition and limitation of liability and indemnity
(i) Definition of interconnection charges and their evolution over time
0 Dispute resolution procedure between parties before requesting national regulator)' authority intervention
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(k) Duration and renegotiation of agreements
(1) Procedures in the event of alterations being proposed to the network or service offerings of one of the parties
(m) Achievement of equal access
(n) Provision of facility sharing
(o) Access to ancillary, supplementary and advanced services
(p) Traffle /network management
(q) Maintenance and quality of interconnection services
(r) Confidentiality of non-public parts of the agreements
(s) Training of staff
